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“scientific thinking is viewed as ‘intensely solitary and social’ at the same time (John-
Steiner, 19851). It is analytical; it ‘tests the value of an insight – a new pattern or set of 
connections – for its general concepts. And in the process of testing, other, more complex, 
anomalous, or disturbing patterns emerge that create a powerful tension between the 
varied aspects of the enterprise of extending knowledge’ (John-Steiner 1985, p. 203). 
Further, it is characterized by ‘logic and metaphor, quick thought and lengthy periods of 
evaluation’ and analogies. In the cultural-historical (sociohistorical) view, this process is 
called learning by expansion (Engeström, 20002)”. Spear-Ellinwood (2008). 
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SUMMARY 
Context, question and goal: Attacks against fire-fighters during interventions in the field, 
by humans or dangerous dogs, are frequent. They are Critical Incidents (CI) of a 
psychologically traumatic nature, theoretically capable to affect people’s capacity to 
perform at the peritraumatic stage (time of the exposure to trauma, i.e. the intervention). 
How can fire-fighters manage to resume and complete their mission after an exposure to 
trauma ?  
Method: This research investigates the cognitive process (Decision-Making-in-Action - 
DMA) that controls the reactions and Peritraumatic Resilience (PTR) of an individual fire-
fighter, Lieutenant A, during the experience of a CI in action, an attack by two rottweilers. 
Pre-traumatic (before the intervention) and post-traumatic (after the intervention) stages of 
the experience of CIs are out of our scope. To this end we elaborate an ad hoc 
methodology, Pheno-Cognitive Analysis (PCA), a consistent data collection, processing 
and analysis method allowing to capture retrospectively the subject’s first-person narrative 
of his episode of individual cognitive experience and to analyse it. The concepts of the 
Elicitation Interview (EI) that guides the subject to recall authentic (not socially 
reconstructed) episodic memories of his experience are detailed. All precautions required 
by the British Psychological Society were taken in order to prevent the risk of causing 
stress or even more trauma to the subject. In data processing, a semantic analysis of the 
subject’s first-person narrative reveals 460 cognitive operations (CogOp), also called 
decision-making steps (DM Steps) and performed during the 44 Present Moments (PM) of 
the episode, i.e. 44 narrated decision making cycles. These 44 PM themselves show that 
Lieutenant A’s experience of the CI was made of 9 Experience Phases (EP), phase 3 being 
the traumatic exposure itself and comprising PM # 11 and 12. Decision network models 
describe statistically each PMs’ cognitive trajectory and evidence variations of their shape. 
Data analysis seeks to characterise and analyse these various shapes (DMA patterns). It 
searches for the factors of these variations through the interpretative definition of several 
categorical and ordinal attributes derived mainly from Lazarus’ work on the appraisal and 
coping mechanism, works on resilience such as Carver et al.’s (1989), also Styles’ (1997) 
analysis of attention, Endsley’s work on situation awareness and our prior work on the 
focus of attention. Three data sets were elaborated: EP data set, PM data set, CogOp data 
set. Data distributions were not normal and attributes were discretised. An exploratory 
factor analysis of these data sets was performed. Chi-Square tests, the Goodman-Kuskal’s 
assymetric lambda and Bayesian analyses revealed dependencies between attributes but did 
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not provide evidence of the factors of variation of DMA patterns. Decision Tree analyses 
(C4.5 and Random Forest) algorithms were used then to explore the datasets and led to 
identifying factors and rules of election of DMA patterns and DM Steps in the flow of 
cognitive operations recalled by Lieutenant A. The exploratory analysis of the CogOp data 
set helped to characterise the impact of trauma on the subject’s ability to perform (self-
agency) and the resilience mechanisms he resorted on in response. 
Findings: Seven findings were drawn from the processed data. 1) Four DMA patterns 
were identified, in which affects play an important part in a third of all PMs. 2) DMA 
patterns change from one PM to the next (Inter-Variability) and a model of inter-variability 
was elaborated. 3) The shape of cognitive trajectories varies within each DMA pattern 
(Intra-Variability) and rules of production of intra-variability were found. 4) Recognition, 
memory and metacognition were not found to play a clear part in DMA. 5) CI Experience 
Phases are resilience-focused turns in the story plot. 6) A CI is an experience of collapse of 
self-agency. 7) PTR stems both from a cognitive struggle for agency and from external 
support. A macrocognitive model of Decision-Making-in-Action (DMA Model) is derived 
from previous analyses and shows the role of affect in the process of individual decision-
making. 
Discussion: The PCA methodological framework must be first considered from the 
perspective of its limitations. First, despite precautions taken, no one can guarantee that the 
subject’s recalls are exhaustive and totally veridical to his original experience. Forgetness, 
voluntary ommissions, and even some forms of social reconstruction are possible. The 
conduct of the Elicitation Interview is itself difficult. It requires concentration and an 
assistant researcher could help notice points in the narration that deserve further elicitation. 
The first-person narrative so obtained may therefore not be as authentic an empirical 
material as the researcher would wish. Beyond, the processing of the narrative, its 
chronological reordering and the semantic analysis of each speech clause found in the 
subject’s answers, may be tainted with some faults (mistakes, misinterpretations, 
forgetness), again despite precautions taken. Finally, the current loneliness of the 
researcher who embarks on using such a protocol is still such that cross-coding and 
verification by other researchers and peers is virtually impossible. However, Lieutenant 
A’s case study shows that the PCA protocol yielded a significant number of detailed, 
usable and fairly reliable data for the exploration and analysis of his individual experience 
of a specific episode of action. It helps to depict and understand the experience of trauma 
in action and peritraumatic resilience. It provides useful inputs for improving the 
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metacognitive training of people potentially exposed to CIs. Two generic skills are 
revealed : Individual Resilience Management and Collective Resilience Management. They 
split into five elementary metacognitive skills : situation-shift management, self-regulation 
conflict management, affect-based decision-making warnings, by-the-second cognitive 
struggle for self-agency, and attentive crew realignment.  
Conclusions and further research: This thesis has introduced a novel first-person 
methodology, and the findings of Lieutenant A’s PCA case study sought to contribute 
NDM research by studying individual decision-making and the experience of trauma (in 
contrast to stressful and nominal circumstances) in action. Further research is envisaged : 
the continuous improvement and validation of the PCA methodology, the development and 
test of CI metacognitive training schemes to enhance fire-fighters safety, the study of the 
transition mechanism and rules between cognitive operations. Inputs to the design of 




Fire-fighters are subject to attacks in the field. This idiographic Pheno-Cognitive Analysis 
(PCA) studies a fireman’s cognitive experience of a Critical Incident (CI) when he is 
attacked by dangerous dogs during an intervention. The PCA method, created for this 
research, extends the Elicitation Interview (EI), yields a first-person narrative of the 
subject’s experience out of his episodic memory, and semantically elicits 460 Cognitive 
Operations and four patterns of Cognitive Trajectories. Their variations in shape (Intra-
Variability) and occurrence (Inter-Variability) are analysed. A model of Decision-
Making-in-Action (DMA), and five Metacognitive Skills providing Peritraumatic 
Resilience (PTR) are revealed. Epistemological limits are discussed. 
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STRUCTURE OF THE RESEARCH REPORT 
PART 1 : The problem space 
Chapter 1 presents a challenge that awaits fire-fighters during their interventions in the 
field, attacks from people and dangerous dogs, that are deemed to be Critical Incidents 
(CI). As CIs are of a traumatic nature, chapter 2 explicits the experience of trauma, in its 
difference from stress. and its peritraumatic phase. Chapter 3 presents our research 
question after defining the concept of peritraumatic resilience (PTR) as the capacity to 
surmount trauma at the peritraumatic stage own to three coping capabilities, and points to 
the need to study its underlying cognitive processes. Chapter 4 presents Naturalistic 
Decision-Making research (NDM), points to what appears as one of its major findings, the 
variety of DM strategies. It highlights the fact NDM research ignores the role of affects, 
defines the concept of Decision-Making-in-Action (DMA) and posits that PTR is a 
metacognitive outcome of DMA. Chapter 5 explores metacognition and metacognitive 
training and presents a framework designed to prepare fire-fighters for CIs. In chapter 6, 
we review the main methods used in NDM research and explain why our research rather 
turns to a first-person approach. Chapter 7 presents the epistemological assumptions of 
phenomenological psychology as it proposes a rigorous method, the Elicitation Interview, 
to capture the subject’s first-person episodic memories of a singular episode of experience. 
This chapter also defines our research object, the episode of experience, and its 
subdivision, the Present Moment, made of a sequence of cognitive operations conceived as 
pairs of {cognitive act ; cognitive object}. 
PART 2 : The Research Design 
Chapter 8 gives a general overview of the Pheno-Cognitive Analysis (PCA) 
methodological framework as it resulted from our research work. Chapter 9 elaborates the 
guidelines for performing Elicitation Interviews (EI) to help the subject recall authentic 
cognitions of the actual time of the experienced episode of action under study. Chapter 10 
elaborates guidelines for data processing in the context of a PCA study and presents 
examples of the cognitive models used to prepare data analysis. Chapter 11 provides 
general directions for data analysis, for the discussion of the study’s findings, and presents 
arguments and guidelines for assuring the scientificity of a PCA study. 
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PART 3 : Data and their processing 
Chapter 12 presents Lieutenant A’s narrative. Chapter 13 presents the results of the data 
processing phase : the structure of the episode of experience elicited from the narrative 
(Experience Phases  Present Moments  Cognitive Operations), the chronotext i.e. the 
chronologically reordered sequence of speech clauses, a taxonomy of cognitive acts and 
objects, the cognigraph i.e. the detailed model of the sequence of cognitive operations 
performed by the subject during the entire episode, then the decision network models 
statistically describing the subject’s cognitive trajectories along the different experience 
phases and present moments. Effective precautions and limits in relation to the scientificity 
of our work are also presented. 
PART 4 : Data analysis, discussion and conclusions  
Chapter 14 analyses the processed data of Lieutenant A’s case and presents our seven 
findings. Chapter 15 discusses these results from a metacognitive perspective and presents 
the general conclusions of the study of Lieutenant A’s case as well as our future research 
areas. 
*/* 
Part 5 presents the appendices of this volume : the bibliography and a thematic index. The 
latter is followed by the end notes of the research. 
*/* 
An ANNEX CD is available that presents the detailed data gained or elaborated throughout 
the study of Lieutenant A’s case. The EP data set, PM data set, and CogOp data set 
Excel files are also joined. Their definitions and analyses are provided in the annex volume 
(ANNEX 15). Copies of illustrations that may be difficult to read in the text are also 
provided on the CD. 
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DEFINITIONS & ABBREVIATIONS 
AM : Autobiographical Memory 
BSPP : Brigade des Sapeurs-Pompiers de Paris (Paris Fire Brigade) 
CI : Critical Incident 
COA : Course of Action 
COE : Course of Events 
CogAct : Cognitive Act 
CogObj : Cognitive Object 
CogOp : Cognitive Operation = a {CogAct ; CogObj} pair 
DM : Decision Making 
DM Step : Decision-Making Step 
DMA : Decision-Making-in-Action 
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EM : Episodic Memory 
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PM : Present Moment 
PTR : Peritraumatic Resilience 
RPD : Recognition-Primed Decision 
RPDM : Recognition-Primed Decision Model 
STM : Short-Term Memory 
TRAUMA : unless otherwise specified, “trauma” designates psychological, not physical 
trauma 
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CHAPTER 1. Fire-fighters under attack : Lieutenant A and the 
rottweilers 
The work reported in this study is based on a field research carried out between the 
beginning of September and the end of December 2007 as part of a larger project run by 
the Paris Fire Brigade (Brigade des Sapeurs-Pompiers de Paris - BSPP) aiming at better 
understanding how Fire-fighters cope with the difficulties of their work. While 75% of 
BSPP’s interventions are victim rescue missions (non-fire fighting), attacks against 
firemen have multiplied and impact on their personal and professional life. Aggressions 
can be perpetrated both by humans and by dangerous dogs. This chapter seeks to shade 
light on this phenomenon. We establish that such incidents are regular and that they are 
considered as Critical Incidents (CI). We show that their occurrence has generated post-
traumatic support to tackle the risk of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) but that no 
consideration seems to have been given yet to the peritraumatic stage (during the 
intervention itself) of this phenomenon. We conclude by affirming that where statistics are 
needed to shade light on this problem, these cannot account for the individual, subjective 
experience. 
1.1. Firefighting as a high-risk profession 
All fire-fighters have had or will have to handle Critical Incidents in the course of their 
missions (Keenan, 2008 ; Regehr et al., 2005). In the USA, the International Association of 
Fire Chiefs3 (IAFC, 2013) indicates that “Although the trend over the past 10 years has 
been a gradual but steady decrease in firefighter fatalities, 2013 has seen numerous 
multiple-firefighter fatalities.”. The IAFC, founded in 1873 as the National Association of 
Fire Engineers (NAFE), publishes hundreds of reports on their Near-Miss Reporting 
System’s web page4 and on their web site5.  
For instance : 
Report 
Number Report Report Date Event Date 
13-0000301 Crew trapped by flashover. 02/14/2013 2032 
02/11/2013 
1423 
12-0000279 Open valve causes line to whip. 12/10/2012 0723 
11/16/2012 
0000 
12-0000266 Training assist FF in gaining control of skidding pumper. 11/15/2012 1450 
08/31/2009 
0000 
12-0000246 Medical oxygen bottle explodes during fire. 09/06/2012 1652 
09/01/2012 
1412 
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12-0000238 Engine drives away with LDH still connected. 08/28/2012 1438 
06/28/2012 
1115 
12-0000237 Firefighter falls from moving apparatus. 08/23/2012 1617 
08/16/2012 
2300 
12-0000230 Depeleted red blood cells cause FF to fatigue. 08/09/2012 1518 
08/07/2012 
1830 
12-0000227 Adverse heat drives interior crew out. 08/07/2012 1948 
07/14/2012 
1850 
12-0000226 Attack crew initiates entry with no water. 08/07/2012 1737 
10/28/2008 
0030 
12-0000215 Crew member falls through floor. 07/17/2012 1547 
07/16/2012 
2230 
12-0000210 RIT evaluates roof collapse indicators. 07/11/2012 0017 
05/30/2012 
2100 
12-0000183 Lack of water impacts firefighting efforts. 06/26/2012 0959 
12/07/2009 
2200 
12-0000177 Dirty lens nearly causes FF to fall. 06/20/2012 2146 
12/24/2007 
0000 
12-0000166 LDH damaged when crossed by apparatus. 06/15/2012 2100 
05/28/2012 
1600 
12-0000155 No water in the tank to fight fire. 05/31/2012 2305 
01/05/2012 
0000 
Table 1 Extract from IAFC's Near-Miss Incident Reports database 
This problem is in fact universal. The first of Keenan’s (2008) surveys of 98 Australian 
fire-fighters shows that “all of the firefighters in [her] study had experienced a work-
related traumatic event as part of their firefighting career, and the clear majority had 
experienced more than one such event.”, and even twenty or more in their career. 
Regehr et al. (2005) report that “56% of volunteer firefighters in New South Wales 
reported that their safety had been seriously threatened at some time, 26% in the last year 
(Marmar et al., 1999). In addition to personal danger, firefighters are regularly exposed to 
the suffering and death of others. In a sample of 165 firefighters in Australia, 78% 
indicated that they had been exposed to at least one Critical Incident at work including the 
death of a colleague, injury on duty, mass casualties, or the death of a child (Regehr, Hill, 
& Glancy, 2000). Over 40% of 103 firefighters studied in Canada report being exposed to 
each of the following events: violence against others, multiple casualties, and the death of 
a child, and approximately 30% of firefighters report experiencing the death of a person in 
their care (Regehr & Bober, 2004). [...]”. 
And it does not affect only fire-fighters but all emergency response forces. Marmar et al. 
(2006) add “Police service is widely recognized as one of the most dangerous and stressful 
occupations. Police and other first responders are repeatedly exposed to potentially 
traumatic situations (also known as “Critical Incidents”), such as armed confrontations, 
motor vehicle crashes, and witnessing violent deaths.”.  
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Statistics have been missing and the number of injuries on the line of duty reported in the 
USA is underevaluated (Moore-Merrel et al., 2008) : “Currently, there is a dearth of 
published information on firefighter injuries.” (p. 4)6.  
1.2. Attacks on fire crews 
The same is true about the number of attacks perpetrated against fire-fighters in the UK 
says the Fire Brigades Union7 (FBU, 2005)8. FBU (2008) mentions that “official figures on 
the scale of attacks on fire service personnel for the UK as a whole are woefully 
inadequate” (p. 45) and that “The scale of attacks in Northern Ireland has only been made 
public when ministerial questions have been put on behalf of the Fire Brigades Union” 
(ibid). 
The number of attacks perpetrated against fire-fighters is high and has been rising steadily.  
In the UK, “The British Crime Survey (BCS) 2002/3, which is based on interviews with 
around 36,500 people, shows that fire and rescue fireghters and officers, along with police 
officers and prison service officers and other workers defined as being in ‘protective 
service occupations’, most at risk of experiencing violence at work. Fourteen percent of 
workers in this occupational category report that they experienced an incident of actual or 
threatened violence while working, in comparison with 1.7% of the workforce as a whole.” 
(FBU, 2005, p. 3). FBU (2008) indicates that “Official figures obtained from every fire and 
rescue service in England and Wales suggest that overall attacks went up from 1,359 in 
2005-06 to 1,506 in 2006-07.” (p. 45). 
FBU (2005) provides several accounts of such events9, and testimonies and statistics show 
that this problem is not confined to poor urban areas (FBU, 2005)10. 
The problem is the same in Scotland (FBU, 2005) and the Scottish Executive reported 
more than one such incident per day between April 2003 and March 200411. 
In France, the number of attacks against fire-fighters has also seriously increased over the 
past years as Beignon (2003)12 states. This trend is confirmed by the French crime 
observatory (Observatoire de la Délinquance)13 who publishes statistics on attacks 
targeting Firemen provided by the Paris fire brigade, Brigade des Sapeurs-Pompiers de 
Paris (BSPP) . These show that the number of attacks against BSPP firemen increased 
drastically since 1993: 
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Table 2 Number of attacks against BSPP Firemen (1993-2007) ; Source: BSPP 
If this figure remains modest in regard of the 430 000 interventions performed by the 
BSPP in 2007 as a whole, it has entailed several consequences, especially on G1’s sector 
of intervention. Firemen's wives are not willing to live in suburbs where the feeling of 
insecurity has developed so much ; Firemen are recommended not to wear their uniforms 
on public transports ; and many of them are getting more and more depressed with the 
situation according to BSPP’s Chief Psychologist leading to an 33% attrition ratio in 2006. 
In Scotland, FBU (2005) indicates that if serious incidents are rare, their cumulative effect 
has similar impacts on fire-fighters14. In the USA, Sweeney (2012) reports the variety of 
consequences CIs entail : “the staggering number of heart attacks, suicides, unhealthy 
addictive behaviors, and high divorce rates in the fire service as well as the emergency 
medical service and law enforcement communities.”, among which the increasing attrition 
ratio in volunteer fire-fighters15. 
FBU (2005) explains that violence has now become part of fire-fighters’ vision of their 
job, a reason along with heavy paperwork (FBU, 2008, 48) for under-reporting,  
1.3. Attacks by dangerous dogs 
Aggressions against emergency responders can also be perpetrated by animals during 
rescue operations in relation to victims attacked by dangerous dogs16 like rottweilers and 
pit bulls, or during other operations such as suspect arrests by police forces. Reports of 
such victim rescue operations are manifold. In the UK, reports of attacks against dog 
owners can be found on the web17. FBU (2008, p. 39) mentions such an incident reported 
by the Grampian FRS. In the US, it is reported by DogsBite.org18 that on February 17th, 
2011 in Dillon, South-California, 66-years old Sirlinda Hayes was killed by her two 
rottweilers and emergency workers on arrival at the scene were threatened by the animals 
that were eventually shot by police deputies. On July 2nd, 2013 in Hawthorne, NBC 
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Southern California reports the attack of a rottweiler dog against Police Officers who were 
arresting his master. The dog had to be shot by them.  
The general pattern of such victim rescue interventions is virtually always the same : 
emergency responders get to the field to assist victims, dangerous dogs threaten them, and 
if no other means of securing the place is available police officers shoot the dogs, thus 
creating a supplementary risk for other emergency workers. 
1.4. Attacks against fire-fighters are Critical Incidents (CI) 
Sweeney (2012) points to the fact that “it is the men and women in the emergency service 
professions that are at a greater risk of suffering long-term stress that can lead to post 
traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The ‘rate for diagnosable PTSD among firefighters was 
16.5 percent compared to a one percent to three percent rate for the general population—
about one percent higher than PTSD rates of Vietnam veterans’ (DeAngelis, 1995, p.36).”. 
In the UK, FBU (2005) reports that “Bill Feeley, Assistant Chief Fire Officer at Avon Fire 
and Rescue Service, said that one firefighter eventually left the service after a long period 
of sick leave due to post traumatic stress disorder. He had been involved in an incident in 
which a scaffold pole had been thrown through the window of a fire engine.” (p. 8). FBU’s 
(2008) report on attacks against fire crews mentions that “attacks on firefighters should be 
treated as trauma, with significant implications for stress, anxiety and depression” (p. 44). 
1.5. Lieutenant A and the rottweilers : the experience of a CI 
Such is the case of Lieutenant A in 2007, in the northern suburbs of Paris. Lieutenant A is 
a young officer at the BSPP19, with approximately five years of experience. The day of the 
events, he is the duty officer at his fire station. 
When Lieutenant A hears the radio call at the Fire Station's main desk, he thinks that two 
people bitten by their dogs is not serious enough a reason to proceed to their home as 
something more important could happen then. But, when hearing that reinforcements are 
called in, he reconsiders his first opinion and his chauffeur drives him down to the victims' 
domicile. 
Arriving there, a crowd has gathered around the main gate, eager to get glimpses of the 
events. His driver parks their car inside the premises, where Lieutenant A can see that the 
  26 
two dogs are held in respect by armed policemen in the bottom-end of the garden, and he 
decides to attend to the victims, inside the house. 
As one of the women is yelling, his attention is drawn to patches of blood and the scalped 
head of the youngest of the two, a daughter of twenty, her mother lying next to her, 
wounded only from knife cuts she had inflicted on herself when trying to kill her dogs who 
were attacking her beloved one. As the buzz in the villa's lounge indicates, they are well 
attended to by the medics and Lieutenant A goes back into the garden to see what is 
happening of the animals. 
As he is standing in the midst of colleagues and Police Officers in front of the sited dogs, 
the father and husband of the women suddenly irrupts in the garden, shouting "Kill my 
dogs ! Kill my dogs !". Fearing the consequences of his violent behaviour, Lieutenant A 
asks him to stop but fails. Too upset, the man carries on shouting and advancing toward the 
dogs. Farther on his trajectory, a Police Officer also asks him to stop shouting and to calm 
down but is not more successful than the Lieutenant.  
It is when the Police Officer pulled the father to the ground to stop him that the dogs got up 
on their legs and jumped forward... threatening everyone's security. 
At that precise point in time, Lieutenant A' s attention is captured by the dogs' eyes, the 
universe around him becomes like a tube, and while Police Officers are shooting (forty-
five) bullets to try to kill the rottweilers, that sounds to him like 14th July's20 fireworks. As 
he then moves backward one or two steps, time is like suspended and he can see the bullets 
going through the dogs' bodies in slow motion and their impacts only affecting slightly 
their course. 
Just after the dogs had run amidst the group, someone shouts "one of them has escaped !". 
Lieutenant A fears that running wounded on the streets she would be extremely dangerous. 
But after it was found out that all issues had remained closed, the search for the lost animal 
focuses on the garden and its many hidden corners, the cellar, and even the next door yard, 
the street-gate of which had also remained fortunately closed. 
Ultimately her body is found next to the other dog's. Lieutenant A feeling reassured he 
talks to Police Officers and learns from them that forty-five bullets have been shot while he 
was standing right in the middle of their trajectories. Next, he goes back inside the house to 
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attend again to the women. Soon after, the latter are taken by two ambulance vehicles to 
hospitals, though not so easily as the crowd outside staring at them puts another load of 
psychological pressure on the Lieutenant and his men. 
Some minutes later, a Television crew arrives to report on the event. Lieutenant A orders 
his men not to speak to them, as standard procedures request. 
Once the victims have gone, realising that they had just escaped death, he and his driver 
talk in the car on their way back to the Station, the two men only thinking of what might 
have happened of them. 
The story ends with the Lieutenant talking with colleagues from other Stations who were 
present on the premises the day of the incident and later on with his wife. And with an 
official report to write as it was an incident of an exceptional nature... 
This critical incident is the central piece of the present research. 
1.6. What is a Critical Incident ? 
“Critical incident stress is a normal reaction experienced by normal people following an 
event that is abnormal” (NFPA, 1997). For Hammond & Brooks (2001), “A critical 
incident is one that leads to an unusually powerful stress reaction that overwhelms the 
person’s ability to adjust emotionally.”. For Mitchell et al. (2003) they are "Extraordinary 
events that happen suddenly, without warning, and disrupt a person’s feeling of control 
and faith in their surroundings". 
For Mitchell (1983), the theorist of CISD (Critical Incident Stress Debriefing), Critical 
Incidents are extreme events of a psychologically traumatic nature experienced 
individually. For Tuckey (2007) they are "a potentially traumatic event". They are also 
described as traumatic by Marmar et al. (2006) as they trigger “terror at the time of the 
threat”. Marmar et al. (2006) give examples of CIs : “Police and other first responders are 
repeatedly exposed to potentially traumatic situations (also known as “Critical 
Incidents”), such as armed confrontations, motor vehicle crashes, and witnessing violent 
deaths.”. And Bertrand (2007) characterises Critical Incidents by referring to extreme 
situations21 that are1) violent and intense, 2) sudden and unexpected, 3) impossible for the 
subject to handle by resorting on his usual routines and resources. Weick (1993) calls them 
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“cosmology episodes” in his famous re-reading of the Mann Gulch disaster22, and 
characterises them as the experience of the collapse of sense for the subject. 
This characterisation of CIs as traumatic in nature is moderated by some researchers 
however. For instance Duchet (2007, p. 124) says Critical Incidents are only “disturbing 
the return to the field of his teams of professionals”23 while trauma is “an event of a larger 
scale”. 
Life threatening, intense, sudden, inconceivable, beyond ordinary handling procedures, 
Critical Incidents overall seem to be of a traumatic nature, and the nature of the traumatic 
experience has to be explained. But how do fire and rescue services help their staff to cope 
with CIs ? 
1.7. In conclusion : The need to study the experience of attacks against 
firefighters 
FBU (2008) reports that only “A small number of fire and rescue services have conducted 
or supported research into attacks against firefighters.” (p. 49). The usual support 
provided in response to such occurrences is Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM). 
For Mitchell et al. (2003), “The main goals of a debriefing are to mitigate the impact of the 
traumatic event on victims and to accelerate recovery processes. It is intended for use with 
emotionally healthy people who are experiencing acute, normal stress reactions to 
abnormal traumatic events. It helps the participants to: (1) verbalize their distress; (2) 
form appropriate concepts about stress reactions before false interpretations of the 
experience are formed; and (3) return to routine functioning.” (p. 46). Hammond & 
Brooks (2001) indicate that “CISD is now part of a comprehensive spectrum of techniques 
called critical incident stress management (CISM), and may be supplemented by earlier 
interventions, such as demobilization or defusing, or one-on-one encounters. CISD is 
neither psychotherapy nor counseling, but is instead designed to promote emotional health 
through verbal expression, cathartic ventilation, normalization of reactions, health 
education, and preparation for possible future reactions.”. 
Sweeney (2012) reports that “Firefighters receive little if any training or support to help 
them cope emotionally with traumatic stress. Following a distressing (the death of a child, 
a mass fatality, or the death of a fellow firefighter in the line of duty) some fire 
departments may implement a critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) or offer the 
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assistance of department chaplain. However, only a small number of departments offer 
educational programs on coping with traumatic stress and grief for the firefighters, their 
families, and department chaplains.”24. 
The attention of emergency services focuses mainly on Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) and the mitigation of the psychological impacts of CIs.  
Conversely, it seems that how an individual fire-fighter copes with a critical incident that 
affects him during an intervention has received insufficient attention yet. 
Reports of such experiences can be found for instance on the IAFC’s web site. Produced in 
an institutional context, and apart from a narration and interesting lessons learnt in terms of 
needs for improving situation awareness, collaboration, equipment, training, standard 
operating procedures, etc., they contain no study of fire-fighters’ decision-making in 
action. This is the case for instance with report number 10-0001072 of 08/30/2010 
provided by IAFC (2013a) about a fire-fighter falling through a collapsing floor right into 
the middle of the blaze consuming a family home’s basement. IAFC (2013a) also publishes 
report number 05-0000267 of 05/27/2005 about a fire-fighter who intervenes with medics 
to rescue a woman said to have attempted suicide. The victim pulls a knife out of her 
pyjamas and threatens to cut the throat of an emergency worker. Testimonies provided by 
the New-York Fire Department’s Officers and Men after the 9/11 events25 show to what 
lengths these people went to save their and others’ lives. 
The experience of a CI still needs to be studied and as CIs are deemed to be traumatic, the 
next chapter presents trauma and its essential features. 
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CHAPTER 2. Trauma and the peritraumatic experience 
Critical Incidents (CI) are of a traumatic nature. This chapter therefore presents the 
different aspects of the concept of trauma. We focus our attention on the peritraumatic 
phase, for McNally (2003) and Gershuny & Thayer (1999) the word peritraumatic 
referring to the time of the exposure to a traumatic event. We clarify the difference 
between stress and trauma. We present one of the essential features of the experience of 
trauma, peritraumatic dissociation. Finally, we characterise the potential reactions to 
trauma exposure and discuss the potential impact of CIs on fire-fighters’ capacity to make 
decisions and to complete their duty at the peritraumatic stage. 
2.1. What is trauma ? 
2.1.1. Trauma, its characteristics, its different types  
If trauma is an old notion (Dayan & Olliac, 2010)26, for Sauzier (1997)27 “the definition of 
trauma itself is still broad, vague, and changeable”, and Gershuny & Thayer (1999)28 show 
that in the American psychiatric tradition, the concept of trauma evolved from the vague 
notion of an extraordinary event to the more specific notion of a life-threatening event, the 
life at stake being that of the subject himself or of someone in his immediate vicinity.  
The word “trauma” as used by Freud29 conveys three meanings say Laplanche & Pontalis 
(2004, p. 500) : “that of a violent shock, that of an intrusion, that of consequences over the 
whole [psychological] organisation”, and they further explain30 that trauma is by nature 
overwhelming one’s capacity to cope because “the incoming flux of excitation overwhelms 
the psychic apparatus’ tolerance […] leading to a failure of the principle of constancy”31.  
Trauma is not the ordinary surprise32 encountered in everyday life, but the surprise of 
meeting an unbearable-beyond-imagination detail that surpasses in horror anything that 
the subject had tried to anticipate. It is, says Crocq (2007a)33, a violent event that “puts us 
in touch, suddenly and directly, with the reality of death”, and for Vrignaud (2008, p. 146) 
it is “a frontal shock with the (un)human face of reality”. For Lebigot (2005, pp. 28-29)34, 
trauma is a long lasting “effraction”, an “intrusion” into one’s psyche resulting from a 
“fright” (“effroi” in French), from terror35, the subject being untimely confronted with the 
reality of death, an unbearable shock due to the “sudden encounter with a detail that takes 
the subject beyond what he had ever thought horror could be”36 (ibid, p 19). 
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Gershuny & Thayer (1999) stress the current consensual characterisation of trauma: it 
entails an exceptional level of affective excitation : “intense fear, helplessness, or horror”, 
and the experience of trauma is “subjective” and depends on one’s familiarity with 
circumstances.  
2.1.2. Different traumatic circumstances 
Trauma can be experienced in a variety of circumstances. Lebigot (2005) indicates37 that 
trauma refers to “three different types of circumstances : for instance one’s confrontation 
with one’s likely imminent death, or with the unbearable and unimaginable pain inflicted 
on someone else, or it has to do with people’s involvement in others’ death (for instance 
through torturing them), even if in that case they are prepared for the other’s death”( p. 
15). He adds it can also be associated with one’s sudden feeling of complete abandonment 
by the surrounding world as in the case of a rape or the complete collapse of one’s system 
of beliefs and values. Vrignaud (2008) reports the case of Mrs N who suffered violence 
and rape in jail after being arrested for political activism in her country. Vrignaud says Mrs 
N “confronted the destruction of what founded her as desiring and speaking human being 
[…] links were broken, the laws of nature were attacked, the symbolic order upset, taboos 
broken” (p. 145). Laplanche & Pontalis (2004, p. 500) also assert that trauma may lie not 
only with a “very violent event alone” but also with “an accumulation of excitations each 
of which would be tolerable”. 
2.1.3. Trauma or traumatism ? The choice of a working definition 
As we can see from these definitions, the difference between trauma and traumatism is 
unclear. Laplanche & Pontalis (2004, p. 499) explain that “trauma” designates “a wound 
with an intrusion”38 whereas “traumatism” rather designates “the consequences on the 
whole organism of a lesion resulting from external violence”, though, they say, Freud 
himself tended to use one word for the other. Rousseau-Dujardin (1998) gives an opposite 
definition. In this thesis we shall consider that trauma is equivalent to a stressor, while 
traumatism is the process by which trauma affects the subject and its consequences, and 
trauma exposure is the encounter with trauma. 
2.1.4. Trauma vs. stress : the choice of an unambiguous definition for the thesis 
Despite such neat characteristics, the difference between stress and trauma often remains 
unclear. For instance in Kowalski (1995) talks of traumatic stress39. And in their study of 
the response of emergency workers to Critical Incidents that happened during the 1989 
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Loma Prieta earthquake Interstate 880 freeway collapse, stress is referred to as “routine 
non-CI stress” by Marmar et al (2006), differentiating stress from Critical Incidents (CI) 
but creating confusion between CIs and trauma that appears as CI-stress. 
2.1.4.1. Stress as a staged and variable process 
Quoting Welford (1973)40, Schönpflug (1983, p. 299) defines stress as “arising when 
motivating conditions are not reduced by the organism's actions (Welford, 1973, p.568).”, 
and Cox et al. (2000) define it in terms of a negative balance between cognitive demand 
and cognitive capacities : “stress can be said to be experienced when the demands from the 
work environment exceed the employees ability to cope with (or control) them.”. 
Lazarus (1993b)41 showed the tight inter-relation of stress and emotions and extended the 
definition of the former to suggest a staged model of coping and to define stress itself as a 
staged reaction to a stressor42. Carver et al. (1989) explain that for Lazarus, appraisal and 
coping form one single process made of three steps (primary appraisal, secondary 
appraisal, and coping)43 that may loop into one another if circumstances require. Lazarus 
(1993b) also highlighted the “transactional” nature44 of emotions, the reaction to a stressor 
depending on two cognitive processes45, namely “appraisal”46 and “coping”, shaped by 
both endogenous and exogenous factors47. The concept of “appraisal” was formed around 
the notions of relational meaning and noxiousness and it was placed at the centre of his 
definition of stress48.  
The “relational meaning” of an event is what the stressor means to the individual in terms 
of “valence”, the quality and level of affection of his well-being (its potential noxiousness), 
and it results from the appraisal process (Lazarus 1993b)49. 
In Lazarus (1993b), valence is nil if there is no stress, positive if the appraisal is positive - 
Selye (1974)50, quoted by Lazarus (1993b), coined “eustress”, “the good kind of stress 
because it [is] associated, presumably, with positive feelings and healthy bodily states” -. 
Where there is eustress there are positive emotions. A negative valence generates distress, 
“the bad kind, associated with negative feelings and disturbed bodily states” (Selye 1974) 
i.e. negative emotions. The nature of the threat is presented by Lazarus (1993b) in terms of 
a congruence vs. discrepancy between an expectation or belief on one hand and an 
actuality on the other hand. Its appraisal may be dependent also on other variables, namely 
personality and intentions51. Finally, the individual’s capacity to change the course of 
events is also determinant (Lazarus 1993b)52. 
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The coping process, Lazarus (1993b) says, involves a mix of cognition and action53, and it 
varies with circumstances (Lazarus 1993b)54. It is also influenced by individuals’ own 
“coping style”55 (Lazarus 1993b)56. And like Schönpflug (1983), Lazarus (1993b) suggests 
that there are two fundamental “coping strategies”57 (also see Carver et al. (1989), building 
on Lazarus & Folkman (1984)), one that aims at reducing the stressor, the other aiming at 
enhancing the way the stress reaction is handled. Coping strategies tend to match 
circumstances at hand58 (Lazarus, 1993b), and if circumstances vary “Coping strategies 
change from one stage of a complex stressful encounter to another. If we lump together the 
stages in a complex encounter we gain a false picture of the coping process.” (ibid). For 
Carver et al. (1989) coping strategies are selected by subjects on the basis of their appraisal 
of the changeability of the situation59, but only to underline that “the distinction between 
problem-focused and emotion-focused coping […] has proven, however, too simple” (ibid), 
and to evidence a set of more refined “tactics” and “ways of coping”60 (ibid), the cognitive 
selection of which may depend on numerous factors61. 
2.1.4.2. A high-level model of coping with stress and safety concerns 
When people are involved in stressful activities their safety and their ability not to 
compromise the execution of their mission are the main concerns. A controlled rather than 
an uncontrolled reaction is expected from them as Lazarus (1993b) and Hockey (1983) 
remind that stress may affect our functioning, and emotions, fear or anxiety for instance, 
may lead to different degrees of failure in action (Idzikowski & Baddeley, 1983)62.  
A high-level model of coping can be elaborated from what precedes, describing a stressor 
 appraisal  arousal (emotion / stress)  coping  response [reaction] process : 
 
Figure 1 A high-level model of coping : stressor  appraisal  arousal  coping  response 
Such a model suggests that the elements of the process it depicts could be levers usable to 
reduce stress. For instance, as Coates (1997) explains63, providing clear goals may reduce 
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stress, a view shared by Annett (1997). In this context, priming would be an important 
factor of coping as noted by Colman (2006)64. 
2.1.5. Our working distinction between trauma and stress 
A neat difference between the two concepts appears now. In this thesis we adopt the 
following working distinction.  
Trauma (or traumatism) refers to a long lasting psychological effraction, without 
gradation65, due to a violent, most unexpected shock that puts the subject in touch with 
death or with the collapse of his beliefs or values, and that overwhelms his adaptive 
capabilities. 
Stress only refers to a temporary pressure on the individual’s psyche, caused by situations 
mostly anticipated or expectable and that disappears once the individual has ceased to be 
exposed to the stressor. For Lebigot (2005) stress is some light suffering generating anxiety 
that the subject can handle, and for Schönpflug (1983) a kind of linear, progressive, 
scalable, equation of demand (difficulty) and capability. 
2.1.6. The clinique of the peritraumatic experience of trauma 
Clinical observation has helped psychologists and psychiatrists to understand further the 
concept of trauma and the symptoms of the time of the exposure. This is particularly 
interesting as the underlying cognitive process of the peritraumatic experience is ill-known 
(van der Kolk, 1997 ; Anaut, 2006). 
2.1.6.1. Three aspects of the peritraumatic experience 
Clervoy (2007, p. 35) explains that traumatic events affect individuals at the time of their 
exposure in three manners : 
• Unpreparedness : The individual being made overconfident by his professional milieu 
is made weaker in the face of extreme situations as he is less prepared to handle them, 
which increases the intensity of the surprise66. 
• Surprise, senselessness and disorientation : The second fold of the process according to 
Clervoy (2007, p. 42) is that, being exposed to the unimaginable while so confident, the 
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individual is disoriented, left alone, without words to form a mental picture of what is 
going on. His routines are made useless by a totally new situation, taking him aback67. 
• Peritraumatic dissociation : Third, Clervoy (2007) says, the individual is tantalised, 
paralysed, left in a state of mental dereliction or isolation68. He experiences 
psychological “peritraumatic dissociation”, a central feature of psychological 
traumatism (Gershuny & Thayer, 1999 ; Kennedy et al., 2004). 
2.1.6.2. Peritraumatic dissociation as fragmentation of the psyche 
According to Kedia (2009), peritraumatic dissociation can be defined as the collapse of the 
psychic unity69, “spacing out” in Pynoos et al.’s (1997) terms. The word, Kedia says (ibid) 
is used for the first time in 1845 and will be reused by Janet (1889) in his work on 
hysteria70. Janet’s dissociation theory (Colman, 2006) supposes an “automatic 
subconscious activity, spontaneous and regular” (Kedia, 2009) under the level of 
consciousness. For Janet (Kedia, 2009) “the mind synthesises the activities of the conscious 
and subconscious levels, allowing for the unity of the Self and organising the subject’s 
present activity”71. Kennedy et al. (2004) support this view : “Dissociation can be defined 
broadly as a failure to integrate experiences (memories, perceptions, etc.) that are 
normally associated (e.g., Janet, 1889).”. 
Dissociation deteriorates the mind’s capacity to operate this psychological synthesis, and 
creates a psychological split72 through which thoughts, emotions and behaviours can 
function independently of each other. This is why in this state of psychological 
fragmentation (Clervoy, 2007, pp. 276-277) the subject is unable to react, only to be the 
spectator of the course of events that seems to progress in slow motion, as if time and 
space were suspended73, he is unable to think, everything becomes suspended, idled, his 
thoughts, time74. 
2.1.6.3. The symptoms of peritraumatic dissociation 
If Gershuny & Thayer (1999)75 indicate that there is no consensus on several of the 
symptoms of peritraumatic dissociation clinical observations note that these can be : 
• Derealisation (McNally, 2003 ; Gershuny & Thayer, 1999 ; Kennedy et al., 2004 ; 
Kindt & van den Hout, 2003 ; et al., 2004): the “experience or perception of the world 
as unreal, strange or alien” (Colman, 2006, p. 203). 
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• Depersonalisation (McNally, 2003 ; Gershuny & Thayer, 1999 ; Kedia, 2009 ; 
Kennedy et al., 2004 ; Kindt & van den Hout, 2003 ; McLeod et al., 2004): the sense of 
being a spectator to one’s own fate (Colman, 2006), also called “Out of Body 
Experience” by Kindt & van den Hout (2003). 
• Time distortion, or altered time perception (McNally, 2003 ; Kindt & van den Hout, 
2003): a sense of time slowing down or speeding up. 
• Emotional numbing (McNally, 2003): a loss of the sense of affect, of emotions. 
• Dissociative stupor (Colman, 2006 ; Clervoy, 2007): the “profound diminution or 
absence of voluntary movement and responsiveness to external stimuli” (Colman, 
2006). 
• Motor restlessness (McNally, 2003): a form of physical hyper-activity. 
• Elevated heart rate (McNally, 2003). 
• Analgesia (Kindt & van den Hout, 2003): the “absence or diminution of pain 
sensation” (Colman, 2006, p. 34). 
If it has been said that psychological dissociation had a negative impact on one’s capacity 
to synthesise the various elements of his experience, Kennedy et al. (2004) supported by 
Crocq (2007a)76 assert that dissociation has also a protective function as its manifestations 
mentioned above “serve the function of reducing awareness of intolerable information 
(both internally and externally derived)”. 
2.1.6.4. The clinique of the peritraumatic reaction 
Once the subject has undergone the three-fold process described earlier, it still remains for 
him to react in the real world and to cope with the experience for himself. This is what we 
shall call the “peritraumatic reaction” or “peritraumatic response”, the subject’s 
“immediate reaction”. 
Crocq (2007b) asserts that “the clinique of the immediate reaction is ill-known”77 because 
psychiatrists and psychologists meet with victims only late after the exposure to traumatic 
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incidents, sometimes months or years later, when recurrent symptoms start making 
victims’ lives a misery, when they suffer PTSD or ASD (Acute Stress Disorder)78. 
For Crocq (2007b) the peritraumatic, i.e. immediate (in-action) reaction to trauma exposure 
can be described along four folds (cognitive, affective, conative and behavioural) as either 
: 
• Adaptive (Also named “stress adapté”, “adapted stress”, Crocq views it as a reaction of 
alarm and mobilisation (2007b, p. 17)79) ; 
• Maladaptive (Also called “stress dépassé” (“over stress”), it may be caused by inner 
weaknesses in the subject’s psyche or by exhaustion, or by his defencelessness / 
unpreparedness for a violent event, which may be also prolonged or repeated.80) ; 
• Or Pathological (Pathological reactions may be either neurotic or psychotic. Both are 
thought to be based on prior mental pathologies81). 
2.1.6.5. Autobiographical and episodic memory : the persistence of traumatic 
memories 
Brewin (2003) and Kedia (2009)82 affirm that dissociation would encode the memories of 
trauma into Sensory Accessible Memory (SAM), which would prevent their integration 
into the “ordinary” autobiographical memory, which would be essentially verbal (Verbal 
Accessible Memory, VAM), thus creating grounds for PTSD. 
But all the experiences we live are usually memorised in Autobiographical Memory (AM). 
Autobiographical memory is (Conway, 2004, p. 562) “our ability to recall knowledge of 
our past and to form detailed specific memories of single experiences.”, and therefore the 
ground on which our cognition operates in action83 (ibid). AM is made of two distinct but 
complementary parts : episodic memory and autobiographical knowledge. Episodic 
Memories, Conway (2001, p. 54) says, “represent knowledge of specific actions and action 
outcomes derived from moment-by-moment experience – the minutiae of memory.”84, while 
“Autobiographical knowledge is distinct from sensory perceptual episodic memories which 
represent specific details derived from actual experience (Conway, 2001)” Conway (2004, 
p. 563)85. Autobiographical knowledge stems from the consolidation of episodic memories 
(Conway 2001, p. 54)86. Conway (2001, pp. 56-57) distinguishes three levels of 
autobiographical knowledge : Lifetime periods87, General events88 and Mini-histories89. 
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Autobiographical knowledge and episodic memories are closely tied together in recalls 
(Conway, 2004)90. 
Van der Kolk (1997) stresses the peculiar character of traumatic memories : their extreme 
persistence in autobiographical memory91 : “A century of studies of traumatic memories 
shows that they generally remain unaffected by other life experiences” (ibid, p. 245). The 
retrospective study of the experience of trauma out of Autobiographical Memory is likely 
to be facilitated by the vividness and detail of its associated episodic memories. 
2.1.7. How to find out if a subject was actually exposed to trauma ? 
Retrospectively the researcher can evaluate if the subject has actually experienced trauma 
or only stress using Crocq, Cremniter and Coq’s Immediate Stress Questionnaire (ISQ) 
presented in Crocq (2007b, p. 25). Its 20 questions are rated from 0 (absent symptom) to 5 
(very intense) : 
 
# Question 0 1 2 3 4 5 Mark 
1 I was not expecting this, I was surprised 
       
2 I was afraid to be hurt or ill-treated 
       
3 I was frightened for my life or one of my relatives’ life 
       
4 My thoughts were fuzzy, slow or suspended (like a blackout) 
       
5 I didn’t understand a thing about what happened 
       
6 I felt like I was living a nightmare 
       
7 I felt space-disoriented 
       
8 Time felt like accelerated or slowed down 
       
9 There are some aspects of the course of events that I cannot / 
couldn’t remember        
10 I was horrified by what I was seeing 
       
11 
I was feeling one or several discomforting physical symptoms like 
shaking, tight throat, tight chest, heartbeats, gastric of intestine 
spasms, being sick or a compulsive need to urinate 
       
12 I was insensitive (or feeling like I was floating) 
       
13 I was in a state of psychological disturbance or agitation 
       
14 I was feeling powerless 
       
15 My movements were slowed down (or I was even paralysed) 
       
16 I was gesticulating in a disorderly and uncontrolled manner 
       
17 I was acting mechanically, like an automaton 
       
18 I was screaming, I was stammering (or else I staid mute out of 
stupor)        
19 I felt abandoned 
       
20 For several hours after the events I felt very disturbed 
       
A total mark of 50 or over (out of 100) indicates that the subject experienced 
trauma Total:  
Table 3 Crocq, Cremniter and Coq’s Immediate Stress Questionnaire (ISQ) 
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Other questionnaires are also available to assess the reality of peritraumatic dissociation 
like the Peritraumatic Dissociation Experience Questionnaire (PDEQ). 
2.2. Can trauma exposure impact on Firemen’s ability to perform in the field ? 
The process of the experience of a CI and the clinical description of peritraumatic reactions 
point to the risks posed by the subject’s reactions92. But the question at the heart of this 
study stands on a less medical side : Can the extreme circumstances of a Critical Incident 
jeopardise Firemen’s cognitive capabilities that control their action during an intervention 
and generate inadequate reactions ? Literature provides two opposite sets of answers to the 
question and the conclusion of the debate is most unclear at the moment.  
2.2.1. The YES arguments and vulnerabilities in coping capabilities 
Kowalski (1995) points to the fact that Critical Incidents may delay emergency personnel’ 
reactions because of distress93, the more so as the conditions of the exposure to trauma 
Mitchell et al. (2003) say in a study of Emergency Medical Personnel94. And for Marmar et 
al. (2006) fire-fighters’ prior background and their appraisal of circumstances may both be 
determinant of the way they react in the face of trauma95. The experience of trauma is 
devastating for Clervoy (2007, p. 48)96 and Kowalski (1995)97 who says that the impact on 
the subject is emotional and inhibiting and that his coping mechanisms are overwhelmed98. 
Clervoy (2007) says that the subject looses initiative99 for a while, in a state of expectation, 
of passiveness and powerlessness, in the contemplation of his own fate, his life being in the 
hands of destiny, the toy of which he feels he is, destiny that alone can decide upon his 
fate100. This devastating character of the traumatic experience is explained by individuals’ 
vulnerability, a state of psychological unpreparedness for surprise (Bertrand, 2007)101. 
2.2.2. The NO arguments : peritraumatic resilience and the force of consciousness and 
will 
But does the occurrence of trauma really necessarily imply that the subject’s initiative is 
lost, or that his routines are made useless ? Real life examples contradict the previous 
view. 
The testimony posted by a French Fireman on his blog102, Fireman Cyril103, a first-person 
account of a Critical Incident, does not show that the Fireman lost initiative, that his course 
of action was put to a halt, that his routines were of no use, lost. On the contrary, he seems 
to have found enough resources to keep acting despite the situation (which resources 
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though is not clear here as the material is raw and has not been elaborated through a 
controlled interview process). This particular case suggests that Fireman Cyril was moved 
by a superior motivation : to rescue the little boy, and by a total denial of the physical truth, 
the actual death of the carbonised child. At Mann Gulch, Dodge, Sallee and Rumsey 
resume action immediately after the fire whirl says Maclean (1993). Reports provided by 
IAFC (2013a) about fire-fighters experiencing CIs also show that they struggle to 
surmount adversity.  
The concept of defencelessness or helplessness evoked by Gershuny & Thayer (1999) 
should be understood as the impossibility for the subject to reduce the violent threat. It can 
only be experienced passively. When Crocq (2007) evokes maladaptive or pathological 
reactions he refers to subjects with neurotic or psychotic backgrounds, which normally is 
not the case with fire-fighters whose recruitment seeks to select sound people, apt to face 
the dangers of the job. 
2.3. Conclusion: The process of the experience of trauma 
The experience of a CI is a staged process within the context of an action, for instance a 
fire-fighting intervention. Before the intervention, which we could see as a “pre-traumatic 
stage”, is a preparation time during which fire-fighters may be trained to face trauma, and 
this stage extends until action starts.  
For fire-fighters, the intervention starts when they are mobilised at the fire station or from a 
command post and they are dispatched to the field. The intervention itself, the 
“peritraumatic stage” of the Critical Incident, is the short time (40 to 60 minutes for victim 
rescue interventions, as said earlier) during which trauma is experienced. This spans from 
the start of the intervention until the subject terminates his mission, leaves the field and 
returns to the station.  
After the intervention starts the “post-traumatic stage”, the one during which PTSD 
symptoms are likely to appear, lasting from days and weeks up to the remain of one’s life. 
At the peritraumatic stage, the psychological shock encrusts into the subject’s psyche 
unbearable memories of the event and generates peritraumatic dissociation and later the 
subject’s coping mechanisms entail his reaction : 
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Figure 2 The general process of the peritraumatic stage of traumatism 
The peritraumatic stage comprises the “exposure phase” described above, preceded by a 
“pre-exposure” phase during which conditions build-up to create the traumatic incident 
while the subject is acting on his duties, and is followed by a “post-exposure phase” when 
a fire-fighter is expected to resume and complete his mission. 
The overall process of the traumatic experience could be summarised as follows : 
Pre-intervention 
(hours to years) 
Intervention : a given, delimited action 
(40 to 60’ in BSPP victim rescue missions) 
Post-intervention 
(years) 










Action resumption Possible PTSD 
syndrome 
Table 4 The overall process of the traumatic experience 
The peritraumatic stage is only one part of this whole process. It is delimited by the 
beginning and end of a given action performed by an individual in the field. Its duration 
can vary depending on people’s activities. But in the context of BSPP victim rescue 
interventions, it would be a 40 to 60 minutes time slot. 
As trauma and the peritraumatic stage have now been characterised, peritraumatic 
resilience has to be defined. One question could be, among others, at which of the phases 
of the peritraumatic stage resilience intervenes to make the subject surmount the traumatic 
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experience. One could understand that as early as the pre-exposure phase, when the subject 
is likely to perceive some warning signals, he could not act to get the situation under 
control. But would that be called peritraumatic resilience or incident prevention ? Is 
peritraumatic resilience intervening at the exposure phase, though theory points to the 
helplessness of the situation for the subject ? Or is it contained to the post-exposure phase 
when the subject is expected to resume acting on his duty ? 
Now that we have a better understanding of the concept of trauma, of what the 
peritraumatic stage is and how it is itself decomposed into three successive phases, the next 
chapter’s endeavour is to elaborate a working definition of the notion of individual 
peritraumatic resilience (PTR). 
 
  43 
CHAPTER 3. Peritraumatic Resilience and the research question 
This chapter discusses psychological peritraumatic resilience. We do not consider here 
perspectives on resilience held in other domains like metal work, systems engineering, 
critical infrastructure protection, social-ecological systems, and so on. In this section we 
elaborate a working definition of individual peritraumatic resilience (PTR) that synthesises 
how the subject copes with a traumatic incident in the course of a given104, delimited105, 
situated106, embodied107 and enacted108 action109. The study or PTR is concluded to be 
important for human safety in dangerous activities that requires the study of its underlying 
cognitive processes. 
3.1. Perspectives on the concept of psychological resilience 
3.1.1. A dominant focus on post-traumatic resilience 
Resilience is a “successful adaptation” to adverse circumstances, says Lipshitz (1997, 
p.155). A search for “resilience” on the web sites of eminent psychological associations 
such as the British Psychological Society (BPS)110 or the American Psychological 
Association (APA)111 point to a dominant focus on post-traumatic resilience in literature.  
APA (2013)112 focuses on post-traumatic resilience, “How do people deal with difficult 
events that change their lives? […] It means "bouncing back" from difficult 
experiences.”113. A search for “peritraumatic resilience” or “peri-traumatic resilience” 
yields no result. A search for “post-traumatic resilience” yields 5 results, plus an additional 
342 results in APA’s “premium databases”. And a search for “resilience” yields 39 results 
plus an additional 13264 results in APA’s “premium databases”, of which : 431 journal 
articles from PsycARTICLES, 109 book chapters from PsycBOOKS, 1688 grey literature 
from PsycEXTRA, 144 book and film reviews from PsycCRITIQUES, and 11838 
abstracts from PsycINFO. 
A search on the BPS’ web site114 for “peritraumatic resilience” or “peri-traumatic 
resilience” yields zero answer, while a search for “post-traumatic resilience” yields four 
answers : “The struggle to leave military life behind”, “Police: higher risk of psychiatric 
disorders”, “War, earlier trauma and PTSD in troops”, and “Our 2012 research grants 
announced”. And a search for “resilience” yields 55 news and articles, 20 events, 10 
publications, 7 pages, and 4 press releases. Their topics all relate to post-traumatic 
resilience, either studies of factors of resilience or guidelines for resilience, etc. 
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The reason for the focus on post-traumatic resilience is of a public health order. Meredith 
et al. (2011) support this view. Their RAND report “Promoting Psychological Resilience in 
the U.S. Military” seeks to contribute “to promote health and prevent negative 
consequences of war on the nation’s service members and their families.” (p. iii) as “The 
long and frequent deployments of U.S. armed forces associated with Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), combined with the other 
consequences of combat, such as exposure to trauma, have tested the resilience and coping 
skills of U.S. military service members and their families.” (p. xiii). Psychology and 
Psychiatry seek to find ways to help patients to resolve the long-term effects of trauma 
exposure, PTSD, the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder115, say Matthews & Chu (1997). And 
when psychiatry gets interested in the peritraumatic experience, it is (Pynoos et al., 1997) 
to study its predictive character of a later PTSD syndrome and of its severity. 
3.1.2. A review of perspectives on resilience and their practical consequences 
The term Resilience became popular when it entered the field of Social Sciences, 
especially in Developmental Psychology, Psychiatry and Healthcare. It is a composite 
object which can be studied, with nuances, from different angles : 
• Its object : individuals, groups, organisations, social-ecological systems, … 
• Its context : Emergency Work, the Military, Mental Health and Child Development, the 
workplace, leisure, …  
• Its nature : an ability, an outcome, a process, …  
• Its reference : is it a response to stress or trauma, repeated exposure or one-shot events, 
…  
• Its factors : what makes a resilient individual (for instance) resilient ? Genes, 
education, experience, …  
• Its process : how does one achieve resilience ? Out of creativity, in a mediation 
between self and world…  
• Its time span : from before the exposure stage to well after the exposure. 
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• Its impacts : how does it help people ? To come safe out of immediate danger ? To 
keep going ? … 
• The methods of its study : from sociology to psychiatry and genetics through 
phenomenology.  
Meredith et al. (2011) found 270 “relevant publications” on factors of resilience and report 
that “many definitions share some common attributes, including strength to endure some 
type of traumatic stress or adverse circumstances. Some definitions focus on adaptive 
coping that results in coming back to baseline functioning levels, while others emphasize 
positive growth (Connor, 2006; Punamaki et al., 2006; Tedeschi and Calhoun, 2003; and 
Tedeschi and Calhoun, 2004) or thriving and flourishing (Fredrickson et al., 2003) beyond 
baseline functioning.” (p. 2).  
Different, if not conflicting views are held within the research community on resilience.  
Everall et al. (2006) and Metzl (2007) summarise116 three different perspectives on the 
nature of resilience, commonly found in literature. They show that resilience is a multi-
facetted concept : “(1) a stable personality trait or ability […] ; (2) a positive outcome 
[…] ; or (3) a dynamic process”.  
Rutter (1998) and Titus (2002) summarise the views held on the nature of resilience under 
a Mental Health perspective117 : an individual characteristic, and individual’s interaction 
with the environment, a balance of good and bad experiences, a type of immunisation, or 
else something useful and even necessary for human development.  
Such differences have practical implications in fact. For instance, as there is an opposition 
between the trait approach and the process approach, “Masten (1994) has recommended 
that the term resilience be reserved to describe the process of adjustment after 
experiencing significant adversity. This recommendation is based on the concern that 
labeling an individual as having or lacking the personality trait of resilience carries the 
risk that some people will feel that they have inadequate resources for coping. Thus, based 
on this literature, we consider competence despite adversity as resilience, whereas 
resiliency is considered a trait. We focus our study on the process of resilience.” (Meredith 
et al., 2011, p. 3). Such a distinction has a practical utility : Meredith et al. (2011) say that 
they “consider resilience to be a process, because if it were a trait, it would not be 
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malleable; therefore, training to improve resilience would be futile.” (p. 3). This view 
rejoins the view held by APA (2013) and BSP (2013) that people can train to improve their 
resilience : “ It involves behaviors, thoughts and actions that can be learned and developed 
in anyone.” (APA, 2013). 
3.2. Resilience is the outcome of a cognitive process 
Cyrulnik (2006) asserts that resilience is always an interactive construction, “a transaction 
between what one is and what is [in the world]”. Pynoos et al. (1997, p. 275) say that they 
“have consistently found that the experience of a child during a traumatic situation 
involves complex sensory, physiological, affective and cognitive processing of multiple 
moments with differing vantage points of concern”. 
In Healthcare, Jacelon (1997)118 describes the two phases of resilience, disruption and 
reorganisation. He says that the latter is driven by a need for psychological homeostasis. 
Damasio (1999) defines homeostasis as the process by which “the organism, within 
defined limits, simply and quickly adjusts in an economical manner its functionning and 
energetic thrust in a constant search of an optimal state of balance” (pp. 179-183). For 
Laplanche et Pontalis (2004) homeostasis is associated with the idea that the way an 
individual drives his life and keeps it within acceptable limits is controlled by unconscious 
psychological mechanisms such as the Principle of Constancy and the Principle of 
Pleasure (respectively minimising excitations and intending to pleasurable actions), or the 
instinct of self-preservation (preservation of life).  
3.3. Resilience is an aptitude stemming from four coping capabilities 
Gerrard et al. (2004) assert that to be resilient one needs the ability to cope, “defined as 
getting by, being adaptable, and withstanding future adversities”. The first two terms of 
this definition of coping are understood as dealing with the situation at hand and finding 
ways to work circumstances around at the peritraumatic stage, while the third one implies 
the idea of post-traumatic resilience.  
Under a post-traumatic, child development perspective, Luthar et al. (2000)119, supported 
by Edward (2005), define resilience as “the achievement of positive adaptation despite 
major assaults on the developmental process” in reference to a “significant threat or 
severe adversity”. They associate it with three abilities : to persevere through difficult 
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times, to return to a state of mental and physical equilibrium, and to bounce back from 
adversity120.  
Anaut (2006, p. 86)121 stresses the necessary correlation between resilience and traumatic 
events. Resilience is a response to traumatic events, not to ordinary, milder, stressors, 
which distinguishes it from coping with stress as defined by Lazarus and others. She (ibid) 
defines resilience122 as an individual’s capacity to rebound after coming out victoriously of 
traumatic situations, with further strengths, and as his capacity to keep control of his 
identity and to continue to project himself in the future in a way that conforms to this 
identity. In her words also, resilience is a process that spans beyond the time of the 
exposure to trauma, well into the post-traumatic stage.  
Three factors of resilience can be identified in the definitions presented above : 
• to persevere through difficult times, getting by, being adaptable 
• to resume action  
• to bounce back from adversity, to return to a state of internal equilibrium or a state of 
healthy being, to preserve identity and a sense of a future, and withstanding future 
adversities. 
“Persevering” covers in fact two distinct and complementary notions particularly 
important at the peritraumatic stage, “getting-by” and “resisting”, therefore leading to 
identifying four coping capabilities that allow an individual to be resilient : 
• At the peritraumatic stage : 
• Getting by defined as “continuing to perform despite activity”. This capability 
means that the subject manages to “do things”, therefore to have cognitions, to 
make decisions and to act while facing traumatic circumstances. 
• Resisting the destructive pressures of circumstances, as long as needed. Resistance 
can be roughly defined as the more or less conscious mobilisation of various 
physical and psychological capabilities, such as robustness, hope, the management 
of one’s margin of safety, situation awareness, etc., in order to avoid being 
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destroyed by adverse events. For instance at Mann Gulch (MacLean, 1993), to 
resist destruction Dodge first runs away from danger (i.e. he seeks to re-establish 
sufficient margins of safety between danger and himself). Then he orders his team 
mates to drop their heavy equipment to be able to run faster. Then, he lights up a 
fire escape and bends to the ground, which is a last resort choice aiming at trying to 
survive the imminent fire whirl. In this case, hope stands as an element of active 
resistance : hope to be robust enough to withstand circumstances, hope that the 
latter will spare oneself to a sufficient extent.  
• “Resuming action”: As one has already been “getting by” and “resisting”, the 
sense of “resuming” is to return to a “normal”, nominal level of performance, the 
one expected for instance from a Fireman who, after a Critical Incident, is supposed 
to resume and complete his rescuing activity. Resuming also means reconnecting 
with one’s activity after it has been momentarily interrupted by trauma exposure.  
• At the post-traumatic stage : 
• “Bouncing back” is a post-traumatic developmental issue as in Gerrard et al. 
(2004) : “The essence of resiliency was captured in a comment by one of the 
participants: ‘What doesn’t kill you makes you stronger.’ ”. Rebounding is the 
ability to recover a psychological and physical state as satisfactory as possible, to 
re-identify with one’s identity or to elaborate a new identity, to project oneself into 
the future, to adjust to the new relationship one will have to his environment and 
the people around him or her, and to learn from the experience new strengths and 
skills to cope with potential future occurrences of Critical Incidents123. 
These elements allow to establish a working definition of peritraumatic resilience that will 
later allow us to link it to the study of the cognitive process of decision-making in action. 
3.4. A working definition of peritraumatic resilience 
In the thesis, we shall use the following working definition : 
• Peritraumatic Resilience (PTR) is the capacity, the aptitude of a subject to cope with a 
traumatic incident in the course of a given, delimited, situated, embodied and enacted 
action.  
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Rebounding is not included in the definition of peritraumatic resilience as it belongs in the 
post-traumatic stage, and despite the fact it is a source of construction of new resilience 
capabilities. 
3.5. In conclusion : the question and usefulness of this research 
This research is driven by the following question : How does a fire-fighter, Lieutenant A in 
this study, experiencing a Critical Incident in the course of an intervention, manage to 
resume and complete his action immediately after his exposure to trauma ? 
 
Anaut (2006) and van der Kolk (1997) report that the mental process by which 
peritraumatic resilience is produced is ill-known and should now be studied. A similar 
assertion was made in research on stress and emotions, for instance by Skinner & Zimmer-
Gembeck (2007) who call for a “microgenetic” study124 of the process of coping. This 
process involves a variety of cognitive functions. For Lazarus (1993)125, coping strategies 
are complex and incorporate cognition, motivation and emotion. Departing from this view, 
Skinner & Zimmer-Gembeck (2007)126 suggest that coping should be viewed as a set of ad 
hoc reactions setting in motion behaviour, emotion, attention, cognition, motivation and 
social relationships.  
Literature shows that this process mobilises available helping capabilities such as the 
instrumentation of ad hoc artefacts127 on hand (Engeström, 1999 ; Béguin & Rabardel, 
2000) in order to find a way to achieve a circumstantial goal, for instance saving one’s own 
life. For instance, at Mann Gulch (Maclean, 1993) this is what Dodge does when he creates 
an escape fire and it is also what Sallee and Rumsey, his team mates, do when they spot a 
crevice and use it as an in extremis protection from the fire whirl. Weick (1993) in his 
reanalysis of the same Mann Gulch disaster concludes that survivors displayed four 
capacities (while victims did not) : “Bricolage”, “Wisdom”, “Respectful interaction” and 
“Preservation of a virtual role system”, bricolage equating precisely to instrumentation. 
In IAFC’s (2013a) case number 10-0001072, the firefighter who fell through a collapsing 
floor into the blazing basement of a burning house reports that once down there he “began 
to try and find something to use to climb back up with.”.  
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Testimonies also show that the subject hangs on any possibility of rescue on hand and does 
not give up, though he is traversed by moments of hopelessness, of discouragement. For 
instance, in the same firefighter report he says : 
“My deputy chief directed the crew to get the ladder into the hole for my 
escape. By this time, I was burned pretty well on my legs and struggling with 
exhaustion and the intense heat. I was screaming both from pain and due to 
fear. I could hear screaming coming from above, but was unable to make out 
the majority of it. I finally heard the word "ladder" and then felt something 
across my back. Once they got the ladder in to the basement, I had to get 
around to it. I still could not see anything but fire, so this was all by feel. As I 
started up the ladder, I got two rungs up, reached for the third rung, and lost 
my grip and fell back into the basement landing on my back. I was so 
exhausted that I started making my peace with God that this was where I was 
going to die. My wife and my three boys [names omitted] were at the 
foreground of my thoughts and I was thinking about never getting to see them 
again. Somehow, by the grace of God, I found the strength to get up again and 
start climbing the ladder once more. I got to the fourth rung and felt hands 
grabbing hold of me helping to pull me out.”. 
This second extract of his testimony confirms that the subject exposed to critical 
circumstances that challenge his life processes them cognitively through a variety of 
cognitive operations and actions : perceptions, recalls, emotions, regrets, affirmative 
thoughts and instrumentation attempts, will, ceasing opportunities and persevering, … It 
also shows that at a certain moment other people help him and he ows them his rescue, 
showing thus the importance of the support of other crew members. 
In the end of his testimony the subject draws lessons from his experience : he advocates 
training as a major way to prepare for potential critical incidents : 
“Accidents happen, but you have to train hard and take the job seriously, 
whether you are a paid or volunteer firefighter, if you want to survive. Most of 
us go through our career in the fire service without injury, but it can happen at 
any time and at any fire. BE PREPARED! Take your training seriously. The 
more you train, the better prepared you will be. Nothing can really completely 
prepare you for this type of event, but the more you practice what to do, the 
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more likely you are to react in the proper way. […] Had I had to wait on the 
RIT team for rescue, I would not be typing this today. Rely on your own skills 
and training to try and get out. Don't give up and just wait.” 
Routines and instrumentation skills, perseverance and will are what he says is required to 
surmount critical incidents. 
In conclusion, peritraumatic resilience is assumed to be the outcome of an interactive 
cognitive process (Cyrulnik, 2006) mobilising a variety of cognitive functions. This 
cognitive process is complex and unpredictable128, says Thompson (2007).  
We posit that knowing better the cognitive experience of critical incidents, and thus how 
people manage to surmount them, can help firefighters as well as all people working in 
dangerous settings to enhance their safety in action. 
 
The next chapter presents the current principles, general methodology and findings of the 
cognitive study of decision-making in natural settings. 
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CHAPTER 4. The cognitive study of Naturalistic Decision Making 
(NDM) 
This chapter presents Naturalistic Decision-Making (NDM) research and contrasts it with 
Judgement and Decision Making (JDM) research. NDM has focused much on decision-
making in computerised and collaborative environments and its cognitive models of 
decision-making are used to perform the cognitive engineering of systems, decision aids, 
or else training schemes, with a view to improve people’s safety at work and to reduce 
human errors in stressful circumstances. We show that NDM research has considered 
decision-making as rational and has ignored the role affects play in decision-making. 
Meanwhile, JDM (Judgement and Decision Making) research has explored the role of 
affects but has taken account mainly of incidental affects, i.e. external and disturbing, non 
relevant to the task in progress. This chapter posits that the study of the role of affects into 
cognition requires idiographic129 investigations of people’s subjective experience and the 
production of first-person narratives. It concludes on the definition of Decision-Making-in-
Action (DMA) as the individual cognitive process that controls one’s performance in 
action, and as the fundamental object of the present research. 
4.1. A brief, incomplete history of decision-making research 
In the 40’s and 50’s Von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944), Rasmussen (1997) Edwards 
(1954)advocated prescriptive decision-making, what people should do to make rational 
decisions based on an expected utility function. Allais (1953), following Simon (1947), 
then showed that in reality people do not follow the principles of rational decision, which 
was to take Simon (1954, 1957, 1958) to develop his bounded rationality theory that states 
that people mainly make satisficing decisions. Because decision-makers don’t have a clear 
vision of the problem to solve and have therefore to find a trade-off between possibilities, 
outcomes, and constraints. Simon’s work placed the focus on the process of decision-
making rather than on external ideal criteria and rules. The 50’s and 60’s saw the 
development of organisational decision-making studies with March & Simon (1958), 
Emerson (1962), Cyert & March (1963), or else Cohen et al. (1972). Those studies stressed 
the coexistence of different approaches to making decisions in organisations, not dictated 
by pure rationality but by interests, conflicts, circumstances and opportunities. By the end 
of the 60’s, a certain sense of the binding of the decision-making process with a variety of 
factors emerged, whether internal factors like preferences and heuristics, or external like 
potential payoff, and contributed to put an end to the era of deterministic rational decision-
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making theories (Festinger, 1964 ; Tversky, 1967 ; Tversky, 1969 ; Tversky, 1972 ; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974 ; Lichtenstein, Slovic & Zink, 1969 ; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 
1971 ; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968). And around 1970, the relational psychology current 
of research postulated that a decision was a construction and not just the selection of a 
solution within a set of given possibilities (Watzlawick et al., 1967 ; Goffman, 1968 ; 
Bateson, 1972). Zadeh (1965 and 1978) introduced set theory and fuzzy logic. On 
November 15th, 1980, Charles Gettys and James Shanteau invited DM researchers to what 
appears to be the founding meeting of the Society for Judgement and Decision Making 
(SJDM)130 and its afternoon programme announced “Topics to be definitely discussed 
include "The Role of Rationality in Decision Making" and "Computers and Computer Aids 
in Decision Making."”131. March & Olsen (1986) saw decision-making as a rational 
process132. Hastie (2001) considered that people make decisions on the basis of underlying 
plausible story they construct to find consistency in the course of events. Lipshitz et al. 
(2001) define decisions “broadly […] as committing oneself to a certain course of action”. 
Andrade & May (2004, p. 133) or Eysenck & Keane (2005, p. 481) referred to decision-
making as choosing among various options. And Hollnagel (1998, 2000) had presented his 
COCOM Model (Cognitive Control Model) of action control, thus confirming that the 
study of decision-making has moved from a black-box to a white-box perspective. 
By mid 80s, decision-making had become considered as a process, rationality becoming 
viewed as local (as the rationality of the decision-making process, or of a turning point in 
that process) rather than as a goal or an outcome (the “right” decision). This opened the 
door to naturalistic decision-making (NDM) studies.  
4.2. A reinvention of DM Studies ? The emergence of NDM Research 
From the beginning of the 90’s onward, literature on Naturalistic Decision-Making 
flourished after the first NDM Conference was held in 1989 in Ohio to allow researchers 
separating from main stream rational decision-making paradigm and methods to share 
their views (Klein et al., 1993). Klein (1997) reports that “many of the earliest NDM 
researchers ignored classic decision studies and had received no training in that 
framework” (p. 20). 
NDM studies did not focus on errors and biases133. As Klein (1997) explains : “It is difficult 
for NDM researchers to identify and explain errors, and it is difficult to evaluate good 
decisions” (pp. 17-18). The only function of the error concept “is to trigger the 
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investigation of the entire chain of causal factors” that lead individuals to committing them 
(Klein, 1997a, p. 389). Dekker (2002) adds that “The new view of human error wants to 
understand why people made the assessments or decisions they made – why these 
assessments or decisions would have made sense from the view inside the situation.” (p. 
65).  
The concept of expertise stood at the centre of NDM Research : “experienced decision 
makers in many domains [appeared] to have little difficulty in choosing between options, 
their challenge [being] to appropriately categorize the situation” (Klein, 1997, p. 13). 
NDM therefore focused on “the way people use their experience to make decisions in field 
settings” (Zsambok, 1997, p. 4). Expert decision makers were studied “as individuals or 
groups in dynamic, uncertain, and often fast-paced environments” who “identify and 
assess their situation, make decisions and take actions whose consequences are meaningful 
to them and to the larger organisation in which they operate” (Klein, 1997, p. 5). And 
because expertise is built during a long period of activity, “The study of decision making 
[could not restrict] to the moment of choice” (Klein, 1997) but extend to the characteristics 
defining expertise. 
When pressed by circumstances or risk at hand, Klein (1995), Klein (1998), Hutton & 
Klein (1999), to quote only a few, showed that, based on their superior capacities, experts 
often end-up considering only a single, feasible course of action in real settings, the first 
one that comes on their mind, the main concern being “the way [they] represent the 
situation” (Klein, 1997, p. 13), therefore placing emphasis on Situation Awareness. 
NDM Research made some trade-offs and focused on the study of : 
• The decision-making process in natural settings preferably to laboratories, to get 
ecological validity, research becoming more qualitative. But Pruitt et al. (1997) 
advocated the role of laboratory studies in NDM, hence a methodological trade-off and 
to “go beyond CTA134, however, and develop methods to ensure that ‘naturalistic 
decisions’ can be studied in more controlled settings. Laboratory work must have a 
place in NDM” (p. 40), while Klein (1997) said : “The interest in field settings does not 
preclude laboratory paradigms” (p. 17). 
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• Experts, i.e. people who have accumulated experience so as to perform most tasks 
routinely, relying on more conscious processes only when circumstances become 
unfamiliar or more complex. But there may be limits to this focus as Pruitt et al. (1997) 
argue that “one can learn a lot by studying those who are less-than-expert at a task, 
and that in the real world, many important decisions are made by those whose 
expertise is questionable. In fact, in many domains, true experts may not exist. It is the 
study of how a person uses experience and knowledge to tackle a problem which is of 
great interest to NDM.” (p.37). 
• Situations simultaneously fast-paced, uncertain, dynamic and characterised by a certain 
level of adversity (Pruitt et al., 1997, pp. 34-35). 
• The variety of DM Strategies applicable to different circumstances, like those exposed 
in Flin et al. (2007). Therefore, it would be wrong to equate NDM studies only with the 
RPD (Recognition-Primed Decision) Model, Klein (1997, p. 15) says. 
Perhaps, one of the most important findings of NDM research is precisely this : the 
cognitive process of decision-making fits circumstances, its pattern is not set once and for 
all. Decision-makers adapt to situations. There is variability in the cognitive process of 
decision-making. 
4.3. Firemen and expert decision makers 
The study of Firemen’s decision-making is at the origins of NDM. It has been studied 
mostly from the perspective of tactical decision-making performed in command posts by 
Commanding Officers (McLennan et al., 2006).  
Firemen are “experts” in their field of play. Well trained, progressively dispatched to more 
and more dangerous and complex tasks, they develop strong routines and skills, and a 
knowledge of the “physics” of fire, among other things, that altogether give them the 
ability to make enlightened decisions (Hutton & Klein, 1999)135. Focusing on 
“Commanders”, their description of expertise quotes prior research : 
1) Dreyfus’ (1972) and Dreyfus & Dreyfus’ (1986) indicate that experts progressively 
move from an analytical understanding to an intuitive grasp of situations136. 
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2) Rasmussen’s (1983, 1986) Skill-Based Control is the expert level of decision-making 
though it is not consciously goal-oriented and “‘decision making’ becomes an 
integrated part of task performance, and the expert may not even be aware that 
decisions are being made.”. 
3) They precise the particular qualities experts show in making decisions. Experts have a 
“vast domain-specific knowledge”. They “perceive large meaningful patterns, or 
chunks of information, rather than individual pieces of information”. They “are faster 
and make fewer errors” as their “skill being learned to automaticity”. Experts do “not 
have to analyze a situation to perform well”. They “have superior memory in their 
domain” based on “chunking” and being “attuned to the goal-relevant constraints in 
the environment”, which allows to “[recall information] according to, or with respect 
to, those constraints”. They “see and represent a problem at a deeper level”, “at a 
causal level” rather than “at a more superficial level, based on surface features of a 
problem, and on learned rules” as for novices. They “spend more time trying to 
understand the problem”, “in contrast to the novice who jumps right in and begins to 
manipulate the surface features of the problem”. Experts “have refined perceptual 
abilities”, namely : “the ability to see typicality, the ability to see distinctions, and the 
ability to see antecedents and consequences (through story building and mental 
simulation).” 
4) They lay the foundations of the Recognition-Primed Decision Model, positing that in 
many real-world settings, people are performing their jobs with some degree of 
expertise.  
4.4. The RPD Model and the variability of the decision-making process 
The Recognition-Primed Decision Model (Klein. 1989 ; Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-
Cirocco, 1986), conceived out of studies of fire-fighter commanding officers’ decisions137 
(Lipshitz et al., 2001), shows “the experiential basis of intuition” (Klein, 1997, p. 15).  
There are three basic versions of the RPD Model described by Hutton & Klein (1999) as 
well as by Klein (1997b, p. 286) and in other publications and conference acts by Klein 
and colleagues : 
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• “Level 1 RPD, or the simple match, is a situation where the decision maker recognizes 
the situation as being one that has been experienced before, and the course of action to 
be taken is obvious. […]”138. 
• “However, in some circumstances, either the situation assessment or the 
appropriateness of the course of action are unclear. This leads to a more complex 
version of the model. In the case of an unclear situation assessment, where several 
hypotheses are possible, a further diagnosis of the situation may be required (Level 2). 
[…]”. 
• Under certain circumstances, although the assessment may be clear, it may be 
necessary to evaluate a course of action before it is implemented (Level 3)”. This is 
“performed serially, using mental simulation to test the adequacy of the option, to 
identify weaknesses of that option, and to find ways to overcome the weaknesses” 
(Hutton & Klein, 1999). 
To account for these various situations Klein (1998, p. 27) elaborated an integrated RPD 
model : 
 
Figure 3 Klein’s (1998) integrated RPD Model 
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NDM Models have limitations, including the Recognition-Primed Decision (RPD) Model, 
says Klein (1997, p. 15).  
Crego & Spinks (1997) reckon that in the course of a singular intervention people resort on 
several decision-making strategies139 that are activated within the course of an action 
depending upon changes in circumstances. 
Lipshitz (1997a, pp. 155-156) identified three uncertainty reduction strategies : 
 
Figure 4 Lipshitz’s (1997a) uncertainty reduction strategies 
For Lipshitz (1997), these strategies, and more specifically their respective reduction 
tactics, are mobilised in response to three different forms of uncertainty, namely 
inadequate understanding, lack of information and conflicting alternatives : forestalling 
 
Figure 5 Lipshitz’s (1997a) uncertainty reduction strategies vs. forms of uncertainty 
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Flin et al. (2007)140, following on the work performed with aircraft pilots by Orasanu & 
Fischer (1997), showed that the choice of a decision-making strategy might depend on two 
variables : the time available to decide and the level of risk likely to be faced. 
For Orasanu & Fischer (1997, p. 352) the DM strategy elected here and then depends on 
two predominant variables : Is there or is there not time to think ? Does or doesn’t the 
situation at hand present a high risk (present of future) ? 
 
Figure 6 Orasanu & Fischer’s (1997) Decision Process Model 
So decision-making strategies match specific configurations of the situation. But 
differences in circumstances and their constant novelty (Crego & Spinks, 1997, p. 90), or 
in decision-making styles (Crego & Spinks, 1997, p. 92), might not be the only factors that 
shape the way decisions are made.  
4.5. NDM Research and stress 
By definition, Klein (1997, p. 19) reminds, NDM Studies have focused much of their work 
on stressful situations (time pressure, lack of information, multiple-competing goals, etc…) 
and stress may be a factor of variation in DM strategies. 
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Based on their analysis of a number of accidents Stokes & Kite (1994) say that stress 
affects mainly short-term and working memory processes but not long-term memory 
retrieval processes. Orasanu & Fischer (1997, p. 352) make time pressure and risk the main 
two variables of situation assessment. 
Orasanu (1997) studied the effects of stress on pilots. Situation assessment’s cognitive 
processes are to be affected when cues are unfamiliar or unclear, and action selection’s 
cognitive processes are to be affected when pilots need to actually make the choice of a 
course of action because no simple routine-like response to the situation is available. Then 
they are to create ad hoc solutions. In fact, based on Stokes & Kite (1994), Orasanu (1997, 
p. 55) seems to say that situation assessment is more affected by stressful circumstances 
than action selection. Situation assessment can be affected in her views by a number of 
stress-related effects when cues are unfamiliar or unclear : 
• Reduced scanning of cues 
• Perceptual tunnelling, i.e. focusing on a reduced set of cues while ignoring peripheral 
ones 
• Non-systematic search of available cues. 
And when there is time pressure or impending risk, those stress-related effects can be : 
• Overestimation of actual threats 
• Jumping to premature conclusions. 
Action selection can be affected by another set of stress-related effects when choice 
decisions or creative problem solving are required : 
• Task shedding 
• Shifting of decision criteria 
• Simplifying strategies. 
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And we understand further that a certain lack of knowledge or of creativity may also affect 
action selection (Orasanu, 1997, p. 54). 
4.6. An NDM theory without emotions ? 
Brain studies show that emotion plays a part in decision-making (Vogeley & Fink, 2003) 
but NDM research has not studied it properly yet (Mosier & Fischer, 2010).  
In support of this assertion, the list of the cognitive operations involved in decision-making 
identified by NDM researchers, and relating either to Situation Awareness (SA) or to 
Action Selection (AS), shows a rather rational and deliberative picture of decision-making: 
Perception of a situation 
Margins evaluation (Risk at hand, Time to act) 
Diagnosis and recognition of the Situation (what’s going on here?, through recall) 
Awareness of the problem (what does the situation demand?) 
Projection (what’s the situation going to look like in the future?) 
Awareness of Situational uncertainty (situation or problem or projection not recognised or fuzzy) 
Further clarification / diagnosis of the situation or problem (inference, feature matching, story building) 
Recall of associated information (cues, expectancies, goals, action options = rules, task set, nothing) 
Anomaly detection (discrepancy between recalls and situation or Uncertainty in action options) 
Attitude taking (with regard to option uncertainty : ignoring, relying on intuition, gambling, avoiding 
irreversible actions, wait and see)  
Plan elaboration or modification (assumption-based reasoning, weighing pros & cons, eliminating 
irreversible actions, intuition, option selection, task schedule, creation) 
Mental simulation (consistency check) 
Probabilistic evaluation of applicability and efficiency vs. Uncertainty 
Decision to act (soliciting advice, searching for further information, postponing/delaying, engaging in action 
as planned) 
Table 5 The NDM Cognitive Operations Grid (NCO Grid) 
Several inputs from research suggest that the rational, deliberative process formed out of 
these cognitive operations probably does not alone rule the cognitive control of people’s 
performance in the field. Emotions, fear for instance, have both physiological and 
sensorimotor consequences, like an increase of heart rate, “phospholipid secretion”, or a 
decrease of “secretion of testosterone and other androgens” (Idzikowski & Baddeley, 
1983), and psychological consequences such as inhibition of action or panic (ibid). Slovic 
et al. (2002) suggest that individuals make decisions through a “dance of affect and 
reason”, referring to “Affective features that become salient in a judgement or decision 
making process". And Livet (2002), Thompson (2007), Lazarus (1993)141 and Lazarus 
(1993b)142 assert the key role emotions play in the rationality of decisions made in the 
course of one’s action.  
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Mosier & Fischer (2010), contrasting Naturalistic Decision Making and Judgement and 
Decision Making research currents, summarise the argument. 
First, “Part of the NDM community’s reluctance to embrace affect as a component of 
expert decision making” may result from a confusion between emotions that are external to 
the subject’s course of action (mere disturbances of the cognitive process) and emotions 
that are internal to it, task-related say Mosier & Fischer (2010)143, and that are useful in the 
cognitive process of decision-making : “integral affect—task-relevant affect—may provide 
essential cues as well as structure to the decision process.” (p. 242). 
Secondly, affects impact on the decision-making process in several ways, research shows 
(Mosier & Fischer, 2010, pp. 242-243)144 : as “spotlight” or attention guide (warning sign), 
as information (emotions become part of the deliberative process), as motivator (toward 
goals or attitudes, depending on the valence of the appraised situation), or as a frame for 
evaluating decision outcomes. 
Thirdly, affects are triggered by the context of the action performed by the subject : 
negative affects stem from task difficulty, positive affects from easier tasks (ibid, p. 244). 
Four, three hypotheses are formulated as to whether affect plays a role in expert decision-
making: 1) “experts are no different from laypeople and will be influenced by their 
emotions, irrespective of their task relevance or unrelatedness.” (p. 245) ; 2) “experts 
making domain-related decisions are immune to the impact of affect.” (p. 246) ; 3) 
“emotions are not necessarily irrelevant distractions but, rather, may provide valid 
information about the task at hand.” (p. 246). 
Five, experts can discern external, disturbing emotions and control them; And they learn 
the emotional significance of cues, to recognise their emotional reactions as warning signs, 
and to make sense of situations and possibly be pushed to search for complementary 
information and further meanings (ibid, pp. 247-249). 
Finally, there are several ways in which affects can be fitted into NDM models of decision-
making as a result of what precedes (ibid, p. 249-250). 
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4.7. Macrocognition as attempt for NDM research to find recognition ? 
As understood before (Mosier & Fischer, 2010), NDM research has had its critiques and 
has had to strengthen its role in DM research, indicate Maarten Shraagen et al. (2008). 
First, Klein et al. (2000) and Klein et al. (2003) express NDM researchers’ will to come 
into closer touch with cognitive ergonomics. The word “macrocognition” was coined by 
Pietro Cacciabue and Erik Hollnagel (Cacciabue and Hollnagel, 1995) to suggest that the 
links between the two communities could be reinforced and their interests converge, and 
“to indicate a level of description of the cognitive functions that are performed in natural 
(versus artificial laboratory) decision-making settings.” (Klein et al., 2003). The focus on 
macrocognition, they say, had now to be the “mental activities that must be successfully 
accomplished to perform a task or achieve a goal” (Klein et al., 2003).  
Secondly, de facto trying to broaden the scope of NDM research (Maarten Shraagen et al., 
2008, p. 7), after decades of research that “had not led to a discovery of recognitional 
decision making” (Klein et al., 2003), Maarten Shraagen et al. (2008) suggest that this shift 
of focus to macrocognition happened in reaction to three main criticisms : 1) the opposition 
of Behavioural Decision Making researchers who doubted the originality of NDM studies 
to which he answers “NDM also conflicts with the ‘heuristics and biases’ approach to 
decision making” (p. 5) ; 2) the conflict “with the position of Behavioral Decision Making 
to formulate strategies and aids that can replace or fix unreliable human judgement” (p. 5) 
; and 3) it “causes discomfort to experimental psychologists” (P. 6) for NDM “researchers 
could not confine themselves to particular tried-and-true paradigms” (p. 6). 
Thirdly, macrocognition defines its epistemological choices in the same opposition to the 
“reductionist” approach of experimental psychology scientists who reduce cognition to 
“assuming cognition’s building blocks and concocting information processing flow 
diagrams looking like spaghetti graphs that make little sense” (Klein et al., 2003). The 
general methodology used in macrocognition studies is Cognitive Task Analysis (Crandall 
et al., 2006). This includes (Hoffman, 2008) ethnographic methods (to “study the 
workplace and work patterns and conduct documentation analysis. The general approach 
is called activity analysis or work analysis.”), psychometric methods (to “measure human 
performance and conduct cognitive task analysis. This is the general approach of human 
factors engineering and cognitive systems engineering”), and sociometric methods (to 
“interview domain practitioners, study communication patterns, and reveal social 
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networks within knowledge-based organizations. This is the general approach of 
ethnomethodology, although it overlaps significantly with activity analysis and work 
analysis.”).  
In a graph often referred to, Klein et al. (2003) indicate that macrocognition relies upon a 
conceptual framework articulated around a set of core macrocognitive functions and 
peripheral macrocognitive support processes. Functions include : naturalistic decision-
making, sensemaking / situation assessment, planning, adaptation / replanning, problem 
detection, and co-ordination. Support processes include : developing mental models, 
uncertainty management, turning leverage points into courses of action, attention 
management, mental simulation and storyboarding, maintaining common ground. Again, 
some of these categories (co-ordination, maintaining common ground) point to the 
particular interest of NDM researchers for collaborative decision-making especially in 
computerised environments : “macrocognitive functions are generally performed in 
collaboration —by a team working in a natural situation, and usually in conjunction with 
computational artifacts.” (Klein et al., 2003). 
Finally, we must also add a specific interrogation in the context of firefighting.  
The view that “Some of the characteristics of the contexts of interest to NDM researchers 
are: time pressure; high stakes; dynamic settings; incomplete, unreliable or incomplete 
information; ill-defined goals; organizational constraints; multiple players; and, 
experienced decision makers.” (Hutton & Klein, 1999) does not depict faithfully on-scene 
situations reported by BSPP Firemen. Time pressure could be challenged by Firemen as, if 
they must not drag behind, they are dispatched to tasks that by nature require some time to 
be processed and the question is not so much to act fast as to perform well, in safety and 
with tangible results as far as feasible. Ill-defined goals is a very contestable premise as 
BSPP teams and binoms are assigned precise goals and missions. 
4.8. Conclusion 1 : The current NDM analytic framework 
Previous sections of this chapter help to compile the elements of the current NDM Analytic 
Framework into a short set of tables. They are : 
• The NDM Cognitive Operations Grid (NCO Grid145) based on Endsley, Orasanu & 
Fischer, Klein, Lipshitz : 
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SA (Situation Awareness / Assessment) 
Perception of a situation 
Margins evaluation (Risk at hand, Time to act) 
Diagnosis and recognition of the Situation (what’s going on here?, through recall) 
Awareness of the problem (what does the situation demand?) 
Projection (what’s the situation going to look like in the future?) 
Awareness of Situational uncertainty (situation or problem or projection not recognised or fuzzy) 
Further clarification / diagnosis of the situation or problem (inference, feature matching, story building) 
AS (Action Selection) 
Recall of associated information (cues, expectancies, goals, action options = rules, task set, nothing) 
Anomaly detection (discrepancy between recalls and situation or Uncertainty in action options) 
Attitude taking (with regard to option uncertainty : ignoring, relying on intuition, gambling, avoiding 
irreversible actions, wait and see)  
Plan elaboration or modification (assumption-based reasoning, weighing pros & cons, eliminating 
irreversible actions, intuition, option selection, task schedule, creation) 
Mental simulation (consistency check) 
Probabilistic evaluation of applicability and efficiency vs. Uncertainty 
Decision to act (soliciting advice, searching for further information, postponing/delaying, engaging in action 
as planned) 
Table 6 The NCO Grid 
• The Macrocognition Analytic Framework (MAF), from Klein et al. (2003) :  
Macrocognitive Functions 
Naturalistic decision-making 
Sensemaking / situation assessment 
Planning 
Adaptation / replanning 
Problem detection  
Co-ordination 
Macrocognitive Processes  
Developing mental models 
Uncertainty management 
Turning leverage points into courses of action 
Attention management 
Mental simulation and storyboarding 
Maintaining common ground 
Table 7 The Macrocognition Analytic Framework (MAF) 
• The Experts’ Characteristics Grid (ExpGrid)146, based on Hutton and Klein : 
Vast domain-specific knowledge 
Have superior memory in their domain based on chunking 
Perceive large meaningful patterns, or chunks of information, rather than individual pieces of information 
Have refined perceptual abilities, namely to see typicality, to see distinctions, and to see antecedents and 
consequences (through story building and mental simulation). 
Spend more time trying to understand the problem, in contrast to the novice who jumps right in and begins to 
manipulate the surface features of the problem 
See and represent a problem at a deeper level, at a causal level rather than at a more superficial level, based 
on surface features of a problem, and on learned rules as for novices 
Attuned to the goal-relevant constraints in the environment which allows to recall information according to, 
or with respect to, those constraints 
Skill being learned to automaticity, do not have to analyse a situation to perform well 
Are fast and make fewer errors 
Table 8 The Experts’ Characteristics Grid (ExpGrid) 
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• The DM Context Determination Grid (DMContext Grid)147, based on Zsambok (1997) : 
Ill-structured problems 
Uncertain dynamic environment 
Shifting, ill-defined, or competing goals 




Organisational goals and norms 
Table 9 The DM Context Determination Grid (DMContext Grid) 
Secondly, we understand that though some account for the variability of cognitive 
processes of decision-making, NDM models do not integrate emotion. They are essentially 
deliberative148, rational information processing models. The emotion coping process 
synthesised in chapter 2 suggests links with the cognitive operations described in NDM 
and Mosier & Fischer (2010) have suggested different types of such connections.  
4.9. Conclusion 2 : Decision-Making-in-Action (DMA) as working concept 
For the need of this research, we define Decision-Making-in-Action (DMA) as the 
individual cognitive process that controls a subject’s performance within the course of a 
given, delimited, situated, embodied and enacted action performed in the field, not in a 
laboratory : 
• The concept of DMA is established to precisely identify our object of research among 
other objects in NDM research, in which decision-making may cover a wide spectrum 
of decision-making configurations, from individual to collaborative, from laboratory 
and simulation to field settings, from operational to tactical decision-making. 
• DMA does not exclude the fact that the subject may interact with others and objects in 
the course of his action. Only, these interactions are considered from the personal 
subjective perspective of the performer, the central subject under study. Interactions 
with others are information inputs from them or outputs destined to them within the 
frame of specific cognitive operations performed by the subject himself. Others’ 
cognitive activity and its processes remain unknown to the subject beyond these 
interactions. 
• In this thesis, cognitive is understood in a very broad sense and thus includes emotion 
and metacognition as well as motivation, cognition usually understood as information 
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acquisition and processing, memory, imagination, etc…, which are all “mental” 
operations. Cognitive here equates to Mental. 
• DMA may include any cognitive operation that can be performed by a single 
individual. 
4.10. Conclusion 3 : Peritraumatic resilience as a metacognitive outcome of 
DMA? 
PTR mobilises three capabilities : getting-by, resisting and resuming. These capabilities 
can be seen as metacognitive processes. If we posit that PTR is the achievement of an 
individual’s cognitive process of Decision-Making-in-Action, then, in the context of 
Critical Incidents, DMA would be “successful” when it manages to yield PTR. One way to 
look at PTR is to ask if these capabilities are metacognitive functions in the sense of an 
“executive” cognitive loop (Cox, 2005) noticing difficulties at hand and promoting 
solutions to resolve them. 
What is metacognition ? If the hypothesis that it is an important factor of peritraumatic 
experience in DMA is true, can fire-fighters be trained to develop ad hoc metacognitive 
skills ?  
The next chapter presents the functional principles of metacognition. It also presents how 
metacognitive training could be used to prepare fire-fighters to CIs. 
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CHAPTER 5. Metacognition, metacognitive training and CIs 
This chapter defines metacognition. It discusses whether metacognition is only a learning-
related capacity or if it can be associated with the real-time control and adaptation of 
cognition in action. We present metacognitive training and its place in NDM research, and 
expose the starting points to the engineering of metacognitive training. In conclusion, we 
present a metacognitive training framework meant to prepare fire-fighters for potential CIs. 
5.1. An initial definition of metacognition 
Metacognition is a long known149 topic well studied in NDM research. Cox (2005) defines 
it as “cognition about cognition”. Schraw & Moshman (1995) define metacognition as 
“knowledge of one’s own cognition”.  
Also referred to by Spear-Ellinwood (2008) as “thinking about thinking (Bialystok[, 1992, 
2001]150 ; Thompson & Thompson, 1998151 ; Tomasello, 1999152)”, metacognition has been 
essentially envisaged from an educational perspective : “’Metacognition, or the awareness 
and regulation of the process of one’s thinking, has been recognized as a critical 
ingredient to successful learning’ (Lin, Schwartz, & Hatano, 2005, p. 246153).” (p.3), or 
else “Metacognition then includes the ability to assess one’s cognition and “to manage 
further cognitive development” (Rivers, 2001, p. 279154).” (Spear-Ellinwood,  2008, p. 4). 
In that sense, metacognition is related to the process of learning, not to the real-time 
control of cognition in action. 
Sun et al. (2006)155 and Downing et al. (2007) indicate that metacognition can be a 
conscious or a non-conscious (pre-reflexive) cognitive process156. And Schraw & Dennison 
(1994) underline that “metacognitively aware learners are strategic and perform better 
than unaware learners”. 
5.2. A controversy about the idea of a “meta” cognition 
The frontier between cognition and metacognition, however, can sometimes be thin (Cox, 
2005, p. 105). In this vein, Tharp & Gallimore’s (1985) “neo-behaviourist ?”157 perspective 
discards the idea of a “meta” cognition. Their views are : 
1. The knowledge of the theoretical rules behind practical know-how is derived from 
experience158. 
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2. Therefore, learning how to do things derives only from practice, not from theoretical 
teaching159. 
3. Teaching rules is pedagogically useful only to novices160. 
4. A central question is whether we can cognitively train people to know how to do things 
in a wide variety of contexts, what they call generalisation161. Under this line of 
thoughts, the authors suggest the idea that people can be trained to improve their 
capacity to make decisions in action, in the field162. 
5. In fact, the authors question the very possibility to speak of “meta” cognitive 
training163.  
5.3. Metacognition as a process of continuous learning 
For Spear-Ellinwood (2008), not limited to childhood, metacognition is a learning process 
spanning into adulthood (Spear-Ellinwood,  2008, p. 5) of continuously resolving 
discrepancies between one’s knowledge and how the world works. A mediation “between 
what people think they know and how the ‘world’ works” (ibid, p. 5), metacognition “refers 
to children’s acquisition of tools of self-regulation, self-planning, self-monitoring, self-
checking and self-evaluating” (ibid) that helps them resolve this “dissonance”, i.e. 
“disruptions are viewed as moving forces in a cycle of internalization and externalization 
where people ‘construct new instrumentalities’, and engage in the ‘transformative 
construction of new instruments and forms of activity as collective and individual levels’” 
(Daniels, 2001, p. 92-93164)” (ibid).  
Quoting Goos, Galbraith, & Renshaw (2002)165, the author extends the definition of 
metacognition to make it a social interaction process allowing students to “[think] about 
and [reconsider] one’s own and others’ thinking.” (Spear-Ellinwood,  2008, p. 5), and to 
“increase students’ abilities to see the problem from another’s perspective, to rethink their 
own, and to analyze and resolve the dissonance between them.” (ibid). 
This idea of learning from resolving discrepancies, either individually or through social 
interactions, can be viewed as a foundation of the development of expertise conceptualised 
by NDM researchers and “What sets apart an expert learner from a novice learner is the 
development and use of metacognitive strategies” (Spear-Ellinwood,  2008, p. 13).  
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Kapa (2007) describes the loop-like process of real-time mathematics learning and shows a 
complete integration between cognition and metacognition : 
 
Figure 7 Real-time metacognitive process, after Kapa (2006) 
The idea of a metacognitive loop has been described also by Anderson et al. (2006). It is a 
three steps process : noticing the existence of a problem to solve, assessing options to deal 
with the difficulty, and guiding the option into action (p. 388). Similarly for Spear-
Ellinwood (2008) metacognition mobilises five activities : ‘thinking about the learning 
process, planning for learning, monitoring of comprehension, or production while it is 
taking place, and self-evaluation after the learning activity has been completed’” (p. 13). 
5.4. Metacognitive learning, training and provocative strategies 
Schraw & Dennison (1994) suggest metacognition is based on two functions and their 
respective subfunctions166 : 
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Figure 8 Metacognition and its functions (Schraw & Dennison, 1994) 
These functions, or elements of metacognition, are themselves the result of a process of 
metacognitive learning. What metacognitive learning does is to help people develop their 
capacity to regulate their cognition on the basis of their acquired knowledge and in turn 
metacognitive skills help reinforcing their knowledge (Spear-Ellinwood, 2008). This 
process, she says167, relies upon three domains, knowledge, ability and awareness, each 
feeding the next one at the non-meta level, and metacognitive learning transforming the 
contents in each domain into a capacity to regulate cognition.  
Downing et al. (2007) add that in this process of improving their metacognitive skills 
individuals develop heuristics : “For example, how they plan, set goals and process 
feedback” (p. 3). In the case of stress handling (Carver et al., 1989), two coping strategies 
have been identified in research : problem-focused coping and emotion-focused coping. 
These strategies can be considered as metacognitive heuristics. These heuristics are tested 
in the context of episodes of action and adjusted through the process of discrepancies 
resolution mentioned by Spear-Ellinwood (2008). 
The following diagram summarises the process of metacognitive learning : 
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Figure 9 The levels and process of metacognitive learning 
Knowledge is the founding stone of the edifice at the non-meta level : a novice must first 
develop his repertoire of theoretical and practical knowledge. Then, practice in the field 
will gradually help the individual to develop his abilities to use his repertoire of knowledge 
in order to make decisions. More experienced people become aware of their ability to 
make the decisions that allow them to surmount difficulties they encounter in action. 
“Going meta” (Spear-Ellinwood, 2008) is the process of metacognitive learning that allows 
the individual to move up a level of abstraction of his own knowledge and know-how. 
Following the same three levels of development of his capabilities, metacognitive learning 
first takes metacognitive learners to consolidate their knowledge into a “meta-knowledge”, 
i.e. a capacity to draw from the variety of pieces of knowledge and practical experience the 
common and general patterns and rules. Once this is accomplished, the subject can 
generalise his knowledge and abilities to a variety of fields of action. Especially with DMA 
and PTR, the cognitive and social mechanisms on which the individual resorted in specific 
episodes of action are tested or questioned against the particulars of other domains of 
action. “Meta-abilities” are thus elaborated that allow people to apply common DMA and 
PTR processes to a variety of circumstances. Finally, when this is accomplished and the 
individual has extended his understanding of DMA and PTR mechanisms across a wide 
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variety of circumstances is he able to develop ways to regulate, i.e. to adapt his cognitive 
processes to even surprising circumstances. This “meta-awareness” of the cognitive 
requirements of novel situations is here considered the ultimate stage of development of 
one’s expertise. 
Metacognitive training is the process that presents provocative learning strategies (Spear-
Ellinwood, 2008) to metacognitive learners. Designing metacognitive training schemes 
equates to elaborating a process in which metacognitive learning provocative strategies 
(Spear-Ellinwood, 2008) will trigger the interest of the learner and push him to take the 
next step toward what appears as the ultimate goal of this : the metacognitive regulation of 
cognition, in our case of DMA and PTR. 
Spear-Ellinwood (2008) suggest, in the context of the design of scientific exhibits for the 
Arizona University’s Science Center Exhibition, to use a variety of metacognitive tasks 
and associated metacognitive training tools such as : 
• Guided mastery : the visitor of the exhibition uses some tool to solve a problem, and 
video recording to keep trace of his doings and later identify how he solved it. Then the 
same visitor records his explanation and becomes a master guide to other visitors to 
transmit his knowledge. 
• Storytelling : the visitor confronted with an exhibit creates a story. Then he must 
present it to other and therefore has to think of how to transmit his ideas to others and 
chose specific forms and words for this. Eventually, listeners will engage into 
collaborative storytelling and thinking aloud. 
• Metamemory games : the visitor is confronted to symbols such as  (an ambulance) 
and asked to choose a mediating symbol within a selection (for instance :        
) that evokes episodic memories of circumstances in which he encountered an 
ambulance. Being asked why he picks-up a given symbol, for instance the snowy road 
in the occurrence of a car accident the symbol of his explanation is presented to him, 
for instance  he was having a conversation with the passengers of the car and was 
distracted. Etc. This process raises the visitor’s awareness of the chain of events and 
cognitive operations that led to come across the ambulance. 
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• Re-imagining experiences : once the visitor has successfully performed a task he is 
asked to imagine the way he would apply his acquired knowledge in another problem-
domain. This helps the visitor to generalise his cognitive models and processes. 
• Simulation (going through an episode of experience) : the visitor is invited to use 
games (video or more classic games) to share an experience with others and discover 
their goals, intentions and perceptions, thus helping him to understand how others think 
and act and inviting him to reconsider his own ways of thinking and acting. 
• Dissonance & harmony analyses : the visitor is presented a problem containing 
intellectual contradictions and conflicts and his led to experience his self-imposed 
limitations for instance. 
• Narrating neuro & bio feedback : the visitor is asked to remain relaxed, focused and 
alert. While they keep trying to maintain such a state they learn about the thoughts and 
behaviours they had. Asked their feedback after the experiment they discover how they 
control their behaviour or even their neural and biological functions. 
• Making explicit implicit cognitions : through a think-aloud while the visitor performs a 
the task or afterward. This raises his awareness of the cognitive operations he performs, 
the resources and information he uses, etc. 
• Evocative object : the visitor is asked to take a picture of an exhibit and to tell the story 
associated with it, what the object makes him feel or think of. Then he is asked to 
explain what made him draw these connections. This task reveals the subject’s 
cognitive background. The visitor can be invited to draw the concept map associated 
with his evocations. 
Within a process of Exposure to an artefact  Generation of metacognitive learning 
thoughts  Reflection  Adjusting, these provocative strategies serve the second stage. 
The metacognitive learning process we presented here minimises Tharp & Gallimore’s 
(1985) objection to “meta” cognition as we clearly show that “going meta” means 
developing monitoring and regulating mechanisms. Also it takes account of their view that 
knowledge develops with practice. 
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What we posited in this section also moves the focus of metacognition from learning and 
education to the real-time regulation of cognition. 
5.5. Metacognition as real-time regulation of cognition 
For Cox (2005) action, cognition and metacognition rather constitute three complementary 
levels of human experience : metacognition monitors and controls cognition, and cognition 
monitors and controls action.  
Anderson et al. (2006), in their article on metacognition in autonomous agents, define 
"metacognitive monitoring” as the “ability of [an artificial intelligence based] system to 
self-monitor its own decision-making processes and ongoing performance”. In artificial 
intelligence, metacognitive functions can be fitted into computer systems to develop their 
tolerance to perturbations, defining “an anomaly as a deviation from expectations for 
performance or outcomes” (Anderson et al., 2006, p. 389) : “there is some empirical 
evidence for the importance of metacognition in dealing with the unexpected or 
unfamiliar.” (p. 388) and their view is “to equip artificial agents with MCL: the ability to 
notice when something is amiss, assess the anomaly, and guide a solution into place” (p. 
389). Cox (2005), for instance, also highlights the vast interest of artificial intelligence 
research for metacognition (p. 106). 
Secondly, as seen in the previous section metacognitive training can help individuals and 
teams to better deal with challenging situations, improve their safety on the line of duty, 
and develop their expertise. And this is also a focus of the present research. 
Effective decision-makers have “a repertoire of decision making strategies that they can 
draw in response to particular situational clues” (Cannon-Bowers & Bell, 1997, p. 101). 
They are “adaptive” (p.102), i.e. capable of engaging “in a continual process of strategy 
assessment and modulation” (ibid). “Expert decision makers appear to be better [than 
novices] able to monitor their own processes during decision making” (p. 105), which they 
deem a “[crucial ‘executive’ function] as the problem changes and evolves” (ibid). If 
experience provides this kind of expertise, we may think it can be enhanced through 
training schemes that develop people’s metacognitive learning and regulation. Omodei et 
al. (2002) suggest that methods for reducing errors include “both the systemic level by 
redesign of the decision environment and […] the human level by the implementation of 
specific training strategies”. And Schraw & Dennison (1994)168 point to the use of 
metacognitive training to better control stress in action.  
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5.6. How is metacognition taken into account in NDM research ? 
Globally NDM research takes account of metacognition in that sense that decision-makers 
are recognised to adapt their strategies to situations at hand. Orasanu & Fischer’s (1997) 
Decision Process Model is based on problem detection and describes how the subject 
responds to problems. Lipshitz’s (1997a) uncertainty reduction strategies constitute another 
answer to the question. Klein’s (1998) integrated RPD Model embeds several features 
(typicality, feature matching, mental simulation) that can be broadly assimilated to 
Anderson et al.’s (2006) metacognitive loop. But this positive answer can only be provided 
to the extent that the frontier between cognition and metacognition is kept fuzzy and that 
we accept NDM or macrocognitive functions or processes as metacognitive. 
5.6.1. Current views on metacognitive training, its goals and principles 
For Driskell & Johnston (1998) one of the major goals of NDM studies is to prevent 
decision-making errors under stressful conditions. Metacognitive training is one of the 
possible ways to achieve this goals. Metacognitive training is performed post-action to 
enhance in-action metacognitive skills. 
“NDN-consistent training” (Cannon-Bowers & Bell, 1997, p. 100) is “a mechanism to 
support natural decision-making processes, and […] a means to accelerate proficiency or 
the development of expertise”.  
Cannon-Bowers & Bell (1997) conclude that “the value of NDM theories in designing 
training lies in what they have to offer regarding knowledge, skills, and processes that 
underlie expert performance” (p. 103). Metacognitive training, in their view (p. 106), must 
improve decision makers’ skills in three areas : the self-assessment of one’s cognition, the 
selection of a decision-making strategy, and the effective management of knowledge 
resources. 
Prior views suggest that metacognitive training is performed post-action either individually 
or collectively, consciously or not : 
• After an action has been performed metacognitive learning may be individual and 
non-conscious, during Long-Term Memory consolidation periods, like sleep, and 
consolidation develops associations between remembered items of experience, 
either with other such items or with semantic knowledge. 
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• It may also be individual and fully conscious when the subject, used to the practice 
of retrospective metacognitive reflection, consciously looks back at his just-past 
experience, tries to make sense of it and to draw lessons. 
• Metacognitive training can also be collective and focused on one individual : 
coaching, as practised in business organisations, may be seen as a form of 
metacognitive training. 
• Collective sessions can be based on cross-training principles (Blickensderfer et al., 
1998), with a view to enhance specifically collaborative metacognition. 
For Batha & Carroll (2007), a typical a posteriori in-training “Metacognitive strategy 
instruction” is problem-based and includes : 
1) Translation : Read the question/problem, Ask yourself if you understand the problem – 
re-read until you do, Identify and paraphrase the main information in the 
question/problem ;  
2) Integration : Ask yourself what information you need to make a decision, Ask yourself 
if you have all the information necessary to make a decision, Ask yourself if you know 
how to integrate and organise the information ;  
3) Solution planning : Think out a strategy detailing how many steps and operations are 
needed to make a decision, Appraise why that strategy is the most appropriate, Ask 
yourself what would happen if you used an alternate strategy, Check after every step to 
make sure that the strategy you are using is the most appropriate ;  
4) Solution execution : Revise your computation to check for errors or missed 
information, Ask yourself if you have made the right decision. 
Cannon-Bowers & Bell (1997) prescribe five metacognitive training techniques :  
• simulations,  
• guiding novices’ practice and insisting on delivering a feedback on their doings,  
• embedding training tools within people’s work environment,  
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• cognitive apprenticeship by which an apprentice works closely with an expert,  
• and multi-media presentations.  
5.6.2. Metacognitive training for stress handling 
Driskell & Johnston (1998) indicate that SET, Stress Exposure Training169, “is an effective 
method for reducing anxiety and enhancing performance in stressful environments [and 
encourages] further application and research” (p. 213). In this context, metacognitive 
training pursues three goals :  
• first, to convey a knowledge of the stressful environment in which people are likely to 
operate,  
• secondly, to develop decision-making skills with a particular emphasis on the effects of 
stress that can be noticed and recognised in the course of action (physiological changes, 
emotional reactions, cognitive effects, longer reaction times or changes in social 
behaviour),  
• and thirdly to build people’s confidence in their ability to perform under stress (pp. 
192-194).  
All stress-regulation training is not aimed at handling stress in action. For instance, 
Berking et al.’s (2010) Integrative Training of Emotional Competencies (iTEC) for 
emotion-regulation is mainly aimed at preventing mental illness in police officers and their 
families (Berking et al., p. 331). 
5.6.3. Existing schemes for metacognitive training for CI 
Studies on how to prepare fire-fighters to the prospect of Critical Incidents in action are 
scarce. Meredith et al. (2011) have analysed 23 resilience programs aimed at US military 
personnel. Their goal is to help “individuals to incorporate resilience factors into their 
daily lives” (p. 8). They target military personnel and their families and seek to increase 
their psychological fitness and readiness for combat (p. 6) by reducing the adverse impacts 
of the “mental health conditions and cognitive impairments that affect many service 
members” participating in field operations (p. 1). However, these programmes address 
psychological troubles at the post-traumatic stage and therefore do not correspond to the 
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need to train fire-fighters to surmount CIs during the time of their intervention, the 
peritraumatic stage. 
Keenan (2008) proposes five “Key things to be included in pre-incident training &/or 
information on the subject of work-related traumatic incidents for firefighters and officers” 
: 
• Critical Incident Stress Identification (CI) : i.e. training or information about the 
identification and understanding of traumatic reactions and the nature of incidents that 
have the potential to trigger traumatism. It includes : the nature of incidents that might 
constitute “critical incidents” or “traumatic incidents” for self and others, the range of 
potential reactions to a critical incident – including immediate and delayed effects, how 
to recognise signs of traumatism. 
• Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) : i.e. the ways to manage reactions to 
trauma exposure. It includes : how to protect oneself during a critical incident, how to 
cope with reactions to a critical incident while still at the incident scene, how to 
manage (or “deal with”) reactions following a critical incident. 
• Managing and/or supporting others (MO) : i.e. how to manage and/or support others 
during and after a critical incident. It includes : how to recognise signs of critical 
incident stress in others (individuals and crews), how to be a supportive colleague or 
supervisor, how to help others. 
• Partner involvement (P) : i.e. recognising the role of partners in identifying and 
managing traumatic or critical incident stress reactions. This includes teaching partners 
to identify critical incident stress reactions, providing partners with information about 
the nature of help available to their firefighter or officer and how it can be accessed, the 
effect on partners and families of a firefighter or officer suffering from critical incident 
stress, the importance of fire-fighters and officers advising their partners when they 
experience reactions to a critical incident for understanding and support. 
• Reality based training (RT) : this aims at providing exposure to graphic material, 
discussion, or experiences that demonstrate the realities of the job and what fire-
fighters might come across on the line of duty. It includes : visits to the morgue to view 
dead bodies, visual aids showing dead or injured bodies, discussions or scenarios about 
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horrific incidents, death or injuries, material such as photos, videos or other materials 
are used to introduce personnel to what they might experience on-the-job, even if there 
is no explicit comment that indicates this material to be of a graphic or otherwise 
potentially distressing nature. 
5.7. Conclusion : Metacognitive training for CIs requires a model of DMA and 
PTR 
The frameworks presented in the present chapter recommend measures that apply mainly 
to the post-traumatic stage of the experience of CIs, and less to the peritraumatic one. 
Also, there are differences in ambitions with regards to the conceptualisation of 
metacognitive training. Where Keenan’s (2008) propositions are fed with outputs from 
fire-fighters’ field experience, Spear-Ellinwood (2008) rather propose a general, 
conceptual mechanism to take people to “go meta”. 
In any case, CI metacognitive training can only rely upon the development of an individual 
intimate cognitive experience of CIs. Hence the need for methodological principles and 
tools that help to present such an experience in an admissible form. Several points must 
therefore be taken into account to secure the acceptability and success of a metacognitive 
training scheme targetting the peritraumatic stage of the experience of CIs : 
• Cannon-Bowers & Bell (1997) highlight the fact that “the task of generating cognitive 
training principles consistent with NDM is not as straightforward as it may seem” 
(ibid)170 and that for metacognitive control to be effective, it must be founded on a clear 
model of experts’ performance. For instance, Omodei et al. (2002) suggest such a 
model, the Adaptive Control Model. Regarding the experience of CIs, we need 
cognitive data from which models of DMA and PTR can be derived to drive the design 
of CI metacognitive training schemes, and in particular of metacognitive learning 
provocative strategies. 
• A second aspect, not addressed in the elements of literature presented earlier, is the 
capacity of individuals to reflect on their own experience in order to get into closer 
touch with their cognition. For Downing et al. (2007)171 individual metacognitive skills 
develop only to the extent that the subject admits to perform some kind of introspective 
reflection upon his inner experience, and to transfer the acquired knowledge to other 
tasks.  
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• Thirdly, a well thought off process for preparing, delivering and assessing CI 
metacognitive training is required (Driskell & Johnston, 1998). First, as it must focus 
on the peritraumatic stage, there are limits to what can be included within such training 
schemes that deal with deep human emotions. Secondly, to be effective such 
metacognitive learning must occur only within supportive social processes organising 
interactions with peers and based on instructional strategies (Downing et al., 2007)172.  
The fundamental question posed by the need to design CI metacognitive training schemes 
therefore lies with the capacity of researchers to dig out the cognitive material required to 
elaborate the models upon which such schemes can be built. It is a methodological 
question. 
The next chapter reviews the methods used in NDM and, showing that they do not match 
the requirements of the present research, presents the methodological foundations of this 
study. 
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CHAPTER 6. From NDM methods to first-person approaches 
The study of naturalistic decision-making must take into account cognition173 as well as 
emotion and their respective roles in the control of people’s performance in critical 
circumstances. This chapter presents the methods used in NDM research to study 
cognition. We perform a detailed review of Cognitive Task Analysis and of the Human 
Factors Interview Protocol in the context of our research. The uniqueness of our case 
requires a first-person methodological approach to capture retrospectively the details of the 
subject’s episodic memory, rather than an experimental protocol. We present the 
psychophenomenological foundations of our methodological approach. The chapter 
concludes on the description of our research object, an episode of experience, and on the 
general structure of the cognitive experience as it can be recalled and narrated by a subject. 
6.1. Cognitive Task Analysis and other methods used in NDM research 
6.1.1. Panorama of methods used in NDM studies 
A number of methods have been developed and used by NDM researchers. Among them 
(Klein & Hoffman, 2008 ; Maarten Shraagen et al., 2008) stands Cognitive Task Analysis 
(CTA). Rassmussen (1985) explains that it was developed along with the evolving 
complexity and criticality of systems and the required level of interaction between 
computers and their users, stressing the emergence of situations users would not be 
prepared for and in which uncertainty as to their causes and impacts would be high.  
Hoffman (2005) presents the variety of methods included today under the CTA umbrella : 
• Bootstrapping methods : They are used to allow the researcher to familiarise himself 
with the domain he studies. They include : documentation analysis, the Recent Case 
Walkthrough (a simplified version of the Critical Decision Method), the Knowledge 
Audit, and Client Interviews. 
• Proficiency scaling methods : They are used to distinguish levels of proficiency of 
people working within a given domain (Naïve, Novice, Initiate, Apprentice, 
Journeyman, Expert, Master, from the lowest to the highest level). They include : 
Career Interviews, Sociogrammetry, Cognitive Style Analysis. 
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• Workplace observation and interview methods : They are used to study how people 
carry out their work in their domain under a variety of perspectives, including the 
workspace where individuals and groups work, activities carried out by people, roles 
and jobs, decision requirements, action requirements, and standard operating 
procedures. 
• Methods for modelling practitioners’ reasoning : They include : 
• Protocol Analysis (usually associated with TAPS – Think Aloud Problem Solving) 
to study experts’ cognition in particular problems, cases or challenges. It resorts on 
various coding schemes such as the Abstraction-Decomposition scheme, the 
Coding of Proposition for a Model of Knowledge scheme, the Coding of Leverage 
Points scheme, or else the Coding of Unstructured Interviews to Identify Rules for 
an Expert System. 
• The Goal-Directed Task Analysis to explore the knowledge and key pieces of 
information needed by task performers as well as cues and situations that dictate a 
shift in priority. 
• The Cognitive Modelling Procedure to elicit quicker than with other methods the 
reasoning model of experts working in a given domain by starting from a general 
model and presenting them with some bogus models that experts tend to correct. 
CTA methods are usually based on structured interviewing and task retrospection, say 
Maarten Shraagen et al. (2008, p.6). In this line of thoughts, Dekker (2002) relates the 
“questions Gary Klein and his researchers typically ask to find out how the situation 
looked to people on the inside at each of the critical junctures” (p. 71) in retrospective 
verbal reporting approaches : 
Cues What were you seeing ? 
 What were you focusing on ? 
 What were you expecting to happen ? 
Interpretation If you had to describe the situation to your fellow crewmember at that point, what 
would you have told ? 
Errors What mistakes (for example in interpretation) were likely at this point ? 
Previous experience / 
knowledge 
Were you reminded of any previous experience ? 
 Did this situation fit a standard scenario ? 
 Were there any rules that applied clearly here ? 
 Did you rely on other sources of knowledge to tell you what to do ? 
Goals What governed your actions at the time ? 
  84 
 Were there conflicts or trade-offs to make between goals ? 
 Was there time-pressure ? 
Taking action How did you judge you could influence the course of events ? 
Table 10 Gary Klein's questioning approach related by Dekker (2002) 
CTA methods is to find ways to help users make decisions in tough circumstances, when 
everything is not nominal, and to design systems in order to facilitate this process by 
giving the interaction between computer and operators characteristics matching the pattern 
of the operators’ cognitive functioning under such circumstances. Rassmussen’s (1985) 
“Schematic map of the information processes involved in a control decision” represents the 
logic of decision-making under a variety of circumstances and its underlying principles : 
rule-based shortcuts, when situations are easy to handle and the operator has the ad hoc 
cognitive routines ready ; knowledge-based analysis, when situations at hand are unclear ; 
and knowledge-based planning, when solutions have to be constructed ad hoc as ordinary 
routines and answers are insufficient. 
Other methods have been used in NDM research like : 
• Observations of exercises (Pascual & Henderson, 1997). 
• Quiz and questionnaires, used in Aviation for instance by Stokes, Kemper & Kite 
(1997).  
• Simulation : Orasanu (1997, p. 47), like many other researchers (see for instance 
Roth’s article in the same volume), evokes simulation as a means to elicit decision-
making strategies while Maarten Shraagen et al. (2008) point to its difficulty as it has 
“to reflect key challenges of the task and engage practitioners in realistic dilemnas” (p. 
6). It is sometimes prepared well in advance (Hutchins, 1997)174. Waag & Bell (1997) 
used simulation in combination with Woods’ (1993) Behavioural Protocol, involving 
two Subject Matter Experts (SME’s) whose judgements and observations of a 
simulation training session were “the most important data sources”.  
• The Impromptu Recall Technique and the Verbal Protocol Technique described by 
Bisseret et al. (1999). 
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6.1.2. Protocol Analysis 
Protocol analysis is not designed for idiographic studies of cognition. For Hoffman (2005, 
p. 65), Protocol Analysis is fundamentally a “data analysis method” rather than, as often 
said, a “research method”175, used to “conduct a study in which expert's performance at 
their familiar tasks is examined” (P. 65). For Ericsson & Simon (1984) Protocol Analysis 
is aimed at studying “cognitive processes used during many trials of an experiment” (ibid, 
pp. XII, 151).  
A protocol here is “a record of a process in which a domain practitioner has performed 
some sort of task.” (Hoffman, 2005, p. 65).  
To collect data, Protocol Analysis resorts either on Think-Aloud Protocols (TAP) or on 
Retrospective Verbal Reports (Ericsson & Simon, 1984, p. XVI). For Hoffman (2005), 
Think-Aloud Problem Solving (TAPS) knowledge elicitation “can be more revealing than 
observing experts solving common or routine problems (Klein and Hoffman, 1993).” (p. 
66). 
In Protocol Analysis, data processing includes : 
• Coding statements based on pre-defined categories that reflect the goals of the research 
(Hoffman, 2005, p. 66)176. 
• Clustering identified categories (Hoffman, 2005, p. 66)177. 
Some of the main characteristics of Retrospective Verbal Reporting in Protocol Analysis 
are (Ericsson & Simon, 1984) : 
• The Model is based upon STM (Short-Term Memory) for Think-Aloud Protocols, and 
on LTM (Long-Term Memory) and Episodic Memory for Retrospective Verbal 
Reports (ibid, p. 149). Retrospective recalls are facilitated by cues stored in STM that 
are usable if recalls are performed immediately after the task (ibid, p. 149) with a risk 
that STM being very volatile gaps in retrospective memories may appear (ibid, pp. 
168). 
• The authors formulate a number of criticisms (ibid, p. 61) of retrospective verbal 
reporting (it affects performances, it may be incomplete, and it might refer to unlooked 
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for cognitive processes), but undermine these difficulties (ibid, p. 62) as they can be 
overcome. 
• Retrospective Verbal Reporting relies upon the idea (ibid, p. 150) that “questions can 
be answered by direct retrieval of the information only if the subject has, during his 
performance of the task, already generated this kind of general description of his own 
cognitive processes”, as the subject encodes the elements characteristic of his 
performed action while he performs it (Zimmer, 2001 ; Mayes & Roberts, 2001 ; 
Conway, 1995). 
• Empty segments of the episode of experience under study, i.e. that cannot be recalled, 
are attributed by the authors (ibid, p. 151) to routine-based behaviours178. 
• Ericsson & Simon’s (1984, pp. 150-151) account of the difficulties of full retrospective 
verbal reports may result from the researchers’ inadequate probing (ibid, p. 150). 
• Retrospective Verbal Reporting seeks generalisations through inferences (ibid, p. 151). 
All coding schemes used in Protocol Analysis as described by Hoffman (2005) cannot be 
used in the present study : 
• The Abstraction-Decomposition coding scheme is not applicable179 to the study of the 
cognitive experience of a single subject. It rather depicts collaborative work and the 
variety of cognitive stances held by the different actors. 
• The Coding for Leverage Points coding scheme seeks potential improvements of 
standard operating procedures (Hoffman, 2005, pp.70-72), which is not our goal. 
• However, the Coding an Unstructured Interview to Identify Rules for an Expert System 
coding scheme seeks to elicit “concepts and rules” with a view to create inference-
based expert systems, and the Coding of Propositions for a Model of Knowledge 
coding scheme (Hoffman, 2005, pp.69-70) seeks to formulate logical reasoning 
propositions180, suggest that inference rules might be established in our research. 
TAP/TAPS protocols yield elements of first-person cognition in line with the researcher’s 
objective. It may be to elicit difficulties, information requirements, problem-solving 
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methods, recalls from memory (regulations or instructions for instance), … Operators can 
also be asked to express freely their thoughts as they come on their minds. These protocols 
are therefore “focused” and contained within the boundaries set by the researcher.  
Verbal Reporting can also be assigned specific goals. They can be asked “to retrospect 
about cases that they themselves encountered in the past” (Hoffman, 2005, p. 65) as well 
as about a particular experience or a test case (ibid, p. 65). Verbal Reports are unguided 
recollections from episodic memory, the subject being “only” given instructions or asked 
questions as in Dekker (2002, p. 71) that frame his recollections. They do not exclude 
personal a posteriori re-interpretations and re-constructions. 
6.1.3. The Human Factors Interview Protocol (HFIP) 
Following their original suggestion to use head-mounted audio-video recorders (Omodei et 
al., 1997 ; Omodei et al., 2002), and based on the assumption that “what remains relatively 
unclear are the mental (psychological) processes which generate safety-compromising 
orders and actions”, Omodei et al (2005) proposed the “Human Factors Interview 
Protocol” (HFIP)” at the Eighth International Wildland Fire Safety Summit held in 
Missoula, Montana, aimed at “[revealing] the human factors causes of potentially unsafe 
decisions in the context of Australian wildland fires (i.e. bushfires).”181 (ibid). It targeted 
safety-critical situations. 
Stressing “the absence of an appropriate research methodology” (ibid), they declared “The 
scarcity of systematic research into the mental processes which underlie decision making 
in wildland firefighting […] not surprising given that such processes cannot be studied 
directly during the firefight” (ibid), concluding that such mental processes ought to “be 
studied retrospectively using interview techniques that cue memory recall.” (ibid). 
They described (ibid) “Task-related psychological processes” as ranging “from basic 
interactions with the task environment via perception and attention, through the processes 
which comprise memory functioning, to the complex functions of reasoning and 
judgement.”.  
HFIP’s heuristic principle was “to find out what is in and on someone’s mind” (ibid) and 
“not to put things in someone’s mind (for example the interviewer’s preconceived 
categories for organizing the world)” (ibid), in other words “to access the perspective of 
the person being interviewed” (ibid).  
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This would require “To promote the recall of the maximum amount of relatively 
uncontaminated information, particularly in the early stages of the interview” (ibid) and 
that “the primary interviewing technique […] encourage the interviewee (i.e. the 
firefighter) to maintain during his or her recall an ownpoint-of-view or ‘insider’ recall 
perspective” (ibid). 
The protocol was staged in eight phases : 
1. Setting the parameters 
2. Eliciting the narrative and its chapters 
3. Performing a collaborative analysis of the chapters 
4. Stepping back - the wisdom of hindsight 
5. Anything else?’ – checking 
6. Bigger picture 
7. Even bigger picture 
8. Wrapping up. 
In Omodei et al.’s (2005) method : 
• The focus is not so much on the subject’s private cognitive experience, his “mental 
experience”, than on his “social experience”. The method elicits personal and 
collective attitudes and patterns of interactional behaviour, though, initially, the authors 
stated that “The purpose of interviewing is to find out what is in and on someone’s 
mind” (ibid). 
• First-person interviews182 present risks : they may lead to a “distorted understanding of 
the decision making process” as “experiences least likely to be recalled are those 
associated with actual or potential errors precisely because such experiences 
constitute a negative self-assessment” (ibid). 
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• There is some emphasis placed upon collecting personal theories in stages 4 to 7. The 
progressive breakdown of the course of events into a story and its episodes frames the 
subject’s account of his experience. 
• HFIP targets commanders and tactical decision-making rather than field-responders 
and the cognitive control of their own performance in action. 
6.1.4. In conclusion : the need for an ad hoc methodology 
The methods used in NDM research cover a wide range of investigations. But, as seen in 
Omodei et al.’s (2005) proposal, the need for a first-person approach to cognition is 
advocated. Banbury et al. (2002) in their evaluative study of the Cognitive Model of 
Commercial Airline Threat Management (CAPT-M) also suggest that deterministic models 
of cognition do not reflect how people actually make decisions and explain that this may 
be due to the lack of introspective knowledge of the actual cognition of the subject, de 
facto calling for such an introspective analysis, hence a first-person methodology to 
investigate subjects’ “private” cognition. And their conclusions make it clear that this 
cannot be achieved through the statistical study of numerous subjects but through the study 
of single cases. 
6.2. The turn toward a first-person methodology 
“NDM studies seem to hinge on the study of unique events, situations that cannot easily be 
replicated. But this is not to say that the core phenomena cannot be replicated, which they 
are, across cases.” (Maarten Schraagen et al., 2008, p. 10). The unique character of a 
subject’s cognitive experience cannot be captured through statistical experimental methods 
(Allport, 1962). The investigation of the individual cognitive process that underlies the 
experience of trauma by one fire-fighter in the course of an intervention in the field 
presents this character of uniqueness.  
Beside, the research context itself was constrained.  
First, during our immersion in the field one fire-fighter, Lieutenant A, having experienced 
a CI and ready to participate in the research to perform guided recalls of his memories 
rather than delivering an embellished version of his story was identified. The study of his 
case could only be idiographic.  
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Secondly, this study performs a retrospective investigation of Lieutenant A’s cognitive 
processes and of their patterns, of the cognitive operations he performed between the start 
and the end of his intervention. But there was no trace nor any recordings of his lived 
story. His episodic memory was therefore the only source of data available. Lieutenant A’s 
experience dated back one month before the interview, and fortunately his memory proved 
to be still vivid. To minimise the risk of falling into the pits of the narration of biased 
social reconstructions and personal interpretations, a retrospective verbal protocol with 
proper episodic recall induction and guidance techniques (Vermersch, 2006) was needed. 
An epistemological choice had to be made in response to our goals and constraints. 
Radical empiricism is James’ (1904, 1912) epistemological principle for the study of a 
subject’s cognition. James (1904) opposes it to rationalism (the empirical science founded 
on statistics) that he sees as a science of the universal and therefore as an abstraction of the 
individual. Numbers fail to grab the subjective reality of a subject’s experience of life, say 
Maarten Shraagen et al. (2008)… James’ empiricism is the opposite of the “empiricism” 
usually referred to in positivist, quantitative methods (Bryman, 1984, p. 77). James (1904) 
also uses the term “radical” to say that the researcher must “neither admit an element that 
is not directly experienced by the subject nor exclude an element that is directly 
experienced” by the subject.  
These elements are the mental acts and mental objects (Husserl, 1977), and their sequence, 
that form the subject’s cognitive process : 
• These acts, objects and temporal order are to be found in the subject’s episodic 
memories of given, delimited, situated, embodied and enacted lived-experiences.  
• Therefore, they are authentic if they are not the subject’s life-stories, his retrospective 
generalisations, social reconstructions or philosophical re-interpretations of his lived 
experience. Nor are they the researcher’s generalisations or theoretical interpretations 
of the cognitive experience. 
To capture these authentic elementary elements of a subject’s cognitive experience, this 
research relies on an idiographic study (Willig, 2008) and a first-person methodology183. 
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6.3. First-person methods, their place in NDM and in cognitive science 
First-person methods of research are meant for studying singular cases and are named 
(Creswell, 2007 ; Moustakas, 1994) phenomenological or (Vermersch, 2006) 
psychophenomenological methods. They search for a detailed description of “reality 
through the eyes of participants”, the “new naturalistic paradigm” of psychological 
research (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994). 
A first-person case study starts with an interview of a subject about a given type of 
experience, which delivers a first-person narrative. From this material, researchers, who 
usually work in social sciences, extract categories through an interpretative open coding 
process. Categories are then clustered to bring about the sense of the subject’s type of 
experience. Such approaches have been employed in disciplines on the edge of sociology 
such as gender studies to understand the essence of the experience of illness (Petitmengin, 
2008), of the experience of deportation in nazi concentration camps (Barclay, 1995), etc. 
Vermersch (2006) points to the necessity to study singular episodes of experience184, away 
from life stories and generalisations, in order to collect data about authentic elements of 
cognition, lived as opposed to reconstructed or interpreted a posteriori, and for this to 
access the subject’s episodic memory (EM). And to get such recollections from the 
subject’s EM, the researcher needs an interview protocol that can trigger and focus recalls 
of the originally encoded elements of lived experience, while minimising the narration of 
interpretations, generalisations and reconstructions. These authentic cognitive operations 
may have been conscious or unnoticed (Varela & Shear, 1999a, p. 308 ; Vermersch, 2006) 
at the time of the actual facts. Conscious means that at the time of the actual facts, the 
subject was metacognitively aware of a given cognitive operation, for instance a thought or 
an emotion. Unnoticed means, on the opposite, that the subject did not have such an 
awareness. Unnoticed cognitive operations are called pre-reflexive185, for not reflected 
upon in a metacognitive process. 
In NDM research, Omodei et al. (1997, pp. 137-146) suggested the same move from third-
person approaches (based on external observations) toward first-person accounts of the 
experience (from the own, “I”, person’s standpoint). They advocated the use of head-
mounted audio-video recorders to get “own-point-of-view stimulated recalls” (ibid) of 
one’s experience to video-cue “the recall of other associated non-verbal components (e.g., 
affects, motivations, etc.)”. Omodei et al. (2002) add that the “own-point-of-view 
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psychological perspective […] of this procedure” allows “to generate data not obtainable 
using other methods” and “to obtaining data on underlying psychological processes, 
especially those associated with error.”. 
If there has been so far a great deal of “blindness to the usefulness of working with first-
person methods” (Varela & Shear, 1999, pp. 11-12), research now needs to create a 
“Necessary Circulation” (ibid, pp. 2-3) between first-person and third-person studies.  
Maarten Schraagen et al. (2008, pp. 10-13), while they present the epistemological 
differences between NDM research and experimental psychological science (“Naturalism 
vs. Experimentalism”), in response to criticisms of NDM, also advocate a necessary dialog 
between the two approaches, between statistical methods on one hand and case study and 
storytelling approaches on the other. In this sense, NDM research performs “the initial 
steps of formulating questions and observing phenomena” (Maarten Schraagen et al., 2008, 
p. 12) and feeds experimental science with new phenomena and questions (Henwood & 
Pidgeon, 1994). 
The multiplication of scientific perspectives is beneficial to cognitive psychology : 
Newell’s (1973) “You can’t play 20 questions with nature and win” had highlighted the 
limits he saw to experimental psychology as it is based on the statistical study of 
dichotomies, oppositions such as peripheral vs. central. And he advocated computer 
simulation models to fit the growing mass of available data into a single coherent theory of 
cognition. Kosslyn (2006) answers Newell that these data are to be integrated within a 
multi-level theory of cognition, “extraordinarily complex” (p. 1522), founded upon three 
distinct levels of studies. First, the upper level of computation (what does cognition 
compute) is the level of a black-box experimental psychology. Secondly, the middle level 
of the algorithm (how does cognition work to compute) is the level of a white-box 
phenomenological psychology, typically as in NDM qualitative studies or in 
psychophenomenological studies. Thirdly, the lower level of the “wetware” (the brain’s 
hardware that explains how the algorithm is computed) is the level of brain sciences, 
neurophysiology, brain imagery… 
Already, such an integration is part of hard sciences and, for instance, “contemporary 
neuroscience allows subjective report to be part of its methodology” (den Boer, 2008, p. 
380), introspective data186 being used today “in four different ways” (pp. 382-383) : 
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 Guided introspection Unguided introspection 
Weak introspection 
participants are asked to pay 
attention to perceiving stimulus, a 
procedure which is usual 
 
Strong introspection 
participants are specifically 
instructed to pay attention 
introspectively to what feelings are 
evoked by presentation of a 
sensory, visual, or auditory 
stimulus 
the participant is asked to pay 
attention to what he is currently 
experiencing without special 
relationship to an ongoing stimulus 
 
Neurophenomenology  
Same as strong introspection but 
without any relationship to an 
ongoing stimulus presentation; 
aiming at invariant self-organising 
structure of experience 
Table 11 The use of introspective data in neuroscientific investigations 
Thus, neurosciences study both “the immediate feltness of a feeling, and its perception by a 
subsequent reflective act” (James, 1890, p. 189) and seek to bridge the gap between 
cognition and brain processes. 
6.4. Conclusion : A summary of methodological requirements 
First, we must take great care of the subjects, in line with the prescriptions of the British 
Psychological Society, as we are dealing with a human subject and evoking the experience 
of trauma may trigger noxious feelings and reactions in him. 
From what precedes, we assume that our research method should also have the following 
characteristics : 
Required characteristics Opposite characteristics 
1) The focus of data collection is on an individual’s 
cognition during a given, delimited, situated, 
embodied and enacted episode of experience. 
The focus is on populations, or narratives of whole-
life experiences, of a “kind” of experiences (several 
ones), or on social interactions in a context of 
action… 
2) Data collection aims at producing a first-person 
narrative of such an experience. 
The protocol uses observations, think-aloud 
protocols, third-person accounts by witnesses, 
interviews of several participants in the event, group 
debriefings, category-based questionnaires, expert’s 
judgement… 
3) The subject’s interview protocol must help him to 
perform recalls of his authentic (= not interpreted, not 
reconstructed, not theorised) episodic memories of 
the episode of experience. The researcher must not 
censor the subject’s narration but only induce and 
guide recollections from episodic memory : any 
recollection is welcome as long as it has to do with 
the subject’s authentic cognitive experience of the 
episode under study, not with retrospective 
judgements and generalisations. 
Interviews allow the subject to narrate his personal 
theories or social reconstructions or an a posteriori 
reconstruction of the episode of experience.  
4) The processing of the narrative must allow to elicit 
cognitive operations performed by the subject during 
his experience through a semantic open-coding 
Interviews based on questionnaires are processed so 
as to elicit or to analyse pre-defined categories of 
different levels of abstraction or of decomposition ; 
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process ; refinement of the categories may occur 
through iterations between coded categories and the 
semantic analysis of the narrative as natural language 
takes a variety of forms to express a single concept 
(Watson, 2006). 
automatic text analysis software may be used to dig 
out words defined in a dictionary. 
5) As far as possible, data processing should prepare 
both for a purely qualitative, interpretative analysis, 
and for an exploratory factor analysis of the data 
extracted from the first-person narrative. Data 
analysis should rely as needed upon interactions 
between the two. 
Data analysis is quantitative only. 
Table 12 Methodological requirements for the research 
The next chapter presents the psycho-phenomenological foundations and general 
modalities of a first-person methodology. 
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CHAPTER 7. Phenomenological Psychology and its methodology 
Phenomenological Psychology seeks to study an individual’s experience of life from his 
inner, private, subjective standpoint. In this thesis, we assume an equivalence between the 
words “consciousness” and “cognition”, between “mental” and “cognitive”, between 
“subjective” and “cognitive”. This view is supported by Husserl (1977, p. 148, pp153-
157), Thompson (2007, p. 17), Dilthey (1977), Rouger (1969), Gusdorf (1951), Bachelard 
(1934), and by Marbach (1993) in particular who explains that “cognitive psychology and 
related philosophy of mind”, i.e. phenomenological psychology, share “their objects – i.e. 
mental phenomena – a systematic descriptive analysis of consciousness”. In this chapter, 
we recapitulate the fundamental assumptions of phenomenological psychology and present 
two methods that provide the foundations of our methodological apparatus, 
psychophenomenology for data collection, and phenomenography for data processing. 
7.1. History and principles of Phenomenological Psychology 
Phenomenology at large is the sum of three main currents of studies. First, Transcendental 
Phenomenology roughly postulates that things are not (just) what they are but what our 
relation to them makes them. It is interested187 in getting to the essence of things present in 
our world of activity through the variation of an individual’s subjective experience of 
them, which “allows us to view the world, not as a pre-given reality, but rather as 
constituted by consciousness” (Naudin et al., 1999). This branch of phenomenology is not 
the one we are interested in for this research. Secondly, Existential Phenomenology, or 
existentialism, is interested in the conditions of our freedom and free-will [Heidegger and 
Sartre are among the major philosophers in this branch of Phenomenology.]. This branch 
of phenomenology is also not the one we are interested in for this research. Third, 
Phenomenological Psychology is interested in our “pure subjectivity” i.e. in our inner 
experience of the world, with our cognitive experience of the world and, through the 
creation of sense that each cognitive act allows, in the progressive constitution of one’s 
Self, one’s identity and personality. In other words, it seeks to study the subjective 
experience of encounters with things and events at hand, the memories of these subjective 
(personal, private) experiences, and the compilation of these experiences into a life-history 
and the constitution of the Self.  
The history of Phenomenological Psychology saw it marginalised. Born with Brentano 
(1874), Phenomenological Psychology and the also newly born Scientific Psychology, 
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founded by Wundt188 worked hand in hand for some time (den Boer, 2008). Unfortunately, 
several factors189 contributed to marginalise the former and to leave the floor to 
Experimental Psychology and, later on, to Behaviourism (Thines, 1977, p. 56). The new 
“psychophysical, physiological, experimental” psychology, born in the nineteenth 
century190, “advanced so far as to make its psychological knowledge practically useful, just 
like physical and chemical knowledge” (Husserl, 1977, p. 3). As it could not match this 
performance, Phenomenological Psychology fainted away (Husserl, 1977, p. 1). But, as 
Husserl also reminds (1977, pp. 3-7), an early radical criticism marked scientific 
experimental psychology, and a first revival of the idea of Phenomenological Psychology 
came about in 1894 when Dilthey published his “Ideen über eine beschreibende und 
zergliedernde Psychologie” in the Sitzungsberichten der Berliner Akadamie. Dilthey, 
Husserl (1977) says, called for a “descriptive and analytic” psychology that would turn 
toward “internal experience”191, this task concerning the complex interaction of our mental 
acts192. Ryle (1949) and Skinner (1985) definitively forbade psychology to consider as 
scientific what is going on within one’s mind. Phenomenological Psychology was nearly 
ignored until 1975, Marbach (1993, p. 14) says, when consciousness became again an 
acceptable topic in psychology. The real “revival of interest for phenomenal 
consciousness” took place by the end of the eighties (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2007, p. 4). 
First, it demarcated itself from the old introspectionist temptation of early 
phenomenological psychology. Then, in the nineties, the objections to cartesian dualism 
(Damasio, 1994/2006) along with the emergence of Neurosciences raised the question of 
the embodied cognition and contributed to undermine the classic computer-like approach 
to cognition (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2007, pp. 4-5). 
Phenomenological psychology was conceived of as an “Act Psychology” (Thinès, 1977, p. 
56), in the sense of a “science of the disclosure of pure internality” by Husserl (1977, p. 
148). It sought to study our “consciousness” understood as the rolling flow of mental 
operations performed by an individual. Three elementary concepts are at its very root : 
• “Phenomena”, subjectively “experienced facts” (Thompson, 2007, p. 61), such as 
“affect, motivation, attention, habit” (Thompson, 2007, p. 17), are the central element 
of the experience of life by a given individual (Keen, 1975, p. 139).  
• Phenomena are pairs193 of {mental act ; mental object}194. They can be assimilated to 
cognitive operations.  
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• A “mental act” relates to, i.e. “intends” to a mental “object” in a necessary and 
unbreakable relation. This “basic feature was called intentionality” (Thompson, 
2007)195. 
The “Actus” (Husserl, 1977, p. 160) is the “connective force in the mind that links 
impressions and ideas in virtue of their simultaneous occurrence, proximity, or repeated 
succession” (Thompson, 2007, p. 31). We can understand actus as the sensemaking 
property of a series of cognitive operations, successive pairs of {cognitive act ; cognitive 
object} forming the cognitive process of Decision-Making-in-Action (DMA). 
Varela (1999) stresses that affects are “sculpting the dynamical landscape” of this 
cognitive process, possibly “emotional traces from past experiences” (Banakou et al., 
2013). Affects are characterised by Thompson (2007) as : 
• “Emotion”, an “outward movement [that is] the welling up of an impulse within that 
tends toward outward expression and action” (Thompson, 2007, pp. 363-364), in other 
words “a response to relational meaning […] a person’s sense of the harms and 
benefits in a particular person-environment relationship” (Lazarus, 1993b), the 
“awareness of a tonal shift” (Varela, 1999, p. 132), an experiential shock resulting 
from an object’s “affective allure” that acts as an attractor of consciousness toward new 
unexpectable directions (Thompson, 2007, chapter 9).  
• “Affect” : Affect must be understood here as “a dispositional trend proper to a 
coherent sequence of embodied actions” (Thompson, 2007). To clarify this notion, we 
can understand it as a binary “like / dislike”, “attraction / repulsion” feeling. 
• “Mood” “a background setting” that “favour particular emotions and interpretations 
[…]” (Thompson, 2007, pp. 378-379). 
“Affection” is to be understood as the impact on consciousness of what emerges in 
consciousness (Thompson, 2007, pp. 371-381). Its associated concepts is the “Affective 
Tone”, or “Affective Allure”, or “Affective Force” of the phenomenon at hand. The 
affective allure of a phenomenon contributes to the transition toward the next mental 
operation and can be seen as a notion close to James’ (1950, Volume 1, p. 258) concept of 
“fringe” : the “influence of a faint brain-process upon our thought, as it makes it aware of 
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relations and objects but dimly perceived” due to the “part of the object cognized, 
substantive qualities and things appearing to the mind in the fringe of relations.”.  
The “History of the I” (Husserl, 1977, p. 161), or I-History, is shaped by the successive 
“comprehensions of the world that persist for the subject” that also create 
“habitualities”196. The sum of these habitualities constitutes one’s personality (I-
Personality) and attitudes. 
The “Life-world” is our “everyday-world in which we live […] and the things that can be 
directly experienced within [it]” (Thompson, 2007, p. 34), which one can conceive of as an 
“openly infinite multiplicity” (Husserl, 1977, p.57). The successive constitutions of one’s 
life-world make-up his I-World as accumulated knowledge of one’s life-world. Thompson 
(2007, p. 34) says that the life-world, being imposed upon us (“always a pre-given”), 
serves as “the horizon of all our activities”. 
The “Horizons” that our various life-worlds (Schutz, 1987) set, select “the things of which 
we can experience” (Thompson, 2007, p. 35). 
Experience has a temporal dimension, the transitional “retention-protention” dialogue 
between past experiences and the open landscape of the future, anticipations of all forms.  
The “Present Moment” (Stern, 2004 ; Gusdorf, 1951 ; Bachelard, 1934) is the unit of the 
subjective experience, a “living present” (Schutz, 1987 ; Keen, 1975 ; Thompson, 2007 ; 
Marbach, 1993 ; Varela, 1999). The Present Moment is a kairos197, a “passing moment in 
which something happens” (Stern, ibid, pp5-7). 
7.2. The episode of experience as research object 
This research is based on a fundamental epistemological assumption.  
We assume its object is a given “episode of experience”, i.e. a given, delimited, situated, 
embodied and enacted episode of action. Within an episode of experience, the “Present 
Moment” (PM) is the smallest sensemaking unit of experience remembered and narrated by 
a subject. In the narration of a PM, the subject relates a transformation of circumstances or 
of his own relation to circumstances.  
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A PM can only loosely be assimilated to a decision-making cycle. A PM is potentially 
made of a number of “decision-making cycles”. Theoretically, decision-making cycles are 
the smallest portion of cognitive process that spans between an initial cognitive stimulus 
and the corresponding response of the subject, an action in the physical world. The longer 
the PM’s duration, the more decision cycles are likely to be performed by the subject. 
When short, a few seconds for Stern (2004) for instance, PM and decision cycle are one 
same cognitive process.  
The narration of a PM may omit some, possibly many, decision cycles, for instance when 
the PM is not a memorable experience of a neutral valence (Gusdorf, 1951), or not 
interesting or acceptable to narrate (Watson, 2006 ; Gardner, 2001) from the subject’s 
social stance.  
Therefore, the recall and narration of elementary decision cycles being uncertain during 
interviews, this leaves the qualitative researcher with narratives of larger-than-decision-
cycles stretches of cognitive processes, i.e. Present Moments. 
Like elementary decision cycles, Lieutenant A’s narrative shows that PMs are demarcated 
by a triggering cognitive stimulus as their beginning, and a resulting action, or series of 
actions, as their end. 
The present research seeks to analyse the pattern of the cognitive process of each PM and 
the general cognitive pattern of the entire episode of experience. 
7.3. The Present Moment (PM) and associated epistemological assumptions 
7.3.1. The Present Moment as sensemaking narrated unit of experience 
Daniel Stern is a Medical Doctor and Professor of Psychiatry at the Cornell Medical 
School. Like Guitton (1988), Stern’s (2004, p. XI) therapeutic practice focuses on “small 
elementary events that make up our worlds of experience”. 
The Present Moment (PM) is the “process unit for [such] experiences” (Stern, 2004, p. 
20). It is the smallest segment of the “actual experience, a subjectively lived happening 
[…] lived with feelings and actions taking place in real time, in the real world, with real 
people” (ibid) that the subject can narrate. It is (Stern, 2004, pp. 31-40) the “felt experience 
of what happens during a short stretch of consciousness”.  
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PMs have sense for the subject because they each have a “trigger”: “something must 
happen to bring them to psychological life” (ibid, p. 56), they each are “structured around 
a plot” (p. 57), and they each “have a line of dramatic tension” (p. 57). 
7.3.2. Duration of a PM 
The objective length of a PM can vary from a “short duration” of some seconds (ibid) to 
several minutes. A victim rescue intervention at the BSPP lasts 40 to 60 minutes for 
instance and this episode of experience is made of several PMs, the length of which should 
range from several seconds to several minutes.  
From a subjective perspective, Bergson (1934) says it is vague (“flottant”, floating), 
“related to the attention we pay to our life”, the Present Moment “taking just as much 
space as that effort of attention”. For Gusdorf (1951, p. 18) “The objective duration of the 
Present Moment varies to a considerable extent, but, beyond doubt, it can last for a 
considerable period of time : we can say ‘now’ of the entire hour we spend in the dentist’s 
chair or of the whole morning spent to solve a baffling problem” (p. 11) : “The 
consciousness of time bears on what fills-up this time and not on the abstract framework of 
its duration” (p. 13). The “unit” that measures time in our awareness of the Present 
Moment is “the unit of the drama or of the adventure I am currently experiencing” (p. 
42198).  
7.3.3. PM, valence and faculty to be remembered 
The Present Moment can be understood “as the consciousness of […] a concrete 
situation.” (Gusdorf, 1951). “Concrete”, as in “concrete memory” (“mémoire concrète”) is 
the key characterisation of the Present Moment for Gusdorf (1951, pp. 76-80), and each 
moment of our experience can be remembered in two distinct ways : an abstract and a 
concrete one.  
Abstraction lies in the fact that once the Present Moment is gone we retain its meaning (p. 
77). This abstract memory is “deprived of any reference to the authentic time that we 
experienced” (ibid199). Our “abstract memory” is “what is left when we forgot everything, a 
memory that transcends reality” (p. 79200).  
Our concrete memories, on the opposite, seem “useless, intervening only by chance in our 
present experience, always surprising us” (ibid201). They would be “expanding, a memory 
of luxury and magnificence, a historical self-awareness revealing the plenitude of what I 
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was once” (pp. 78-79202). The memorised “pieces” (p. 79) of a past Present Moment (pp. 
69-76) “revive, often in an unexpected fashion, such or such past moment in the plenitude 
of its original taste” (p. 76203) and “may be useful in the construction of new Present 
Moments” (p. 79204).  
“Abstract Memory” refers to the autobiographical knowledge derived from experience.  
“Concrete Memory” is the episodic memory of the flow of a given episode of experience, 
with its texture and details. 
Gusdorf (1951, p. 29, p. 40) says meaningless or “uninteresting” moments may seem very 
long while very little remembered, and very meaningful or intense (p. 37) moments can be 
very short but vividly memorised. Unremembered Present Moments are those which did 
not engage us because the perspective they bore was annoying, mediocre, or even 
worthless to us (p. 34).  
The Present Moments we memorise in our concrete memory are those that have a valence, 
an “affective value” (Gusdorf, 1951, p. 35). The affective quality of a Present Moment is 
what will make it more or less easy to recall. It is the resonance of the situation with the 
subject’s history, his “Total Present” (Gusdorf, 1951). A historical moment, says Gusdorf 
(1951, p. 37), is one of a decisive importance, one that reshapes my Total Present. A 
Critical Incident is such a historical moment. It is a high affective valence Present Moment. 
It is a shock, that “questions me in the immediate violence of the situation, that leaves me 
incapable to analyse what is going on, that I feel directly as the death of life values, a 
surprising image only commented by the shock in me, felt as a whole, and subsisting in me 
as a whole, which I later retrieve in me as a whole with its emotional power” (ibid205).  
7.3.4. Demarcating Present Moments 
It is posited in the present study that Present Moments will be demarcated by : 
• An initial context, preceding the start of the Present Moment : by convention an 
“action”, the one the subject last performed, or a “state” (of “being in the world” : the 
subject stands in his world of life, in a state of idleness or in waiting)206. 
• A trigger : the beginning of a Present Moment will be the acquisition of a fact 
constituting an initial cognitive stimulus, a situation at hand. 
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• A cognitive trajectory, or cognitive process, made up of a sequence of various 
cognitive operations sparked one after another and creating a tension toward a decision 
or urge to act upon the initial cognitive stimulus207. 
• A conclusion, a new ad hoc action or state marking the end of the PM’s plot. 
7.4. The methods of Phenomenological Psychology 
Our first endeavour was to establish a method that would allow the collection and the 
analysis of a given, delimited, situated, embodied, enacted episode of experience and its 
PMs. 
7.4.1. Psychophenomenology as data collection method 
Phenomenological Psychology has had the ambition to be a science of consciousness but it 
never produced a widely adopted working methodology. One could argue that cognitive 
psychology is such a methodology. Psychophenomenology is the methodology that 
materialises this ambition. 
Psycho-phenomenology, Maurel (2008) says in Expliciter208, is a “branch of psychology the 
aims of which are to develop a method to access the subject’s subjective experience and to 
develop the descriptive categories and conceptual definitions necessary for this 
description”209. It is a regular reference in neuroscience (Varela, 1999, den Boer, 2008). 
Research in Psycho-Phenomenology started in the mid eighties when Pierre Vermersch 
(2006, p. 173), in the animation of error analysis workshops in the fields of Education and 
Work Psychology, felt the need to help other researchers to study how teachers and 
students in class were dealing intellectually with problems at hand. 
The “Elicitation Interview” (EI) is the practical method to access the subjects’ episodic 
memories of a given, delimited, situated, embodied and enacted episode of experience in 
order to elicit his authentic cognition of the time. Vermersch (2006) assigned it three goals 
: 
1. To help the interviewer to get information on how the interviewee performs a specific 
task in order to find out which difficulties he faces and how he deals with them, the 
possible causes of his erroneous or unsuccessful behaviours, or on the opposite the 
factors that lead to success, or else to understand the cognitive process involved in the 
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performance of the task, i.e. the aims the individual sets, the reasoning he does, the 
knowledge he mobilises, the way he represents the situation, … (p. 18)210.  
2. To help the interviewee to inform himself : expliciting one’s own inner cognitions 
helps an individual to raise his awareness of how he processes tasks at hand 
(Vermersch,2006, pp. 27-29). It is a pedagogy “based on a reflexive going back to 
one’s experience”211 (ibid) that “helps the learner to reflect on his own ways of 
thinking”212. 
3. To teach the interviewee how to inform himself about “how he knows he performs a 
specific act” : learning metacognitive skills that can be mobilised in action to help the 
subject to better control his own cognition and, by way of consequence, his action 
(ibid, p29)213. 
The principle of the Elicitation Interview is to obtain from the subject a “re-
presentification” (Vermersch, 2006, p. 57), i.e. a controlled cognitive re-experiencing, of a 
past, given, delimited, situated, embodied and enacted episode of action.  
Being guided (second-person interview technique) to recall episodic memories of this 
episode, the subject can narrate it (into a first-person narrative = on the “I…” mode) in 
great details as his memory is rich of conscious and pre-conscious cognitive operations and 
actions performed at the time of action.  
The EI directs the subject’s attention to his authentic cognition and action of the time, and 
avoids his a posteriori reconstructions, interpretations and generalisations (Vermersch, 
1999). For the researcher to detect these elements “that stand there in front of us [and that] 
can be unveiled only if one has the idea to look for them”214, Vermersch (2006, pp. 43-52) 
has synthesised from research a taxonomy215 of the elements that can be recalled from 
episodic memory. They are categories of the subject’s actions, cognitions and “peripheral 
data”216 (ibid, p. 43) : 
Procedural data (Doing) : 
• Elementary actions performed 
• Mental operations performed 
• Practical know-how used 
Contextual data (Externalities) : 
• Circumstances encountered 
• Environment 
Judgmental data (Metaposition217) : 
• Subjective evaluations of one’s experience 
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• Beliefs about one’s actions and cognitions 
Declarative data (Knowledge) : 
• Theoretical knowledge mobilised 
• Procedural instructions 
• Regulatory instructions 
Intentional data (Goals & Motives) : 
• Goals or (temporary) sub-goals pursued 
• De facto, circumstantial ad hoc intentions or motives 
Table 13 Vermersch’s (2006) taxonomy of typical phenomenological recollections 
Some comments should be added : 
• Sensations, sensori-motor data, are not mentioned by Vermersch as they were not part 
of his domain of research, education. They are body-related contextual data. 
• Emotions are merely considered by him as part of the textural data : “some [authors] 
also include emotional tone as a descriptive element attached to action” (Vermersch, 
2006, p. 202), maybe again as his research was centred mainly on education in the 
classroom. 
• Practical know-how, routines, is included by Vermersch into procedural data. 
• Intentional data do not include a specific form of motivation (as “Driving force or 
forces responsible for the initiation, persistence, direction, and vigour of goal-directed 
behaviour. It includes the biological drives such as hunger, thirst, sex, and self-
preservation, and also social forms of motivation such as need for achievement and 
need for affiliation.” (Colman, 2006, p. 479)). 
• What Vermersch refers to when he uses the term evaluation can be an a posteriori, 
post-action global subjective judgement of one’s handling one’s action (Vermersch, 
2006, p. 47). If Vermersch attracts our attention to this kind of autobiographical 
elements, it is because subjects may insert in their narrative retrospective judgements 
that do not pertain in the actual experience itself and they must be avoided. But 
judgements are also made as the course of action progresses : they are thoughts, a 
reflection upon the meaning and sense of the experience in progress. The researcher 
must not mix them up. 
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• With regard to our focus on the cognitive processing of the experience, in the course of 
his action a subject may become aware of his own cognitive processing of the situation 
at hand. Metacognitions are a sub-category of procedural data.  
• “Knowledge” should be understood as knowledge of the facts of the world and of our 
body. One’s attitudes towards life, people, objects and issues, sense of life, and 
assumptions about the world are likely to be recalled by the subject as part of his past 
experience. 
During the interview or during its analysis, this taxonomy helps the interviewer to 
segregate authentic, episode-specific phenomenological recollections from a posteriori 
reconstructions and theorisations of the subject’s experience (Vermersch, 2006, p. 45). It 
helps : 
• To draw the researcher’s attention to the “parasites” of phenomenal narration, the 
judgmental data that are often included within the narrative, as the subject reflects 
retrospectively on his experience, elements of his metamemory (Brewer, 1995), 
retrospective “beliefs about the operation of their own mental processes” formed after 
the events, and of which Vermersch (2006, p. 47) provides examples : “it didn’t work… 
I didn’t do much…it was difficult… I’m not very pleased with myself, etc…”. 
• To cue recalls from subjects’ autobiographical memory as the taxonomy shows the 
diverse paths the researcher can take to help the subject to reconnect with a given 
episode of his past experience. 
In summary, the EI appears as a method that rigorously helps the researcher to focus the 
subject’s attention on the authentic elements of his cognitive experience at the time of the 
episode of action he narrates. The EI does not allow free narrations and seeks to avoid 
social and narrative biases : retrospective interpretations, generalisations and 
reconstructions of the authentic cognitive experience. Thus, the first-person narrative so 
produced should allow to unveil the cognitive operations and processes of Decision-
Making-in-Action, nothing else, in a radically empiricist (James, 1904) epistemological 
stance. 
Once these data collected, what can the researcher do with them ? 
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7.4.2. Phenomenography as a formal description of the cognitive experience 
In traditional phenomenological psychology as well as with psychophenomenology, 
narratives are usually freely analysed through open coding, clustering and interpretation 
(Creswell, 2007 ; Moustakas, 1994). 
Phenomenography is the idea of a formal modelling or description of the cognitive 
experience related in a first-person narrative. 
For Marbach (1993, p. 9) a “phenomenography” of the cognitive objects of experience is a 
“conceptual notation or ideograph)”, which he deems “indispensable […] in a domain 
where even the phenomena to be studied scientifically are elusive, as it is the case with 
mental activities”. 
Marbach (1993, p 7) explains that “in order to convey a truly scientific content to the 
terms/concepts that cognitive psychology and related philosophy of mind use for 
determining their objects – i.e. mental phenomena – a systematic descriptive analysis of 
consciousness in its own nature must be presupposed”. 
For this purpose, he posits that a “language of phenomenology” conceived as “an 
intersubjectively available tool”, a formal “notation”, a “precise language”218, should be 
introduced for the purpose of “communicating phenomenological results”. Through such a 
formal notation, mental phenomena could be described, both in their static and dynamic 
structures219. Mental Operations were rendered in Marbach’s phenomenological notation 
(Marbach, 1993, pp. 25-40) in an algebraic form. One of the simplest examples Marbach 




][( −  
This strange and unconventional notation describes a cognitive operation (Marbach, 1993) 
: 
• a recall (REP) of object “x” as it was perceived = [PER]x while perceiving object y = 
(PER)y, 
• “REP” = Representing, recalling (a cognitive act made upon what follows the “–“), 
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• “PER” = Perceiving (this is a cognitive act), 
• “x” and “y” = cognitive objects involved in the cognitive acts, 
• “()” or “[]” demarcating the terms of the cognitive operation. 
Other examples are provided by Marbach (1993) describe more complicated cognitive 
operations and become more complicated to interpret. No practical application of this 
notation could be found. 
In this research, provided both static and dynamic dimensions be taken into account, we 
define a phenomenography as the data processing stage of the formal description and 
modelling of an episode of cognitive experience. 
7.5. The structure of the episode of cognitive experience 
From what precedes we can derive a general model of the cognitive experience of a 
singular episode of action narrated by a subject in an Elicitation Interview : 
 
Figure 10 The general model of the cognitive experience 
An episode of lived experience a subject narrates has two main components : Present 
Moments (PM), and holes, i.e. PMs not remembered or not narrated by the subject.  
  108 
Present Moments are demarcated by criteria such as the initial perception of a change in 
the scene (Stern, 2004, p. 14) and a final action. Present Moments are decomposed into a 
sequence of cognitive operations. 
Cognitive operations are posited to be performed in sequence : neurosciences suggest that 
a cognitive operation corresponds in the brain to a global mental state, a large-scale global 
synthesis (Varela, 1999 ; Lutz et al., 2002 ; Dehaene et al., 2006 ; Naccache, 2006). Global 
syntheses occur in sequence220, each one lasting between 250 millisecond and several 
seconds.  
At the time of the actual lived experience, cognitive operations may have been 
(Vermersch, 2006 ; Dehaene et al., 2006) either conscious i.e. either reflexive (= as we 
perform them we are fully aware of them), or pre-reflexive (or pre-conscious = as we 
perform them we are not aware of them). Conscious and pre-conscious cognitive 
operations are encoded into episodic memory (Damasio, 1994, p142 ; Conway, 2004) and 
can be recalled and narrated during an EI.  
A Cognitive Operation is an undissociable pair of {Cognitive Act ; Cognitive 
Object}(Husserl, 1977 ; Rouger, 1969 ; Thinès, 1977 ; Thompson, 2007). Cognitive Acts 
are functions that, applied to Cognitive Objects, produce the meaning (Varela, 1999, pp. 
134-137 ; Dehaene, 2006) that makes the cognitive process in progress move on. Cognitive 
acts belong in various types and include “impressions, sense feelings, perceptions, 
memories, expectations, multiple types of judicative knowing, valuing, desiring, willing” 
(Husserl, 1977, p. 11). Cognitive objects also belong in various types : self, others, objects, 
ideas, plans, and more generally any focus of the attention of one’s consciousness. 
In the light of the elements gained through this first part of the study, the next chapter 
details the research question exposed in the abstract of this report. 
7.6. Conclusion : Refining the research question 
We can now summarise the assumptions entailed by the research question presented in the 
conclusion of chapter 3 and situate it within the entire problem space developed earlier.  
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7.6.1. Summary of the argument (the problem space) 
For fire-fighters, experiencing Critical Incidents (CI) during interventions in the field is 
common, and the more so as they are under regular attacks from human beings, or even 
from dangerous dogs. CIs are of a traumatic nature. One essential characteristics of trauma 
exposure is peritraumatic dissociation. The exposure to trauma is said to be capable to 
affect people’s capacity to perform. But real life cases heard of at the BSPP or read in 
Critical Incident reports show that fire-fighters usually manage to resume and complete 
their mission after the exposure221, as in the case of Lieutenant A. This aptitude of the 
subject to surmount traumatism at the time of exposure is called Peritraumatic resilience 
(PTR). We assume it is the outcome of DMA (Decision-Making-in-Action). DMA is the 
cognitive process that controls a subject’s performance during a given, delimited, situated, 
embodied and enacted episode of action. Under the circumstances of a CI, this process is 
assumed to yield three coping capabilities essential to PTR : getting-by, resisting, and 
resuming. And if it does so, it is possibly because DMA includes ad hoc metacognitive 
processes. To capture these personal cognitive and metacognitive processes after the events 
in the absence of traces and video records, a first-person methodology is required to access 
the subject’s episodic memory and to allow him to recall the authentic elements of his 
cognition and action of the time of his actual experience rather than his retrospective social 
and theoretical reconstructions, reinterpretations and generalisations of the events. Such a 
methodology is based upon epistemological assumptions inherited from 
psychophenomenology, which can be itself considered as a particular form of retrospective 
verbal protocol. 
7.6.2. Hypothesis 
Within the cognitive process of DMA, peritraumatic resilience might result from 
metacognitive processes yielding the required ad hoc coping capabilities (getting-by, 
resisting, resuming). 
7.6.3. The object of the research 
The episode of experience is the fundamental object of the research. We posit, along with 
phenomenological psychology, that the Present Moment (PM) is the subject’s unit of 
narration of his lived experience. PMs are made of a sequence of cognitive operations 
(CogOp) forming the cognitive process that fires a response (an action) of the subject to an 
initial cognitive stimulus. 
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7.6.4. The objectives of the research 
This research is an investigation into the cognitive processes of DMA that underlie 
Lieutenant A’s peritraumatic experience of a Critical Incident (CI) during a victim rescue 
intervention. During this intervention, he is exposed to an attack from two rottweiler dogs 
and is subsequently caught in the middle of the heavy gun shooting by police officers 
attempting to kill the animals. 
The present research seeks to analyse the cognitive pattern of Lieutenant A’s episode of 
experience and of the cognitive process of each Present Moment that compose it, and to 
explicit how peritraumatic resilience is yielded in this context. 
To this end, it aims at : 
• Elaborating the methodological framework allowing to perform the study of Lieutenant 
A’s case within the frame of the various constraints and hypotheses expressed in Part 1. 
• Showing if the Elicitation Interview protocol can trigger and guide the subject’s recall 
of authentic (not reconstructed) cognitive elements from his episodic memory. 
• Modelling the subject’s cognitive activity in a manner that elicits cognitive operations 
(CogOp) and reveals cognitive trajectories, i.e. patterned sequences of CogOps. 
• Studying the link between DMA and PTR as it is posited that the latter stems from 
metacognitive processes within the former. 
• Using the associated cognitive models and findings to elaborate a metacognitive 
training framework aimed at preparing fire-fighters (and other people working in high 
risk environments) for the peritraumatic experience of potential CIs. 
7.6.5. The limits of the research 
There are two essential limits to the present research :  
1. We perform an idiographic case study, with its inherent limitations and its 
methodological differences with positivist, statistical research.  
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2. The validity of the study relies upon the accuracy and authenticity of the subject’s 
episodic memory recalls. 
As we shall see, the Elicitation Interview (EI) allows the subject to recall a great number of 
actions and cognitive operations he performed at the time of the actual episode. But we 
cannot be guaranteed that he recalls all of them, that he does not hide some of them, and 
even that he does not discretely reconstructs some of them. These are limits one must keep 
in mind, and they justify the precautions taken along this research in order to avoid these 
biases as far as feasible. 
As for the idiographic character of the study, we shall see that the significant number of 
cognitive operations and actions (all called CogOps to simplify our discourse) stimulates a 
quantitative analysis of data gained from the case. Here again lies one limitation, inherent 
to the nature and context of the production of those data. Distributions are not normal and 
ad hoc quantitative methods have been adopted. 
With these elements in mind, the next part of the report presents the methodological 
framework created for the present study and later similar research. 
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Part 2. THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
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CHAPTER 8. The research method : Pheno-Cognitive Analysis 
(PCA) 
Part 2 describes in detail the Pheno-Cognitive Analysis methodological framework created 
for the present research. This framework has been the object of progressive refinements 
and has concentrated much of the effort spent on the latter in order to facilitate data 
analysis. First, this chapter, following the recommendations of Creswell (2007), Silverman 
(2006), Willig (2008), presents the epistemological foundations and an overview of the 
PCA framework. Secondly, later chapters of Part 2 detail its successive phases, and 
elements of memoing (Creswell, 2007) help the reader to trace the steps taken in its 
creation.  
8.1. Assumptions constitutive of the PCA framework 
The assumptions that frame the PCA framework are : 
• A research object : An individual’s given, delimited, situated, embodied and enacted 
episode of cognitive experience, performed in the field, in natural settings not in 
laboratory conditions, during which a Critical Incident occurs. The case is that of 
Lieutenant A. 
• A conceptual framework : 
• Ontological : The research aims at describing and studying the structure, processes, 
variations and other characteristics of the research object. 
• Epistemological : The research is radically empirical and seeks to collect data 
depicting a subject’s authentic cognitive experience of a Critical Incident (CI) 
during a specific victim rescue intervention, away from his general theories and 
social reconstructions of such circumstances. 
• Axiological : The goals of the research are to investigate the cognitive processes of 
Decision Making in Action (DMA) that underlie Lieutenant A’s peritraumatic 
experience of a Critical Incident (CI) during a victim rescue intervention, and to 
show whether or not it is possible to study retrospectively, out of his Episodic 
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Memory, the subject’s cognitive experience of this given episode of experience, 
here including a Critical Incident. 
• Methodological : The study of the subject’s cognition is performed on the basis of a 
guided recall of the subject’s authentic episodic memories of the particular episode 
of concern to this research. Authentic means recalling and narrating the actions and 
cognitive operations actually performed by the subject at the time of events. 
• A research paradigm, i.e. a scientific approach to data collection, processing and 
analysis that entails its own questions and methods. In the present case, a psycho-
phenomenological “white box” approach to the cognitive processes that control a 
subject’s performance. 
• An interpretative framework, a particular “lens” through which to make sense of 
results during the discussion. Metacognition, and in particular metacognitive training, 
is the perspective chosen in this research. 
• A methodological ambition to design and describe an effective, consistent PCA 
framework, and to contribute NDM research through the cognitive study of individual 
decision-making in action, of the experience of trauma in action, and of peritraumatic 
resilience. 
8.2. Overall presentation of the PCA process 
The process of a Pheno-Cognitive Analysis comprises the following phases : 
• Data collection : Chapter 9 details the principles of the Elicitation Interview (EI) used 
to allow the subject to recall his authentic episodic memories of the episode under 
study, and provides precise guidelines for its conduct and for the transcription of the 
narrative. This chapter also presents the basic principles of the immersion in the field 
that may be (and was in the present study) run before performing EIs. 
• Data processing : Chapter 10 presents the origins, principles and guidelines for the 
semantic parsing of the narrative into speech clauses, their chronological resequencing 
into a chronotext, the elicitation of cognitive operations (CogOp)222 and the elaboration 
of a taxonomy of their constituting cognitive acts (CogAct) and cognitive objects 
(CogObj), and the elaboration of the basic cognitive model of the subject’s experience, 
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the cognigraph. It also provides guidelines for the production of the Decision 
Networks, derived from the cognigraph, that reveal the statistical patterns of DMA.  
• Data analysis, discussion and conclusion : Chapter 11 recapitulates the guidelines 
learned from the research in relation to : 
• The interpretation of Decision Networks and the analysis of DMA223 patterns. 
• The categorical analysis of the inter-variation of DMA patterns, as successive PMs 
are likely to have cognitive trajectories of different patterns. 
• The Exploratory Factors Analysis intended to search the factors of the intra-
variation of DMA patterns, as each DMA pattern is likely to take a variety of 
shapes. 
• The categorical and qualitative analyses of peritraumatic resilience (PTR) and its 
factors. 
• The elaboration of models of DMA and PTR that synthesise Lieutenant A’s case 
study. 
• The discussion of the results of the analysis in the light of our interpretative 
framework. The discussion takes two perspectives : a topical one, that is to say the 
perspective under which the findings of the study can be used or critically analysed. 
Namely, the findings of the study of DMA, the experience of trauma in action and 
peritraumatic resilience are considered from the point of view of metacognitive 
training, i.e. training in advance people for potential Critical Incidents that might 
occur in the course of their (dangerous) activity. The second perspective is 
epistemological and exposes the limits of the methodological approach adopted in 
this study.  
• The general conclusions of the research and the identification of further research 
work. 
The PCA process described in this section is made of a number of detailed tasks, 
intermediate objects, flows and results that are modelled in the following diagram : 
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Figure 11 The process of a Pheno-Cognitive Analysis 
The next chapter provides guidelines for the data collection phase. 
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CHAPTER 9. Data collection and the Elicitation Interview (EI) 
This section is mainly based on Vermersch (2006). It presents the principles that guided 
Elicitation Interviews (EI) in this research. An EI helps an individual to recall from his 
Autobiographical Memory the sequence of actions and cognitive operations he performed 
during a particular episode of lived experience, along with their textural features224. This 
technique was used to collect the data of the central case of this research (Lieutenant A). 
9.1. The immersion in the field of research 
Researchers in social sciences, for instance Fivush et al. (1995, p. 344) and Ross (1991), 
adhere to the common idea that narratives are recreations of the subject’s authentic 
experience aimed at allowing the listener to experience the event with the teller. In the 
context of a guided recall of episodic memories, an element of intersubjectivity between 
the interviewer and the interviewee is therefore present. The former must come on the 
grounds of the latter as highlighted by Varela & Shear (1999, p. 10) and Stern (2004). That 
coming on the same grounds is facilitated first by the recognition by the interviewee that 
the interviewer has real connections with his world of activity. This is one of the 
justifications of a preparatory immersion in the field, whenever it is feasible, before 
conducting Elicitation Interviews. 
The immersion in the field of a PCA research is meant to get some "knowledge of a 
minuscule human group by observing and describing their intimate singularities" (Bloch, 
2006). 
It allows to understand what Bloch calls their "tacit knowledge [...] that allows everyone to 
perform the numerous inferences that confer daily life with a manner apparently so little 
thought of" (p. 21), "the contextual setting of the task performed" (Gallagher, 2007, p. 81) 
beyond their likely "meta discourse" (Bloch, 2006) made of "standardised declarations 
provided as answers to expected questions" (ibid, p. 41). 
The researcher’s insertion in the world of his target subject(s) can be performed according 
to Copans’ (2005) recommendations : 
• A unit of analysis : ritual activities, daily activities and exceptional circumstances; 
• An object : subject’s "tacit knowledge" (Bloch, 2006); 
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• A "participant observation" (Copans, 2005, p. 101) involving : 
• A public and professional validation of the researcher by the community in which he is 
inserted. This can be done through a period of training shared with members of the 
community. 
• The use of the community’s language and codes : learning and speaking their language 
made of a lot of acronyms (CCOT, BCOT, BOT, BEP, PSR, ...), wearing their uniform, 
keeping hair short if they have it short, even resorting on the community’s hairdresser 
services as a supplementary mode and sign of insertion, sharing the community’s 
routine life (morning activities, lunch breaks, duty shifts, etc.), getting acquainted with 
managers, intermediate staff and men of the rank. 
• A focus on observation more than on authorities' discourse : this is achieved by 
listening to conversations and exchanges between members of the community, victims, 
hospital staff and Firemen, etc., as well as to dialogs between command posts and 
vehicles dispatched in the field, etc. 
• An organisation of the researcher’s daily presence structured in five steps as in Copans 
(2005, pp. 36-42) : Arrival and installation, Integration and routine, Experience of 
surprising and critical moments, Departure, Follow-up. 
9.2. Finding subjects 
Subjects are selected on the basis of a suspicion that they might have experienced trauma 
in action. The process by which they are referred to the researcher should, as much as 
possible, guarantee the confidentiality of their participation. After they give their consent 
to take part in a Pheno-Cognitive Analysis, they must be called and explained the goals and 
principles of the study, and the researcher must check the likeliness of their traumatic 
experience, at this stage taking precautions not to disclose too much of the exact nature of 
the work to be done together in order to avoid that they start reconstructing their story 
beforehand. Having got their consent a meeting must be arranged for the Elicitation 
Interview (EI), at a location most convenient for them during their service. Similar 
precautions must be repeated at the start of the Elicitation Interview sessions to secure their 
good understanding of the research process. 
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The verification of the reality of their experience of trauma in action can be performed at 
the earliest during the EI, or a posteriori on the basis of the Immediate Stress Questionnaire 
(ISQ). 
9.3. Contracting the EI and the “contextual priming” of phenomenal 
recollections 
Contextual priming consists for the researcher to induce the appropriate attitude in the 
subject so as to frame, to orient his remembering onto authentic elements of his original 
cognitive experience : a given, delimited, situated, embodied and enacted episode of 
cognitive experience and the evocation of the authentic, original elements of cognition 
experienced by the subject himself during this episode. Beyond, contracting the EI means 
that the subject and the researcher formally adhere to the rules and conditions of the EI. 
For Robinson (1995) and Bartlett (1932) the perspective set at the beginning of an 
interview session by the researcher shapes the subject’s “state of mind” and his recalls. The 
subject’s induced attitude guides his “remembering. Attitude [being] an inclusive term 
covering motivation, emotion, and interests” (Robinson, 1995, p. 200). Klein (1970) 
“proposed a framework for relating individual emotional and cognitive styles to account 
for perception and memory”, Jenkins (1979) and Tulving (1983) who “argued that a 
person’s cognitive state is an important determinant of memory encoding and retrieval”. 
Vermersch (2006) suggests to take great care of establishing an appropriate relational 
climate at the start of an EI session, a clear “contract” between the researcher and the 
subject that must be well understood by the subject and agreed by him (Vermersch, 2006, 
pp. 105-110). The main lines of this contract, which is the first step of contextual priming, 
include : 
• Choosing a location and time convenient for the subject and quiet225 
• Clarifying the fact that the interview is confidential and no personal data will be passed 
on to the hierarchy 
• Explaining that confidentiality (anonymity) will be respected in later publications if 
any 
• Clarifying the goals and method of the EI, the role of the researcher and of the subject 
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• Making clear that the EI has nothing to do with an inquiry 
• Asking clearly that the subject delivers honestly data pertinent to the goals of the 
research. 
More specifically, in Vermersch (2006)226 it is recommended to explain to the subject : 
• His right to pull off at any time without justification, especially if he or she feels 
uncomfortable. This echoes the common view, expressed by Gusdorf (1951), Van der 
Kolk (1997) or else Thompson (2007) that due to the high affective value of the mental 
states associated with the experience of Critical Incidents, very strong feelings could be 
triggered at recollection time, and therefore there is a risk of psychological disturbance 
for the subject (as well as for the researcher)227. 
• The methodological principles of the EI and especially what is expected from the 
subject : 
• A first-person narration of his or her experience; i.e. in the form of “I …” and NOT 
“we …” nor “one …”228. 
• A narration bearing exclusively on the particular episode of experience, the 
intervention for which the subject agreed to take part in the EI, not his personal 
theories about what happened or what he or she should have done, nor his general 
knowledge of similar facts. 
• A narration of his or her own authentic experience : his / her own perceptions, 
feelings, thoughts, actions of the time, not the type of verbal report they would 
provide in an inquiry, nor socially correct ready-made phrases, interpretations, etc. 
• A true report of his or her experience, unfalsified, honest, and uncensored229. 
Vermersch, in a number of issues of Expliciter230, insists on perlocutory effects, i.e. 
the impact on the other person of what is said or asked. It is important to say to the 
subject that he must not tell what he thinks might be interesting to the interviewer, 
but rather anything authentic that pops up in his mind during his or her narration. 
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From a formal point of view, Vermersch’s (2006, pp. 108-110) recommendations match 
those of the British Psychological Society231. 
Contextual priming is a sine qua non condition of the evocation, the re-presentification (re-
living) of the subject’s past experience. 
9.4. Principles of the Elicitation Interview : from recalls to evocation 
Vermersch (2006, pp. 86-87, 57, 58, 59) presents the two theoretical principles of the 
evocation of a given past experience is possible :  
• “Re-presentification”232 : When narrating “is not anchored in the situation of reference, 
most of the time it brings only unspecific, general, and often very poor elements of 
information [about one’s experience] though [that experience] may have been very 
rich”, says Vermersch (2006, p. 58). Re-presentification233 (Varela, 1999, p. 127) is the 
“pure evocation” narrative stance234. During the narration, re-presentification is a re-
living in thought now the subject’s past experience, including his presence to his body-
then235 and to his world-then236, a re-embodiment and re-situatedness of that past 
experience. If properly primed (and guided) the subject “at the moment he narrates a 
past situation, is present in thought to the lived experience of this situation” 
(Vermersch, 2006, p. 57). 
• and “Subjective cueing”237 : Re-presentification means to be in contact with one’s past 
experience when narrating it, (Vermersch, 2006, p. 58), and it is the interviewer’s 
priority to constantly “guide the subject toward this narrative stance as it is not 
spontaneous, being not encouraged socially, both in family education and school 
teaching” (Vermersch, 2006, p. 59). It “therefore requires active guiding, which 
constitutes an actual form of mediation” (ibid). 
The process of the evocation allows the subject to recall even pre-conscious and pre-
reflexive238 episodic memories239. 
9.5. Inducing the evocation : getting in touch with a past experience 
The researcher starts inducing the evocation process as early as the start of the Elicitation 
Interview through contextual priming. 
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Even if the subject takes part in the EI on a voluntary basis, it is the researcher’s role to 
induce the process. This is, says Vermersch (2006, p. 124), a most difficult task for the 
researcher who often “creates himself difficulties by uttering negative-inductive 
formulations by multiplying questions and recommendations that complicate his task, 
create confusion in the subject’s mind and orient the latter toward categories of 
recollective data which are not those sought after”. 
To avoid such pitfalls, the researcher (Vermersch, 2006, pp. 124-130) must use “simple, 
direct and positive formulations”. “Positive” means calling for the evocation in a first-
person mode of the episode of experience under study, and saying to the subject what to do 
in this context rather than what not to do. The typical formulation is “I propose that you 
take some time to allow the situation xxx to come back on your mind. I leave you find it. 
When it’s there, just let me know.” 
Negative-inductive formulations are : “don’t be afraid to recall / stop whenever you wish, 
…”, “can you remember …, can you try to remember …”, complex formulations (those 
articulated in several “logical” steps) as well as short ones like “OK, now start telling me 
…”, vague ones that do not imply a clear explicitation contract like “choose an episode 
within what happened …”, or imperative injunctions, even using the conditional, like “I 
would like you to …” have proved to induce negative reactions on the subject’s part 
(Vermersch, 2006). 
Evocation cannot be performed under constraint, but rather out of the subject’s free will. It 
must not be experienced as a memory effort. Contextual priming, because it is 
accomplished prior to the induction stage, frees the induction process of the need to draw 
the subject’s attention to the manifold, therefore confusing even if fundamental, requests 
and rules that frame the Elicitation Interview. 
Sometimes, Vermersch (2006, p. 130) notes, the subject has difficulties to focus on his 
experience to reach a pure evocation stance of re-presentification. In that case, the 
researcher must probe a plain question that will help the subject to resolve the difficulty by 
turning his attention for instance to the very beginning of the episode, like “what were you 
doing when it started ?, how did it start for you then ?”. Another way is to question the 
subject about what was happening just before it started : “what were you doing just before 
it started ?”, “how was the ambience just before it started ?”, “had you noticed anything 
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particular just before it started ?”. The subject can then regain contact with his experience 
through an episodic memory easier to recall. 
9.6. “Subjective cueing” 
9.6.1.  “Subjective cueing” : helping re-presentification 
To help re-presentification during the whole duration of the EI, Vermersch (ibid, pp. 63-
69) provides a number of cueing guidelines, applicable “each time it is necessary” (ibid, p. 
63). Cueing can be as simple as in the following example240 : 
“51- I hear my voice. 
52- You hear your voice, yes… 
53- I ask the girl to read again what she just wrote and I see myself 
following her reading with my finger in order to… There’s something 
missing, a word or something like that. 
54- Yes. 
55- And I would like her to realise that she forgot something.”. 
But the narration may present difficulties and to help the subject in these circumstances, 
two types of probes can be used : 
• Probing questions unrelated to a specific moment of experience : 
• To slow down the pace of the subject’s speech : The subject may be narrating 
unstoppably, while in a very authentic manner, his phenomenal experience. This 
may be a sign that the interviewee “is falling into prolixity or well-rehearsed 
speech” (ibid, p. 64). Then, questions like “please wait a second… I suggest that 
you take some time to reconnect more specifically with this situation…”, or “take 
your time… and tell me when you are sure that you found it… you are there…” 
(ibid) help him to calm down and to refocus. For Vermersch, subjects “find a form 
of comfort in this rejoining oneself as they know they were falling into prolixity or 
well-rehearsed speech, and that they needed that mediation from the researcher to 
be refocused on one’s actual lived experience”241 (ibid). 
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• To gain richer details about the texture of the subject’s experience through textural 
cueing, i.e. a question that he can answer only with an evocation of his actual lived 
experience :  
• Either by probing questions relating to the context of the action (Vermersch, 
2006) : “for instance, you ask him where in the class he was sited, next to 
whom, with what pen he was writing, which objects were on his table, etc…” 
(ibid). Vermersch (2006) adds, “it will be easy to abandon these cues as soon as 
the result will be gained […] and it is likely that they do not call any available 
autobiographical memories as they are inessential [but] it will help the subject 
not to resort on his ‘intellectual’ memory, and not to proceed to a 
reconstruction, [and] although the result cannot be guaranteed […] these cues 
will help the subject to represent for himself the actual context, his past reality 
will start to exist again”242 (pp. 64-65), 
• or, alternatively, and provided the subject is actually re-living his experience, 
by probing a question [about] the sensory texture of the subject’s 
representation of his experience (ibid, p. 65). In this case, “the questions will 
temporarily bear, not on the actual past lived experience (of the reference 
situation), as with the prior technique, […] on the content of the evocation, but 
on the structure of that evocation” (ibid) by asking the subject “whether he has 
visual images of it or not, or a particular sensation associated with it when he 
reconnects with the original situation” (ibid), and next to indicate if it is a 
sound, a word uttered, etc…, a sensory modality “more easily accessible by the 
subject” (ibid). That second technique “does not aim at yielding pieces of 
information, but at guiding the subject toward the evocation of the reference 
situation” (ibid). 
• Probing questions focused on specific moments of the narrated experience : They seek 
to reconnect the subject with a particular moment in the flow of his experience by 
placing him in a position of “hearing elements of his own experience presented to him 
by the researcher, elements that speak directly to the experience that the subject knows, 
as it is his own, so that he fills in the gaps left by the vagueness of the researcher’s 
formulations” (ibid, p. 67). This technique, which uses the very content of the narration 
as its starting point, must be applied with care as it is easy for the researcher to be 
inaccurate and consequently to force the subject to come out of evocation to understand 
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the meaning of what the researcher is suggesting : “no, I didn’t say that” (ibid, p. 66) is 
the subject’s reply in that case. Three techniques are usable here, depending on whether 
the researcher has “a starting point” (ibid, p. 67) on hand or not : 
• Ericksonian reformulations : Specific moments within the flow of the subject’s 
experience provide the researcher with starting points. In Vermersch’s (2006, p. 67) 
example : Subject : “Yes, I see the place where I was sitting…” ; Researcher : “And 
when you see this place, as you are seeing it right now, what do you see ?”. The 
threefold structure of this question is purposeful, says Vermersch (2006) : “The first 
part is a simple probe, in echo, [on which the researcher] can base the formulation 
of his own probe […,] the second part, a subtle one, speaks to the subjects about 
his own experience, without naming its contents, only pointing to it, recognising its 
existence and its presence [and] it guides the subject toward his inner experience”. 
The third part of the probe constitutes a “cognitive challenge” (ibid). If the 
researcher makes this cognitive challenge equally engaging, real and manageable 
for the subject, he may successfully trigger the evocation of the latter’s experience 
(Vermersch, 2006, pp. 84-85). 
• Pseudo-connectors : They are less sophisticated, but still “efficient” probes 
(Vermersch, 2006, p. 68). They are typical formulations used to begin probes : 
“and when…, while…, while you keep doing…” (ibid). They facilitate the 
continuation of the subject’s narration and are a way to insist on specific moments 
of the experiential flow. 
• Absolute formulations : They are “formulations impossible to refute” (ibid) that 
“help the subject, while he regains contact with his own experience, to reach a re-
presentified narrative stance by suggesting he focuses his attention on a sensory 
modality for instance, or on an aspect of the context […,] without introducing 
disturbing243 formulation [by using an ericksonian] reformulation that covers all 
potential aspects [, which] whatever reality be are included in it” so that ”among 
all possible propositions, the subject will pick one up that matches his experience 
and will neglect others” (ibid). Formulations are for instance : “maybe you find 
images, but maybe not, only you can tell”, “maybe you recall images, unless they be 
sounds, or sensations, something that you are re-experiencing”244 (ibid). 
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9.6.2. “Subjective cueing” : encouraging and regulating episodic recalls 
Another function of subjective cueing is to encourage the subject to sustain his efforts until 
the moment is reached when the evocation can go no further (exhaustion of the story). 
Secondly, the evocation is usually punctuated of recollections of particular moments and in 
the flow of the narration, it is difficult to discern them. Hence also the need to slow the 
pace of the narration. 
Encouraging the explicitation process consists for the researcher : 
• Either, when appropriate, when there is a short blank in the narration for instance, in 
keeping silent or humming, smiling or nodding, a discrete sign that tells the subject that 
the researcher is with him, in close contact, 
• or when the subject makes a short pause, in resorting on one of the probes presented 
earlier.  
9.6.3. “Subjective cueing” : filling gaps and enriching the evocation 
typically, after twenty to thirty minutes, the subject terminates a first round of narration. 
He has browsed through the story from beginning to end. 
At this point a brief critical review of the material gained must be performed by the 
researcher in order to detect and evaluate the holes in the phenomenological account of the 
story. 
Using probes, he must then try to refocus the subject’s attention on key moments. The 
researcher must be attentive to the fact that the subject may have rejoined the present of the 
interview session, or gone into a reflection upon its meaning and abandoned his story. This 
process of reconnection must be repeated in sequence for each of the identified gaps. 
Formulations such as “And when you see this place, as you are seeing it right now, what do 
you see ?” can be used. 
9.6.4. “Subjective cueing” : Tying together the elements of the story 
When the subject narrates his inner experience, he does not proceed in chronological order, 
from beginning to end. In the course of his narration, some facts trigger the recall of further 
details or segments of experience, for instance because they are explicative of the 
dynamics of the story, or because the subject realises he left a gap in his narrative. The 
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researcher is left with an untidy situation : bits and pieces of evoked experience, obvious 
holes in its account, abandoned chunks. He must then proceed to a tying-up of these 
elements.  
He needs to quickly put together the elements of the narrative to reconstitute its storyline 
and identify its missing segments. Then, using the moment-specific probes presented 
earlier in order to, he can guide the evocation from narrated moments to give the subject a 
chance to evoke the missing moments.  
The typical question to use in such a case can be focused plainly on the course of action : 
“and at that moment, what do you do ?”, or on the course of events : “and at that moment, 
what happens ?”, or on the changes in the nature of the experience : “and at that moment, 
does something change around you ?”, “and at that moment, do you feel something 
happening in you ?”, or on the texture with a focus on sensory aspects as in : “and at that 
moment do you ear or see something in particular ?”. This last type of probes helps the 
subject to reconnect with the textural elements of his experience, and, from there, with its 
procedural aspects. 
9.6.5. Further comments on subjective cueing 
As far as possible, the researcher should avoid questions that bear on the already-made-
conscious. Rather, he should ask the subject to depict what he has done as “what do you do 
when you perform such act ?”, “how do you do it ?” (ibid, p86), or “guide the subject 
toward a textural evocation” (ibid, p. 97).  
9.6.6. Signs and further probes for monitoring and regulation 
Vermersch (2006, pp. 60-63, 111-116, 139-140, 161-162) provides guidelines for efficient 
re-presentification monitoring. 
Re-presentification, pure evocation, Vermersch (2006, p. 60) reminds, “is a private fact, 
not directly observable, except by the subject himself”, and monitoring that the subject has 
reached and keeps that narrative stance requires “indicators both verbal and non verbal” 
(ibid). Indicators and regulation means can be : 
• Eye redirection, and sensory synchronisation : “Accessing the re-presentification 
stance translates mainly into a redirection of the eyes” says Vermersch (ibid, p. 161). 
Based on lessons from neuro-linguistic programming Vermersch (ibid) indicates that 
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when a subject keeps looking at the researcher his attention has not refocused on his 
past experience. Would he have redirected his attention to the past situation, his eyes 
would redirect upward or downward, to his right or left. Vermersch (ibid, p. 114) 
summarises this : the subject’s eyes quit the researcher and look upwards when the 
subject’s evocation is based on a visual picture245, downwards when it is associated 
with his intimate inner experience (turning to the subject’s right if evocation makes 
reference to feelings or sensations, to his left when referring to thoughts), and eyes 
redirect either to his right or left when the subject’s evocation is rather auditive). 
Individuals very much acquainted with the practice of evocation can sometimes keep 
their eyes centred and unfocused like in day-dreaming (ibid). In consequence : 
• Should the subject’s eyes indicate that he has not switched his attention toward his 
past inner experience, the researcher should resort on the probes mentioned earlier 
to (re)focus it. 
• Should the subject’s eyes show a given sensory mode of evocation, the researcher 
should be attentive to formulate his probes accordingly (Vermersch 2006, p. 116) in 
order to accompany the subject in his present mode of evocation rather than 
disrupting it and forcing the subject to enter a different mode, e.g. if in auditive 
mode, to ask questions in relation to the visual experience of the subject, etc. 
• Speech pace and tone, and verbal synchronisation : Vermersch (2006, p. 61) suggests 
that when subjects are in the re-presentification narrative stance, their speech pace may 
slow down as their cognitive – retrieval – activity is resource consuming and elements 
of his past cognition only come slowly one after another. He adds that this is especially 
true of experts whose semantic knowledge being vast seek the right words to describe 
their experience adequately (ibid). they can also narrate their experience sometimes on 
a fairly fast pace, sometimes in a very hesitant, hectic manner. Vermersch (2006, p. 
111) also notes that sometimes there are pauses in the subject’s narration : they 
correspond to the time needed to access his Autobiographical Memory. In consequence 
: 
• Should the subject’s speech pace indicate he has difficulties in the evocation 
process, it is to the researcher, Vermersch (2006, p. 112) says, to adjust, either by 
progressively slowing down the subject’s pace after rejoining him initially, or by 
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adopting a similar tone of voice, loud, intense, soft, very quiet, etc…, without 
imitating the subject grossly though. 
• Speech tone must be adjusted by the researcher to the subject’s as early as the 
induction stage : in those moments, says Vermersch (ibid), the best the researcher 
can do is to remain silent as much as possible to let the subject reconnect quietly 
with his past experience, and he should speak in a very mild voice to probe cues 
only if the subject needs some help to reconnect with his episodic memories. 
• Congruence of verbal and non-verbal indicators, and other synchronisation modes : 
Basically, Vermersch (2006, p. 62) suggests that a feeling narrated by the subject is 
usually matched by a bodily expression that enacts it. For instance, a sad face for the 
evocation of past sadness. Vermersch reminds that “bodily expressions are not 
conscious and thus stand little chance to be altered by the subject” (ibid)246. In 
consequence : 
• With regards to non verbal indicators themselves, it is necessary for the researcher 
to synchronise his own posture with the subject’s, for instance by adopting a similar 
position of the body, laughing or smiling with the subject, performing similar 
micro-movements (like scratching one’s ear, crossing legs, etc…) says Vermersch 
(2006, pp. 112-113).  
• Should the subject gesticulate, “it would not be appropriate to copy him” (ibid, p. 
113), but rather to accompany the formulation of probes with bodily movements 
that subtly echo the subject’s, for bodily movements, as said already, enact one’s 
mental processes. Echoing the subject’s movements echoes his cognition and 
therefore encourages it. 
• Linguistic markers : The main marker provided by subjects who are in a re-
presentification stance is the use of the first-person, often in the present form, 
sometimes using the past, with few evaluative, judgmental utterances. The use of “one” 
(“on” in French) may be expressing a rather spectator-like narrative stance, or a 
culturally-induced formulation. This view seems to be supported by the study of 
Bruner & Fleischer Feldman (1995) who report that individuals “with the highest sense 
of [group] internal coherence and dedication” use the plural first-person “we” 
significantly more often in their autobiographical narrations than more individualistic 
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members of social groups with a lesser sense of common and strong identity and less 
sharing common principles. But it can also mean “we” or relate to a generalisation of 
the subject’s experience. In both cases the subject is not in the pure evocation stance 
likely to yield authentically phenomenological narratives. In consequence : 
• Should the subject be in a “one” mode, the researcher may always attempt to clarify 
the meaning of that “one” formulation. To that end, with a risk of disrupting the 
subject’s evocation, the researcher may ask fairly direct questions, though 
precautionously introduced. If in relation to an act in the physical world : “Hold on 
a second… When you say ‘one’, is it you who does this ?”, “I propose to you to stay 
on this moment for a second : is it you who does this or is it someone else whom 
you see or ear maybe ?”, “who says this then ?”. If in relation to a cognition : “hold 
on a second : at that moment, are you personally thinking this ?”, “I propose to you 
to stay for a minute with this moment, when you think this : is there anything 
around you that makes you think so ?”.  
• When “one” is used abundantly by the subject, it is also necessary to monitor as 
many non verbal signs as possible in order to assess his narrative stance, re-
presentification vs. generalisation or reconstruction. 
• Doubts and expressions of impossibility : Sometimes (Vermersch, 2006, pp. 161-165) 
the subject may express his inability to reconnect with his autobiographical memories : 
“I cannot remember”, “I don’t know”, or he expresses doubt about what went on : “I 
am not quite sure”, “it’s something like that but I am not sure”. This situation may arise 
from the fact the subject tries to “keep control of the researcher” (Vermersch, 2006, p. 
161), or because subjects may find it difficult, and even taboo, to talk about themselves 
: “During educators training sessions, it is not infrequent that trainees have got used to 
talking about themselves, i.e. about their pupils, and it is sometimes hard for them to 
accept the personal involvement it takes to talk about ‘what I do’ rather than talking 
about ‘what they do’ ”247 (ibid). It may also be an authentic doubt or the subject, 
unfamiliar with the evocation process, cannot think that it is possible for him or her to 
access his own autobiographical memory (ibid, p. 162). The researcher, without trying 
to understand why this happens, must help the subject who otherwise may feel blocked, 
trapped in the process, and terminate it (ibid, p. 163) : 
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• A first approach to this difficulty is to check, in a direct manner, with the subject “if 
he knows, if he really is back into the past situation” (ibid), to bring him to an 
“evaluation of his own evocation to help him get hold of an evocation closer to him 
by helping to formulate his own criteria” (ibid). 
• Another way is to create a counterpoint, says Vermersch (ibid) : “instead of trying 
to reach what is known of what was going on, it is possible to work from the 
certainty of what is doubted”, and he provides an example from classroom 
experience, of which this excerpt248 :  
Researcher : When you do not understand, what do you already 
understand ? 
Subject : I got an answer, but what was it ?… 
Researcher : In what position are you at that moment, when you hear 
yourself again speaking ? 
Subject : Was I standing ? I don’t know, it’s really annoying that I cannot 
retrieve the situation […] 
Researcher : Nothing at all… What do you know that there was not ? 
Subject : What I know there was not ? I know that I didn’t get anything in 
relation to my goals […]. 
To conclude, Vermersch (2006, p. 165) adds that “regulation starts each time the 
researcher realises that he has to make too much efforts to get the Elicitation Interview 
going”. 
9.6.7. When to probe ? Another perspective on opportunities and signs 
When can the researcher finds opportunities to probe cues or to regulate the evocation 
process ? Coulthard (1985, pp. 61-69) provides several indications that may help the 
interviewer to probe cues adequately, at precise ad hoc moments, without disrupting the 
evocation process : 
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• Precise interruptions : A “conversation is made up of units which are recognizable as 
either incomplete or possibly complete and [indicate] that next speakers can begin as 
soon as a current speaker has reached a possible completion” (ibid, pp. 61-62) : 
speakers can interrupt each other and “place their entries with great precision”, 1) by 
producing “a completion to a prior speaker’s otherwise complete utterance” with a 
form of ericksonian reformulation that summarises the prior speaker’s idea : “just like 
that ?…” ; 2) by “coming in just at the right moment [with his] own proposed 
completion of an as yet uncompleted sentence” : the interviewer, while the interviewee 
is about to finish a sentence, voices over his own termination to induce a change of 
perspective in the interviewee’s mind : for instance, the subject says “I can see the 
green truck that drives straight on” and as he says “that”, the interviewer speaks over 
“that makes no noise” for instance, thus inducing a switch from events in the world to 
auditive sensory modalities ; 3) by predicting “the ending of a sentence and 
[attempting] to say the same thing at the same time” as the current speaker : both the 
subject and the interviewer end the prior sentence saying that drives straight on. 
• Silence : Silence is very little tolerated between turns in a conversation and “if the 
intended next speaker does not begin almost at once the previous speaker is likely to 
produce a post completor” : in the case of an Elicitation Interview, the subject will 
either restart his narration in a way that seems best to him, or will manifest a need for 
some guidance. The researcher must not remain inactive. 
• Request from the subject that the interviewer takes turn : In that last case, the speaker – 
the subject – can prompt some “turn signal” (ibid, p. 68) to let the interviewer know 
that he wishes him to take over. These cues can belong in six categories : 1) a change 
in the intonation of the voice, 2) a “paralinguistic” change like drawling on the final or 
stressed syllabi of his last sentence, 3) terminating any hand gesticulation or relaxing a 
tense hand position, 4) using stereotypical “sociocentric” expressions like “but uh”, “or 
something”, “you know”, 5) using a combination of paralinguistic change and a 
sociocentric expression, 6) or just completing his sentence to silence while “assuming a 
characteristic head posture and by looking steadily at the auditor before [actually 
finishing speaking]”. When the researcher, “who spends most of his time looking at the 
speaker” (ibid, p. 67), perceives such a turn signal he has to respond. 
• Request from the subject to speak uninterruptedly : Sometimes, the speaker just 
“wishes to continue speaking past a particular ‘possible completion’” (ibid, p. 64) of 
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the current segment of his narration as he may feel some pressure from the interviewer 
to take turn, and then he uses an “utterance incompletor” (ibid) such as, for instance : 
“but”, “and”, “however”. The speaker may also want to make it possible for him to 
utter “a fairly large unit of speech” or “at least two clauses” (ibid) : in that case, the 
speaker will start a new segment of his narration with respectively a “pre-structuring” 
device such as “two things happened then…” or “first…”, or an “incompletion marker” 
such as “if” or “since”. 
9.6.8. In conclusion : a taxonomy of probes 
In summary, probes have three functions, says Vermersch (2006, p. 121) : 
• Focusing, i.e. 1) to induce the evocation process, 2) to stay on or return to an already 
narrated moment or cognitive operation to augment its phenomenological description 
and fill its evocation gaps, 3) to suggest an angle not already used like a sensory aspect 
never mentioned by the subject in order to explore further how the action was produced 
and experienced, which requires that the researcher be attentive to the taxonomy of the 
phenomenal data already uttered by the subject and to his own probing that can fail to 
cue certain evocation categories of phenomenal data. 
• Elucidating, i.e.1) to clarify cognitive objects evoked by the subject, 2) to clarify or 
establish the chronological order of several cognitive operations which seem to the 
researcher not to be positioned in a correct sequence by the subject, 3) to resolve what 
appears as contradictions to the researcher, 4) to lift doubts in the subject’s mind, 5) to 
“clarify how action’s efficiency or inefficiency was produced” (Vermersch, 2006, p. 
135), 6) to clarify the evocation category under which evoked cognitive operations fall 
when they are not clear to the researcher, 7) to check the accuracy of the narrative 
provided by the subject, 8) to clarify whether the speech mode used by the subject (“I” 
vs. “one”, but not when “we” or “they” are used as these are clearly incongruent with a 
pure evocation stance) relates to a pure evocation narrative stance (does “one” equal 
“I” ?). 
• Regulating, i.e.1) to help the subject to return to a pure evocation stance, re-
presentification, should he introduce in his narration elements of evaluation of his 
experience, general theories of his life experience, elements of his wider context rather 
than about the single episode of experience under study, or elements from another 
episode, 2) to help the subject remain on the right level of description of his 
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experience, the Episode, its Present Moments and their sub-summed cognitive 
operations or actions. 
ANNEX 3 summarises subjective cueing tips. 
9.7. The validation of the EI 
Vermersch (2006, pp. 178-180) equates validation of first-person narratives to the issue of 
their veridicality. In the context of the EI, some notions should be clarified however. 
Veridicality is the production of authentically phenomenological recalls of the facts of a 
lived experience, can be guaranteed under two fundamental conditions : 
• A deliberate focus on a single episode of lived experience, in order not to mix data 
from different episodes. 
• Re-presentification, the authentic, pure evocation of the experience of this past episode, 
rather than social reconstructions, generalisations and retrospective theorisations. This 
can be obtained through induction and subjective cueing. 
Validity is the adhesion to the principles for conducting the EI, and its minimal conditions 
are :  
• An attentive, trained, detached, sensible interviewer, capable to come on the same 
grounds as the subject 
• The way the interview is conducted : it must yield a pure evocation stance, within a 
clear contract, after context priming and through induction and subjective cueing.  
• Loyal transcripts of EIs, from audio records.  
• The phenomenological authenticity of the subject’s evocation, that must be evaluated 
by the researcher both as he proceeds and after the narration. 
Validation is the verification by the researcher, or preferably by a peer, of the veridicality 
of the narrative and of the validity of the process. 
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The evaluation of the phenomenological authenticity of the narration determines whether 
or not to process the narrative further. Unauthentically phenomenological narratives should 
not be processed. Only authentic narratives can be further processed, i.e. transcribed from 
audio records and analysed. In some cases, like a frequent use of “one” instead of “I”, a 
retrospective verification of authenticity is needed if it has not been possible during the EI.  
In Lieutenant A’s case, the following signs of an authentically phenomenological narration 
are : 
• The spontaneous use of the “I” speech mode and of the present 
• Voice intonations : quasi-stammering, hesitations, variations of the speech pace 
• Narration was mainly centred on facts, little on their retrospective interpretation 
• A “direct evocation” stance : drawing a sketch and referring to it, quotation of others’ 
utterances, eyes redirection 
• No a posteriori social reconstruction : when triangulating on specific moments249, the 
formulation of the details of those moments differed slightly indicating that the story 
had not been learnt but rather that it was being recalled each time, each re-evocation of 
a given moment having brought new details. 
9.8. The transcription of the Elicitation Interview 
Elicitation Interviews must be, at least, audio-recorded250. A loyal transcript of the audio-
recorded narrative must be produced by the researcher. Coding convention must remain 
simple : they must a minima distinguish the researcher’s questions from the subject’s 
answers.  
9.9. Synthesis 1 : the process of the Elicitation Interview 
An Elicitation Interview must be performed based on the following process : 
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Figure 12 The process of the Elicitation Interview 
9.10. Synthesis 2 : the dynamics of the Elicitation Interview 
As shown earlier, the Elicitation Interview is a staged process controlled by a feedback 
loop : 
 
Figure 13 The dynamics of the Elicitation Interview 
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9.11. In conclusion : a clear focus on recalling authentic episodic memories 
What really distinguishes the Elicitation Interview from other techniques251 is its systematic 
guidance of the subject toward a pure evocation narrative stance, i.e. an exclusive interest 
for the subject’s access to his episodic memories of the authentic details of a given episode 
of his cognitive experience.  
What we call phenomenological authenticity is the recall from his episodic memory of the 
phenomena (his actions and cognitive operations) the subject authentically experienced, 
from his own subjective perspective, at the time of his actual episode of action. 
Phenomenologically authentic recalls are void of, i.e. exclude a posteriori social 
reconstruction, interpretation or theorisation. It is the Elicitation Interviewer’s role to guide 
the subject’s recall away from these biases. It is also his role do discard from his research 
narratives that would be biased in such a manner. 
To achieve this ambition, this chapter has codified the principles and rules of the EI in a 
fashion that should benefit later researchers in their attempts to study the cognitive 
processes of people’s episodes of experience. 
The next chapter presents the data processing stage of the Pheno-Cognitive Analysis 
method. Data processing starts from the transcript of the first-person narrative of the 
subject’s experience. It aims at eliciting the data describing the subject’s cognition in a 
fashion that will allow, at the data analysis stage, the researcher to build his knowledge of 
studied cases in terms of taxonomy of cognitive operations, of cognitive trajectories and 
patterns, and of frequencies and order of apparition of these patterns and cognitive 
operations. 
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CHAPTER 10. Data processing (phenomenography) 
Even if phenomenologically authentic, a first-person account of the experience of a Critical 
Incident in the course of an intervention is all but ready to be analysed. It is messy. The 
narrative does not follow the chronological order of the actual course of things. It is 
unstructured, sometimes unclear, redundant. It has gaps. It is not uttered so as to help the 
researcher discern the cognitive operations performed by the subject and their sequence. It 
includes the researcher’s questions (probes) and the subject’s answers. There is jargon, etc. 
Some processing of the raw material thus gained from the EI is therefore necessary before 
data analysis can start. This section presents the process elaborated for data processing. 
First, we present the semantic analysis process through which the objects of a 
phenomenography are elicited from the narrative. Secondly, we present the cognitive 
modelling techniques developed in the research, the cognigraph and decision networks. 
They are the foundations of the later data analyses. Finally, we present the concepts of a 
phenomenographic database as it helps manipulating and tracing the large amount of data 
yielded by the narrative and the discovery of the phenomenographic objects. 
10.1. The objects of a phenomenography and their elicitation 
Data processing aims at producing a reliable, formal (structured), and verifiable description 
of the narrated episode of cognitive experience, to allow its later analysis, a 
phenomenography. It starts with the elicitation of its objects : 
 
Figure 14 The general model of the objects of a phenomenography 
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The elicitation of the elements of the model takes the following steps : 
• The semantic parsing of the Narrative separates the subject’s answers from the 
researcher’s probes. Answers are broken into Speech Clauses by looking for semantic 
markers and sequence markers. Speech clauses are put into chronological order within 
speech units, which are meaningful segments of the subject’s story that facilitate the 
chronological reordering of the narrative. Sequence tags are posted at this stage to 
indicate how different speech clauses from different answers should rejoin 
chronologically or be merged for their respective semantic markers indicate they relate 
the same chunk of the subject’s experience.  
• Secondly, the elaboration, out of the parsed transcript, of a chronotext that 
reconstitutes the chronology of the whole experiential flow. Sequence tags help to 
merge and resequence speech clauses.  
• The semantic analysis of each resequenced speech clause elicits the occurrence of an 
action (in the world) or of a (or several : a sequence252) cognitive operation (CogOp). A 
taxonomy of Cognitive Acts (CogActs) and of Cognitive Objects (CogObjs) forming 
CogOps is elaborated. CogActs and CogObjs are defined in two steps : first, detailed 
sub-types are identified during the semantic analysis of Speech Clauses; secondly, they 
are grouped in generic types to manipulate a reduced set of concepts. The chronotext 
helps to finalise the chronological sequence of CogOps = pairs of {CogAct ; CogObj}. 
• The elaboration of the cognigraph is derived from the chronotext. It graphs the 
chronological chain of CogOps and actions that form Present Moments and helps to 
demarcate the latter253. The sequence of Present Moments helps to identify CI 
experience phases, which correspond roughly to turns in the story plot with different 
emotional tones of the experience of CIs : nominal (non stressful, non traumatic), 
stressful, traumatic. 
• Each CogOp can later be interpreted and further described by a set of characteristics to 
analyse the cognitive process of Decision-Making-in-Action and to model this process 
as in NDM research. They can also be grouped into higher-order decision-making 
steps (DM Steps) that simplify analyses and diagram reading. 
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10.2. Conventions for the semantic parsing of the narrative 
10.2.1. Writing conventions for the transcript of narratives 
Conventions used for transcribing the narrative from audio tapes are only a few.  
Each of the researcher’s probes and subject’s answers must be numbered and identified as 
question or answer. 
(ss), (pff), (nss)  mouth noises the interviewee made within his utterances 
[était] / [was] missing word inserted by researcher to clarify the interviewee’s utterance 
{xxx}  a comment or observation inserted by the researcher within the text of the interview 
---  a pause made in the course of speech, and a measure of its length in number of “-“ 
<XXX>  information replaced by the researcher to guarantee anonymity of the narrative. 
Table 14 Writing conventions for the transcript of narratives 
10.2.2. Conventions for semantic parsing 
A good understanding of the interviewee’s language, as well as a good knowledge of his 
occupational context’s culture and language, are necessary to detect illocutory meaning in 
the subtleties of the subject’s utterances. Hence the preparatory immersion in the field. 
Speech Units : Usually, as seen in all narrative grammars (Kintsch & Van Dijk, 1978 ; 
Mandler & Johnson, 1977), a narration starts with an exposition phase : “once upon a 
time” is the best known one, but subjects will simply start with “Well… I was waiting by 
the call desk…”. From there on, the episode reveals a sequence of meaningful sub-
episodes, consistent segments of the story, named speech units254 : 1) hearing the report of 
an emergency call about two dog-bitten women, 2) paying more attention to it later on as 
further news indicate it’s a serious case, etc. 
Speech Clauses : They are basic propositions found in the subject’s answers out of one or 
out several semantic markers. Speech clauses are short and say only one thing at a time 
like “and then I forgot”, or “and then I forgot I wanted to tell him to rush upstairs”. They 
may be ambiguous despite or because of their shortness. Should a speech clause reveal or 
let the researcher assume the occurrence of several CogOps, it must be “duplicated” in the 
chronotext and numbered as many times as there are CogOps stemming from it. 
Sometimes, the researcher will aggregate several speech clauses describing the same 
CogOp into a single one. In this case, a “+” sign should be inserted between the assembled 
propositions forming the speech clause. 
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Semantic Markers : They are signs of the performance by the subject of a cognitive 
operation, i.e. of its cognitive act or cognitive object, or of an action : nouns, verbs, 
complements, onomatopoeias, and any other element present in the narrative. The 
conceptual model of the semantic analysis is very simple : 
 
Figure 15 The conceptual model of the semantic analysis of speech clauses 
But the simplicity of this conceptual model masks the principle difficulty of a semantic 
analysis. In this process, it is very easy to hesitate to deduce semantically a CogAct or a 
CogObj from a set of words composing a speech clause as the initial material may take a 
number of shapes (Watson, 2006) : a single word, an onomatopoeia, a group of words 
sometimes spread across several speech clauses, jargon, etc.. Some principles were 
elaborated to resolve this issue :  
• CogActs are the “performance”, the “processing” of CogObjs. CogObjs are the “what 
is processed” by CogActs.  
• A basic heuristic consists to designate CogActs strictly by verbs (in the active form 
avoiding “to be” and “being” as far as possible), and CogObjs strictly by nouns.  
• What semantic markers point to during the semantic analysis are in fact very finely 
“nuanced” verbs and nouns found in dictionaries. They name the basic “sub-types” of 
cognitive operations, CogOpST = {CogActST ; CogObjST}, that can be summed into a 
higher-order “type”, a CogOp = {CogAct ; CogObj} : 
 
Figure 16 Types and sub-types of CogAct and CogObj 
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As the sense of a speech clause may be not immediately clear, the narrative’s semantic 
parsing may be a recursive process. 
One of the principal difficulties is to become capable, repeatedly, of open listening. By 
this, we mean the researcher’s faculty to read plainly a clause. Words often mean exactly 
what they say.  
For instance : “to, well…, catch the dogs and to put them into –well- into a box” : 
• “to”, and Lieutenant A's main preoccupation on the dogs front is to have them collected 
by the dogs unit and to make the place safe (“to put them into –well- into a box”) are 
semantic markers helping to identify a CogOp made of : 
• A CogAct = Tending toward (“to”) 
• And a CogObj = a Goal (“catch the dogs and to put them into –well- into a box”). 
However, referring to the subject’s general cultural and cognitive background is always 
necessary to avoid misinterpretations. Hence the usefulness of the initial immersion in the 
field. 
Some utterances are rather difficult to interpret. Others reflect the difficulty for the subject 
to search and retrieve episodic memory traces, and onomatopoeias (words formed from 
sounds) are very common in the course of a narration. Some may express an internal 
process of reconnection with memories. For instance : 
• “hmmm…” expresses surprise or interrogation or a momentary hesitation or 
disorientation 
• (nss), (pfff) are noises made with the teeth or the lips : their meaning is difficult to grab 
: 
• (nss) here may express some internal interrogation or conflict in relation to the 
order in which memories should be voiced ; memories pop-up and there is a 
difficulty in the subject’s mind to sequence his narration 
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• hhhmmm--- may express the subject’s internal effort to recall an element of 
experience. 
Contractions, for instance “there’s” instead of “there is” are not significant. 
Hesitations, repetitions and quasi-stammering are also frequent. They may express 
emotions, a memory retrieval effort, or an internal verbalisation priority conflict like in : 
“and I was at the call desk and hhhmmm there’s there’s – hhhmmm---“ 
Technical jargon is used by subjects in their narration : it is important for the researcher 
either to be acquainted with the interviewee’s milieu, or to ask him for clarifications after 
the interview : 
“in addition to that VRV255 there’s there’s a pump that went”. 
Assumed vs. Certain CogAct : Another difficulty lies with the level of “certainty” of the 
semantic elicitation of CogActs, hence of CogOps.  
As said earlier, a narrative may have gaps and some cognitive operations may be felt 
missing by the researcher. On what grounds can the researcher elicit missing CogOps ? 
For instance, one practical question is : can a cognitive process fire an action without any 
prior form of decision ? From time to time the semantic analysis of speech clauses may not 
allow to elicit such a (decision  action) sequence, and it looks like the subject has “fallen 
into action by chance”. NDM models such as Klein’s RPD model associate systematically 
an action with a prior decision (made and evaluated in a deliberative manner).  
Alternatively, in the reality of individual cognition, action can also result from256 a 
physiological “need” or “drive” (Zajonc, 1965), a “motivation” (Arnold, 1960)257 as in 
Hobbes’ (1651) theory of hedonism, or from Freud’s instinctal impulse (Laplanche & 
Pontalis, 2004). Nowhere in psychological research the possibility to act without some 
form of prior motivation or decision is suggested. An urge to act is usually associated with 
an emotion (Frijda, 1993 ; Mosier & Fischer, 2010). When such an element can be 
identified during the semantic analysis of a speech clause, it is systematically parsed into 
the sequence of CogOps suggested by the high-level model of coping presented in chapter 
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2 : Appraisal  Arousal / Affect  Coping. In this second case, “Action” then follows, 
and stems from a “Coping” cognitive operation. 
Therefore, as a convention reflecting this established fact, an action is always preceded by 
either a form of psychological “emergency” or pre-reflexive “urge”, or by a deliberative 
decision. When not expressely narrated by the subject, this prior cognitive operation is 
“assumed”. When narrated and clearly recognised by the analyst, a cognitive operation is 
deemed “certain”.  
There may be other circumstances in which some CogActs (and therefore CogOps) are 
assumed rather than certain. The analysis of a speech clause echoes with the elements of 
the research field’s background culture gained from a preparatory immersion. A simple 
speech clause can suggest that a number of cognitive operations have been performed but 
not narrated.  
For instance, in the speech clause from Lieutenant A’s narrative “as for me now, bitten by 
a dog… maybe there's something more serious to come up.’”, we can say that the subject : 
• evaluates the situation (does it deserve that I go vs. staying at the station ?) 
• evaluates it's not so serious ("bitten by a dog that's not---") 
• knows he is not supposed to intervene unless serious case (from regulations) 
• knows from experience more important cases may appear (“something more serious to 
come up”). 
The following cognitive operations (sub-type level) are then identifiable : 
PM# CO# Status COGACT (sub-type) COGOBJ (sub-type) 
01 6 CER Evaluating Severity of the situation 
01 7 ASS Remembering Regulation 
01 8 ASS Anticipating What could happen (how the situation might 
evolve) 
01 9 CER Considering  Options for action (go or not go) 
01 10 CER Weighing Pros & Cons / Comparing / Pondering Options for action  
Table 15 An example of assumed cognitive operations 
Sequence Markers : Another difficulty lies with the restitution of the authentic 
chronological order of performance of speech clauses258. Sequence markers help to 
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reconstitute this chronological order. They may be of different types : the very order of the 
narration itself, linking propositions such as “and at that point”, “next”, “I had not yet seen 
the car coming”, complements of narration that shed light on the chronology of narrated 
facts, the result of a clarification probe, the comparison of the meaning of two or more 
clauses. 
Sequence Tags : Once sequence markers have been identified, tags are reference numbers 
telling 1) in which speech unit and 2) before which other speech clause a given speech 
clause should come chronologically. Sequence markers and tags are used to elaborate the 
chronotext. 
10.3. Modelling the subject’s cognitive processes 
This section presents the cognitive modelling techniques used in the Pheno-Cognitive 
Analysis (PCA) and how they were developed from two initial methodological attempts. 
The first attempt was based on a semiotic analysis of activity(Théron, 2005). The second 
one elaborated the foundations of the cognigraph cognitive modelling technique in the 
early moments of this research. Tracing these prior steps constitutes a manner of 
“memoing”259 (Creswell, 2007, p. 67), useful to better understand the epistemological 
assumptions at the root of PCA. 
10.3.1. Towards cognitive models of DMA : the chronotext and its verification 
The speech clauses discerned during semantic parsing are chronologically reordered into a 
chronotext. After cleaning up duplicate speech clauses it allows to rewrite the subject’s 
story : 
• In a veridical chronological order 
• Out of the speech clauses provided by the subject in his narrative. 
The following table presents a short extract of Lieutenant A’s chronotext : 
Speech Unit NSEQ Speech Clause # Speech Clause 
02 - It's really 
serious 1 
8-8-ZZZZZ-
ZZZZZ Et puis j'étais toujours au standard 




y'a, y'a--- euh--- (nss) en plus de ce VSAV y'a y'a un engin pompe qui est parti en 
plus euh--- les les véhicules cinotechniques de <DOGS SPECIALIST STATION> et 
euh--- euh une ambulance de réanimation. 
02 - It's really 
serious 3 8-10-356-1 
oh, eh bien oui, de toute façon, c'est euh, comme j'ai dit aux policiers, j'avais déjà fait 
des interventions avec des chiens, des chiens mordus, enfin, des gens mordus par des 
chiens, où nos équipes cinotechniques interviennent et attrapent les chiens 
02 - It's really 4 8-10-ZZZZZ- là peut-être 
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serious ZZZZZ 




Table 16 Example of chronotext 
In this example, we can see that speech clause # 356-1 has been resequenced by the 
researcher and placed before speech clause # 8-10 as they complement one another to show 
that the subject remembered his prior experience of dogs bitting victims. “ZZZ” means no 
resequencing. 
It is important to validate this rewritten story with the subject. No further processing of the 
data can be accomplished before. This validation can also be the occasion for the subject to 
remember further details and to provide clarifications where needed. When validated, the 
speech clauses can be semantically analysed and CogOps can be elicited (as certain or 
assumed). 
10.3.2. Activity theory, semiotics and the origins of the cognigraph model 
Theureau’s (2004) activity theory and semiotics work provided the methodological bases 
for the cognitive inquiry into a railway accident (Théron, 2005) for the French Railways 
(SNCF).  
Theureau’s (2004) approach is based on four pillars260 : 
1. A sign processing unit called tetradic sign by which the individual noticing a sign 
(“Object”) interprets it through an interpreter (“acquired frame”), rooted in his 
experience and his social build, to elaborate an outcome (“representamen”) in line with 
the overall logic of the course of action (“unity of the course of action”). “People act 
through stories”, says Theureau (2004), adding that objects that have the highest 
“salience” or “force” in one’s consciousness will take precedence in triggering such 
semiotic reactions. 
2. The transformation of the situation is a succession of sign processing units, tetradic 
transformations creating new outcomes that become objects for new tetradic 
transformations, and action results from that rolling course of semiotic reactions. 
3. The primacy of the “intrinsic”, which means that rather than investigating behaviours 
from the outside perspective of an expert it is necessary to look for the “intrinsic”, 
internal, subjective perspective of the individual, his own cognition. 
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4. A formal representation : one of Theureau’s contributions to activity analysis is a 
graphic representation of the succession of triadic261 signs that underpin human 
activities to help communicating analyses to other people, first of all to the individual 
being studied. 
In this railway accident three people “helped” to derail a passenger train stationed on a 
service track of a small station in the West of France. The incident that had taken place in 
May 2005 was caused by the fact that the passenger train, when ordered to restart its 
journey, had gone over an armed security device placed on the service track’s rail to 
prevent trains from rolling loose across the express trains track (this device is called 
“taquet dérailleur”, derailing peg). The traffic officer, the platform officer and the train 
driver, though having all taken a part in or having been aware of the removal of that device 
prior to stationing the train on the service track, all forgot about it when time came to 
restart the train’s journey. The traffic officer did not remember he had manoeuvred it 
initially and when the train departed from its parking he was in his command post, thinking 
of what he would do in the evening. Meanwhile, the platform officer was worried that he 
might be late, only a couple of minutes later, to give the departure to the Paris – Le Havre 
Express train on platform one and didn’t pay attention to the security peg. And the train 
driver, when given permission to start by the platform officer, thought - as he always used 
to - that everything was clear ahead, and he departed. Alas, the security peg was still up 
and the train, rolling on it, derailed. The research question asked by SNCF then was how 
could all three men, very experienced in their jobs, forget about the derailing peg though 
they all had gone through its manoeuvring when initially parking the train on the service 
track ?  
This study of “accidentising”, the process that brought the accident about, was carried out 
on the basis of interviews of the traffic officer and the platform officer about their own 
stories of the last couple of minutes that preceded the accident. An interview protocol was 
designed, using a questionnaire similar to Klein’s as reported by Dekker (2002). The 
answers, plus some complementary free comments and the compilation of a detailed 
chronogram of the course of events, helped drawing a timelined graph of the semiotic 
transformation of the situation for each actor. It was based on the semantic analysis of 
subjects’ utterances. Along the timeline the successive cyclems, i.e. triplets of (object  
interpreter  outcome) labelled (Genotype  Mediator  Phenotype), helped to reveal 
that each person had mental stories competing with one another on her mind during the 
two minutes preceding the derailment.  
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The study also indicated that subjects had embarked on intersubjective cognitive courses to 
reach the decisions they each made. A revised version of the Semiotic Graph approach was 
applied to the case of Lieutenant A. Théron (2005) had shown that triadic cyclems only 
represented a chain of cognitive objects, not pairs of {cognitive act ; cognitive object}262 as 
in phenomenology. A first “cognigraph” (Théron, 2009) was thus elaborated in October 
2007, and conceived as a Process Model (OMG, 2011 ; Tardieu et al., 1983 ; Tardieu et al., 
1985) of Lieutenant A’s cognitive activity263. It represented his experience as a sequence of 
pairs of {cognitive act ; cognitive object}. A semantic analysis of {subject, verb, 
complement} found in Lieutenant A’s narrative revealed an early taxonomy of cognitive 
acts and objects. After various attempts to produce an easily readable graph, it was decided 
to represent cognitive acts as coloured pictograms and to represent cognitive objects as 
column headings on the cognigraph. The idea of using pictograms was derived also from 
activity theory (Theureau, 2004 ; Amano, 1999, p.193). 
This first version evidenced the need to refine the semantic analysis of speech clauses 
(hence the guidelines provided in this chapter). In contrast with NDM models of cognition, 
it also showed that there were probably gaps in Lieutenant A’s cognitive processes. Beside, 
the semiotic approach that still influenced our work revealed constraining. Forcing to 
search for mediators and to designate phenotypes and genotypes arbitrarily, it was giving 
too much space to interpretation and the composition and validity of triadic cyclems could 
not be assured. Furthemore, mediators could be formed of several cognitive pairs (grouped 
inside rectangles on the above semiotic cognigraph). The semiotic approach was 
abandoned. 
We kept the principle of the cognigraph with cognitive acts positioned within the columns 
corresponding to their associated cognitive objects. Assumed CogActs pictograms would 
be striped, instead of plain when CogActs would be certain. In Lieutenant A’s case, 
CogActs and their pictograms are as in the following table : 
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Figure 17 CogActs and their pictograms (for use in cognigraphs) 
The definitions elaborated for each CogAct and their higher-order families are : 
Family CogAct Definition 
A01- Learning LEARNING = optimising one's ways of cognising and acting  
A01- Solliciting Attention & 
STM ATTENDING = pay attention to sthg  
 STM KEEPING = to memorise, keep in mind  
A01- Solliciting LTM REMEMBERING = cue, seek, retrieve, and bring to consciousness elements from any type of memory 
A02- Perceiving PERCEIVING = perception, sensation, anticipation  
A03- Intuiting / Imagining PRO/PARA-TENDING = turning toward the future / anticipating / expecting / imagining  
A03- Reasoning ELABORATING = consider, tend toward, wish ; a volition, a motivation, an intention, a story, WOA  
 ORIENTING = providing directions for action planning / design  
 REFLECTING = reasoning / reflecting / assuming / believing / being concerned..  
 UNDERSTANDING = perform a synthesis / get a clear, conscious, comprehension & projection of a 
situation  
A04- Emoting E1 APPRAISING = being struck by / becoming aware of the presence of a salient 
stressor(discrepancy / trauma) 
 
E2 
EXPERIENCING = a traumatism, an Emotion / Stress, a Mood, ie a Pressure from the COE  
 E3 COPING = choose / elect a style / way of coping  
A05- Deciding DECIDING = consciously selecting a pragmatic option  
A06- Acting PERFORMING = an act in the world = to do, make, search, seek, move, interact, speak, express, freeze, ...  
Table 17 Types and definition of CogActs 
The following table presents the different CogObjs also identified in this research, their 
name, a definition, and the higher order family in which they were grouped : 
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Familiy CogObj Definition 
00- LTM objects ENCYCLOPAEDIA The subject's memory : What has been learnt theoretically or through practice 
 PERSONALITY The subject's personality traits 
01- Metacognitive objects COGNITIVE PROCESS The subject's own cognitive process as object of his cognitive experience 
02- Attention Objects ATTENTIONAL OBJECTS The subject's direction / tension of consciousness toward objects of 
cognition. 
03- Affective objects A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE The emergence of a striking phenomenon in the subject's consciousness 
 A2 AFFECTS The subject's emotional reaction to the experience of a sudden salience in his consciousness 
 A3 COPING MODE The subject's tendency to react in one way rather than another 
04- Cognitive objects REFLECTIONS The subject's thoughts 
05- Situational objects SITUATION - COE / COA264 Situation : An understanding, Picture, Mental Story, Explanation 
06- Action Regulator objects ABILITIES The subject's inner capacity to act upon the situation : Knowledge, 
strength… 
 ACTION PLAN The potential ways the subject seeks to inflect the course of events 
 CONFIDENCE The subject's sense or understanding of probability, confidence, trust 
 LATITUDE - MARGINS 
The margins of manoeuvre experienced / appraised by the subject at the 
time of action, that allows him or not to engage into options for action, 
and such as: Space, Time, Safety, Freedom, Social support, Legal 
rights… 
 STIMULATIONS Intention / Motivation, a Goal, Priority, Order… 
07- WOA Experience objects OBJECTS Material / Inanimate things / artefacts in the subject's World Of Activity 
 OTHERS / ANIMALS Other people or animals in the subject's World Of Activity 
 SETTINGS Texture or Sense of space  
 SOCIAL AMBIENCE Sense of social ambience  
 TIME Texture / Sense / Perception of time 
 WE The group in which the subject belongs 
08- Actions taken SELF The subject as actor in the world and object of cognition 
Table 18 Types and definitions of CogObjs 
10.3.3. Cognitive models of DMA : the cognigraph (elaboration and verification) 
When cognitive operations have been elicited from the semantic analysis of speech 
clauses265 they can be processed in several steps : 
1. Present Moments (PM) appear : in the total sequence of cognitive operations266 the 
researcher can delimit them by detecting first “actions” and then, going backward in 
the sequence of CogOps, by trying to detect the corresponding triggering CogOp, a 
perception or remembrance cognitive activities for instance. Itself, except for the very 
first one in the sequence (usually an action), is preceded by another “action”, which 
marks the end of the previous PM. Each PM is numbered in sequence and given a short 
descriptive title in order to allow a quick reading through of the entire story. Within 
each PM, CogOps are numbered in a sequence relative to the PM : CogOps are 
numbered from 1 to n in each PM. So that a CogOp is uniquely identified by the 
concatenation of both numbers : 1-1, 1-2, 2-3, etc. 
2. A verification of the encoding and chronological sequence of the CogOps forming each 
PM is required. This is accomplished through a patient process of iterative checks 
between the speech clauses in the resequenced narrative and the list of CogOps derived 
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from each speech clause. At this stage, encoding and sequencing errors can be detected 
: wrong category of CogActST267 or CogObjST in correspondence to a speech clause268, 
wrong status of a CogAct (certain vs. assumed), missing CogOps that should have been 
elicited or assumed, wrong sequence between CogOps, absence of an action between 
what the researcher considers as two distinct PMs. 
3. The cognigraph of each PM should be drawn at this stage. The visual verification of the 
cognigraph of a PM helps the researcher to check the composition of the PM. The 
pattern of its cognitive trajectory is revealed at this stage. The researcher can see how 
types of cognitive operations follow one another and check each trajectory against 
competing cognitive models (such as the RPD model for instance). Proceeding further 
with data processing requires that these verifications have been made. 
A cognigraph is presented in lines and columns.  
Each line corresponds to a CogOp along the timeline.  
The CogOp is a {CogAct ; CogObj} pair. On each line, the symbol of the CogAct 
composing the CogOp is displayed under the column corresponding to its associated 
CogObj.  
A cognigraph looks as follows (cognigraph automatically generated by the 
phenomenographic database), here for PM # 10 in Lieutenant A’s case (column headings 
are drawn from table 18 above, and raws’ headings are drawn from table 17) : 
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Figure 18 Lieutenant A’s cognigraph at the "Pre-CI Tension" Experience Phase (PM #10) 
 
10.3.4. Cognitive models of DMA : decision networks 
The calculation of a decision network creates a more meaningful picture of the subject’s 
cognitive activity than a cognigraph.  
The fairly high number (460) of CogOps permited to calculate the genotypic and 
phenotypic shapes of cognitive trajectories at any level of analysis of the subject’s 
experience : his entire story (global level), a CI Experience Phase (intermediate level), a 
Present Moment (detailed level).  
“Genotypic shape” refers to the summed frequencies of each series of posterior  anterior 
links between CogOps. The calculation of these links produced what was called 
“Anteriority Networks”. For instance, at the Pre-CI Tension phase, the following table of 
genotypic links was calculated : 
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PHENOTYPIC COGOP FREQ OF GENOTYPIC LINK 
 
PRECEDED BY GENOTYPIC COGOP 
E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 50,00% UNDERSTANDING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 
E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 50,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 100,00% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
E3 COPING – ABILITIES 100,00% E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 
E3 COPING – ACTION PLAN 100,00% E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 
PERCEIVING – OTHERS / ANIMALS 83,33% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 16,67% E3 COPING - ABILITIES 
PERFORMING - SELF 100,00% E3 COPING - ACTION PLAN 
UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 100,00% UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
Table 19 Table of genotypic links for the “Pre-CI Tension” CI Experience Phase 
“Phenotypic shape” refers to the summed frequencies of each series of anterior  
posterior links between CogOps. The calculation of these links produced “Decision 
Networks”. The following table of phenotypic links was calculated for the same Pre-CI 
Tension phase : 
GENOTYPIC COGOP FREQ OF PHENOTYPIC LINK 
 
FOLLOWED BY PHENOTYPIC COGOP 
E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 100,00% E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 50,00% E3 COPING - ABILITIES 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 50,00% E3 COPING - ACTION PLAN 
E3 COPING - ABILITIES 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
E3 COPING - ACTION PLAN 100,00% PERFORMING - SELF 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 83,33% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 16,67% UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
UNDERSTANDING - LATITUDE - 
MARGINS 100,00% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 100,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 100,00% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
Table 20 Table of phenotypic links for the “Pre-CI Tension” CI Experience Phase 
The Decision Network of the same “Pre-CI Tension” CI Experience Phase looks as 
follows: 
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Figure 19 Lieutenant A’s Decision Network at the “Pre-CI Tension” CI Experience Phase 
Each oval represents a CogOp, and arrows represent phenotypic links. Summed 
frequencies are indicated at their origin. As each Present Moment (PM) starts after the last 
ACTION269 (represented by the “Performing – Self” CogOp) sparked by the previous 
Present Moment, Decision Network graphs show as a bold doted arrow the phenotypic link 
between the previous PM’s ending ACTION and the first CogOp performed in the PM 
(this indication is supplied by the PM’s corresponding cognigraph). Decision Networks of 
the global and intermediate levels of analysis270 present the driving cognitive trajectory 
(boldest links = most frequent), and alternative cognitive trajectories (second boldest links 
= less frequent trajectories). Narrow arrows indicate infrequent links. Decision Networks at 
the PM detailed level of analysis do not distinguish driving trajectories from alternative 
trajectories as there is only one trajectory within a given PM. Decision networks show, 
when easily representable, the cognitive loops performed in the course of cognitive 
trajectories. Cognitive loops are “sub-trajectories”, sub-processes that the subject seems to 
accomplish in order to support either Situation Awareness or Action Selection within a 
Present Moment. They may be triggered by factors of bifurcation noted by Klein’s 
(1998)271 : the a-typicality of the situation pattern, the need to find a more efficient plan, 
etc. 
Decision networks can be drawn for the detailed level of Present Moments (PM). The 
decision network for PM # 2 looks as follows (data are extracted from the 
phenomenographic database) : 
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Figure 20 Decision network of PM # 2 in Lieutenant A's case (based on CogOps) 
Decision networks provide a synthetic view of cognitive trajectories whereas cognigraphs 
present the actual complete sequence of CogOps performed during a PM. In Zachary et 
al.’s (2001) terms, cognigraphs and decision networks are individual, descriptive critical 
decision models i.e. “Domain-specific models that capture and represent the logic and 
situational relationships that underlie decision making in that specific domain” and 
represent it in “a combined prose / graphical notation.”. The calculation of Decision 
Networks at the level of sub-types of CogAct and CogObj, i.e. of {CogActST ; 
CogObjST} pairs, was also attempted but it yielded such a variety of cognitive trajectories 
that in fact it did not anymore reveal any cognitive pattern of the DMA process. Therefore 
it was decided to keep on the {CogAct ; CogObj} level. Finally, Anteriority Networks did 
not add any significant epistemological value and the choice was made to analyse only 
Decision Networks. This choice is also consistent with current NDM modelling 
approaches. 
10.3.5. Decision-making steps : drawing a more readable global decision network 
When drawn for the global level of the entire episode of experience, decision networks 
become too detailed and hard to read if based on cognitive operations i.e. pairs of {CogAct 
; CogObj}, and even more if based on pairs of {CogActST ; CogObjST} sub-types. 
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Beside, the denominations of a CogOp or of a CogOpST does not match the vocabulary 
commonly used in NDM studies to name the cognitive steps / functions of the decision-
making cycle. Finally, if we consider that this latter cognitive step is an attribute in a 
context of data processing, using CogOps and CogOpSTs creates too many categories for 
this attribute. 
On the basis of the NDM analytic framework summarised in the conclusions of chapter 4, 
each CogOp can be substituted a DM Step (Decision Making Step). DM steps are a higher 
level of abstraction of CogOps. The following taxonomy of DM Steps, indicating the 
correspondence with the CogOps they substitute, was elaborated : 
DM domain/family DM Steps CogOps corresponding to DM Steps 
0- Attention & STM DM01- Attention & STM ATTENDING - ATTENTIONAL OBJECTS 
  ATTENDING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 
  ATTENDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
  ATTENDING - SELF 
  STM KEEPING - OBJECTS 
  STM KEEPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
  STM KEEPING - SETTINGS 
  STM KEEPING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
  STM KEEPING - STIMULATIONS 
1- Metacognition DM02- Metacognition LEARNING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
  LEARNING - PERSONALITY 
2- LTM DM03- LTM REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
  REMEMBERING - OBJECTS 
3- Perception DM10- Acquisition PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 
  PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
  PERCEIVING - SELF 
  PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
4- Interpretation DM21- Analysis REFLECTING - ACTION PLAN 
  REFLECTING - ATTENTIONAL OBJECTS 
  REFLECTING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 
  REFLECTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
  REFLECTING - REFLECTIONS 
  REFLECTING - SETTINGS 
  REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
 DM22- Anticipation (SA) PRO/PARA-TENDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 
  REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
 DM27- Judgement UNDERSTANDING - CONFIDENCE 
  UNDERSTANDING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
  UNDERSTANDING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 
  UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
  UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
  UNDERSTANDING - STIMULATIONS 
  UNDERSTANDING - TIME 
5- Affect Coping DM31- Appraisal E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
 DM32- Affection / Shock E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 
 DM33- Coping E3 COPING - ABILITIES 
  E3 COPING - ACTION PLAN 
  E3 COPING - OBJECTS 
  E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
  E3 COPING - SELF 
  E3 COPING - SETTINGS 
6- Planning DM42- Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) ELABORATING - STIMULATIONS 
  ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
  ORIENTING - SELF 
  ORIENTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
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  ORIENTING - STIMULATIONS 
 DM44- Orientation (Action Design) ELABORATING - ACTION PLAN 
  ELABORATING - STIMULATIONS 
  REFLECTING - ACTION PLAN 
 DM48- Checking (consistency / applicability 
/ efficiency / outcome) 
ORIENTING - SELF 
  REFLECTING - ACTION PLAN 
7- Decision DM50- Selection DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
8- Action DM60- Action PERFORMING - SELF 
Table 21 Taxonomy of DM Steps and correspondence with CogOps 
DM steps are numbered as shown above to signify that they could be grouped into higher-
level generic (macrocognitive) decision-making functions. The first of the two digits 
represents these macrocognitive functions : 0 represents support functions, 1 corresponds 
to perception, 2 to Endsley’s concept of situation awareness, 3 to Lazarus’ concept of 
affect coping, 4 to planning the course of action, 5 to the choice (decision) of the course of 
action, and 6 to action in the physical world. DM Domain corresponds to more abstract 
groups in which DM steps were grouped (their number is not significant). The second digit 
of DM Steps code evokes a possible rank or sequence of execution within each generic 
step. ANNEX 12 shows the more detailed correspondence between DM Steps and CogOp 
subtypes.  
At this stage, the researcher has processed the data extracted from the subject’s first-person 
narrative and can start data analysis. 
10.4. The Phenomenographic database 
The constitution of a phenomenographic database was undertaken to support data 
processing and to ensure the traceability of the entire process. It was elaborated during the 
study of Lieutenant A’s case and is now an advanced prototype. This development helped 
to model the process of the phenomenography. Without the phenomenographic database, a 
PCA research would be much more fastidious.  
The Phenomenographic database relies upon a relational database. Its model reflects, like 
all such models, the functional and non-functional requirements and choices272 made in the 
present research : 
• All the data handled for the study of Lieutenant A’s case had to be managed in the 
database : primary data (the transcript of the Elicitation Interview, its question & 
answer structure) as well as secondary data created to prepare the analysis : the speech 
clauses parsed from each answer, identified cognitive operations with their pairs of {act 
  158 
; object}, Present Moments, characteristics / variables describing the context or each 
cognitive operation or Present Moment, the phases of the experience of trauma, DM 
Steps, …). 
• It had to allow the generation of multiple versions of the chronotext should analytical 
doubts lead to chronological variants of the reconstituted story. 
• It had to allow to bring changes in the associations of speech clauses, with story 
segments for instance, as the phenomenography was in progress. 
• It had to allow to record the assumptions made about the existence or the sequence of 
cognitive operations. 
• It had to be easy to use as far as a prototype can be. 
• It had to assure the traceability of the analysis, from the narrative’s speech clauses to 
outcoming data sets used for exploratory factor analyses. 
• It had to automate data processing as far as would be feasible, and beyond to allow to 
export data sets from the database for their reuse in other pieces of software (for 
exploratory factor analyses). 
ANNEX 4 provides an overview of the classes of data that were implemented. 
As it is, the Phenomenographic database is still a prototype. Its functions were 
progressively developed and successive refinements were made as taxonomies, definitions, 
constraints, needs and data processing possibilities emerged. It cannot yet be considered 
operational for reuse by other researchers and its further development is one of our folllow-
up projects. Its main functions are : 
• EI Transcript entry 
• Initial parsing of the EI transcript (into Speech Clauses and Speech Units) 
• Chronological resequencing of speech clauses (Chronotext) 
• Cognitive taxonomy (CogActs and CogObjs forming CogOps, and their sub-types) 
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• Cognitive Operations sequencing and sequence checks 
• Integrity Checks 
• Present Moments identification and demarcation 
• Cognigraph generation (global, per PM, per CI experience phase) 
• Identification of generic Decision-Making Steps (DM steps) 
• Genotypic analyses (Precedence links between CogOps or DM Steps) 
• Phenotypic analyses (Subsequence links between CogOps or DM Steps) 
• PM and CogOp attributes and basic statistics and categorical analysis functions 
• Data queries and exports 
• Results printing 
• Notes recording 
• Data Management (parameters) 
• Utilities (development functions, windowing). 
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CHAPTER 11. Methods of data analysis, discussion and conclusions 
11.1. Data analysis 
Data analysis aims at producing findings out of the material elaborated by data processing. 
This includes : 
1. The categorisation of the various patterns of cognitive trajectories (DMA273 patterns) 
and their description at the different levels of the structure of an episode of cognitive 
experience (episode, Present Moments, and any other intermediary sub-episode levels 
identified by the researcher). This analysis stems from decision networks and 
cognigraphs. 
2. The identification and analysis of their variations (if any) and the search of the factors 
of such variations. There are two potential levels of analysis : 
• Variations of pattern from one PM to the next, and across all PMs during the entire 
episode : this is called inter-variation analysis. The number of PMs in an episode is 
relatively small (44 in Lieutenant A’s case) and the data sets that can be elaborated 
are therefore fairly small. The analysis can be performed through : 
• The search and definition of PM characteristics (attributes and their categories 
or values). This part of the analysis can be based either on inputs from existing 
literature or on a process of iterative interpretation of the material on hand 
• The exploration of data through a categorical analysis (Mendenhall et al., 2003) 
and exploratory factor analysis (EFA), to look for associations between 
attributes (Upton & Cook, 2006). This can include various forms of scatter 
plotting, regression coefficients, principal component analysis, or else Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient when analysing continuous attributes, and the Chi-square 
test, Goodman & Kruskal’s (1979) asymmetric lambda274, Cramér’s (1946) v or 
bayesian networks when analysing categorical (nominal) attributes. 
• Variations within patterns, called intra-variation analysis. In a case study a few 
patterns can be discerned. The number of CogOps performed during an episode is 
important (460 in Lieutenant A’s case). The analysis can be performed through an 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of the corresponding data set. 
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3. The identification and analysis of possible phases in the individual experience of a 
Critical Incident. The process of this analysis is qualitative – interpretative. 
4. The analysis of peritraumatic resilience (PTR). It consists in searching for Present 
Moments during which PTR is displayed by the subject, for its factors, for coping 
strategies, and for relations between PTR and the cognitive process of DMA. This can 
be done through interpretative and categorical analyses. 
5. The elaboration of cognitive models of DMA and PTR. Once elaborated, models 
should be tested against the data of the case and compared to similar models found in 
the relevant scientific literature. The ambition of the data analysis stage in a PCA study 
is to perform a trustworthy restitution of the reasoning model (Zachary et al., 2001) of 
the subject and to validate this model against actual outcomes (actions) identified in 
cognigraphs, which is a limited form of predictive validation (Zachary et al., 2001). As 
there is not a unique way to model cognition in action, two techniques have been 
employed in the study of Lieutenant A’s case : production rules and bayesian 
networks. For Zachary et al. (2001), production rules are “abstracted representations of 
atomic if/then propositions”, “typically used in expert systems.” (p. 217). Bayesian 
networks are “mathematical and computational methods to permit reasoning about 
uncertainty based on the underpinning of Bayes rule (that the probabilities of all 
disjoint events sum to unity).” (ibid, p.217). This completes the analysis before the 
discussion.  
General findings should be summarised at the beginning of the data analysis part of the 
report. 
NB : These recommendations correspond to the goals of the present research. Other 
findings could be sought in relation to other research goals : for instance to studying 
mental models, mental stories at work, collaborative cognition, etc. 
11.2. Discussion : the topical and the epistemological perspectives 
Discussion is the phase of a Pheno-Cognitive study that allows the researcher to interpret 
the findings of the analysis from two perspectives : 
• A topical perspective : for instance this study focuses mainly on metacognitive training 
that can prepare for, or protect from potential CIs fire-fighters and other people 
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exposed to dangerous work conditions. Other perspectives can emerge in the course of 
the discussion as this is an open process. 
• An epistemological perspective : the validity and efficacy of the PCA Framework, for 
instance, and depending on the fact these issues have already been debated or not in the 
body of the report : 
• The epistemological value of a PCA study 
• The scientificity of the data collection process, the Elicitation Interview (EI) 
• Data processing and its choices 
• The attributes with which data analyses are performed 
• The data analysis process (interpretative aspects, factor analyses, …) 
• The way cognitive models derived from an idiographic study can be validated, first 
against the case’s data, secondly against competing / existent models… 
11.3. Epistemological considerations 
This chapter explains the principles of scientificity in this context. 
11.3.1. Discussion as reflection on the scientificity of a PCA study 
The epistemological discussion should, when needed, bear on the precautions taken in the 
performance of the Elicitation Interview (EI) and the verifications made along the data 
processing tasks as part of the measures to take in order to ensure the scientificity of a PCA 
study. 
11.3.2. Five minimal conditions of scientificity of a PCA study 
At least five conditions should be met to ensure the scientificity of a PCA study : 
• The veridicality of phenomenological memories evoked in the Elicitation Interview 
• The quality of the narrative 
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• The reliability of the phenomenography (data processing) 
• The ecological validity of the analysis 
• The traceability of the process. 
11.3.3. Further views on the veridicality of phenomenological memories 
Cho & Trent (2006) say that “Reminiscent of the paradigm wars, qualitative research, 
validity safeguards included, is the object of intense scrutiny and critique.”. They provide 
doctrinaire examples of this segregation between good and poor science : “In the USA […] 
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 calls for ‘scientifically based research’ and defines 
this as ‘the application of rigorous, systematic, and objective procedures to get reliable 
and valid knowledge. The research … must employ rigorous data analysis to test the stated 
hypothesis … The definition includes the expectation that the studies are replicable’ 
(AACTE, 2002: 2; NRC, 2002). [… and] the US Department of Education’s Strategic Plan 
2002–2007 supports only ‘studies that are backed by ‘qualified scientists,’ that ‘address 
causal questions,’ and that employ ‘randomized experimental designs.’” (pp. 319-320). 
Phenomenology, “step by step, attempts to eliminate everything that represents a 
prejudgement, setting aside presuppositions”, says Moustakas (1994, p. 41). In his view, it 
is a science because “it affords knowledge that has effectively disposed of all the elements 
that could render its grasp ‘contingent’”(ibid, p. 45). Three points should be raised in 
relation to scientificity in the context of a PCA study : 
1. The hermeneutical objection 
2. The “embodiment” and “situatedness” of the cognitive experience 
3. The risk of inaccuracy in phenomenological recollections (Conway, 1995) : 
• The “fantasy/memory complex” 
• Repression 
• Memory sins. 
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11.3.4. The hermeneutical objection and the way forward 
The validity of a research based upon narratives is essentially a transactional trade-off 
between the researcher’s inquiry paradigm (Cho & Trent, 2006) and the subject’s 
motivations (Edwards & Potter, 1992). 
The “hermeneutical objection” to phenomenological studies, say Varela & Shear (1999), is 
that “the deeper experience is always enfolded in language and hence a new account can 
only be an inflexion of linguistic practices” (pp. 13-14). Hence an impossibility to collect 
memories of the authentic cognitive experience of the subject. The “descriptions we can 
produce through first-person methods are not pure, solid ‘facts’ but potentially valid 
intersubjective items of knowledge, quasi-objects of a mental sort. No more, no less.” (ibid, 
p. 14).  
In the context of non-phenomenological, episodic-memory-loosely-guided interviews such 
as the John Dean’s testimony to the senate ‘Watergate’ committee and similar verbal 
reports, Edwards & Potter (1992) argue that the interviewee’s account of a past event can 
only be a socially circumstantial motivated reconstruction of the authentic facts. 
Such views are supported by Gardner (2001) and researchers in Memory studies (Conway, 
1995 ; Barclay, 1995). But as Gergen (1994) states, it might be only a matter of dispute 
between psychologists on one hand who see cognition behind narratives, and “textual 
essentialists” (ibid, p. 80) for whom “what can be said about one’s past and how it can be 
made intelligible are fashioned by the rhetorical conventions of the time” (ibid).  
Cho & Trent (2006) define “transactional validity in qualitative research as an interactive 
process between the researcher, the researched, and the collected data that is aimed at 
achieving a relatively higher level of accuracy and consensus by means of revisiting facts, 
feelings, experiences, and values or beliefs collected and interpreted.” (p. 321). 
Bartlett (1932, p. 296) adds that in a “social constructionist view” a “social organization 
gives a persistent framework into which all detailed recall must fit, and it very powerfully 
influences both the manner and matter of the recall” (ibid, p. 90). 
Conway (1995) assumes the “veridicality” of autobiographical memories, 
“autobiographical knowledge [being] an accurate but incomplete record” (p. 88). Only, 
the researcher must be attentive to eliminate from the subject’s account anything that 
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resembles a retrospective interpretation of his experience at large (Vermersch, 2006), 
which each individual necessarily produces in the construction of his own Self (Husserl, 
1977, p. 161 ; Barclay, 1995). 
Rosat (2008), quoting the late works of Wittgenstein275, states that “there is no language 
nor concepts that would be more directly related to the feeling of pain than the physical 
expression of pain itself – expression of the body in screaming or faces -, and also the 
verbal expression of pain, the utterance “I hurt” that adds or substitutes to the physical 
expression”276 (p. 15). He adds that “in order to identify our experiences – to recognise 
them, to name them, to distinguish them from one another – we describe them by way of a 
verbal expression that is that of a comparison, and therefore of an interpretation” (ibid, p. 
16) and that the “words of the interpretation”277 describe our experience. Our utterances are 
the most direct way we have to report our inner experience. The reality of our inner 
experience would then be little interpreted through elements of language. Language does 
not disable the possibility of a phenomenological narration. But for Matthews & Chu 
(1997) the subject’s “capacity for language” may be determinant.  
Finally, the expressions of the subject, both verbal and non-verbal, and their “style”, his 
grammar in Wittgensteinian formulation, help the analyst to explicit the actual nature of 
the subject’s experience. This point highlights the importance of a good knowledge of the 
subject’s milieu, hence of an immersion prior to Elicitation Interviews. 
The hermeneutical bias is assumed in this thesis to be a moderate problem under the 
following conditions : 
• Elicitation Interviews must be performed strictly according to the guidelines provided 
here and by Vermersch (2006) : its main principle is to systematically induce and guide 
the recall of authentic elements of cognition from the subject’s episodic memory. 
• The researcher should proceed to a preparatory immersion in the field of his research 
prior to performing EIs in order to understand the subtleties of the narration and be able 
to better guide the subject’s recall and narration. 
• Other forms of first-person interviews are not applicable in a PCA study : unguided self 
reports, inquiry interviews, cognitive interviews, psychiatric interviews, etc… 
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11.3.5. The “embodiment” and “situatedness” of the cognitive experience 
The notion of veridicality rejoins the concept of embodiment highlighted by all researchers 
in phenomenological psychology. Embodiment can be understood as the rooting of all 
human experience in one’s body. Ginsburg (1999) explains that “We speak of 
consciousness as a state. Yet everything we know in consciousness is connected to 
movement. In order to see the book on the table across the room I must make an act of 
attention. I turn my head and eyes and focus at the distance.” (p. 79). Experimental 
Psychology (Zimmer & Cohen, 2001, pp. 9-10) “demonstrated a clear memory advantage 
of performing the actions”. The subject-performed task (SPT) effect is that in laboratory 
settings we keep a better memory of the actions we have physically performed than of 
actions we have only imagined. The embodiment of experience contributes to the encoding 
in episodic memory of certain elements of its “texture” (Conway, 1995)278. 
Beside being situated in our body, our experience is situated in our world of activity. 
Conway (1995) stresses that our autobiographical memories are full of “microdetails” 
associated with salient micro events emerging in the course of the lived experience : “turn 
taking in conversation, perhaps a number of different topics were covered, possibly people 
left and joined the group during the discussion, and so on” (p. 70).  
The situatedness and embodiment of the Present Moment reinforce our autobiographical 
memories : events are encoded along with the “texture” (Moustakas, 1994) of experience. 
For Koutstaal & Schacter (1997) “Whereas memories for perceived events generally 
contain many perceptual details (e.g. sound, color, contextual information (details 
concerning time and place, and semantic information, memories originating in one’s 
thinking or imagination tend to have relatively less information of these forms and more 
information about an individual’s internal cognitive environment at the time of the event, 
such as why or when one happened to notice certain things.” (pp. 112-113). 
The present research studies a given, delimited, situated, embodied and enacted episodes of 
experience. It presents the above mentioned characteristics. 
11.3.6. The risk of inaccuracy in phenomenological recollections 
Barclay (1995) stresses the risk of inaccuracy of the public reconstruction of personal 
memories, “built on fragments of information [that] require inferences in order to fill in 
the gaps until there is a ‘narrative fit’” (p. 100). If what is in discussion in his work is the 
study of memory in laboratory settings, based on well known protocols : free recall, cued 
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recall or recognition, and the use of lists of words279, some factors may endanger the 
veridicality, the “truthfulness to the original experience” of phenomenological narratives : 
• The “fantasy/memory complex” (Matthews & Chu, 1997) 
• Repression (Elin, 1997 ; Kluft, 1995) 
• Memory sins (Schacter & Dodson, 2001 ; Brewer, 1995). 
11.3.6.1. The “fantasy/memory complex” 
Interesting lessons have been learned from early childhood abuse studies. Subjects affected 
by traumatic experiences may develop, especially if those experiences are repeated at an 
early age (Matthews & Chu, 1997), a “subjective memory” of those past events, i.e. 
fabricated memories “created under the synergistic pressures from external influences 
(family280) and internal needs to deny the horrible truth” (ibid), mixing “objective reality, 
personal meanings, and fantasies […] unconscious interpretations […] and associated 
feelings (such as guilt)” (ibid).   
The hypothesis is that autobiographical memories of traumatic experiences might be 
augmented, in the course of the constitution of one’s personality, of “added meanings” 
(Kris, 1956), progressively “added into the structure of the personality” (ibid). 
Psychological trauma “is an affliction of the powerless” (Herman, 1992)281, and “The child 
who is living in an abusive situation is captive to the experience [… and] faced with 
overwhelming traumatic experience and the failure of external supports […he] has 
powerful motives to deny, distort, or rationalize the traumatic events in order to maintain 
needed emotional ties, and to reduce the feelings of helplesness” (Matthews & Chu, 1997). 
Matthews & Chu (1997) remind the “schematic function of memory”, i.e. “the formation of 
‘schemata’ or ‘scripts’ that represent and synthesize past experience, organize the 
perception of current experience, and are constantly revised by the assimilation of new 
information […] and are modified through both conscious and unconscious processes to 
serve the needs of coherence, defense, and adaptation”.  
Therefore, “the internal representation of actual traumatic experience will always contain 
(in varying degrees) elements of fantasy” (ibid). On another hand, “the external trauma 
makes actual the most feared or dangerous fantasies, replacing the fantasy with a horrible 
reality” (ibid).  
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But memories of the experience of trauma are hardly alterable with the passage of time 
says Van der Kolk (1997) : “the excessive arousal at the moment of the trauma interferes 
with the effective memory processing of the experience [] the resulting speechless terror 
[leaving] memory traces that may remain unmodified by the passage of time, and by 
further experience”.  
When a long time has elapsed it may happen that people who suffer traumatism “reach a 
position where they have resolved the internal doubts, are realistically confident of their 
own histories, have an understanding of the associated fantasies and conflicts, and accept 
the limits of absolute knowledge […] and can speak of the abuse memories as a part of the 
past [and] the memories are well integrated into the self and world schemas, and can be 
referred to as part of the shared understanding of the patient’s life story” Matthews & 
Chu’s (1997) experience. 
In the case of Lieutenant A, his memories were still fresh and vivid : the incident had taken 
place only one month before the Elicitation Interview. As indicated in the EI guidelines, 
we were attentive to282 “listen to the subject’s internal reality”, and to a possible 
“reconstruction” (Matthews & Chu, 1997) of his experience. Contextual priming and 
probing guided the subject into an evocative stance, and the impact of the “fantasy/memory 
complex” should be minimal. 
11.3.6.2. Repression as an obstacle to the narration of traumatic episodes 
The attempt to collect episodic memories of traumatic events could be jeopardised by 
repression, a “defense of the psyche” (Elin, 1997, p. 216), a process “by which the 
defensive exclusion of autobiographical experience from available and routinely 
retrievable memory” (Kluft, 1995, p. 25) is performed, a “horizontal splitting” (Matthews 
& Chu, 1997) “in which certain psychic experiences [something that is once ‘known’ 
(consciously experienced) and becomes unavailable to consciousness] are actively barred 
from conscious awareness”. The traumatic event may become forgotten by subjects who 
suffered it. 
This was not the case with Lieutenant A. 
11.3.6.3. Memory sins 
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Memory errors have been extensively studied, for instance by Brewer (1995), or Schacter 
& Dodson (2001) who remind that “Memory is a troublemaker” prompt to a number of 
“transgressions [classified] into seven ‘fundamental’ sins : transience, absent-mindedness, 
blocking, misattribution, suggestibility, bias and persistence” (pp. 71-72). But there is 
probably a lesser chance that memory be affected by these transgressions if they relate to 
embodied pieces of life experience, especially of traumatic experiences (Van der Kolk, 
1997). Van der Kolk (1997) stresses the peculiar character of traumatic memories, their 
extreme persistence in autobiographical memory : “A century of studies of traumatic 
memories shows that they generally remain unaffected by other life experiences” (p. 245) 
because “Personally highly significant events generally are unusually accurate [in 
memory], and tend to remain stable over time” (p. 247), “While memories of ordinary 
events disintegrate in clarity over time, some aspects of traumatic events appear to get 
fixed in the mind and to remain unaltered by the passage of time or by the intervention of 
subsequent experience” (p. 248). 
We can assume that memory sins, errors in episodic recalls should not affect the 
veridicality of the subject’s phenomenological recalls of his experience of the Critical 
Incident under study. 
11.3.7. Phenomenological quality of the narrative: the Narrative Authenticity Scale 
In a PCA study, the narrative must be evaluated along the discrete values of the Narrative 
Authenticity Scale (NAS) : 
Authenticity levels 
3- The narrative was produced by a controlled EI and its phenomenological authenticity was judged, out of 
signs noted during the EI, good by the researcher 
2- The narrative was produced by a controlled EI and its phenomenological authenticity was subjectively 
judged insufficient, though not poor, by the researcher 
1- The narrative was not produced in any of the other manners, the phenomenological authenticity of which 
can be doubted (for instance a book or a testimony are social reconstructions of actual experiences and have 
not been properly guided  
0- All other materials, including EI’s which have failed to induce a pure evocation stance 
Table 22 The Narrative Authenticity Scale (NAS) 
Lieutenant A’s EI scored level 3. 
  170 
11.3.8. Cross-coding during data processing 
Cross-coding means that the resequencing of speech clauses, the semantic elicitation of 
cognitive operations, and the elaboration of the taxonomy of cognitive acts and objects 
should be performed by different researchers in parallel. 
11.3.9. Ecological validity of the analysis 
The results of data processing, i.e. the resequencing of the speech clauses found in the 
subject’s narrative into a chronologically veridical story should be validated by the subject 
himself. 
Beyond, the other results of the data processing phase (cognitive models) and of the data 
analysis phase (the researcher’s findings) should also be validated by peers representing 
the field of the study. 
11.3.10. Traceability of the process 
A PCA study does not aim at elaborating nor at assessing a theory of Decision-Making-in-
Action or of peritraumatic resilience. But it ambitions to model the cognitive performance 
of a subject for later comparisons with the PCA study of other subjects in similar 
circumstances. 
Ensuring that the process of a PCA study can be verified by other researchers, its 
description as well as the data it yields must be included in the research report. In the 
present case, the elements of the PCA process have been described in details. 
11.4. In summary 
The PCA methodological framework relies upon three principles that derive from what 
was exposed in this chapter : 
1. It is consistent along all the phases and steps of its process and as such acts as a guide 
for all reseachers interested in studying cognition in action and specific phenomena 
affecting it such as the experience of stress or trauma. 
2. A number of objections have been raised as they are common when researchers embark 
on qualitative, often called phenomenological, studies. As shown before, yes, the biases 
and weaknesses we reminded can possibly affect our research. But no more than other 
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work undertaken in NDM research. Klein’s questionnaire reported by Dekker (2002) or 
resorting on simulation to observe subjects, as well as verbal protocols can induce the 
same biases and problems. However, those who undertook such studies have helped 
make science progress and it is all a matter of rigorous care to prevent or mitigate the 
side-effects of such a methodological choice. 
3. The PCA methodological framework is the result of several years of trials and 
refinements. If in the first place it was not foreseen to perform exploratory factor 
analyses, the quality of the data increased along several reanalyses and self-
distantiation from the material on hand. The phenomenographic database was an 
invaluable contribution to this progress and now a pathway between purely 
psychophenomenological studies and quantitative analyses has been open. 
The next part of this report presents the data gained from Lieutenant A’s Elicitation 
Interview and how they were processed to later allow the analysis of the case, among 
which quantitative exploratory factor analyses. 
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Part 3. DATA AND THEIR PROCESSING 
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CHAPTER 12. Collected data 
This chapter presents the data gained from the preparatory immersion at the BSPP and 
from the Elicitation Interview (EI) of Lieutenant A. 
12.1. Discovering the BSPP and firemen’s naturalistic context of intervention 
An immersion of four months at the Montmartre Fire Station of the Paris Fire Brigade 
(BSPP : Brigade des Sapeurs-Pompiers de Paris) was performed. This station regroups the 
Headquarters (EMG1) of the First Fire Group (G1283) that covers the North of Paris and 
adjacent Seine-Saint-Denis suburban areas, and the 9th Rescue Company (CS9, 9ème 
Compagnie de Secours284), said to be one of the most active in Europe with no less than 
15000 interventions per calendar year in average.  
The description of this context is presented in the end notes285 of the report. In summary, 
BSPP regulations and practice make fire-fighting a technical activity requiring proper 
training, a pre-defined organisation and a strict discipline. In the field, interventions are 
precisely defined : binoms (Firemen always go in pairs for their own safety) are assigned 
clear goals and they are trained to operate to prescribed standards. The BSPP’s motto is 
“Rescue or Perish”. When asked “how are you”, Firemen usually answer "we had good 
fires". They hate the idea that any of them may die in service. The dead on the line of duty 
are commemorated every month in every fire station : this ritual is meant also to recall the 
dangers of the profession. Firemen's life in barracks is difficult, and it has always been so 
(Rolland, 2005). For Men of the rank, it is confined in small dormitories, cantines and 
solitude. Sub-Officers have decent flats for them and their families. Commanding Officers 
have larger flats. Training plays a constant and important part in BSPP activities. Unable to 
pass monthly tests, Firemen can be removed from active service and assigned to 
administrative or logistic jobs. Their sense of identity may then suffer considerably and 
psychological support is provided by the Brigade’s Chief-Psychologist and colleagues. 
First year current attrition ratios are around 25 to 30%. 
12.2. Transcript of Lieutenant A’s narrative 
The integral transcript of Lieutenant A’s Elicitation Interview is reproduced in ANNEX 7. 
It is in French. I provide here the compilation of the subject’s narrative, fully translated to 
English as it was resequenced and cleaned up of the researcher’s probes. Its fidelity was 
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validated by the subject in November 2007. ANNEX 12 provides the English translation of 
speech clauses. The layout of the place where Lieutenant A’s action took place, as he drew 
it during the EI, is in ANNEX 6. 
The translation of Lieutenant A’s resequenced narrative based on reordered speech clauses 
is : 
Well, I was at the station's switchboard. Then the call taker tells me : Lieutenant the 
<other station's> VSAV has gone for a person bitten by a rottweiler dog. Are you going ? I 
say ‘listen, as for me now, bitten by a dog… maybe there's something more serious to come 
up. We'll wait’. 
And later on I was still at the call desk. On top of the VSAV there's a pump that's gone, the 
dogs unit vehicles have gone from <DOGS SPECIALIST STATION> and a resuscitation 
ambulance. In such a case then maybe… So I left for... <INTERVENTION LOCATION>. 
Upon arrival, there are plenty of people on the pavement, a crowd in front of the gate, 
there’s the fence all around the garden, a large gate, nearly two meters high, one cannot 
see through, that's open, with the police. You have walls all around, the gate there, fencing 
all around. 
So I drive in. The house is here (he draws). There was a terrace at the front, a large house, 
and here there were two tents, you know, like a circus tent. 
I spot the police here, there (he draws), but I don't join them (in the back of the garden) 
immediately. 
I walk into the house. Then I noticed on a small table, on the terrace, some hairs on a 
table. 
I hear a woman crying. I see this disorder as I enter, I see that mess, I see the sofa, that 
woman seated head bent backwards, a woman, a young woman. 
Her mother speaks, the daughter yells. 
The mother, on the floor, was not seriously hurt, she was shocked, she had a faint, stress. 
The young woman was bitten. She was saying 'I hurt, you must anaesthetise me, do 
something. 
Of course she hurts. 
I don't pay too much attention, rather I hear the mother. 
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The daughter has blood all over her face. I couldn't see much. She had only hair left on the 
back of her head, she was completely scalped, one could see her scull. As I had walked 
earlier from the car to the house, I had noticed a wig on a small table on the terrace at the 
front of the house, some hairs on a small table. And also she is cut and bitten all over. 
I can’t keep watching this young woman all the time, the worst case of the two. 
Some time later I hear that there was also a baby, in the house. 
All around well it's a brouhaha of medical terms, with the SAMU. The SAMU was there, 
there was the VSAV that was dealing with the victims. Well they were talking between 
them, I didn't know really, I saw they were taking care of them. 
Because the dogs were the only thing I had not yet seen, I spot my driver there who is 
going to help them, another team with two other guys there. Then I saw that they were all 
taking care of these two victims. I told my driver 'then you take care of- you stay here with 
them, and I go outside see what's going on’. 
And then I then I go out and I see the police who deal with the dogs. Finally I'm standing 
here, I keep an eye on the dogs. When I'm outside I tell myself the dogs must be dealt with 
swiftly. There was well a good 50 people and I didn't even count them, a crowd, but they 
were looking over, to see what was going on. 
I walked down this way, there, the terrace was like this, some steps down here (he draws), 
I walked back to the front gate to close it. 
I sent the message, and then the father had not yet arrived. After that I walk back at the 
foot of the terrace. 
The young police woman was in charge of the radio {he performs a hand movement 
symbolising the radio}, a policeman here {draws a little circle to position the policeman 
who was standing right behind him from the dog}, and here I had some other guys {draws 
two or three firemen standing behind him} with me. We were standing there, we were three 
of four. 
That's where I saw the police who were pointing their guns at the two dogs, at the end of 
the garden. The dogs were calm well, they didn't move. There were trees there and there 
{on the map, he points to the left end of the garden}, they were behind these trees. The 
dogs that's the squares (he draws). One of the dogs was lame in a leg. Then the dogs didn't 
move, they were calm, everything was OK. The dogs were surrounded, taken in pincers by 
the police who were pointing guns at them. 
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We were only expecting the veterinary, and the dogs unit to capture the dogs and to put 
them into a cage. 
I try to switch mind a bit… 
We were waiting, for about ten minutes, the dogs were immobile, they were calm, 
everything was going OK apart from the young girl, she needed care. 
Well to try to switch mind a bit, from the outside I later saw that the mother was shocked 
and that the medics had placed her in a chair, with an oxygen mask. She was shocked. 
They start to perfuse them. 
We chat from time to time, we try to talk to one another, and at that point everything was 
OK, well, in brackets… I can't remember because after that I was obsessed by the dogs. 
And the father arrives, fuming, a tall guy. He didn't even go to see inside the house. 
Kill my dogs ! Kill my dogs !… You must kill them ! 
He walks past me. I say 'calm down'. 
And at this point it all happened very quickly. 
I say 'calm down Sir'. Then a policeman says 'calm down Sir' and the father re starts 
walking toward the dogs. The father says 'no, no'. 
'Calm down Sir'… 
The policeman grabs him, and then the dogs, immediately, get up on their legs, 
immediately, and attack. 
I see the dog arriving. They attack us. And from that moment, I saw only the dog, the two 
dogs that were jumping at us. They jump at us. 
The police had already their guns in hand and then I tell the police 'shoot', yes yes, 'shoot, 
shoot, shoot'. 
He shoots backwards, with the father who gets back on his feet, the policeman who shoots, 
the father who was afraid too, as frightened as us. And the three police officers, there 
{those who were in front of him, facing the dogs}, start shooting. 
I could see these policemen in front of me, there, who were shooting at the two dogs, and 
there was this police woman in front of me with the other policeman then who was 
shooting. Both policemen were shooting at the dogs who were advancing, who were 
moving on, moving on. 
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It’s like 14th of July petards well, like a machine gun as they were shooting so much. 
When the dogs started charging--- and they were shooting--- it’s not- how to say ?, it’s not 
the fear of the petards, well, of the guns, it was the fear of the dogs. 
All the shots… 
And space became like a tube. 
At the time (of the dogs attacking) I could see only that blue eye ; the dog she she- well, the 
dog that was getting at me like this. 
I see myself moving backward, I move back two three meters, in addition I hurt my hand on 
the terrace, moving next to the policeman. 
I see the bullets’ impacts, they get into the dog but that does not hurt her and she keeps 
running, she keeps running, running. 
The dog, that makes them deviate, the dog falls, gets back up on her legs, restarts and runs 
past us. 
I could see these policemen in front of me, there, who were shooting at the dogs, and the 
dogs who were running running running, then the dog, it makes them deviate. 
I see see myself, I'm telling myself 'but they don't know how to shoot' or 'they don't shoot in 
the proper direction'. 
And then this dog there, one of the dogs didn't manage to reach us. With the bullets, she 
went to the right and to hide in a bush. That one, she crossed here, till there, and restarted, 
that way {he points to the gate on the map}. 
I say 'then we're done' because well, then we could have found her there… 
Our priority was to find the missing dog. Someone says 'there's a dog in the grove, she's 
dying. Good, then she, good. Then someone else says 'but where is the second dog?'. 
When they started shooting, they saw the dog run off that way {toward the front gate to the 
street}. Then here {he draws the space of the car parked in the garden, left of the north-
east angle of the map} there's a car. We thought she was hiding under the…, she ran under 
the car, but nobody saw it turn to the right. 
The dogs unit arrive with their lassos, they wore polo necks, shirts. I tell them 'well, but 
you don't wear gear to capture them ?’. He comes to me : ‘well' no no, we the lasso will 
do’. 
But then I tell myself no I… I'll never have dogs. 
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I followed the dogs unit, I went that way {to the adjacent garden on the south side}, I went 
down to the shade, a little gate, that was open. There was an adjacent parcel, with a shade, 
here {he draws the store on the left of the south side of the map}. 
There's a policeman who says 'the dog escaped'. Here no one was guarding the gate. And 
that gate had staid open by the father. And then immediately we say 'but where is this dog 
? We have a dog missing she ran away'. 
The dogs unit went into the shade, found nothing. Then, here we go, we go around, we 
search. Here there was a cellar, therefore we searched the cellar. Well, we sent the dogs 
unit search the cellar. 
I say 'we didn't found any dog'. I come back that way (clockwise) and as I was arriving 
there, only after a while, I hear a policeman say ‘the dog is there, she's hiding'. Because 
there was a black mass. She had sought refuge in the grove. Finally, after three minutes 
only it was found, she had gone around, she had found refuge, like the other dog, a bit 
further, behind a grove {he draws the route taken by the dog around the house, clockwise}. 
And there, now, once everything, both dogs were there, well everything was sorted out, 
they were half dead in the grove, the dogs unit had collected the dogs bodies. 
The veterinary didn't arrive immediately 
And when the dogs were under control because they had been shot dead, I briefly spoke 
with a colleague. He says 'they shot all around in a mess'. I reply 'Yes, we might have been 
hit---‘. It's at this point that one said 'on top of being bitten, maybe we could have been 
shot'. 
I say 'yes yes it was like like a machine gun shot, yes we could have been shot, once, maybe 
twice, yes, but they shot what ten ten ten, they must have shot ten bullets'. 
So I inquire because I see some other police officers there, I go to see the police officers 
and I ask 'but how many bullets did you fire ?'. 
‘Hhmm well’, he says, 'me well I emptied the charger'. 
Then I say 'how many bullets in a charger ?'. 
‘Fifteen, hhmm I fired fifteen’. 
I say 'but but what about the others ?'. 
‘Well’, he says, 'well I have a colleague, it's the same, he emptied the charger hhmm and 
the others they shot too'. 
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They said they were pointing their guns toward the ground, well, OK… 
Then the forensics unit arrives, the commissioner arrives, the police commissioner, and 
lieutenants with plenty of envelopes and everything then. They arrive with all their 
equipment. 
Then I inquired later. I learned that there had been 45 bullets shot. I learn finally that in a 
charger there are, I think there are ten or fifteen bullets, and that two policemen emptied 
their charger, and I told myself 'already twenty or thirty, plus the others'. And at the end, 
before I left, I learn 45 bullets had been shot, three chargers. I think it's fifteen bullets 
there are in a charger. 
Because they must collect all the cases, all the cases of the bullets, I tell myself they will 
have luck if they can find the bullets ! And also that if it's like in The Experts on TV, they 
haven't made it yet. Then I even ask one of the forensics 'but do you have metal detectors to 
find the cases ?’. 
He says 'no no we don't have that'. So I say 'well it's it's going to be hard work then'. 
And then, then it all works on my brain, not the shooting story then, it's the intervention 
that comes to an end, I must attend back to the victims to see how much progress they had 
made, to know where the doctor would send the victims. 
After that I went back inside the house. There's the doctoress who says to me 'you--', how 
do you say that ?, 'you neared true disaster', something like that, 'it could have been 
dramatic'. 
I say 'yes nearly'. 
Them, after that, when they told us 'but what happened ? We heard heavy gun shooting', 
and other colleagues who said 'pfff it was heavy shooting', I say 'yes yes'. 
Because there's a fence all around the garden, after we found the dogs, a short while 
afterwards, I tell myself 'all that could have happened, it would be bad to find a dead 
grandma a few days later shot with a bullet in the head while watching TV’. 
Five firemen plus SAMU, then they are three or four, nine people in total, for two victims ! 
That's plenty, then all those who don't have anything to do inside, well there were some 
outside to watch the engine, drivers, and here we were three or four, then plus these, then I 
sent one of the guys to check on adjacent properties (if everyone was safe). 
I send all the messages and all and I want to know about the progress, where victims are to 
be dispatched. 
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They are going to <HOSPITAL 1>, there was the resuscitation ambulance, it went very 
quickly. Before it starts the engine I ask the doctoress if her days are in danger, the young 
woman, if she's at risk. 
'Her life no', but what does she say ?, 'her life--- psychologically and aesthetically yes, her 
life is jeopardised'. And they leave. 
The mother, my men wanted to walk her, because she wasn't…, they wanted to walk her to 
the front gate. She was due to be dispatched to <HOSPITAL 2>. Still some people were 
watching outside, on the right on the left, they're nosy.  
I say 'no no no, there are still people who watch on the right and left, they're nosy, bring 
that PSR {emergency rescue and reanimation vehicle} backward, where the ambulance 
was’. And the woman got in. 
When we left, there were TV people from <TELEVISION CHANNEL>.  
‘TV ? Well, as instructed, they may shoot, but we say nothing’. 
I seat back in the car, well, and it's when, well, about the shooting, it's when it restart to 
work on my mind, more. The driver is next to me. While we drive back to the station I say 
'pfff we could have been bitten, we could have- have been shot'. I tell myself 'yes but if the 
cops had not fired their guns 'maybe it's me who would have been bitten but it's not me 
who pulled the father down'. But I say 'there might have been one or two bitten police 
officers should they have not fired their guns'. 
Well after that, I talked about it at the station, I talked about the whole intervention what 
happened, even several times, several times with colleagues… 
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CHAPTER 13. Data processing 
This chapter extracts cognition-related data from the subject’s narrative, explores their 
structure and elaborates their taxonomy (Bailey, 1994) that, we hope, will be reusable by 
other researchers, and that provides the consistent basis for further processing and analytic 
work. We reorder chronologically the cognitive operations elicited from the semantic, 
interpretative analysis of the subject’s speech clauses. We present the process model, or 
cognigraph, of the subject’s cognitive activity during the episode. An analysis of the 
frequency of phenotypic succession links between cognitive operations allows us to draw 
Decision Network models of Lieutenant A’s cognitive activity. Finally, we discuss the 
scientificity of our data processing work and its limits. In this chapter, we chose to present 
the detailed elements of taxonomy and the grounds of our semantic analysis of the 
narrative for the reader to be fully aware of both the interest and limitations of our work. It 
seems the only way to engage this same reader into a constructive discussion and critique 
of our methodological approach in view of future research endeavours. 
13.1. Structure of the story 
13.1.1. Hierarchical structure of the story 
We found the structure of Lieutenant A’s story to be composed of : 
• 10 CI Experience Phases, themselves divided in 
• 26 meaningful segments (called Speech Units in the Phenomenographic database), 
divided in 
• 44 Present Moments. 
Experience Phases Speech Units Present Moments 
0 Ante-Action – Nominal 00 - At the fire station 00 - Before it started 
0 Ante-CI - Nominal 01 - Doubts and economy 01 - Waiting to see… 
 02 - It's really serious 02 - Deciding to intervene 
 03 - Getting to the scene 03 - Deciding to park in the garden 
 04 - Initial decision 04 - Deciding to attend to the victims 
 05 - Discovering the 
victims' fate 
05 - Attending to the victims and leaving 
 06 - Going back to the dogs 06 - Deciding to close the front gate on the 
way back to dogs 
  07 - Deciding to send an ambience message 
to BSPP 
1 Pre-CI Signals - Stressful 07 - A precarious 
situation… 
08 - Distracting from anxiety 
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  09 - A glimpse of the victims 
2 Pre-CI Tension - Stressful 08 - The father's arrival 
raises the level of risk 
10 - The father irrupts… 
3 CI Trauma Exposure - 
Traumatic 
09 - Dogs attack… 11 - The dogs attack !!! Shoot them ! Shoot 
! Shoot ! 
  12 - The fright 
4 CI Post-Tension - Stressful 10 - A dog escaped ! 13 - Searching the missing dog 
 11 - The dog specialists 
arrive 
14 - Continuing the search and being 
astonished by the dogs unit 
 12 - Where is the missing 
dog ? 
15 - Following the dogs unit into the 
adjacent parcel 
  16 - Searching the adjacent parcel : 
worrying ! 
 13 - No the dog didn't 
escape to the street 
17 - Going back into the garden 
  18 - Searching the cellar 
 14 - No the dog is not in the 
cellar 
19 - No luck with the cellar : restarting the 
search 
5 CI Post-Relief - Stressful 15 – It's been found in a 
grove ! 
20 - The dog has been found ! 
  21 - Seeing the dogs dying 
6 CI Post-Venting - Stressful 16 - We nearly got killed, 
didn't we ? 
22 - First realisation of what went on 
  23 - A quick chat with a colleague… 
  24 - Asking questions about the shooting 
 17 - I'll ask the Police 25 - Further questions about the shooting 
  26 - First answers… 
  27 - 15 Bullets ?… 
 18 - Forensics arrive 28 - Even more 
  29 - 45 bullets ! 
  30 - Why do they carry envelops ? 
  31 - They need to collect the bullets 
  32 - Good luck with the bullets then ! 
7 CI Post-Resumption - Stressful 19 - I need to attend back to 
the victims now 
33 - Deciding to go back inside 
 20 - You got close to 
disaster 
34 - What happened ?, she asks 
  35 - It sounded like heavy gun fire, 
colleagues say 
 21 - Could a bullet have 
shot a neighbour ?… 
36 - Could neighbours have been shot too 
?… 
 22 - The scalped woman's 
evacuation 
37 - Deciding to ask where victims are to be 
dispatched 
  38 - Asking about the daughter 
 23 – The mother's 
evacuation 
39 - You can't walk that woman in her 
condition ! 
  40 - The crowd are watching : bring the PSR 
inside ! 
 24 - A television crew is 
here !… 
41 - The mother departs : time to report and 
go 
 25 - About to leave 42 - Back in the car, sending radio message 
8 CI Post-Debriefing – Stressful 26 - Back in the car, talking 
with the driver 
43 - Starting to think and talk about the 
events 
  44 - Reflecting upon the course of things 
Table 23 The hierarchical structure of Lieutenant A’s story Cognitive taxonomy 
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13.1.2. The phases of Lieutenant A’s experience of the Critical Incident 
The initial action (“Well, I was at the station's switchboard.”) that constitutes an ante-
action phase of the story was not taken into account in further data processing and analysis 
: Lieutenant A was standing by the fire station’s call desk, waiting for likely emergencies, 
which is his last action before the actual action under study starts. However, an Ante-
Action experience phase was created to account for this starting point of the story and to 
distinguish it in later analyses should it have to. The Post-CI phase was elicited but the 
subject’s narrative of this phase was insufficiently detailed to be taken into account in the 
data processing and analysis process. Identified CI experience phases are : 
CI Experience Phases Stressfulness 
0 Ante-Action : before the action considered for analysis even started (the initial context) Nominal 
0 Ante-CI : before exposure to the critical incident Nominal 
1 Pre-CI signals : the subject perceives early warnings of a possible Critical Incident Stressful 
2 Pre-CI tension : the subject is under emotional pressure Stressful 
3 CI Trauma Exposure : he experiences Trauma (Traumatism) Traumatic 
4 CI Post-Tension : he experiences some sequels of the traumatic encounter Stressful 
5 CI Post-Relief : at this point the subject finds out that adversity is over Stressful 
6 CI Post-Venting : the subject now inquires about events to understand what happened Stressful 
7 CI Post-Resumption : the subject is free to return to his mission but he faces others’ 
questions 
Stressful 
8 CI Post-Debriefing : the subject needs to talk about events with colleagues or family Stressful 
9 Post-CI : the subject returns to his normal life and writes an official report about the events Nominal 
Table 24 Definitions of the phases of Lieutenant A’s experience of the Critical Incident 
Here, stressfulness indicates if we considered a subject’s experience phase as nominal (non 
stressful, non traumatic), stressful or traumatic. Phase 3 is the traumatic one. 
13.1.3. The 44 Present Moments and associated narratives 
The subject’s reconstituted narrative can be parsed along the 44 Present Moments as 
follows : 
PM Narrative 
00 - Before it started Well, I was at the station's switchboard.  
01 - Waiting to 
see… 
Then the call taker tells me : Lieutenant the <other station's> VSAV has gone for a 
person bitten by a rottweiler dog. Are you going ? I say ‘listen, as for me now, bitten by 
a dog… maybe there's something more serious to come up. We'll wait’. 
And later on I was still at the call desk 
02 - Deciding to 
intervene 
On top of the VSAV there's a pump that's gone, the dogs unit vehicles have gone from 
<DOGS SPECIALIST STATION> and a resuscitation ambulance. In such a case then 
maybe… So I left for... <INTERVENTION LOCATION>. 
03 - Deciding to 
park in the garden 
Upon arrival, there are plenty of people on the pavement, a crowd in front of the gate, 
there’s the fence all around the garden, a large gate, nearly two meters high, one cannot 
see through, that's open, with the police. You have walls all around, the gate there, 
fencing all around. 
So I drive in 
04 - Deciding to 
attend to the victims 
The house is here (he draws). There was a terrace at the front, a large house, and here 
there were two tents, you know, like a circus tent. 
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I spot the police here, there (he draws), but I don't join them (in the back of the garden) 
immediately. 
I walk into the house.  
05 - Attending to the 
victims and leaving 
Then I noticed on a small table, on the terrace, some hairs on a table. 
I hear a woman crying. I see this disorder as I enter, I see that mess, I see the the sofa, 
that woman seated head bent backwards, a woman, a young woman. 
Her mother speaks, the daughter yells. 
The mother, on the floor, was not seriously hurt, she was shocked, she had a faint, 
stress. 
The young woman was bitten. She was saying 'I hurt, you must anaesthetise me, do 
something. 
Of course she hurts. 
I don't pay too much attention, rather I hear the mother. 
The daughter has blood all over her face. I couldn't see much. She had only hair left on 
the back of her head, she was completely scalped, one could see her scull. As I had 
walked earlier from the car to the house, I had noticed a wig on a small table on the 
terrace at the front of the house, some hairs on a small table. And also she is cut and 
bitten all over. 
I can’t keep watching this young woman all the time, the worst case of the two. 
Some time later I hear that there was also a baby, 
06 - Deciding to 
close the front gate 
on the way back to 
dogs 
and I see the police who deal with the dogs. Finally I'm standing here, I keep an eye on 
the dogs. When I'm outside I tell myself the dogs must be dealt with swiftly. There was 
well a good 50 people and I didn't even count them, a crowd, but they were looking 
over, to see what was going on. 
I walked down this way, there, the terrace was like this, some steps down here (he 
draws), I walked back to the front gate to close it 
07 - Deciding to 
send an ambience 
message to BSPP 
I sent the message, and then the father had not yet arrived. After that I walk back at the 
foot of the terrace. 
08 - Distracting 
from anxiety 
The young police woman was in charge of the radio {he performs a hand movement 
symbolising the radio}, a policeman here {draws a little circle to position the policeman 
who was standing right behind him from the dog}, and here I had some other guys 
{draws two or three firemen standing behind him} with me. We were standing there, 
we were three of four. 
That's where I saw the police who were pointing their guns at the two dogs, at the end 
of the garden. The dogs were calm well, they didn't move. There were trees there and 
there {on the map, he points to the left end of the garden}, they were behind these trees. 
The dogs that's the squares (he draws). One of the dogs was lame in a leg. Then the 
dogs didn't move, they were calm, everything was OK. The dogs were surrounded, 
taken in pincers by the police who were pointing guns at them. 
We were only expecting the veterinary, and the dogs unit to capture the dogs and to put 
them into a cage. 
I try to switch mind a bit… 
We were waiting, for about ten minutes, the dog 
09 - A glimpse of 
the victims 
from the outside I later saw that the mother was shocked and that the medics had placed 
her in a chair, with an oxygen mask. She was shocked. They start to to perfuse them. 
We chat from time to time, we try to talk to one another 
10 - The father 
irrupts… 
and at that point everything was OK, well, in brackets… I can't remember because after 
that I was obsessed by the dogs. 
And the father arrives, fuming, a tall guy. He didn't even go to see inside the house. 
Kill my dogs ! Kill my dogs !… You must kill them ! 
He walks past me. I say 'calm down'. 
And at this point it all happened very quickly. 
I say 'calm down Sir'.  
11 - The dogs attack 
!!! Shoot them ! 
Shoot ! Shoot ! 
Then a policeman says 'calm down Sir' and the father re starts walking toward the dogs. 
The father says 'no, no'. 
'Calm down Sir'… 
The policeman grabs him, and then the dogs, immediately, get up on their legs, 
immediately, and attack. 
I see the dog arriving. They attack us. And from that moment, I saw only the dog, the 
two dogs that were jumping at us. They jump at us. 
The police had already their guns in hand and then I tell the police 'shoot', yes yes, 
'shoot, shoot, shoot'. 
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12 - The fright He shoots backwards, with the father who gets back on his feet, the policeman who 
shoots, the father who was afraid too, as frightened as us. And the three police officers, 
there {those who were in front of him, facing the dogs}, start shooting. 
I could see these policemen in front of me, there, who were shooting at the two dogs, 
and there was this police woman in front of me with the other policeman then who was 
shooting. Both policemen were shooting at the dogs who were advancing, who were 
moving on, moving on. 
It’s like 14th of July petards well, like a machine gun as they were shooting so much. 
When the dogs started charging--- and they were shooting--- it’s not- how to say ?, it’s 
not the fear of the petards, well, of the guns, it was the fear of the dogs. 
All the shots… 
And space became like a tube. 
At the time (of the dogs attacking) I could see only that blue eye ; the dog she she- well, 
the dog that was getting at me like this. 
I see myself moving backward, I move back two three meters, in addition I hurt 
13 - Searching the 
missing dog 
Our priority was to find the missing dog. Someone says 'there's a dog in the grove, she's 
dying. Good, then she, good. Then someone else says 'but where is the second dog?'. 
When they started shooting, they saw the dog run off that way {toward the front gate to 
the street}. Then here {he draws the space of the car parked in the garden, left of the 
north-east angle of the map} there's a car. We thought she was hiding under the… 
14 - Continuing the 
search and being 
astonished by the 
dogs unit 
she ran under the car, but nobody saw it turn to the right. 
The dogs unit arrive with their lassos, they wore polo necks, shirts. I tell them 'well, but 
you don't wear gear to capture them ?’.  
15 - Following the 
dogs unit into the 
adjacent parcel 
He comes to me : ‘well' no no, we the lasso will do’. 
But then I tell myself no I… I'll never have dogs. 
I followed the dogs unit, I went that way {to the adjacent garden on the south side}, I 
went down to the shade 
16 - Searching the 
adjacent parcel : 
worrying ! 
a little gate, that was open. There was an adjacent parcel, with a shade, here {he draws 
the store on the left) of the south side of the map}. 
There's a policeman who says 'the dog escaped'. Here no one was guarding the gate. 
And that gate had staid open by the father. And then immediately we say 'but where is 
this dog ? We have a dog missing she ran away'. 
 
17 - Going back into 
the garden 
The dogs unit went into the shade, found nothing. Then, here we go, we go around, we 
search.  
18 - Searching the 
cellar 
Here there was a cellar, therefore we searched the cellar. Well, we sent the dogs unit 
search the cellar. 
I say 'we didn't found any dog' 
I come back that way (clockwise) 
19 - No luck with 
the cellar : restarting 
the search 
and as I was arriving there, 
20 - The dog has 
been found ! 
only after a while, I hear a policeman say ‘the dog is there, she's hiding'. Because there 
was a black mass. She had sought refuge in the grove. Finally, after three minutes only 
it was found, she had gone around, she had found refuge, like the other dog, a bit 
further, behind a grove {he draws the route taken by the dog around the house, 
clockwise}. And there, now, once everything, both dogs were there, well everything 
was sorted out, they were half dead 
21 - Seeing the dogs 
dying 
in the grove, the dogs unit had collected the dogs bodies. 
The veterinary didn't arrive immediately 
22 - First realisation 
of what went on 
And when the dogs were under control because they had been shot dead, I briefly spoke 
with a colleague. He says 'they shot all around in a mess'. I reply 'Yes, we might have 
been hit---‘. It's at this point that one said 'on top of being bitten, maybe we could have 
been shot'. 
23 - A quick chat 
with a colleague… 
I say 'yes yes it was like like a machine gun shot,  
24 - Asking 
questions about the 
shooting 
yes we could have been shot, once, maybe twice, yes, but they shot what ten ten ten, 
they must have shot ten bullets'. 
25 - Further 
questions about the 
So I inquire because I see some other police officers there, I go to see the police officers 
and I ask 'but how many bullets did you fire ?'. 
  186 
shooting 
26 - First answers… ‘Hhmm well’, he says, 'me well I emptied the charger'. 
Then I say 'how many bullets in a charger ?'. 
 
27 - 15 Bullets ?… ‘Fifteen, hhmm I fired fifteen’. 
I say 'but but what about the others ?'. 
28 - Even more ‘Well’, he says, 'well I have a colleague, it's the same, he emptied the charger hhmm 
and the others they shot too'. 
They said they were pointing their guns toward the ground, well, OK… 
Then the forensics unit arrives, the commissioner arrives, the police commissioner, and 
lieutenants with plenty of envelopes and everything then. They arrive with all their 
equipment. 
Then I inquired later. I learned that there had been 45 bullets shot.  
29 - 45 bullets ! I learned that there had been 45 bullets shot. I learn finally that in a charger there are, I 
think there are ten or fifteen bullets, and that two policemen emptied their charger, and 
I told myself 'already twenty or thirty, plus the others'. And at the end, before I left, I 
learn 45 bullets had been shot, three chargers. I think it's fifteen bullets there are in a 
charger. 
30 - Why do they 
carry envelops ? 
Because they must collect all the cases, all the cases of the bullets,  
31 - They need to 
collect the bullets 
I tell myself they will have luck if they can find the bullets ! And also that if it's like in 
The Experts on TV, they haven't made it yet. Then I even ask one of the forensics 'but 
do you have metal detectors to find the cases ?’. 
32 - Good luck with 
the bullets then ! 
He says 'no no we don't have that'. So I say 'well it's it's going to be hard work then'. 
33 - Deciding to go 
back inside 
And then, then it all works on my brain, not the shooting story then, it's the intervention 
that comes to an end, I must attend back to the victims to see how much progress they 
had made, to know where the doctor would send the victims. 
After that I went back inside the house 
34 - What happened 
?, she asks 
There's the doctoress who says to me 'you--', how do you say that ?, 'you neared true 
disaster', something like that, 'it could have been dramatic'. 
I say 'yes nearly'. 
 
35 - It sounded like 
heavy gun fire, 
colleagues say 
Them, after that, when they told us 'but what happened ? We heard heavy gun 
shooting', and other colleagues who said 'pfff it was heavy shooting', I say 'yes yes'. 
36 - Could 
neighbours have 
been shot too ?… 
Because there's a fence all around the garden, after we found the dogs, a short while 
afterwards, I tell myself 'all that could have happened, it would be bad to find a dead 
grandma a few days later shot with a bullet in the head while watching TV’. 
Five firemen plus SAMU, then they are three or four, nine people in total, for two 
victims ! That's plenty, then all those who don't have anything to do inside, well there 
were some outside to watch the engine, drivers, and here we were three or four, then 
plus these, then I sent one of the guys to check on adjacent properties (if everyone was 
safe). 
37 - Deciding to ask 
where victims are to 
be dispatched 
I send all the messages and all and I want to know about the progress, where victims are 
to be dispatched. 
38 - Asking about 
the daughter 
They are going to <HOSPITAL 1>, there was the resuscitation ambulance, it went very 
quickly. Before it starts the engine I ask the doctoress if her days are in danger, the 
young woman, if she's at risk. 
39 - You can't walk 
that woman in her 
condition ! 
Her life no', but what does she say ?, 'her life--- psychologically and aesthetically yes, 
her life is jeopardised'. And they leave. 
The mother, my men wanted to walk her, because she wasn't…, they wanted to walk 
her to the front gate. 
40 - The crowd are 
watching : bring the 
PSR inside ! 
I say 'no no no, there are still people who watch on the right and left, they're nosy, bring 
that PSR {emergency rescue and reanimation vehicle} backward, where the ambulance 
was’ 
41 - The mother 
departs : time to 
report and go 
And the woman got in. 
When we left, there were TV people from <TELEVISION CHANNEL>.  
‘TV ? Well, as instructed, they may shoot, but we say nothing’. 
 
42 - Back in the car, 
sending radio 
I seat back in the car 
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message 
43 - Starting to think 
and talk about the 
events 
well, and it's when, well, about the shooting, it's when it restart to work on my mind, 
more. The driver is next to me. While we drive back to the station I say 'pfff we could 
have been bitten, we could have- have been shot'.  
44 - Reflecting upon 
the course of things 
I tell myself 'yes but if the cops had not fired their guns 'maybe it's me who would have 
been bitten but it's not me who pulled the father down'. But I say 'there might have been 
one or two bitten police officers should they have not fired their guns'. 
Well after that, I talked about it at the station, I talked about the whole intervention 
what happened, even several times, several times with colleagues… 
 
Table 25 Decomposition of Lieutenant A's narrative into 44 Present Moments 
13.2. Chronotext : resequencing speech clauses and interpretative difficulties 
The following table presents the chronotext of the first two speech units (SU) of the story. 
ANNEX 9 presents the exhaustive chronotext through which the subject’s utterances are 
chronologically resequenced. 
SU N SEQ SC #
286
 Speech Clause Initial interpretation made during semantic parsing 





Ben, j'étais, j'étais au standard, au 
standard de la caserne 
ACTION: he was standing at the 
call desk 





là, et euh y'a un le stationnaire qui 
me dit que euh… " mon lieutenant, 
y'a le VSAV de <OTHER FIRE 
STATION> qui est parti euh pour 
une personne mordue par un ch… 
mordue par un rottweiler. 
"le stationnaire qui me dit" 
- he hears the call taker's utterance 
- his attention is awakened ????? 
- he hears it's about a woman 
bitten by a rottweiler dog 
- he hears a rescue vehicle 
(VSAV) has gone 
- he understands the intervention 
situation at hand 





Est-ce que vous y allez ? he hears a question 





pour l'instant--- mordu par un chien 
c'est pas--- y'a p't'être d'autres 
choses plus graves 
pour l'instant--- he evaluates the 
situation : does it deserve that I go 
vs. staying at the station 
- he evaluates it's not so serious 
("bitten by a dog that's not---") 
- he knows he is not supposed to 
intervene unless serious case 
- he knows from experience more 
important cases may appear (" 
there may be more serious stuff") 
- he considers possible decisions 
(go or no go) 
- he weighs pros and cons ("for 
now---") 





on va attendre he forms an idea of what to do 
("we'll wait") 





Bon alors, j'dis ben moi, écoute - he makes a decision ("well, 
then---") 
- he justifies himself internally 
("listen---") = he checks its 
consistency against his moral / 
professional (ethical) code 
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SU N SEQ SC #
286
 Speech Clause Initial interpretation made during semantic parsing 





j'dis ben moi, écoute, euh, pour 
l'instant--- mordu par un chien c'est 
pas--- y'a p't'être d'autres choses 
plus graves, on va attendre 
- he prepares his answer ("listen, 
well, for now etc...") so as to 
make the call taker understand 
that he has weighed the pros and 
cons 
- ACTION : he utters his reply, 
says he'll wait ("I say" + "we'll 
wait") 





Et puis j'étais toujours au standard - ACTION: he is waiting by the 
desk ("And later on I was still at 
the call desk") 





y'a, y'a--- euh--- (nss) en plus de ce 
VSAV y'a y'a un engin pompe qui 
est parti en plus euh--- les les 
véhicules cinotechniques de 
<DOGS SPECIALIST STATION> 
et euh--- euh une ambulance de 
réanimation. 
- he hears that another truck has 
been sent to the scene 
- he hears that the dogs specialist 
unit is on its way too 
- he hears that a resuscitation 
ambulance is also on its way 




oh, eh bien oui, de toute façon, 
c'est euh, comme j'ai dit aux 
policiers, j'avais déjà fait des 
interventions avec des chiens, des 
chiens mordus, enfin, des gens 
mordus par des chiens, où nos 
équipes cinotechniques 
interviennent et attrapent les chiens 
- he remembers (LTM / EM / 
AM287) the characteristics of such 
an intervention 





là peut-être "là" "là" means "in such a case" : 
- he has recognised the situation 
as serious 





Alors "Alors" = "therefore" / "in that 
case" : 
- I interpret it as "in such a case, 
he recalls his regulation manual" 





là peut-être "peut-être" = "maybe" => this 
shows that his decision is not 
straight forward ; he has some 
hesitation : 
 
1) he says to himself he cannot 
not intervene on a serious case 
2) I assume (knowing his personal 
history of the time : he had been 
bitten by a dog three weeks 
before, I have been told ) 
- he wouldn't like to be harmed 
again 
3) he explicitly says "maybe", 
marking his hesitation even if that 
may be only a ready-made phrase 
- he hesitates to go 





Alors j'dis - he comes to a decision : he 
chooses to go 
- ACTION: so he says 





Bon ben j'suis parti à--- à 
<INTERVENTION LOCATION> 
"Bon ben" = "well… then" :  
- ACTION : he rushes to the car 
(he may also have called his 
driver if he were not at the call 
desk, he will have dialogs in the 
car: first of all asking his driver if 
he knows where to go, finding the 
place on the map if they don't 
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SU N SEQ SC #
286
 Speech Clause Initial interpretation made during semantic parsing 
know, … but we consider these 
actions as one single action : 
leaving the station and driving 
off) 
Table 26 Chronotext of the first two speech units 
The sequence tags and reordering choices were carefully considered several times. The 
result was validated by Lieutenant A in November 2007. 
Here, what is of real importance is the difficulty to perform the semantic analysis of speech 
clauses. This semantic analysis of speech clauses has varied to a limited extent between the 
several rounds of analysis we performed and even until the elaboration of the cognigraph. 
This was due to the fact that the progressive refinement of the identification and definition 
of CogOps may have induced some changes in the interpretation of what was said by 
Lieutenant A. 
In practice, this semantic interpretation was made difficult by the impossibility to apply the 
kind of semantic analysis that yields entity-relationship models in computing science 
where analysed sentences and propositions are expressed in well formulated management 
rules. Here, the subject’s language is not so well controlled. He verbalises his recalls as 
they pop-up, sometimes with an effort, sometimes with a sense in his mind of the disorder 
in which he says things, sometimes probably with doubts as to the exactness of his 
memories, and sometimes he may feel emotional and this creates difficulties of expression. 
Our initial attempt was to apply the classic data modelling technique used in computing 
science and founded on the elicitation of classes within sentences. Finally, we had to give-
up this path for the reasons mentioned above. 
13.3. Cognitive taxonomy : the result of the semantic analysis 
The semantic analysis of the narrative revealed, or allowed to assume, the performance of 
460 CogOps (Cognitive Operations) i.e. 460 pairs of {CogAct ; CogObj}. This process 
started with the semantic elicitation of sub-types. It required several rounds of progressive 
refinement. Those led to progressively refine the wording and definition of each sub-type 
(CogActST and CogObjST) and to group sub-types into types of a higher order of 
abstraction. For instance CogActST were grouped into a CogAct. Then, CogActs 
themselves were in turn grouped into higher-order cognitive families. In this taxonomy 
categories were sought to be orthogonal, i.e. without an intersection of their definitions 
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(this point included orthogonality, independence among CogActs, among CogObjs and 
between CogActs and CogObjs as well). This principle applied both at the sub-type, at the 
type and at the families levels. 
Another researcher might have created different taxonomies. But what is of importance to 
the present research is 1) that successive refinements have yielded consistency in our 
taxonomy, 2) that this taxonomy allowed us to perform a study of the subject’s cognition in 
action that revealed patterns and allowed to study their variations, and 3) that our 
taxonomy constitutes a departure point for later works by other researchers. When other 
research teams will perform similar studies their concern will become that of taxonomic 
choices and the categories presented here may then be updated. 
13.3.1. Cognitive acts (CogAct) : families, types, sub-types, and definitions 
The sub-types, types and families of CogActs are : 
Family CogAct CogActST (sub-type  
A01- Learning LEARNING LRN21- Noting / Memorising (a lesson = attitude, chunk of 
semantic Knowledge, ...) 
A01- Soliciting 
Attention & STM 
ATTENDING ATT21- Scanning actively / Searching (for cues / expectations) 
  ATT23- Discriminating / Singling out (a cue / stimulus) 
  ATT31- Focusing on (focus / stimulus) 
  ATT33- Reviving / Re-awakening / Re-attending to (focus) 
  ATT34- Being attracted / distracted by (distractor) from (focus) 
 STM KEEPING STM31- Remembering (STM data) 
A01- Soliciting 
LTM 
REMEMBERING MEM11- Passive Recall: remembering / evoking 
  MEM21- Active Search: trying to remember 
  MEM23- Active Search: failing to remember (memories in 
relation to object) 
A02- Perceiving PERCEIVING PER11- Seeing (---not in slow motion => or select Dissociate / 
see in slow motion---) / read 
  PER12- Hearing / learning (something from someone, feedback 
from COA / COE) 
  PER17- Sensing (have a sensation, physical or mental) 
  PER21- Failing to perceive 




PRO11- intuiting / anticipating / foreseeing / seeing as imminent 
/ expecting 
A03- Reasoning ELABORATING ELB11- Elaborating / Setting / forming / constructing / devising 
/ conceiving 
  ELB13- Reaffirming (an intention / motivation / …) 
 ORIENTING ORT11- Wanting / Wanting to do / to know 
  ORT12- Wishing / Hoping / Expecting 
  ORT14- Setting priorities / a priority 
  ORT21- Sharing / Following / Replicating / Sticking to (a 
prescribed previous plan / intention / motive) / obey 
  ORT31- Willing not / Wishing not 
  ORT41- Hesitating (between plans / options) 
 REFLECTING ANA11- Analysing / diagnosing 
  ANA12- Counting / Measuring / calculating / computing 
  ANA13- Evaluating (Status of a situation / State of person / 
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object…) 
  ANA40- Considering / studying / examining (alternatives) 
  ANA41- Assuming / hypothesising 
  REF11- Ruminating / Thinking deeply (of sthg) 
  REF12- Saying to oneself / Dialoguing with oneself 
  REF13- Wondering / questioning 
  WEI11- Checking Consistency / Seeking justification (of a fact / 
plan option) 
  WEI13- Simulating / Calculating Outcome (of a fact / plan 
option) 
  WEI14- Weighing (Pros & Cons of an option) / Comparing 
(different options) / Pondering 
 UNDERSTANDING UND01- Realising (things become suddenly clear) 
  UND02- Concluding / Synthesising 
  UND03- Judging / Deeming / Considering 
  UND11- Picturing / Making sense / Figuring out / Linking 
together 
  UND12- Recognising / Making an analogy with (a known 
pattern) 
  UND21- Considering as a suitable hypothesis / Taking as a basis 
for reasoning 
  UND31- Failing to understand / picture 
  UND32- Knowing not 
  UND33- Judging unsatisfactory / false - Doubting 
  UND34- Disapproving 
A04- Emoting E1 APPRAISING APP11- Being alarmed by / Becoming aware of (discrepancy / 
irregularity in the situation) 
 E2 
EXPERIENCING 
EXP11- Feeling / Experiencing (an affect  
 E3 COPING COP01- Urging (an immediate reaction) - Needing / Feeling a 
pressing need (to act) 
  COP11- Tending to Avoid (Obj = Situation) = deter, distance, 
discard, … 
  COP12- Tending to Accept (Obj = Situation) = submit, wait for, 
be patient, hope, ruminate, … 
  COP14- Tending to Vent (Obj = Situation) = vent emotions, talk 
about events 
  DIS11- Seeing in slow motion (things / others / oneself) / 
Slowing (time, sound) / suspending reality 
  DIS12- Narrowing or reshaping (space) 
  DIS13- Hyperfocusing (attention on a detail) 
²  DIS14- Detaching oneself from reality / Derealising (the WOA 
or experience) / becoming spectator of one's own action 
A05- Deciding DECIDING DEC11- Deciding / Choosing / Selecting (a plan / option) 
  DEC22- Resolving finally (after some hesitation) to go for (a 
COA) 
A06- Acting PERFORMING PRF11- Performing / Doing / Executing 
  PRF13- Being / Standing in the world 
Table 27 Taxonomy of Cognitive Acts (CogActs) 
13.3.2. Cognitive objects (CogObj) : families, types, sub-types, and definitions 
The sub-types, types and families of CogObjs are : 
Family CogObj CogObjST (sub-type  
00- LTM objects ENCYCLOPAEDIA RUL12- Moral Rule 
  RUL13- Procedure / Regulation - Practical method 
  SEM11- Stereotype 
  SEM12- Theoretical Knowledge ; Mental Schema ; Model 
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/ Association 
 PERSONALITY PAT11- Attitude (I-World Relating Readiness: Avoidance) 
02- Attention Objects ATTENTIONAL 
OBJECTS 
STM11- Data maintained in Short-term memory 
03- Affective objects A1 SHOCK / 
SALIENCE 
SAL11- Salience / Shock (discrepancy / irregularity / 
novelty / ...) 
 A2 AFFECTS AFF11- Affect: Emotion (Brief reaction: positive or 
negative) 
  AFF12- Affect: Attraction / Affect (Momentary feeling / 
tendency) 
  AFF21- Affect: Stress (Momentary crushing feeling of 
under-capability) 
  AFF31- Affect: Fright / Stupor (Brief and irrepressible 
sentiment of imminent self-destruction and powerlessness, 
beyond fear) 
04- Cognitive objects REFLECTIONS REF11- Inappropriateness of an action 
  REF12- Things I will never do 
05- Situational objects SITUATION - COE / 
COA 
SIT11- PICTURE: Mental Picture as pattern, conceptual 
representation or mathematical explanation 
  SIT12- PICTURE: Mental Story as representation of 
dynamic historic development 
  SIT13- EXPLANATION: Why the situation is what it was 
/ The facts 
  SIT14- RETROSPECTION: What could have happened 
(how the situation could have evolved) 
  SIT15- PROSPECTIVE: What could happen (how the 
situation might evolve) 
  SIT21- RISK: Inadequacy / Discrepancy (expectations // 
reality, facts // information...) 
  SIT23- RISK: Severity of the situation (Nature, extent or 
number of threat / victims / risk, …) 
  SIT24- RISK: Main / Most imminent danger / risk / 
incident 
  SIT25- RISK: Anticipable subsequent incidents / risks 
  SIT26- RISK: Risks inexistant / under control 
  SIT33- PROGRESS: Gap to goals / motivations - 
Difficulties ahead 
  SIT35- PROGRESS: End of the mission reached / Mission 
or step over 
  SIT36- PROGRESS: Failure of the action / mission 
  SIT41- CONDUCT: Adequacy of COA / COE 
  SIT42- CONDUCT: Inadequacy of COA / COE 
  SIT43- CONDUCT: Decisions made to conduct the next 
step of COA 
  SIT44- CONDUCT: Time to act is appropriate 
  SIT46- CONDUCT: Potential / Likely way out of trouble / 
to get results 
  SIT51- CERTAINTY: Reality of the situation 
  SIT61- FACTS: Facts / Figures 
06- Action Regulator 
objects 
ABILITIES ABI21- Powerlessness 
 ACTION PLAN OPT11- Options for action : Plan / Procedure - Steps to 
take 
  OPT13- Role Allocation for action 
  OPT14- Route / Itinerary for action 
 CONFIDENCE CFD32- Low level of Trust (in someone / his words) 
 LATITUDE – 
MARGINS 
MAR11- Safety margin 
  MAR12- Space margin 
  MAR22- Resource on hand / Competent people available 
  MAR51- Absence of margin / Difficulty 
 STIMULATIONS COL11- Collective intention 
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  DUT11- DUTY: What has to be done / The task to 
complete 
  INT11- INTENTION: Goal / Expected or sought effect / 
Mission 
  MOT12- MOTIVE: Perspective (WOA's / Mental Story's 
end / expected development) 
  MOT15- MOTIVE: Justification (why in fine I choose to 
do sthg) 
07- WOA Experience 
objects 
OBJECTS OBJ01- FEATURES - Young / Old - Tall / small 
  OBJ01- OBJECT - One object in particular among several 
  OBJ02- POSITION - Standing / Being gathered 
(somewhere) 
  OBJ02- STANCE - Lying down / Sitting, Open / Closed, 
… 
  OBJ02- STATE - Physical State 
  OBJ03- TRAJECTORY - Where they are heading for / 
Which path they take 
  OBJ10- ACTION - Joining / Going to attend to (sthg / 
someone) / Intervening 
  OBJ11- ACTION - Approaching / Getting close to a place 
  OBJ18- ACTION - Being about to leave 
 OTHERS / ANIMALS OTH01- FEATURES - Young / Old - Tall / small 
  OTH01- IDENTITY - Name or details / Who that is 
  OTH01- SOMEONE - Someone / An animal in particular 
among several 
  OTH02- DETAIL - Eyes / … 
  OTH02- POSITION - Standing / Being gathered 
(somewhere) 
  OTH02- PRESENCE - Being absent somewhere 
  OTH02- PRESENCE - Being there / somewhere 
  OTH02- STANCE - Lying down / Sitting / Standing up… 
  OTH02- STATE - Physical or emotional State 
  OTH03- DIFFICULTIES - What it will take to achieve 
their goals 
  OTH03- METHOD - How they do / will do their job 
  OTH03- MISSION - What they are here for / What they 
have to do 
  OTH03- TRAIL - Traces of past actions 
  OTH03- TRAJECTORY - Where they are heading for / 
Which path they take 
  OTH04- GEAR - Equipment / Clothing 
  OTH04- LATITUDE - Margin of manoeuvre 
  OTH04- SAFETY - Exposure to a threat / Potential 
damage 
  OTH05- FATE - Accident / Story of what happened to the 
person / group 
  OTH10- ACTION - Joining / Going to attend to (sthg / 
someone) / Intervening 
  OTH11- ACTION - Approaching / Getting close to a place 
  OTH12- ACTION - Arriving / Rejoining / Returning 
  OTH13- ACTION - Leaving / Coming out 
  OTH14- ACTION - Moving / Walking / Running / 
Driving 
  OTH15- ACTION - Moving away / Distancing / Running 
away 
  OTH17- ACTION - Boarding / Being carried away / 
transported / taken on board 
  OTH30- ACTION - Holding / Wearing / Carrying sthg 
  OTH31- ACTION - Realising / Executing / Doing sthg 
  OTH32- ACTION - Changing direction / Switching course 
of action 
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  OTH33- ACTION - Failing / Missing / Wasting an 
opportunity 
  OTH35- ACTION - Interacting / Cooperating / 
Teamworking 
  OTH36- ACTION - Pausing / Freezing / Interrupting / 
holding up / stopping / staying 
  OTH38- ACTION - Waiting / getting in waiting / Doing 
nothing / linger 
  OTH39- ACTION - Restarting / Starting / Continuing 
  OTH40- ACTION - Searching / Looking for (sthg) / 
Seeking / Watching 
  OTH43- ACTION - Being intrusive / nosy / curious 
  OTH44- ACTION - Ignoring / Not bothering / Not paying 
attention to sthg 
  OTH52- ACTION - Taking a defensive stance / Trying to 
prevent 
  OTH53- ACTION - Being affected / wounded 
  OTH54- ACTION - Resisting / Protecting oneself / 
Seeking refuge 
  OTH55- ACTION - Recovering 
  OTH57- ACTION - Dying 
  OTH58- ACTION - Being captured 
  OTH61- ACTION - Threatening / Pausing a threat 
  OTH62- ACTION - Knocking down / Putting down / 
Catching 
  OTH63- ACTION - Preparing to attack 
  OTH64- ACTION - Attacking / Destroying / Killing 
  OTH65- ACTION - Fighting / Firing 
  OTH67- ACTION - Protecting / Helping (others) 
  OTH68- ACTION - Keeping under control 
  OTH69- ACTION - Suffering 
  OTH70- ACTION - Utterance : Keeping silent / Saying 
nothing / Mute 
  OTH72- ACTION - Utterance : Question 
  OTH73- ACTION - Utterance : Conversation (Information 
+ Question) 
  OTH74- ACTION - Utterance : Answer 
  OTH75- ACTION - Utterance : Information / Opinion / 
Reporting - Message 
  OTH76- ACTION - Utterance : Injunction / Order 
  OTH77- ACTION - Utterance : Emotional expression : 
Yelling / Screaming 
  OTH78- ACTION - Utterance : Emotional expression : 
Shouting - Insulting 
  OTH79- ACTION - Utterance : Emotional expression : 
Emotion - Sentiment of defeat - Negative / depressed 
feelings 
  OTH88- BEHAV - Fury, anger, shouting with anger 
  OTH96- BEHAV - Calm 
 SETTINGS SET12- Zoning / Structuration of space / Configuration 
  SET13- General Physical State 
  SET14- Noise / Sounds 
  SET21- Populating People and numbers / features 
  SET22- Populating Objects and numbers / features 
  SET32- Ambient Dangers - Incidents - Risks 
 TIME TIM21- Subjective Time: Length 
08- Actions taken SELF288 SLF02- POSITION - Standing / Being gathered 
(somewhere) 
  SLF03- MISSION - What the subject is here for / What he 
has to do 
  SLF03- TRAJECTORY - Where the subject is heading for 
/ Which path he takes 
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  SLF05- FATE - Accident / Story of what happened to the 
subject 
  SLF05- PAIN - Feeling of pain / being hurt / getting 
wounded 
  SLF10- ACTION - Joining / Going to attend to (sthg / 
someone) / Intervening 
  SLF12- ACTION - Arriving / Rejoining / Returning 
  SLF14- ACTION - Moving / Walking / Running / Driving 
  SLF16- ACTION - Following 
  SLF17- ACTION - Boarding / Being carried away / 
transported / taken on board 
  SLF32- ACTION - Changing direction / course of action 
  SLF38- ACTION - Waiting / getting in waiting / linger 
  SLF40- ACTION - Searching / Looking for (sthg) / 
Seeking / Watching 
  SLF45- ACTION - Checking / Verifying de visu 
  SLF68- ACTION - Keeping under control 
  SLF71- ACTION - Utterance : Interruption 
  SLF72- ACTION - Utterance : Question 
  SLF73- ACTION - Utterance : Conversation (Information 
+ Question) 
  SLF74- ACTION - Utterance : Answer 
  SLF75- ACTION - Utterance : Information / Opinion / 
Reporting - Message 
  SLF76- ACTION - Utterance : Injunction / Order 
  SLF79- ACTION - Utterance : Emotional expression : 
Emotion - Sentiment of defeat - Negative / depressed 
feelings 
Table 28 Taxonomy of Cognitive Objects (CogObj  
13.3.3. Cognitive Operations (CogOp), or {CogAct ; CogObj} pairs 
A total of 460 cognitive operations (CogOp) have been elicited in the study of Lieutenant 
A’s case. Cognitive Operations are unseparable {CogAct ; CogObj} pairs. The types of 
CogOps elicited in Lieutenant A’s case were formed of the following CogActs and 
CogObjs : 
CogAct CogObj 
ATTENDING ATTENTIONAL OBJECTS 
 LATITUDE - MARGINS 
 OTHERS / ANIMALS 
 SELF 
DECIDING ACTION PLAN 
E1 APPRAISING A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
E2 EXPERIENCING A2 AFFECTS 
E3 COPING ABILITIES 
 ACTION PLAN 
 OBJECTS 
 OTHERS / ANIMALS 
 SELF 
 SETTINGS 




ORIENTING OTHERS / ANIMALS 
 SELF 
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 SITUATION - COE / COA 
 STIMULATIONS 
PERCEIVING OBJECTS 




PRO/PARA-TENDING SITUATION - COE / COA 
REFLECTING ACTION PLAN 
 ATTENTIONAL OBJECTS 
 LATITUDE - MARGINS 
 OTHERS / ANIMALS 
 REFLECTIONS 
 SETTINGS 
 SITUATION - COE / COA 
REMEMBERING ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
 OBJECTS 
STM KEEPING OBJECTS 
 OTHERS / ANIMALS 
 SETTINGS 




 LATITUDE - MARGINS 
 OTHERS / ANIMALS 
 SITUATION - COE / COA 
 STIMULATIONS 
 TIME 
Table 29 Taxonomy of Cognitive Operations (CogOps) at the type level 
ANNEX 17 presents the more precise subtype-level cognitive operations found in 
Lieutenant A’s case. 
13.3.4. When did we assume the existence of CogOps ? 
Beside what precedes, of the 460 CogOps we elicited : 
• 319 CogOps involve CogActs with a “CERTAIN” status : the semantic analysis of 
Speech Clauses has suggested the occurrence of a CogOp beyond reasonable doubt289. 
• 141 CogOps involve CogActs with an “ASSUMED” status : the semantic analysis of 
Speech Clauses suggested either an “implied” narration of one or several CogActs290, or 
we found a “gap” in the narration of the subject’s cognitive experience. Then, a 
deliberate choice was made to “assume” the occurrence of CogActs, and therefore of 
the corresponding CogOps. 
The number of assumed CogActs (and therefore CogOps) amounts to 30,65% of the total 
number of 460 CogOps. Assumed CogActs are : 
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Contribution to the total % 
of assumed CogActs CogActs 
% of CogActs 
assumed 
NB of CogActs 
assumed 
Out of NB of 
CogOps performed 
17,02% UNDERSTANDING 37,50% 24 64 
14,89% E1 APPRAISING 100,00% 21 21 
11,35% PERCEIVING 10,46% 16 153 
11,35% E2 EXPERIENCING 72,73% 16 22 
8,51% E3 COPING 42,86% 12 28 
7,09% PERFORMING 18,87% 10 53 
5,67% REMEMBERING 57,14% 8 14 
4,96% REFLECTING 25,00% 7 28 
4,96% DECIDING 24,14% 7 29 
4,26% ATTENDING 60,00% 6 10 
3,55% STM KEEPING 41,67% 5 12 
2,13% ORIENTING 17,65% 3 17 
2,13% LEARNING 75,00% 3 4 
1,42% ELABORATING 50,00% 2 4 
0,71% PRO/PARA-TENDING 100,00% 1 1 
30,65%   141 460 
Table 30 Percentage and distribution of assumed CogActs 
A significant part of emotion-related CogActs (E1 APPRAISING, E2 EXPERIENCING, E3 
COPING) were assumed (42,86% up to 100%), out of necessity as the example below 
shows. 
An example of assumed affect-related CogActs is provided here with the cognigraph of 
Present Moment #05 : 
 
Figure 21 An example of a cognigraph and the choice to assume emotion-related CogOps (PM # 5) 
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In this example the assumptions we made (CogActs in italic) can be better understood if 





(sub-type = {CogActST ; 
CogObjST}) 
Speech Clause 
and translation to English Interpretation 
05-022 PER11- Seeing (---not in slow 
motion => or select Dissociate / see 
in slow motion---) / read - OTH02- 
STATE - Physical or emotional 
State 
y'avait plus que euh- les 
ch'veux de- derrière, y'avait 
plus qu'les ch'veux derrière, 
donc scalpée complètement, 
que- que- on voyait l'crane 
 
"she had only hair left on the 
back of her head, that is she 
was completely scalped, one 
could see her skull" 
he saw her scull made naked 
by scalping 
05-023 STM31- Remembering (STM data) 
- OBJ01- OBJECT - One object in 
particular among several 
quand j'suis arrivé, j'ai vu, j'ai 
aperçu sur une p'tite table (ns) 
sur une terrasse, y'avait une 
terrasse euh- devant l'pavillon, 
sur une table euh y avait euh-
des ch'veux 
+ 
parc'que quand j'suis arrivé 
 
“when I was on the garden 
terrace about to enter the 
lounge there was hair on a 
small table” 
When he sees the woman has 
been scalped : 
- he remembers the hairs on the 
terrace table 
05-024 UND01- Realising (things become 
suddenly clear) - SIT12- 
PICTURE: Mental Story as 
representation of dynamic historic 
development 
quand j'suis arrivé, j'ai vu, j'ai 
aperçu sur une p'tite table (ns) 
sur une terrasse, y'avait une 
terrasse euh- devant l'pavillon, 
sur une table euh y avait euh-
des ch'veux 
+ 
parc'que quand j'suis arrivé 
 
“when I was on the garden 
terrace about to enter the 
lounge there was hair on a 
small table” 
he understands / gets a clear 
picture of what must have 
happened, of the story 
05-026 PER11- Seeing (---not in slow 
motion => or select Dissociate / see 
in slow motion---) / read - OTH02- 
STATE - Physical or emotional 
State 
et donc euh- coupée euh-, et 
puis mordue un peu partout 
 
“and also she is cut- hmmm- 
and bitten all over” 
"et puis" "and also" : after 
being overwhelmed by the 
sight of the victim's face / head 
he notices the other wounds, 
bites everywhere 
05-030 COP11- Tending to Avoid (Obj = 
Situation) = deter, distance, 
discard, … - OTH02- STATE - 
Physical or emotional State 
euh les esprits, on reste pas 
tout l'temps euh la vue sur euh-
- sur cette jeune femme, là, 
mais euh-- 
 
“hmm my spirit, I don’t keep 
watching hmm-- this young 
woman all the time, there, but 
hhmm—“ 
- his coping mode is of an 
"escape" style / distract himself 
- he alternates focus of 
attention (once the dogs, once 
the victims) as a consequence 
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05-031 UND01- Realising (things become 
suddenly clear) - SIT24- RISK: 
Main / Most imminent danger / risk 
/ incident 
le plus grave, c'était surtout sa 
sa fille 
 
“the worst case, it was her her 
daughter” 
- he realises that the daughter is 
more shocked than the mother 
Table 31 "CERTAIN" CogOps in Present Moment # 5 
Without any assumption, Lieutenant A’s “CERTAIN” cognitive trajectory lacks “cognitive 
consistency” and makes one wonder how the subject’s cognitive flow can spark a given 
“CERTAIN” CogOp without the meaning-creating mediation of the ASSUMED CogOps. 
For instance between CogOps 05-026 and 05-030 : 
• In 05-026 Lieutenant A sees that the woman has been bitten and cut all over her body 
on top of being scalped. 
• 05-030 shows a coping reaction of avoidance (“I don’t keep watching”) without the 
“cognitive build up” suggested by the “high-level model of the stressor  appraisal  
coping  response process” presented in chapter 2. This model indicates that a coping 
reaction is associated with a stress / emotional reaction, itself following a negative 
appraisal of a stressor.  
• Though Lieutenant A did not make any utterance suggesting the performance of the 
“missing” CogOps, it is deemed acceptable to assume them (05-027 to 05-029). 
Assumptions were also made for REMEMBERING CogActs, based on the knowledge 
gained from my field study.  
Assumptions about ATTENDING CogActs were based on the “logic” of the story. For 
instance at CogOp 05-021, when Lieutenant A says “I couldn’t see much” we can assume a 
“ ATT21- Scanning actively / Searching (for cues / expectations)” CogAct sub-type that 
itself falls under ATTENDING.  
STM KEEPING CogActs are assumed in 41,67% of cases, as in CogOp 05-043 for 
instance when Lt A says “ because that was the only thing I had not yet seen” that means 
that at this point he remembers his duty (attending to the dogs). 
The case of “PRO/PARA-TENDING” CogActs (100% assumed) is different on all 
accounts : 
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Figure 22 An ASSUMED anticipation CogOp in Present Moment # 1 (CogOp # 01-008) 
• Only one such CogAct could be discerned (or rather inferred) in Lieutenant A’s 
narrative, in PM # 1 (CogOp # 01-008). 
• The assumed CogAct is likely as it refers to the most basic reasoning Lieutenant A 
should make in similar circumstances : thinking of what else might happen in 




(sub-type = {CogActST ; 
CogObjST}) 
Speech Clause 
and translation to English Interpretation 
01-008 PRO11- intuiting / anticipating / 
foreseeing / seeing as imminent / 
expecting - SIT15- PROSPECTIVE: 
What could happen (how the 
situation might evolve) 
pour l'instant--- mordu par un 
chien c'est pas--- y'a p't'être 
d'autres choses plus graves 
 
"for now… bitten by a dog, 
that's not… maybe there's 
something more serious to 
come up" 
he knows from experience 
more important cases may 
appear : there may be more 
serious stuff 
Table 32 An ASSUMED anticipation CogOp in Present Moment # 1 
 
As the picture shown in the example above also indicates, a “MEM11- Passive Recall: 
remembering / evoking”291 REMEMBERING CogAct is assumed at CogOp # 01-007. It 
refers to the very likely remembrance of applicable regulations : 




(sub-type = {CogActST ; CogObjST}) 
Speech Clause 
and translation to English Interpretation 
01-007 MEM11- Passive Recall: remembering 
/ evoking - RUL13- Procedure / 
Regulation - Practical method 
pour l'instant--- mordu par un 
chien c'est pas--- y'a p't'être 
d'autres choses plus graves 
 
"for now… bitten by a dog, 
that's not… maybe there's 
something more serious to come 
up" 
he knows he is not supposed to 
intervene unless serious case 
Table 33 An ASSUMED remembrance CogOp in PM # 1 (CogOp # 01-007) 
13.4. Cognigraph 
13.4.1. The descriptive process model of Lieutenant A’s cognitive experience 
Examples of PM-level cognigraphs have already been given. The cognigraph is the 
descriptive process model of Lieutenant A’s cognitive experience during his intervention, 
i.e. the sequence of CogOps performed by the subject. As 460 CogOps were identified in 
Lieutenant A’s narrative, a complete cognigraph would be too long to be presented in the 
pages of this report. Therefore, it is presented for each Present Moment in ANNEX 13292.  
13.4.2. Ambiguities in the detailed chronology of CogOps 
The narrative does not always provide clues about the exact sequence of CogOps 



















assise en arrière, la tête 
en arrière 
 
"seated head bent 
backwards" 
Perceiving Others / 
animals 
PER11- Seeing (--
-not in slow 
motion => or 
select Dissociate / 
see in slow 
motion---) / read 
OTH02- STANCE - 
Lying down / Sitting 












une femme, une jeune 
femme 
 
"a woman, a young 
woman" 
Perceiving Others / 
animals 
PER11- Seeing (--
-not in slow 
motion => or 
select Dissociate / 
see in slow 
motion---) / read 
OTH01- 
FEATURES - 













Elle {the mother}, elle 
parle, elle {the 
daughter} elle gémit 
 
"she (the mother), she 
speaks, the other (the 
daughter) she yells 
Perceiving Others / 
animals 





COA / COE) 













Et, et une aut' femme 
également- par terre- 
 
"and, and another 
woman also- on the 
floor-" 
Perceiving Others / 
animals 
PER11- Seeing (--
-not in slow 
motion => or 
select Dissociate / 
see in slow 
motion---) / read 
OTH01- 
SOMEONE - 
Someone / An 
animal in particular 
among several 



















qui euh--- qui n'était 
pas- qui n'avait pas 
grand chose, enfin pas 
grand chose, qui avait 
été, qui était choquée, 
quoi. Elle faisait un 
malaise, stressée euh- 
 
 "who hhmm- who was 
not- who was not 
seriously hurt, well not 
seriously, she was 
shocked, she had a 
faint, stress" 
Perceiving Others / 
animals 
PER11- Seeing (--
-not in slow 
motion => or 
select Dissociate / 
see in slow 
motion---) / read 
OTH02- STATE - 
Physical or 
emotional State 
Table 34 A series of PERCEIVING CogActs difficult to sequence 
There is no evidence that perceptions occurred in the chosen sequence (05-006 to 05-010) 
and another ordering choice could have been made. When Lieutenant A validated the 
reordered sequence at the end of 2007, he did not notice any discrepancy with his actual 
experience. But this may mean he did not notice or did not deem important such details 
during his validation. 
13.5. 460 cognitive operations 
13.5.1. Detailed view (460 CogOps, with matching original speech clauses) 
ANNEX 12 presents the full sequence of CogOps with the corresponding speech clauses 
(in French and English) from which they were drawn during semantic parsing. The 
following table presents only, as an example, the first three CogOps and their composition 









Speech Clause and 
Translation CogAct Cog0bj CogActST CogObjST 





00-001 Ben, j'étais, j'étais au 
standard, au standard de la 
caserne 
 
"Well, I was at the station's 
switchboard" 
performing self PRF13- Being / 
Standing in the 
world 
SLF02- POSITION 
- Standing / Being 
gathered 
(somewhere) 





01-001 là, et euh y'a un le 
stationnaire qui me dit que 
euh… " mon lieutenant, y'a 
le VSAV de <OTHER 
FIRE STATION> qui est 
parti euh pour une personne 
mordue par un ch… 
mordue par un rottweiler. 
 
"then and hhmm the call 
taker tells me : Lieutenant 
the <other station's> VSAV 
has gone for a person bitten 
by a rottweiler dog" 
perceiving others / 
animals 





COA / COE) 
OTH75- ACTION - 
Utterance : 
Information / 
Opinion / Reporting 
- Message 








Speech Clause and 
Translation CogAct Cog0bj CogActST CogObjST 





01-002 là, et euh y'a un le 
stationnaire qui me dit que 
euh… " mon lieutenant, y'a 
le VSAV de <OTHER 
FIRE STATION> qui est 
parti euh pour une personne 
mordue par un ch… 
mordue par un rottweiler. 
 
"then and hhmm the call 
taker tells me : Lieutenant 
the <other station's> VSAV 
has gone for a person bitten 
by a rottweiler dog" 
perceiving others / 
animals 





COA / COE) 
OTH05- FATE - 
Accident / Story of 
what happened to 
the person / group 
Table 35 First three CogOps in Lieutenant A's case, with speech clauses 
CogOps are assigned a sequential number like 01-002 : 01 represents the Present Moment 
in which the CogOp is found, and 002 is the sequential number of the CogOp within this 
PM. 
13.5.2. A simplified view : 460 Decision Making Steps 
In order to facilitate the reading and elaboration of the global decision network of 
Lieutenant A’s experience, a more abstract DM Step was substituted to every CogOp.  
ANNEX 12 presents the corresponding sequence of 460 DM Steps. 
13.6. Decision networks : the shape of Lieutenant A’s cognitive trajectories 
This section presents decision networks calculated for the global episode (CogOp and DM 
Step based versions) and intermediate CI Experience Phase (CogOp-based version) levels.  
Decision networks represent the phenotypic succession links between CogOps. The width 
of the arrows reflects the found frequency of each given phenotypic link. 
First, we present the global CogOp-based decision network, and next the same global 
decision network is presented, but DM Step-based.  
The comparison shows how DM Steps simplify the reading of the model. On another hand, 
it shows how abstraction diminishes the semantic content of each operation present in the 
model.  
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This is why decision networks for the intermediate (CI Experience Phase) and detailed 
(Present Moment) levels remain CogOp-based, in order to convey to the reader richer 
details of Lieutenant A’s cognitive activity. 
Frequencies were computed from the CogOp data set by the phenomenographic database. 
The following decision networks are as good and usable by other researchers as data 
collection and processing were performed to a satisfactory standard of rigour. 
The calculated frequencies are presented systematically after each graph. 
Graphs do not show all found phenotypic links as they are too numerous and would have 
made graphs illegible. Therefore, only the links with a frequency of 9% and above, or 
those of particular interest are represented. 
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13.6.1. Global level : CogOp-based global decision network 
 
Figure 23 CogOp-based global decision network 
Data : 
GENOTYPIC COGOP 
{COGACT – COGOBJ} 
FREQ OF PHENOTYPIC 
COGOP  
FOLLOWED BY PHENOTYPIC COGOP 
{COGACT – COGOBJ} 
ATTENDING - ATTENTIONAL OBJECTS 100,00% REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
ATTENDING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
ATTENDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 85,71% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
ATTENDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 14,29% REFLECTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
ATTENDING - SELF 100,00% UNDERSTANDING - TIME 
DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 100,00% PERFORMING - SELF 
E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 100,00% E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 59,09% E3 COPING - ACTION PLAN 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 13,64% E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 9,09% E3 COPING - SETTINGS 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 4,55% ATTENDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 4,55% E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 4,55% E3 COPING - ABILITIES 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 4,55% E3 COPING - SELF 
E3 COPING - ABILITIES 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
E3 COPING - ACTION PLAN 100,00% PERFORMING - SELF 
E3 COPING - OBJECTS 100,00% E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 28,57% E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 28,57% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 14,29% ATTENDING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 
E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 14,29% E3 COPING - SELF 
E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 14,29% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
E3 COPING - SELF 33,33% E3 COPING - OBJECTS 
E3 COPING - SELF 33,33% PERCEIVING - SELF 
E3 COPING - SELF 33,33% PERFORMING - SELF 
E3 COPING - SETTINGS 50,00% E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
E3 COPING - SETTINGS 50,00% PERFORMING - SELF 
ELABORATING - ACTION PLAN 100,00% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
ELABORATING - STIMULATIONS 100,00% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
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GENOTYPIC COGOP 
{COGACT – COGOBJ} 
FREQ OF PHENOTYPIC 
COGOP  
FOLLOWED BY PHENOTYPIC COGOP 
{COGACT – COGOBJ} 
LEARNING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 33,33% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
LEARNING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 33,33% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
LEARNING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 33,33% REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
LEARNING - PERSONALITY 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 42,86% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 14,29% ATTENDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 14,29% ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 14,29% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 14,29% REFLECTING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 
ORIENTING - SELF 33,33% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
ORIENTING - SELF 33,33% ELABORATING - ACTION PLAN 
ORIENTING - SELF 33,33% STM KEEPING - STIMULATIONS 
ORIENTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 75,00% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
ORIENTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 25,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
ORIENTING - STIMULATIONS 33,33% ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
ORIENTING - STIMULATIONS 33,33% ORIENTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
ORIENTING - STIMULATIONS 33,33% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 44,44% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 22,22% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 11,11% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 11,11% STM KEEPING - OBJECTS 
PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 11,11% UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 51,20% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 15,20% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 5,60% UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 3,20% PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 3,20% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 3,20% REFLECTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 2,40% ATTENDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 2,40% REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 2,40% STM KEEPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 1,60% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 1,60% ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 1,60% UNDERSTANDING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 0,80% REFLECTING - ATTENTIONAL OBJECTS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 0,80% REFLECTING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 0,80% REFLECTING - REFLECTIONS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 0,80% REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 0,80% REMEMBERING - OBJECTS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 0,80% STM KEEPING - OBJECTS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 0,80% UNDERSTANDING - CONFIDENCE 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 0,80% UNDERSTANDING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
PERCEIVING - SELF 100,00% E3 COPING - SELF 
PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 38,89% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 22,22% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 5,56% ORIENTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 5,56% PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 
PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 5,56% REFLECTING - ACTION PLAN 
PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 5,56% REFLECTING - SETTINGS 
PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 5,56% REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 5,56% STM KEEPING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 5,56% UNDERSTANDING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 
PERFORMING - SELF 50,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERFORMING - SELF 13,46% PERFORMING - SELF 
PERFORMING - SELF 7,69% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
PERFORMING - SELF 5,77% REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
PERFORMING - SELF 3,85% PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 
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GENOTYPIC COGOP 
{COGACT – COGOBJ} 
FREQ OF PHENOTYPIC 
COGOP  
FOLLOWED BY PHENOTYPIC COGOP 
{COGACT – COGOBJ} 
PERFORMING - SELF 3,85% STM KEEPING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERFORMING - SELF 1,92% ATTENDING - ATTENTIONAL OBJECTS 
PERFORMING - SELF 1,92% ATTENDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERFORMING - SELF 1,92% ATTENDING - SELF 
PERFORMING - SELF 1,92% ELABORATING - STIMULATIONS 
PERFORMING - SELF 1,92% ORIENTING - STIMULATIONS 
PERFORMING - SELF 1,92% STM KEEPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERFORMING - SELF 1,92% STM KEEPING - SETTINGS 
PERFORMING - SELF 1,92% UNDERSTANDING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 
PRO/PARA-TENDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 100,00% REFLECTING - ACTION PLAN 
REFLECTING - ACTION PLAN 50,00% REFLECTING - ACTION PLAN 
REFLECTING - ACTION PLAN 25,00% ELABORATING - STIMULATIONS 
REFLECTING - ACTION PLAN 25,00% REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
REFLECTING - ATTENTIONAL OBJECTS 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
REFLECTING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 50,00% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
REFLECTING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 50,00% UNDERSTANDING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 
REFLECTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 66,67% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
REFLECTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 33,33% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
REFLECTING - REFLECTIONS 50,00% LEARNING - PERSONALITY 
REFLECTING - REFLECTIONS 50,00% REFLECTING - REFLECTIONS 
REFLECTING - SETTINGS 100,00% UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 25,00% REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 25,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 16,67% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 8,33% LEARNING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 8,33% ORIENTING - SELF 
REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 8,33% REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 8,33% STM KEEPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 23,08% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 15,38% REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 15,38% UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 7,69% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 7,69% ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 7,69% ORIENTING - STIMULATIONS 
REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 7,69% PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 
REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 7,69% PRO/PARA-TENDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 7,69% REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
REMEMBERING - OBJECTS 100,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
STM KEEPING - OBJECTS 100,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
STM KEEPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 60,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
STM KEEPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 20,00% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
STM KEEPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 20,00% REFLECTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
STM KEEPING - SETTINGS 100,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
STM KEEPING - SITUATION - COE / COA 66,67% REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
STM KEEPING - SITUATION - COE / COA 33,33% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
STM KEEPING - STIMULATIONS 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
UNDERSTANDING - CONFIDENCE 100,00% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
UNDERSTANDING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 100,00% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
UNDERSTANDING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 60,00% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
UNDERSTANDING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 20,00% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
UNDERSTANDING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 20,00% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 27,27% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 18,18% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 9,09% ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 9,09% PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 
UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 9,09% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
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GENOTYPIC COGOP 
{COGACT – COGOBJ} 
FREQ OF PHENOTYPIC 
COGOP  
FOLLOWED BY PHENOTYPIC COGOP 
{COGACT – COGOBJ} 
UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 9,09% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 9,09% REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 9,09% REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 36,36% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 20,45% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 6,82% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 4,55% LEARNING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 4,55% ORIENTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 4,55% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 4,55% REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 2,27% ATTENDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 2,27% E3 COPING - ACTION PLAN 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 2,27% ELABORATING - ACTION PLAN 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 2,27% ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 2,27% ORIENTING - SELF 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 2,27% REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 2,27% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 2,27% UNDERSTANDING - STIMULATIONS 
UNDERSTANDING - STIMULATIONS 100,00% ORIENTING - SELF 
UNDERSTANDING - TIME 100,00% ORIENTING - STIMULATIONS 
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13.6.2. Global level : DM Step-based global decision network 
 
Figure 24 DM Step based global decision network 
Data : 
GENOTYPIC DM Step FREQ OF PHENOTYPIC DM Step  FOLLOWED BY PHENOTYPIC DM Step 
DM01- Attention & STM 36,36% DM27- Judgement 
DM01- Attention & STM 36,36% DM10- Acquisition 
DM01- Attention & STM 22,73% DM21- Analysis 
DM01- Attention & STM 4,55% DM50- Selection 
DM02- Metacognition 50,00% DM10- Acquisition 
DM02- Metacognition 25,00% DM03- LTM 
DM02- Metacognition 25,00% DM31- Appraisal 
DM03- LTM 42,86% DM27- Judgement 
DM03- LTM 14,29% DM03- LTM 
DM03- LTM 14,29% DM42- Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) 
DM03- LTM 7,14% DM10- Acquisition 
DM03- LTM 7,14% DM50- Selection 
DM03- LTM 7,14% DM21- Analysis 
DM03- LTM 7,14% DM22- Anticipation (SA) 
DM10- Acquisition 58,17% DM10- Acquisition 
DM10- Acquisition 22,22% DM27- Judgement 
DM10- Acquisition 7,84% DM21- Analysis 
DM10- Acquisition 5,88% DM01- Attention & STM 
DM10- Acquisition 1,96% DM42- Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) 
DM10- Acquisition 1,96% DM03- LTM 
DM10- Acquisition 1,31% DM50- Selection 
DM10- Acquisition 0,65% DM33- Coping 
DM21- Analysis 33,33% DM27- Judgement 
DM21- Analysis 20,83% DM10- Acquisition 
DM21- Analysis 12,50% DM21- Analysis 
DM21- Analysis 8,33% DM02- Metacognition 
DM21- Analysis 8,33% DM03- LTM 
DM21- Analysis 4,17% DM22- Anticipation (SA) 
DM21- Analysis 4,17% DM01- Attention & STM 
DM21- Analysis 4,17% DM48- Checking (consistency / applicability / 
efficiency / outcome) 
DM21- Analysis 4,17% DM31- Appraisal 
DM22- Anticipation (SA) 50,00% DM44- Orientation (Action Design) 
DM22- Anticipation (SA) 50,00% DM27- Judgement 
  210 
GENOTYPIC DM Step FREQ OF PHENOTYPIC DM Step  FOLLOWED BY PHENOTYPIC DM Step 
DM27- Judgement 29,69% DM31- Appraisal 
DM27- Judgement 21,88% DM50- Selection 
DM27- Judgement 14,06% DM10- Acquisition 
DM27- Judgement 10,94% DM42- Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) 
DM27- Judgement 7,81% DM27- Judgement 
DM27- Judgement 4,69% DM03- LTM 
DM27- Judgement 3,13% DM21- Analysis 
DM27- Judgement 3,13% DM02- Metacognition 
DM27- Judgement 1,56% DM01- Attention & STM 
DM27- Judgement 1,56% DM33- Coping 
DM27- Judgement 1,56% DM44- Orientation (Action Design) 
DM31- Appraisal 100,00% DM32- Affection / Shock 
DM32- Affection / Shock 90,91% DM33- Coping 
DM32- Affection / Shock 4,55% DM32- Affection / Shock 
DM32- Affection / Shock 4,55% DM01- Attention & STM 
DM33- Coping 57,14% DM60- Action 
DM33- Coping 21,43% DM33- Coping 
DM33- Coping 14,29% DM10- Acquisition 
DM33- Coping 3,57% DM27- Judgement 
DM33- Coping 3,57% DM01- Attention & STM 
DM42- Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) 41,18% DM50- Selection 
DM42- Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) 17,65% DM10- Acquisition 
DM42- Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) 17,65% DM42- Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) 
DM42- Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) 11,76% DM01- Attention & STM 
DM42- Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) 5,88% DM44- Orientation (Action Design  
DM42- Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) 5,88% DM21- Analysis 
DM44- Orientation (Action Design) 75,00% DM50- Selection 
DM44- Orientation (Action Design) 25,00% DM48- Checking (consistency / applicability / 
efficiency / outcome) 
DM48- Checking (consistency / applicability / 
efficiency / outcome) 
33,33% DM44- Orientation (Action Design) 
DM48- Checking (consistency / applicability / 
efficiency / outcome) 
33,33% DM48- Checking (consistency / applicability / 
efficiency / outcome) 
DM48- Checking (consistency / applicability / 
efficiency / outcome) 
33,33% DM50- Selection 
DM50- Selection 100,00% DM60- Action 
DM60- Action 61,54% DM10- Acquisition 
DM60- Action 13,46% DM60- Action 
DM60- Action 13,46% DM01- Attention & STM 
DM60- Action 5,77% DM03- LTM 
DM60- Action 3,85% DM42- Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) 
DM60- Action 1,92% DM27- Judgement 
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13.6.3. Intermediate level : 0 Ante-CI experience phase 
 
Figure 25 CogOp-based decision network of experience phase : 0 Ante-CI 
Data : 
GENOTYPIC COGOP FREQ OF PHENOTYPIC COGOP  FOLLOWED BY PHENOTYPIC COGOP 
ATTENDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 100,00% PERFORMING - SELF 
E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 100,00% E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 50,00% ATTENDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 50,00% E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 100,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
ELABORATING - ACTION PLAN 100,00% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
ELABORATING - STIMULATIONS 100,00% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 100,00% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
ORIENTING - SELF 33,33% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
ORIENTING - SELF 33,33% ELABORATING - ACTION PLAN 
ORIENTING - SELF 33,33% STM KEEPING - STIMULATIONS 
PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 75,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 25,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 43,33% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 20,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 10,00% UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 6,67% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 3,33% ATTENDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 3,33% ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 3,33% PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 3,33% REFLECTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 3,33% STM KEEPING - OBJECTS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 3,33% UNDERSTANDING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 
PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 36,36% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 27,27% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 9,09% PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 
PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 9,09% REFLECTING - ACTION PLAN 
PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 9,09% REFLECTING - SETTINGS 
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GENOTYPIC COGOP FREQ OF PHENOTYPIC COGOP  FOLLOWED BY PHENOTYPIC COGOP 
PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 9,09% UNDERSTANDING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 
PERFORMING - SELF 40,00% PERFORMING - SELF 
PERFORMING - SELF 30,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERFORMING - SELF 10,00% PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 
PERFORMING - SELF 10,00% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
PERFORMING - SELF 10,00% REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
PRO/PARA-TENDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 100,00% REFLECTING - ACTION PLAN 
REFLECTING - ACTION PLAN 50,00% REFLECTING - ACTION PLAN 
REFLECTING - ACTION PLAN 25,00% ELABORATING - STIMULATIONS 
REFLECTING - ACTION PLAN 25,00% REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
REFLECTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
REFLECTING - SETTINGS 100,00% UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 50,00% ORIENTING - SELF 
REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 50,00% REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 20,00% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 20,00% PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 
REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 20,00% PRO/PARA-TENDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 20,00% REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 20,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
STM KEEPING - OBJECTS 100,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
STM KEEPING - STIMULATIONS 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
UNDERSTANDING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 50,00% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
UNDERSTANDING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 50,00% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 50,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 25,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 25,00% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 16,67% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 16,67% REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 8,33% ATTENDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 8,33% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 8,33% ELABORATING - ACTION PLAN 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 8,33% ORIENTING - SELF 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 8,33% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 8,33% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 8,33% REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 8,33% UNDERSTANDING - STIMULATIONS 
UNDERSTANDING - STIMULATIONS 100,00% ORIENTING - SELF 
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13.6.4. Intermediate level : 1 Pre-CI signals phase 
 
Figure 26 CogOp-based decision network of experience phase : 1 Pre-CI signals  
Data : 
GENOTYPIC COGOP FREQ OF PHENOTYPIC COGOP  FOLLOWED BY PHENOTYPIC COGOP 
DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 100,00% PERFORMING - SELF 
E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 100,00% E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 100,00% E3 COPING - SETTINGS 
E3 COPING - SETTINGS 100,00% PERFORMING - SELF 
ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 50,00% ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 50,00% REFLECTING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 63,64% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 18,18% REFLECTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 9,09% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 9,09% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERFORMING - SELF 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
REFLECTING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 100,00% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
REFLECTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 50,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
REFLECTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 50,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 100,00% ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
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13.6.5. Intermediate level : 2 Pre-CI tension phase 
 
Figure 27 CogOp-based decision network of experience phase : 2 Pre-CI tension 
Data : 
GENOTYPIC COGOP FREQ OF PHENOTYPIC COGOP  FOLLOWED BY PHENOTYPIC COGOP 
E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 100,00% E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 50,00% E3 COPING - ABILITIES 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 50,00% E3 COPING - ACTION PLAN 
E3 COPING - ABILITIES 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
E3 COPING - ACTION PLAN 100,00% PERFORMING - SELF 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 83,33% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 16,67% UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
UNDERSTANDING - LATITUDE - 
MARGINS 100,00% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 100,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 100,00% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
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13.6.6. Intermediate level : 3 CI Trauma Exposure phase 
 
Figure 28 CogOp-based decision network of experience phase : 3 CI Trauma Exposure 
Data : 
GENOTYPIC COGOP FREQ OF PHENOTYPIC COGOP  FOLLOWED BY PHENOTYPIC COGOP 
ATTENDING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
ATTENDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 100,00% REFLECTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 100,00% E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 25,00% E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 25,00% E3 COPING - ACTION PLAN 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 25,00% E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 25,00% E3 COPING - SETTINGS 
E3 COPING - ACTION PLAN 100,00% PERFORMING - SELF 
E3 COPING - OBJECTS 100,00% E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 40,00% E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 20,00% ATTENDING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 
E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 20,00% E3 COPING - SELF 
E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 20,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
E3 COPING - SELF 50,00% E3 COPING - OBJECTS 
E3 COPING - SELF 50,00% PERCEIVING - SELF 
E3 COPING - SETTINGS 100,00% E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
LEARNING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 79,17% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 4,17% ATTENDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 4,17% REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 4,17% UNDERSTANDING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 4,17% UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 4,17% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERCEIVING - SELF 100,00% E3 COPING - SELF 
PERFORMING - SELF 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
REFLECTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 100,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 33,33% LEARNING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 33,33% REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
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REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 33,33% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
UNDERSTANDING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 100,00% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 100,00% REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 66,67% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 33,33% E3 COPING - ACTION PLAN 
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13.6.7. Intermediate level : 4 CI Post-Tension phase 
 
Figure 29 CogOp-based decision network of experience phase : 3 CI Trauma Exposure 
Data : 
GENOTYPIC COGOP FREQ OF PHENOTYPIC COGOP  FOLLOWED BY PHENOTYPIC COGOP 
ATTENDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 100,00% PERFORMING - SELF 
E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 100,00% E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 100,00% E3 COPING - ACTION PLAN 
E3 COPING - ACTION PLAN 100,00% PERFORMING - SELF 
ELABORATING - STIMULATIONS 100,00% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
LEARNING - PERSONALITY 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
ORIENTING - STIMULATIONS 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 50,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 50,00% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 47,37% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 15,79% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 5,26% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 5,26% PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 5,26% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 5,26% REFLECTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 5,26% REFLECTING - REFLECTIONS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 5,26% REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 5,26% UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERFORMING - SELF 33,33% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERFORMING - SELF 16,67% ATTENDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERFORMING - SELF 16,67% ELABORATING - STIMULATIONS 
PERFORMING - SELF 16,67% PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 
PERFORMING - SELF 16,67% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
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REFLECTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 100,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
REFLECTING - REFLECTIONS 50,00% LEARNING - PERSONALITY 
REFLECTING - REFLECTIONS 50,00% REFLECTING - REFLECTIONS 
REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 100,00% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 75,00% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 25,00% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
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13.6.8. Intermediate level : 5 CI Post-Relief phase 
 
Figure 30 CogOp-based decision network of experience phase : 5 CI Post-Relief phase 
Data : 
GENOTYPIC COGOP FREQ OF PHENOTYPIC COGOP  FOLLOWED BY PHENOTYPIC COGOP 
DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 100,00% PERFORMING - SELF 
ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 100,00% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 50,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 25,00% ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 25,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERFORMING - SELF 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 33,33% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 33,33% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 33,33% 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 
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13.6.9. Intermediate level : 6 CI Post-Venting phase 
 
Figure 31 CogOp-based decision network of experience phase : 6 CI Post-Venting 
Data : 
GENOTYPIC COGOP FREQ OF PHENOTYPIC COGOP  FOLLOWED BY PHENOTYPIC COGOP 
DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 100,00% PERFORMING - SELF 
E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 100,00% E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 85,71% E3 COPING - ACTION PLAN 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 14,29% E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
E3 COPING - ACTION PLAN 100,00% PERFORMING - SELF 
E3 COPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
ORIENTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 100,00% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 35,71% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 21,43% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 7,14% REFLECTING - ATTENTIONAL OBJECTS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 7,14% REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 7,14% REMEMBERING - OBJECTS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 7,14% STM KEEPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 7,14% UNDERSTANDING - CONFIDENCE 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 7,14% UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 50,00% ORIENTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 50,00% STM KEEPING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERFORMING - SELF 63,64% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERFORMING - SELF 9,09% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
PERFORMING - SELF 9,09% PERFORMING - SELF 
PERFORMING - SELF 9,09% STM KEEPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERFORMING - SELF 9,09% STM KEEPING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
REFLECTING - ATTENTIONAL OBJECTS 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
REFLECTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 100,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 50,00% REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
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GENOTYPIC COGOP FREQ OF PHENOTYPIC COGOP  FOLLOWED BY PHENOTYPIC COGOP 
REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 25,00% STM KEEPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 25,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 66,67% REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 33,33% UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
REMEMBERING - OBJECTS 100,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
STM KEEPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 66,67% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
STM KEEPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 33,33% REFLECTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
STM KEEPING - SITUATION - COE / COA 50,00% REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
STM KEEPING - SITUATION - COE / COA 50,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
UNDERSTANDING - CONFIDENCE 100,00% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 50,00% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 50,00% REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 66,67% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 22,22% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 11,11% ORIENTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
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13.6.10. Intermediate level : 7 CI Post-Resumption phase 
 
Figure 32 CogOp-based decision network of experience phase : 7 CI Post-Resumption 
Data : 
GENOTYPIC COGOP FREQ OF PHENOTYPIC COGOP  FOLLOWED BY PHENOTYPIC COGOP 
ATTENDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 100,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
ATTENDING - SELF 100,00% UNDERSTANDING - TIME 
DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 100,00% PERFORMING - SELF 
E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 100,00% E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 100,00% E3 COPING - ACTION PLAN 
E3 COPING - ACTION PLAN 100,00% PERFORMING - SELF 
LEARNING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 100,00% REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 66,67% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 33,33% ATTENDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
ORIENTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 50,00% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
ORIENTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 50,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
ORIENTING - STIMULATIONS 50,00% ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
ORIENTING - STIMULATIONS 50,00% ORIENTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 33,33% STM KEEPING - OBJECTS 
PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 33,33% UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 33,33% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 31,25% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 18,75% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 12,50% PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 12,50% STM KEEPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 6,25% ATTENDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 6,25% REFLECTING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 6,25% REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 6,25% UNDERSTANDING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 
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GENOTYPIC COGOP FREQ OF PHENOTYPIC COGOP  FOLLOWED BY PHENOTYPIC COGOP 
PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 100,00% REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
PERFORMING - SELF 63,64% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
PERFORMING - SELF 18,18% REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
PERFORMING - SELF 9,09% PERFORMING - SELF 
PERFORMING - SELF 9,09% STM KEEPING - SETTINGS 
REFLECTING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 100,00% UNDERSTANDING - LATITUDE - MARGINS 
REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 40,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 20,00% ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 20,00% ORIENTING - STIMULATIONS 
REMEMBERING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 20,00% UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
STM KEEPING - OBJECTS 100,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
STM KEEPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 50,00% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
STM KEEPING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 50,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
STM KEEPING - SETTINGS 100,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
UNDERSTANDING - LATITUDE - 
MARGINS 100,00% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 50,00% ORIENTING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
UNDERSTANDING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 50,00% PERCEIVING - OBJECTS 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 44,44% DECIDING - ACTION PLAN 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 11,11% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 11,11% LEARNING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 11,11% ORIENTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 11,11% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 11,11% PERCEIVING - SETTINGS 
UNDERSTANDING - TIME 100,00% ORIENTING - STIMULATIONS 
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13.6.11. Intermediate level : 8 CI Post-Debriefing phase 
 
Figure 33 CogOp-based decision network of experience phase : 8 CI Post-Debriefing 
Data : 
GENOTYPIC COGOP FREQ OF PHENOTYPIC COGOP  FOLLOWED BY PHENOTYPIC COGOP 
ATTENDING - ATTENTIONAL OBJECTS 100,00% REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 100,00% E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 50,00% E3 COPING - ACTION PLAN 
E2 EXPERIENCING - A2 AFFECTS 50,00% E3 COPING - SELF 
E3 COPING - ACTION PLAN 100,00% PERFORMING - SELF 
E3 COPING - SELF 100,00% PERFORMING - SELF 
LEARNING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 100,00% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 100,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
PERFORMING - SELF 50,00% PERFORMING - SELF 
PERFORMING - SELF 50,00% STM KEEPING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 50,00% PERCEIVING - OTHERS / ANIMALS 
REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 50,00% UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
STM KEEPING - SITUATION - COE / COA 100,00% REFLECTING - SITUATION - COE / COA 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 50,00% E1 APPRAISING - A1 SHOCK / SALIENCE 
UNDERSTANDING - SITUATION - COE / 
COA 50,00% LEARNING - ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
 
We can note that all but one intermediate level decision networks contain an affect coping 
sequence (E1  E2  E3 CogActs sequence shown on the right hand side of graphs). 
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13.6.12. Decision networks of the detailed (Present Moment) level 
Decision networks presented above are of the intermediate level (CI Experience Phases). 
CogOp-based decision networks of the detailed level (of the 44 PMs) are presented in 
ANNEX 14. Whether at the intermediate or at the detailed level, the shape of decision 






Figure 34 Visual evidence of the variation in shape of decision networks during the first ten PMs 
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Above, a glance at at the general pattern of the decision networks of the first ten PMs (for 
more visible and complete diagrams of PM-level decision networks refer to ANNEX 14) 
provides a clear view of this variation from one PM to the next (ordered from left to right, 
top to down). 
13.7. Conclusion : precautions taken to assure the scientificity of the study, and 
limits 
The following precautions were taken in order to assure the scientificity of the PCA study 
of Lieutenant A’s case : 
• Veridicality / authenticity of the Elicitation Interview and of the subject’s recalls :  
• The insight of how BSPP Firemen act, and of their common cultural and regulatory 
background gained from the four months immersion in Montmartre helped us to 
understand Lieutenant A’s narrative and to make assumptions about some of his 
non-narrated cognitive operations. 
• A review of the resequenced narrative (after the chronotext was finalised) was 
performed with Lieutenant A in November 2007. 
• A critical review of the authenticity of Lieutenant A’s experience and evocation 
stance was performed on the basis of the signs given by the subject during the EI 
and of Vermersch’s (2006) guidelines : 
• His first-person narration (he says “I” almost all the time, rarely “we” or “one”). 
• Voice intonations : quasi-stammering, hesitations, variations of the speech pace 
and non verbal signs (stammering, hesitations, red patches appearing on his 
face, moments of silence in his narration, eyes in a position of rememoration or 
reflection). In the context of this particular EI, this indicates an absence of 
premeditated, well rehearsed social construction of the subject’s discourse. 
• Spontaneous narrative initiatives (drawing the map of the intervention place, 
referring to it when he felt he had to clarify things, quotations of other people’s 
utterances). 
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• The narration was mainly centred on facts, little on the subject’s retrospective 
interpretation. The almost total absence of explications is very significant of his 
focus on facts. 
• Validity (and ecological validity) : 
• Lieutenant A’s case, the goals and methodological principles, and the work done on 
data processing and data analysis were presented to several researchers and to 
BSPP peers and discussed : Pierre Vermersch (CNRS) in 2009 (It covered the 
quality of the narrative and the data processing steps : semantic parsing, chronotext 
and re-sequencing, cognigraph) ; Thales Computing Science Research Department 
(ThereSIS) : March 9th, 2009 ; Mines ParisTech (Crises and Risk Research Centre) 
: June 6th, 2009 (A validation of the research object : the episode of cognitive 
experience and the Present Moment) ; Carnegie Mellon Portugal: January 20th, 
2010 ; IMASSA (French Army’s Medical and Psychological Studies Centre) in 
2010. The findings of the analysis of Lieutenant A’s case were submitted to the 
expert judgement of senior BSPP Firemen. The last presentation was made on June 
16th, 2013. 
One of the limits to the scientificity of our study was the impossibility to perform cross-
coding with the help of other researchers. There were two reasons for this : 
• The novelty of the approach : the PCA framework being novel, the researchers we 
approached after Lieutenant A’s interview did not know it and at the time there were 
no sufficient guidelines to help them. 
• Their lack of time. 
Alternatively, several rounds of encoding from anew and of data processing were 
performed : October – December 2007, July & August 2008, July & August 2009, July & 
August 2010, July & August 2011, July & August 2012 (the current version), with a time 
lapse between rounds of several months, during which time no work at all was done with 
the material on hand.  
This process was called distantiation by Klein & Hoffman (2008, p. 72). Each interval 
between rounds effectively led to forgetting anterior choices to some extent, to reconsider 
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the problem nearly from anew, and to refine the semantic analysis technique and the 
taxonomy of CogAct and CogObj. The successive improvements of the cognitive 
taxonomy gained through these rounds of work are presented in ANNEX 18. Progress was 
made in several areas : 
• The chronological resequencing of speech clauses was verified and validated. It was 
validated by Lieutenant A in November 2007. 
• We better and better took into account the subject’s self-centric cognitive perspective 
in the semantic analysis of his narrative. Actions performed by others are seen as food 
for the subject’s cognition, for his perception, whereas he can narrate his own actions 
as his. His emotions, thoughts, etc. are his too. Therefore, cognitive acts and objects 
had to be defined from the subject’s standpoint and objects could relate to either 
himself or to external others or objects. CogActs and CogObjs had to match the first-
person perspective: the subject perceives such object, for instance in himself or in 
another person, hence the distinction between objects293 : self, others and animals, 
objects, settings. 
• We sought to establish a neat distinction between cognitive acts and objects, and to 
clearly differentiate definitions between acts, and between objects. 
• We included cognitions and actions under a single term (CogOps) to facilitate the 
reading of the study’s report. 
• We codified the sub-types (CogActST and CogObjST) taxonomy : each one starts with 
a 5 position code followed by an expanded denomination precising its definition, like 
in this CogObj sub-type : “AFF31- Affect: Fright / Stupor (Brief and irrepressible 
sentiment of imminent self-destruction and powerlessness, beyond fear)”. 
• The encoding of decision-making steps (DM Steps) was performed twice, in July-
August 2011 and July-August 2012. Only minor changes intervened from one round to 
the next.. 
• The determination and encoding of the attributes of Present Moments and CogOps (to 
create the PM data set and CogOp data set in the data analysis phase) were performed 
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in July & August 2011 and checked in July & August 2012. Minor changes occurred 
from one round to the next. 
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Part 4. ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
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CHAPTER 14. Seven findings about DMA and PTR 
Maurel (2008) says that once the cognitive experience of an individual in a given situation 
has been narrated through an Elicitation Interview (EI) the question becomes “what to do 
with this material ?” (p. 7). The richness of the data provided by Lieutenant A’s narrative 
helps to understand how a Critical Incident (CI) affects an individual and how the subject 
responds to situations and displays peritraumatic resilience (PTR). This chapter presents 
seven findings in relation to Decision-Making-in-Action (DMA) and to PTR. The present 
study is an “idiography” (Shaughnessy et al., 2006, p. 43) hence the interpretative 
character of some of the following analyses. The efforts made to guarantee the scientificity 
of the data collection and data processing activities have been described in previous 
chapters.  
Three data sets were created : the CogOp, PM and EP data sets294. Their attributes, origins 
and analyses are presented in ANNEX 15. Attributes were discretised as their numerical 
(categorical or ordinal) definition showed non normal distributions. Exploratory factor 
analyses and bayesian analyses were performed in order to reveal the rules of production of 
Lieutenant A’s cognitive trajectories and resilience mechanisms. 
14.1. The pattern of Decision-Making-in-Action (DMA) 
The analysis of Lieutenant A’s DMA patterns yields four findings : 
• Finding 1 : There are four DMA patterns in which affects play an important part 
• Finding 2 : DMA patterns change from one PM to the next 
• Finding 3 : The shape of cognitive trajectories varies within each DMA pattern 
• Finding 4 : Recognition, memory and metacognition play an unclear part in DMA. 
14.1.1. Finding 1 : There are four DMA patterns in which affects play an important 
part 
Given the nature of Critical Incidents that expose subjects to trauma, a dominance of affect 
in Lieutenant A’s cognitive activity appeared as a fair hypothesis. De facto, decision 
networks highlight the role played by affects in Lieutenant A’s DMA cognitive process. 
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The global decision network shows a dominant (boldest arrows = most frequent 
phenotypic links) affect-based cognitive trajectory (i.e. where emotion is determinant in 
sparking ACTION = “PERFORMING – SELF” CogOp), an alternative (less frequent, 
second boldest links) deliberation-based cognitive pattern (where reasoning is 
determinant), and a number of much less frequent phenotypic links (thinnest arrows) : 
 
Figure 35 Lieutenant A's CogOp-based global decision network 
At this global level of the whole episode, the affect-based DMA pattern seems the most 
influential over Lieutenant A’s behaviour and this is confirmed at the intermediate level of 
CI Experience Phases as their decision networks indicate that two thirds of the nine phases 
have affect-based driving cognitive trajectories : 
CI Experience Phase Driving / Alternative295 Cognitive Trajectory 
0 Ante-CI Deliberation-based / no alternative 
1 Pre-CI Signals Affect-based / Deliberation-based trajectory 
2 Pre-CI Tension Affect-based / no alternative 
3 CI Trauma Exposure Affect-based / no alternative 
4 CI Post-Tension Affect-based / Deliberation-based trajectory 
5 CI Post-Relief Deliberation-based / no alternative 
6 CI Post-Venting Affect-based / Deliberation-based trajectory 
7 CI Post-Resumption Deliberation-based / affect-based trajectory 
8 CI Post-Debriefing Affect-based / no alternative 
Table 36 Driving and alternative cognitive trajectories in the 9 phases of the experience of a Critical Incident 
In total, four DMA patterns can be identified. 
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But, in contrast to what precedes, if we look at the decision networks of the Present 
Moment level (based on the PM data set ; also see PM decision networks in ANNEX 14) 
we notice the predominance of deliberation-based DMA patterns : 
1) DB_NA = a Deliberation-based driving cognitive trajectory WITH No alternative (26 
occurrences out of 44 PMs296, i.e. 59,1% of all PMs) 
2) AB_NA = an Affect-based driving cognitive trajectory WITH No alternative (14 
occurrences, 31,8% of all PMs) 
3) DB_AL = a Deliberation-based driving cognitive trajectory INCLUDING an Affective 
loop WITH No alternative (2 occurrences, 4,55% of all PMs) 
4) AB_DL = an Affect-based driving cognitive trajectory INCLUDING a decision loop 
WITH No alternative (2 occurrences, 4,55% of all PMs). 
If we group DMA patterns 1 and 3 above, a total of 63,65%, about two thirds, of all PMs 
rely upon a deliberation-based driving cognitive trajectory, in an exact opposition to the 
picture previously drawn from the intermediate and global levels of analysis. The detailed 
view (PM level) invalidates the intermediate and global views, as well as the a priori 
hypothesis that affect might play a predominant part in the experience of a CI.  
If affect-based cognitive trajectories play an important part in DMA, Lieutenant A’s data 
suggest that deliberation-based cognitive trajectories are more influent. 
14.1.2. Finding 2 : DMA patterns change from one PM to the next 
The second finding is the Inter-Variability of DMA patterns as the experience moves on. 
Inter-Variability refers to the change of DMA pattern from one segment of experience to 
the next within a given level of analysis (intermediate – CI experience phases –, or detailed 
– PM –).  
14.1.2.1. Evidence of Inter-Variability 
The PM data set shows that the DMA pattern of the 44 PMs changes from one PM to the 
next : 
  234 
CI Experience 
Phase Present Moment P_A_CogTrajectories 
0 01 - Waiting to see… DB_NA 
 
02 - Deciding to intervene DB_NA 
 
03 - Deciding to park in the garden DB_NA 
 
04 - Deciding to attend to the victims DB_NA 
 
05 - Attending to the victims and leaving DB_AL 
 
06 - Deciding to close the front gate on the way back to dogs DB_NA 
 
07 - Deciding to send an ambience message to BSPP DB_NA 
1 08 - Distracting from anxiety AB_NA 
 
09 - A glimpse of the victims DB_NA 
2 10 - The father irrupts… AB_NA 
3 11 - The dogs attack !!! Shoot them ! Shoot ! Shoot ! AB_DL 
 
12 - The fright AB_DL 
4 13 - Searching the missing dog DB_NA 
 
14 - Continuing the search and being astonished by the dogs 
unit AB_NA 
 
15 - Following the dogs unit into the adjacent parcel DB_NA 
 
16 - Searching the adjacent parcel : worrying ! AB_NA 
 
17 - Going back into the garden DB_NA 
 
18 - Searching the cellar AB_NA 
 
19 - No luck with the cellar : restarting the search DB_NA 
5 20 - The dog has been found ! DB_NA 
 
21 - Seeing the dogs dying DB_NA 
6 22 - First realisation of what went on AB_NA 
 
23 - A quick chat with a colleague… DB_NA 
 
24 - Asking questions about the shooting AB_NA 
 
25 - Further questions about the shooting DB_NA 
 
26 - First answers… AB_NA 
 
27 - 15 Bullets ?… AB_NA 
 
28 - Even more DB_AL 
 
29 - 45 bullets ! AB_NA 
 
30 - Why do they carry envelops ? DB_NA 
 
31 - They need to collect the bullets DB_NA 
 
32 - Good luck with the bullets then ! AB_NA 
7 33 - Deciding to go back inside DB_NA 
 
34 - What happened ?, she asks DB_NA 
 
35 - It sounded like heavy gun fire, colleagues say DB_NA 
 
36 - Could neighbours have been shot too ?… DB_NA 
 
37 - Deciding to ask where victims are to be dispatched DB_NA 
 
38 - Asking about the daughter DB_NA 
 
39 - You can't walk that woman in her condition ! AB_NA 
 
40 - The crowd are watching : bring the PSR inside ! DB_NA 
 
41 - The mother departs : time to report and go DB_NA 
 
42 - Back in the car, sending radio message DB_NA 
8 43 - Starting to think and talk about the events AB_NA 
 
44 - Reflecting upon the course of things AB_NA 
Table 37 Distribution of the 4 DMA patterns among the 44 Present Moments (PM data set  
14.1.2.2. Exploratory Factor Analysis of Inter-Variability 
The study of Inter-Variability was based upon the PM data set (ANNEX 15). It aimed at 
finding the attributes (ANNEX 15) that best predict a PM’s DMA pattern. ANNEX 15 
shows non normal distributions and attributes were discretised. Correlation coefficients 
point to dependencies between attributes : the Chi-square test shows all but one p-values 
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around 0297. Dependencies were confirmed by the Cramér’s v coefficient298, compatible 
with both nominal and ordinal attributes, but as it is symmetric (not YX directional) it 
could not help to determine an YX network of dependencies. A bayesian network was 
generated from the PM data set299 and the EMOTION attribute (the stressfulness of the PM 
context) appeared to be a construct of other attributes : 
 
Figure 36 Stressfulness co-occurrence wit other PM attributes (Bayesian network ; width of arrows shows strength of influence) 
None of these attempts, however, helped to establish a dependency of the variable to 
predict (DMAPATTERN) upon other attributes. Using Quinlan’s (1993) C4.5 Decision 
Tree and Breiman’s (2001) Random Forest classification algorithms300, seven analyses 
were performed, each one seeking an optimal combination of factors minimising the 
prediction’s error rate. The variable to predict is DMAPATTERN : 
Attributes Variable Factors Factors Factors Factors Factors Factors Factors Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Trial 6 Trial 7 
DMAPATTERN Yes        
EMOTION  Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
SA   Yes   Yes Yes  
MOM   Yes Yes Yes Yes   
MOS   Yes Yes Yes Yes   
LOCUSCTRL   Yes    Yes  
THREAT   Yes Yes    Yes 
PERFORMANCE   Yes Yes Yes    
EXPECTEDNESS   Yes Yes  Yes Yes  
CONTROLABILITY   Yes   Yes   
C4.5 error rate : 11,36 22,73 20,45 31,82 6,82 9,09 4,55 
Random Forest error rate : 11,36 18,18 22,73 25,00 11,36 11,36 4,55 
Table 38 C4.5 and Random Forest error rates in the successive analyses of DMA patterns factors 
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The last attempt using Breiman’s Random Forest, yielded the same lowest error rate of 
4,55% of DMA patterns not predicted than Quinlan’s C4.5, and its tree301 (below) was 
more detailed : 
• EMOTION in [s6_neutral]) AND 
• THREAT in [s4_SOPmistake] then DMAPATTERN = DB_NA (100,00 % of 3 examples) 302 
• THREAT in [s5_nil] then DMAPATTERN = DB_NA (93,33 % of 15 examples)  
• THREAT in [s3_PeopleSafety] then DMAPATTERN = DB_NA (100,00 % of 6 examples)  
• THREAT in [s2_SituationSafety] then DMAPATTERN = DB_NA (0,00 % of 0 examples)  
• THREAT in [s1_PersonalIntegrity] then DMAPATTERN = DB_NA (0,00 % of 0 examples  
• EMOTION in [s4_anxiety]) AND 
• THREAT in [s4_SOPmistake] then DMAPATTERN = DB_AL (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
• THREAT in [s5_nil] then DMAPATTERN = AB_NA (87,50 % of 8 examples)  
• THREAT in [s3_PeopleSafety] then DMAPATTERN = AB_NA (100,00 % of 3 examples)  
• THREAT in [s2_SituationSafety] then DMAPATTERN = DB_NA (100,00 % of 2 examples)  
• THREAT in [s1_PersonalIntegrity] then DMAPATTERN = DB_NA (0,00 % of 0 examples  
• EMOTION in [s3_distress] then DMAPATTERN = AB_NA (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
• EMOTION in [s2_fear] then DMAPATTERN = AB_DL (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
• EMOTION in [s1_trauma] then DMAPATTERN = AB_DL (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
• EMOTION in [s7_contentment] then DMAPATTERN = DB_NA (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
• EMOTION in [s8_relief] then DMAPATTERN = DB_NA (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
• EMOTION in [s5_surprise] then DMAPATTERN = AB_NA (100,00 % of 1 examples). 
Table 39 DMA pattern Inter-Variability decision tree [Breiman’s (2001) Random Forest, error rate = 4,55%] 
Based on these results, the following diagram shows the rules of activation of DMA 
patterns303 in Lieutenant A’s case : 
 
Figure 37 Rules of activation of the four DMA patterns (error rate = 4,55%) 
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14.1.3. Finding 3 : The shape of cognitive trajectories varies within each DMA 
pattern 
14.1.3.1. Evidence of Intra-Variability 
Decision Networks (Chapter 13) are statistical abstractions of cognitive processes based on 
phenotypic links’ frequencies. They show the existence in any of the four DMA Patterns of 
a driving cognitive trajectory (the most frequent one), possibly of an alternative cognitive 
trajectory (less frequently), and possibly also of infrequent phenotypic links between 
CogOps. There are also what looks like cognitive loops in the middle in some cases. 
Decision networks also show that the shape of the cognitive trajectory within a given DMA 
pattern varies. In any generic DMA pattern, the shape of the Lieutenant A’s cognitive 
trajectory varies in many ways along the 44 Present Moments of the studied episode.  
Intra-Variability refers to the multiple detailed shapes of cognitive trajectories that can be 
found within each DMA Pattern, and, beyond, throughout all Present Moments. 
The following table shows that the steps304 of the cognitive trajectories (phenotypic chain 
of cognitive operations) of the 44 Present Moments involve different families305 of CogAct  





Decomposition of the cognitive trajectory into steps and characterisation of the shape of the DMA pattern 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 
01 - Waiting 
to see… DB_NA Perceiving 
Interpretation 
(LTM) Planning Decision     
02 - Deciding 
to intervene DB_NA Perceiving 
Interpretation 
(LTM) Planning Decision     
03 - Deciding 
to park in the 
garden 
DB_NA Perceiving Interpretation Decision      
04 - Deciding 
to attend to 
the victims 





DB_AL Perceiving Interpretation Affect Coping Attention & STM 
Affect 
Coping Interpretation Planning Decision 
06 - Deciding 
to close the 
front gate on 
the way back 
to dogs 
DB_NA Perceiving Interpretation Planning Decision     
07 - Deciding 








AB_NA Perceiving Interpretation Affect Coping      
09 - A 
glimpse of 
the victims 
DB_NA Attention & STM Decision       





Decomposition of the cognitive trajectory into steps and characterisation of the shape of the DMA pattern 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 
10 - The 
father 
irrupts… 
AB_NA Interpretation Affect Coping Perceiving Interpretation 
Affect 
Coping    
11 - The dogs 
attack !!! 
Shoot them ! 
Shoot ! Shoot 
! 
AB_DL Perceiving Interpretation Coping      
12 - The 










the dogs unit 
AB_NA Attention & STM Perceiving Interpretation Coping     
15 - 
Following 










AB_NA Perceiving Interpretation Coping      
17 - Going 
back into the 
garden 




AB_NA Perceiving Interpretation Coping      





DB_NA Decision        
20 - The dog 
has been 
found ! 
DB_NA Perceiving Interpretation Decision      
21 - Seeing 
the dogs 
dying 
DB_NA Perceiving Interpretation Perceiving Planning Decision    
22 - First 
realisation of 
what went on 
AB_NA Attention & STM Interpretation Coping      
23 - A quick 
chat with a 
colleague… 
DB_NA Interpretation Decision       




AB_NA Interpretation Coping       




DB_NA Planning Decision       
26 - First 
answers… 
AB_NA Interpretation Planning Coping      
27 - 15 
Bullets ?… AB_NA Perceiving 
Attention & 
STM Interpretation Coping     
28 - Even 
more 
DB_AL Perceiving Interpretation Coping Perceiving Interpretation Decision   
29 - 45 
bullets ! AB_NA Perceiving Interpretation 
Attention & 
STM Coping     
30 - Why do 
they carry 
envelops ? 
DB_NA Perceiving Interpretation Planning Decision     




DB_NA Interpretation (LTM) Decision       





Decomposition of the cognitive trajectory into steps and characterisation of the shape of the DMA pattern 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 
32 - Good 
luck with the 
bullets then ! 
AB_NA Perceiving Interpretation Coping      
33 - Deciding 
to go back 
inside 
DB_NA Attention & STM Interpretation Planning Decision     
34 - What 
happened ?, 
she asks 
DB_NA Perceiving Attention & STM Interpretation Decision     






DB_NA Perceiving Attention & STM Decision      
36 - Could 
neighbours 
have been 
shot too ?… 
DB_NA Attention & STM Interpretation Metacognition LTM Planning 
Attention & 
STM Interpretation Decision 
37 - Deciding 
to ask where 
victims are to 
be dispatched 
DB_NA LTM Planning Decision      
38 - Asking 
about the 
daughter 
DB_NA Perceiving Interpretation Perceiving Interpretation Planning Decision   





AB_NA Perceiving Attention & STM Interpretation Coping     




PSR inside ! 
DB_NA Perceiving Interpretation Decision      
41 - The 
mother 
departs : time 
to report and 
go 
DB_NA Perceiving Perceiving Interpretation Perceiving LTM Planning Decision  




DB_NA NA        
43 - Starting 
to think and) 
talk about the 
events 






AB_NA Attention & STM Interpretation Metacognition Coping     
Table 40 The variety of internal shapes of DMA patterns 
Like Inter-Variability, Intra-Variability is consistent with the finding of a plurality of 
decision-making strategies raised by Klein (1997, 1998), Lipshitz (1997a), Orasanu & 
Fischer’s (1997), Crego & Spinks (1997), Hutton & Klein (1999) and Flin et al. (2007). 
Refer to chapter 4.4. 
 
14.1.3.2. Exploratory Factor Analysis of Intra-Variability 
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The analysis of the factors of Intra-Variability aimed at unveiling the attributes and rules 
that in Lieutenant A’s case contribute to the election of phenotypic decision-making steps 
(pheno DM Step). It was based upon the CogOp data set (ANNEX 15). 
The analysed variable (the one to predict) is Pheno_DM (the phenotypic – current – DM 
Step following a genotypic – anterior – DM Step). Rather than defining the categories of 
Pheno_DM as the values of CogOp (i.e. all possible pairs of {CogAct ; CogObj}) as this 
was giving birth to too many values, which ultimately prevents finding correlations 
between the attributes and the variable) we reduced the number of values of Pheno_DM to 
predict by substituting to CogOps their equivalent DM Step (ANNEX 12) as presented in 
the taxonomy.  
Attributes considered for this analysis were : 
• The previous DM Step : Geno_DM. 
• Descriptive attributes : Ctrl, Agency, Valence, Attention, Temp and FOCUS, both in 
their phenotypic (that of the DM Step to predict) and genotypic (i.e. of the previous 
DM Step) values. 
• Attributes refering to the contextual Present Moment (PM) described by the 
Pheno_EMOTION attribute, i.e. the stressfulness of the context in which a CogOp is 
performed. The value of a PM’s attribute is attributed to all CogOps / DM Steps it 
includes. EMOTION was found to be a construct of other PM attributes (see finding 2 
above). 
• The feeling left on the subject’s consciousness by the whole episode of experience, as 
defined by Moshkina (2006) and Moshkina & Arkin (2003, 2005) as “feelings about an 
object, a person or a issue”, as “affective attitudes” represented in the TAME’s 
affective module306 as a function of the total number of encounters, up to date, with the 
features of that object. This notion is materialised by the Pheno_Mean_EMOTION 
attribute, defined here as the progressive mean of the EMOTION attribute calculated 
for each DM Step i.e. the mean of the values of EMOTION assigned to all preceeding 
DM Step up to and including the DM Step to predict. The chart shows 
Pheno_Mean_EMOTION along the 460 DM Steps : 
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Figure 38 The progressive value of the Mean_EMOTION attribute along the 460 CogOps 
Pheno_Mean_EMOTION was discretised on the following grounds as the progressive 
mean of the EMOTION attribute is an abstract notion: 
Mean_EMOTION Numerical range 
n Distribution Discrete values from to 
s1_SignificantNegative  -2.779237 73 
 
s2_MildNegative -2.779237 -1.56382 227 
s3_FairNegative -1.56382 -0.595338 95 
s4_LittleNegative -0.595338  63 
Table 41 Attribute characterising the subject's general feeling of his experience while performing a CogOp 
The values of Pheno_Mean_EMOTION are to be compared with those of EMOTION : 
PM attributes Definitions (plus numerical values and their meanings when assigned  
EMOTION 
(stressfulness  
The stressfulness of circumstances at hand : -10 (trauma), -6 (fear), -4 (distress), -2 (anxiety, 
disgust, reproach, distress), -1 (surprise), 0 (emotionlessness), 2 (contentment), 6 (relief) 
NB : Negative values correspond to negative emotions, and vice-versa. 
 
The analysis of Inter-Variability of the DMA Pattern was performed as follows: 
• The CogOp data set was defined as n = 459 CogOps / DM Steps, all attributes are 
discrete. 
• Phenotypic attributes refer to attributes describing the CogOp / DM Step we seek to 
predict. Genotypic attributes refer to attributes describing the previous CogOp / DM 
Step in the whole sequence of Lieutenant A’s cognitive operations. 
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• We first performed an Exploratory Factor Analysis to analyse dependencies between 
attributes. Based on Goodman-Kruskal’s (1954) asymmetric λ307, Pheno_Ctrl (a CogOp 
attribute, the subject’s coping mode to regain / keep his level of agency at a CogOp) 
appeared as a construct of other genotypic CogOp attributes : 
 
Figure 39 Pheno_Ctrl association with other CogOp attributes [Goodman-Kruskal’s (1954) assymetric λ] 
• The Chi-Square test (ANNEX 15) confirmed dependencies between attributes 
evidenced by the Goodman Kruskal’s (1954) λ test. A bayesian analysis (using the 
Geno_FOCUSLEVEL attribute, an abstraction of the Geno_FOCUS attribute, 
presenting fewer categories than the latter) confirmed the likeliness of this construct : 
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Figure 40 Pheno_Ctrl joint probabilities of occurence with other CogOp attributes (bayesian network  
• But again, none of these tests allowed to find explicative factors of the target variable, 
Pheno_DM. 
• Therefore, we resorted again on Quinlan’s (1993) C4.5 Decision Tree algorithm and 
Breiman’s (2001) Random Forest decision tree analysis algorithms to search the factors 
and rules active in the election of phenotypic DM Steps. Twelve trials were performed 
with C4.5 and Random Forest algorithms to look for the optimal factors and rules of 



























Pheno_DM Yes             
Pheno_EMOTION  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pheno_SA              
Pheno_MOM              
Pheno_MOS              
Pheno_LOCUSCTRL              
Pheno_THREAT        Yes      
Pheno_PERFORMANCE              
Pheno_EXPECTEDNESS              
Pheno_CONTROLABILITY              
Pheno_SUBGOAL    Yes       Yes Yes Yes 
Pheno_Mean_EMOTION      Yes    Yes Yes  Yes 
Pheno_Sum_EMOTION       Yes Yes Yes   Yes  
Geno_DM  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geno_Ctrl   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geno_Agency              
Pheno_Agency             Yes 
Geno_FOCUS     Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pheno_FOCUS     Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geno_Valence              
Pheno_Valence         Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geno_Attention              
Pheno_Attention             Yes 
Geno_Temp              
Pheno_Temp             Yes 
C4.5 error rate : 38,13 35,08 32,46 10,68 10,24 10,24 8,06 8,28 8,5 7,84 7,63 5,23 
Random Forest error rate : 36,82 36,17 30,28 13,94 13,29 11,76 13,29 10,89 10,89 7,84 8,06 11,76 
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Table 42 Successive trials of decision tree analysis of phenotypic DM Steps election 
Trial twelve’s C4.5 results being the most accurate (error rate = 5,23%) and in the form of 
production rules linking genotypic DM Steps with phenotypic DM Steps (“if Geno_DM 
and Condition X Then Pheno_DM”), while Random Forest results were less accurate, the 
C4.5 results of trial 12 were selected for analysis. The decision tree generated by the C4.5 
algorithm was cleaned-up of nil phenotypic clauses (“then Pheno_DM = y in 0,00% of 0 
examples”) and of [Geno_DM  Pheno_DM] links = [DM60-Action  DM60-Action] 
sequences of actions that correspond only to holes in the narrated episode. 
The analysis of the C4.5 production rules308 shows that the stressfulness of CogOps’ 
context (PM’s EMOTION attribute) appears as the main factor in the election of DM Steps 
: DM01-Acquisition, DM21-Analysis, DM27-Judgement, DM31-Appraisal. 
 
Other Phenotypic DM Steps are elected under a wide variety of factors and no clear 
production rule could be found. 
14.1.4. Finding 4 : Recognition, memory and metacognition play an unclear part in 
DMA 
The role played by memory and metacognition in DMA is hard to characterise. In a similar 
way, the reality of recognition-priming, described by Klein (1998) for instance, can only be 
inferred. 
ANNEX 15 indicates the number of occurrences of CogAct and CogObj types and sub-
types per CI Experience Phase in Lieutenant A’s episode of experience. Numbers here are 
rather statistically insignificant : 
• Attending and STM Keeping : Short Term Memory related CogOps (STM KEEPING) 
are performed on 12 occasions, of which 5 are assumed. They are activated mainly in 
experience phases posterior to trauma exposure when Lieutenant A tries to make sense 
of the events. Beside, ATTENDING CogOps are performed on 10 occasions, of which 6 
were assumed.  
• Long Term Memory (the subject’s encyclopaedia) : Out of a total of 14 
REMEMBERING CogActs performed, 8 being assumed, 12 were associated with 
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RUL12- Moral Rule and RUL13- Procedure / Regulation - Practical method CogObj 
sub-types. 
• Prior recognition of the situation : Only 4 occurrences of a “pattern recognition” 
CogOp could be elicited [UND12- Recognising / Making an analogy with (a known 
pattern) CogAct sub-type]. The shortness of many trajectories may point to the fact 
that situation recognition occurs on a regular basis but CogOps we found do not 
provide evidence of this. 
• Learning from experience (metacognition) : On 4 occasions we could elicit or assume a 
“LRN21- Noting / Memorising (a lesson = attitude, chunk of semantic Knowledge,)... ” 
CogOp sub-type. Beyond considering learning from experience as metacognition, the 
narrative does not reveal metacognitive processes. 
14.2. The experience of Critical Incidents (CI) and Peritraumatic Resilience 
(PTR) 
Three more findings can be drawn from the analysis of Lieutenant A’s case : 
• Finding 5 : CI Experience Phases are resilience-focused turns in the story plot 
• Finding 6 : A Critical Incident is an experience of collapse of self-agency 
• Finding 7 : PTR stems from a cognitive struggle for agency and from external support. 
14.2.1. Finding 5 : CI Experience Phases are resilience-focused turns in the story 
plot  
As seen earlier, Lieutenant A’s experience of the CI (Critical Incident) has proceeded 
through nine documented phases. Each CI experience phase (EP) can be interpreted as 
corresponding to a turn in the story plot. We looked for what was changing from one EP to 
the next. The narrative shows that the subject had some awareness of the degradation of the 
situation before Phase #3, and that the focus of the subject’s awareness of the situation 
started to change, in relation both to the pattern of events and to his own psychological 
comfort : 
CI Experience Phase Awareness of situation’s status 
0 Ante-CI Duty Awareness 
1 Pre-CI Signals MOS+MOM 309 limitation (risk) Awareness 
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2 Pre-CI Tension MOS+MOM collapse awareness 
3 CI Trauma Exposure Agency collapse awareness 
4 CI Post-Tension Situational discrepancies awareness 
5 CI Post-Relief Situation normalisation awareness 
6 CI Post-Venting Homeostasis need awareness 
7 CI Post-Resumption Duty Awareness 
8 CI Post-Debriefing Homeostasis need awareness 
Table 43 Focus of situation awareness at each CI Experience Phase (interpreted from data  
EP #4 shows that the subject “manages” his reconnection with duty when his attention is 
attracted by someone shouting “a dog is missing”. In EP #6 a process of emotion self-
diffusing and understanding helps him to recover enough calm to resume activity in EP #7. 
However, as Phase #8 shows also, the process of self-diffusing in the field did not suffice 
and the subject needed to do more talking with colleagues on the way back to the fire 
station. The following table presents three further attributes of CI Experience Phases that 
our analysis of the EP data set found to characterise these turns in the story plot : the 
subject’s action sub-goal, his coping focus, i.e. what his coping efforts seek to regulate, a 
notion consistent with Higgins’ (1997, 1998) prevention-focused310 self-regulation311 and 
with Carver et al.’s (1989) ways of coping, and the general resilience mechanism, i.e. the 




situation’s status Sub-goal Coping focus Resilience mechanism 
0 Ante-
Action Duty Awareness 
00- None/Be ready for 
action NA NA 
0 Ante-CI Duty Awareness 01- Save/Optimise 
efforts/resources/time NA NA 
  
02- Fulfil duty/Complete 
the job at hand NA NA 
  
03- Protect others / 





03- Protect others / 
Secure emotion_focused distraction 
















03- Protect others / 





03- Protect others / 





06- Get relief / De-stress / 
Vent emotions emotion_focused sensemaking 
  
08- Understanding / 
Interpreting emotion_focused sensemaking 
  09- Support / Help emotion_focused sensemaking 
7 CI Post-
Resumption Duty Awareness 
02- Fulfil duty/Complete 
the job at hand duty_focused decision 
  
02- Fulfil duty/Complete 
the job at hand NA NA 
  
03- Protect others / 
Secure NA NA 
  10- Be sociable emotion_focused keeping_brief_and_vague 
  11- Maintain moral NA NA 










06- Get relief / De-stress / 
Vent emotions emotion_focused sensemaking 
  
08- Understanding / 
Interpreting emotion_focused sensemaking 
Table 44 Characteristics of CI Experience Phases 
This table allowed to determine that the change of EP depends on the subject’s concern for 
the adversity of the context in which he operates (C4.5 algorithm used, EP data set in 
ANNEX 15) : 
(EP, attributes) association rules (cleaned-up, error rate = 20%) 
· RESILMECA in [NA]  
· SUBGOAL in [00_None_Be_ready_for_action] then EP = 0_Ante_Action (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· SUBGOAL in [01_Save_Optimise_efforts_resources_time] then EP = 0_Ante_CI (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· SUBGOAL in [02_Fulfil_duty_Complete_the_job_at_hand] then EP = 0_Ante_CI (50,00 % of 2 examples)  
· SUBGOAL in [03_Protect_others_Secure] then EP = 0_Ante_CI (50,00 % of 2 examples)  
· SUBGOAL in [11_Maintain_moral_standards] then EP = 7_CI_Post_Resumption (100,00 % of 1 examples  
· RESILMECA in [distraction] then EP = 1_Pre_CI_Signals (100,00 % of 2 examples)  
· RESILMECA in [mitigation] then EP = 2_Pre_CI_Tension (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· RESILMECA in [self_protection] then EP = 3_CI_Trauma_Exposure (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· RESILMECA in [exogenous_opportunism]  
· AWARENESS in [Situational_discrepancies_awareness] then EP = 4_CI_Post_Tension (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· AWARENESS in [Situation_normalisation_awareness] then EP = 5_CI_Post_Relief (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· RESILMECA in [sensemaking]  
· SUBGOAL in [06_Get_relief_De_stress_Vent_emotions] then EP = 6_CI_Post_Venting (50,00 % of 2 examples)  
· SUBGOAL in [08_Understanding_Interpreting] then EP = 6_CI_Post_Venting (50,00 % of 2 examples)  
· SUBGOAL in [09_Support_Help] then EP = 6_CI_Post_Venting (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· RESILMECA in [decision] then EP = 7_CI_Post_Resumption (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· RESILMECA in [keeping_brief_and_vague] then EP = 7_CI_Post_Resumption (100,00 % of 1 examples) 
Table 45 Association rules between CI Experience Phase and their four attributes (C4.5 algorithm, error rate = 20%) 
Given its apparent importance, we wanted to know if the subject’s resilience mechanism 
was influenced by other attributes. A C4.5 decision tree was calculated (EP data set in 
ANNEX 15) with variable = RESILMECA, and factors = (AWARENESS, 
COPINGFOCUS). The following rules of association (error rate = 0%) show that 
resilience mechanisms are mobilised by the subject in conjunction both with 
AWARENESS and COPINGFOCUS : 
Peritraumatic Resilience Mechanisms rules of association at CI Experience Phase level (error rate = 0%) 
· COPINGFOCUS in [NA] then RESILMECA = NA (100,00 % of 7 examples)  
· COPINGFOCUS in [emotion_focused]  
· AWARENESS in [Duty_Awareness] then RESILMECA = keeping_brief_and_vague (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· AWARENESS in [MOS_MOM_limitation_risk_Awareness] then RESILMECA = distraction (100,00 % of 2 examples)  
· AWARENESS in [Situational_discrepancies_awareness] then RESILMECA = exogenous_opportunism (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· AWARENESS in [Situation_normalisation_awareness] then RESILMECA = exogenous_opportunism (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· AWARENESS in [Homeostasis_need_awareness] then RESILMECA = sensemaking (100,00 % of 5 examples) 
· COPINGFOCUS in [problem_focused] then RESILMECA = mitigation (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· COPINGFOCUS in [self_preservation_focused] then RESILMECA = self_protection (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· COPINGFOCUS in [duty_focused] then RESILMECA = decision (100,00 % of 1 examples) 
Table 46 Peritraumatic Resilience Mechanisms rules of association at CI Experience Phase level (C4.5, error rate = 0%) 
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When the subject’s focus of coping efforts is on regulating his emotions, his awareness of 
the situation influences the election of a peritraumatic resilience mechanism. 
CI Experience Phases are resilience-focused turns in the story plot. They correspond to 
changes in the subject’s awareness of and way of responding to the stressfulness of 
circumstances. 
 
14.2.2. Finding 6 : A Critical Incident is an experience of collapse of self-agency 
Present Moments # 11 and 12 correspond to CI Experience Phase 3, the traumatic 
exposure. In terms of recalls from Lieutenant A’s episodic memory they provide the richest 
account of his experience, with 57 CogOps identified, 12% of the total 460, a detailed by-
the-second account of these two PMs that must have lasted around 5 seconds altogether312. 
Given this richness, we wanted to study if resilient reactions were also narrated by the 
subject.  
The AGENCY ordinal attribute was defined through successive iterations of interpretation 
of the data to characterise each CogOp. Deemed a composite concept in literature by 
Campbell (2009) we define “power of agency”, or self-agency as an “actor’s ability to 
initiate and maintain a program of action” (p. 407) by reference to Weber (1920)313. 
Categories of self-gency were defined by asking for each CogOp Is Lieutenant A able to 
act upon the course of events ? (NB: Negative values signify adverse levels): 
Category Value Definition of the AGENCY attribute 
Loss of 
Agency -8 
End of Agency. 
= a total dependence upon the course of events. 
Survival -5 
Minimal Agency. 
= the course of events is overwhelming and only creative adaptation and hope can sustain the 
subject. 
Manoeuvre -2 Struggling Agency. 
= the subject has to constantly adapt tactically to ever changing and threatening circumstances. 
Control 5 Controlled Agency. 
= the subject has a good control of circumstances. 
Safety 8 Safe Agency.  
= the subject is in full control of circumstances. 
Table 47 The definition of the AGENCY CogOp ordinal attribute measuring Lieutenant A’s self-agency 
Based on the CogOp data set (ANNEX 15) and the accuracy of the subject’s recalls, the 
following chart shows the evolution of self-agency across Lieutenant A’s episode of 
experience : 
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Figure 41 Lieutenant A's level of self-agency along the 460 CogOps 
Lieutenant A’s profile depicts the collapse of his power of agency from the moment he 
feels uncomfortable in the threatening dogs’ presence (PM #8) until he recovers self-
agency when the missing dog is found dying (PM #21). Several observations can be made : 
• The collapse of his level of agency is progressive : falling down one level when 
waiting in the garden for dogs to be captured then lower when the father irrupts (PM # 
10), falling to survival level when he realises the dogs are attacking, down to the loss of 
agency level when he experiences peritraumatic dissociation (PM # 11 & 12). 
• But a struggle with circumstances characterises what is going on during PM # 11 & 12 
: seeing the police’s reaction, his level of agency rises back up to survival level, but 
falls again when he understands their inefficacy. It recovers a manoeuvre level when 
the subject attempts to give instructions to police officers, falls back again when he 
experiences another occurrence of peritraumatic dissociation and sees that bullets 
traversing the dogs’ bodies in slow motion are inefficient. It recovers a survival level 
when he makes physical moves in order to avoid the dogs and when he sees them 
running away, wounded. Then, when he is embarked in a course of submissive action 
to find the missing dog (PM # 13), his level of agency remains low, at a manoeuvre 
level. He recovers full agency only when the dog has been found (PM # 21). If a 
Critical Incident is an experience of collapse of self-agency, peritraumatic resilience 
appears to be a struggle by which the subject tries to recover it. 
• If Lieutenant A managed to resume activity after the exposure to psychological trauma 
this is due to the fact that his experience of trauma was not physical but psychological. 
The hypothesised categories presented earlier in this section could be added one 
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“worse” level corresponding to a “physical trauma” should Lieutenant A have been 
bitten by the dogs or mistakenly shot by police officers, implying the total 
disappearance of self-agency. 
• Finally, another element must attract our attention. One hypothesis could have been 
that at the lowest level of Self-Agency, the “loss of agency” level, the subject’s 
situation awareness would become nil. In fact when Lieutenant A is both attacked by 
the dogs and caught in the middle of the heavy gun fire, we can assume he has an 
accurate awareness of circumstances along with the effects of peritraumatic 
dissociation. He pictures exactly what is going on, understands clearly the police’s 
incapability to kill the dogs. And, beyond doubt, he knows what the result of his 
situation is likely to be : he anticipates his possible death from the shooting as well as 
his being bitten by the dogs : “it’s not the fear of the petards, well, of the guns, it was 
the fear of the dogs” (PM #12). Based on our knowledge of Lieutenant A’s case, an 
ordinal attribute (SA) was elaborated in successive refinements of analysis of the data 
in order to characterise the subject’s situation awareness during a Present Moment : 
PM attribute Definition and categorical and numerical values 
SA The subject’s situation awareness : -7 (nil / disorientation), -3 (insufficient picture or anticipation), 0 (little), 3 (fair / partial picture and anticipation), 10 (high / good picture and anticipation  
Table 48 PM attributes characterising the context of Lieutenant A's cognition (ordinal attributes in italics  
In the CogOp data set, the value of SA assigned to a given PM was assigned to each 
CogOp within that PM. The following line chart illustrates the relation between the PM’s 
contextual SA attribute and the CogOp-level Agency attribute314 across Lieutenant A’s 
episode of experience : 
 
Figure 42 Comparative levels of self-agency (CogOp level) and situation awareness (contextual PM level  
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High SA seems associated here with a small physical perimeter, a single event at hand, the 
traumatic threat, peritraumatic dissociation, and intact reasoning capacities.  
14.2.3. Finding 7 : PTR stems from a cognitive struggle for agency and from 
external support 
14.2.3.1. Evidence of a cognitive struggle for self-agency 
We interpreted again the narrative to search, at the fast-paced CogOp level, what kind of 
phenotypic control (Ctrl attribute) the subject had over his genotypic level of self-agency 
(Agency attribute). The Ctrl attribute was interpretatively defined in iterations as follows : 
Category Value General definition and complementary elements for the analysis of CogOps 
Struggling 9 Subject, understanding the failure of the response/defence mechanism, escalates his fight for agency by guiding others through injunctions, orders or directions, or by taking action 
Margins seeking 7 Subject instruments circumstances on hand in order to try to re-augment his Margins of Manœuvre or Margins of Safety (MOM MOS  
Thinking right 5 Subject evaluates the situation, risks and possibilities 
Vigilance 3 Subject monitors attentively the evolution of the situation 
Unsought 
Opportunity 2 
Subject regains some control of agency by using, taking advantage of an unlooked for 
opportunity 
Distraction 1 Subject tries to keep self-agency by changing his mind, trying to ignore the source of danger 
With RSK 0 Total control of agency through ordinary Routines (learnt to automaticity), Skills (practical 
skills, creativity) or Knowledge (theoretical knowledge  
Reliance -2 Subject can only rely on hope, others or defence mechanisms to keep or regain some self-
agency 
Powerlessness -9 Subject has lost all means of keeping or regaining self-agency, whether through others or by himself 
Table 49 The definition of the CogOp ordinal attribute measuring Lieutenant A’s by-the-second coping mode 
Assigned to each CogOp, the Ctrl and Agency attributes help to understand how Lieutenant 
A’s coping reactions varied along with his power of agency (data in ANNEX 16). The 
following line chart shows this relation between the Agency and Ctrl attributes. PM # 08 to 
PM # 12315 are remarkable as they correspond to the pre-exposure and exposure to trauma 
(EP # 2 and 3) : 
  252 
 
Figure 43 Timeline analysis of numerical values of the Agency and Ctrl attributes (CogOp level  
We can relate these values of the two attributes to what goes on during PM #11 and PM 
#12. Based on the subject’s narrative that provides many details of the fast pace of events, 
actions and cognitions that took place during the trauma exposure phase itself, the 
following graph relates details of Lieutenant A’s by-the-second reactions to previous levels 
of  Agency : 
 
Figure 44 Details of Lieutenant A's resilient reaction at the trauma exposure phase (paralleled with the events timeline) 
This graphical analysis shows Lieutenant A’s reactions to adversity are quick. As soon as 
the dogs attack, he starts reflecting upon the situation, between active coping and planning 
in Carver et al.’s (1989) terms. When he experiences fright for the first time, his agency-
control reaction is one of avoidance of the threat, he seeks shelter ; at this moment he has 
lost his power of agency. It is at this point that he regains some power of agency, though 
still on a low level while he is forced to manœuvre around circumstances. When he realises 
that police shootings are inefficient he tries to direct their action and he yells his order 
“shoot ! shoot !” to them. When he realises that the situation is hopeless he looses his 
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power of agency. But this is when he takes some physical moves aiming at safeguarding 
him (steps backwards, beside another person, hurting his hand on the side of the garden 
terrace, which shows the high level of energy he thrusts into these moves). Then, the dogs 
running away, he resorts on his vigilance and recovers some power of agency. When he 
understands that a dog might have run away his professional competence allows him to 
regain control of his course of action : danger for himself has gone away now. 
This confirms that by-the-second coping reactions take place in the subject’s cognitive 
process of DMA. A C4.5 analysis of the CogOp data set (ANNEX 15, n = 459, variable = 
Pheno_Ctrl, factor = Geno_Agency) reveals, with an error rate of 12,85%, the rules of 
association of a phenotypic control mode (Ctrl) with a genotypic level of agency (Agency): 
. Geno_Agency in [Safety] then Pheno_Ctrl = With RSK (99,66 % of 294 examples 316)  
. Geno_Agency in [Control] then Pheno_Ctrl = Reliance (51,85 % of 27 examples)  
. Geno_Agency in [Manoeuvre] then Pheno_Ctrl = With RSK (70,37 % of 108 examples)  
. Geno_Agency in [Survival] then Pheno_Ctrl = Vigilance (73,33 % of 15 examples)  
. Geno_Agency in [Loss of Agency] then Pheno_Ctrl = Powerlessness (40,00 % of 15 examples). 
Table 50 Rules of association between Geno_Agency and Pheno_Ctrl (C4.5 algorithm, error rate = 12,85%) 
These elements evidence the existence of a cognitive, fast-paced (by-the-second) 
alternance of the subject’s levels of self-agency and of coping reactions. 
 
In the face of trauma, the subject is not defenceless, even if in short moments he looses his 
power of agency. This finding seems to contradict the view of a defenceless subject at the 
peritraumatic stage (Clervoy, 2007) but this contradiction probably does not exist as 
such317. 
14.2.3.2. The opportune support from others 
But peritraumatic resilience (PTR) may also stem from some form of luck. In Lieutenant 
A’s case, when he is (probably) still overwhelmed by the dogs’ attack and the police 
shooting, someone shouts that a dog is missing. This opportunistically reconnects him with 
his duty, though in a rather passive, submissive manner. In so doing, the subject’s response 
is adaptive. PTR can then be seen as prevention-focused self-regulation (Higgins, 1997, 
1998 ; Brockner et al., 2002) : the subject has an homeostatic need for safety and his 
attitude is based on his moral standards (duties, obligations, and responsibilities). He seeks 
to avoid further trouble. 
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The lesson here is that in the field, reciprocal attention to team mates can ensure that when 
a Critical Incident occurs unexposed personnel see to help affected ones to reconnect with 
the requirements of their duty by proposing them a circumstantial challenge (like looking 
for a missing dog, searching for survivors, …). 
 
14.3. A macrocognitive model of Decision-Making-in-Action (DMA model) 
A descriptive high-level, macrocognitive model of Decision-Making-in-Action can be 
derived from the DM Step based global decision network, and from the result of Inter-
Variability and Intra-Variability analyses : 
 
Figure 45 The high-level model of Decision-Making-in-Action (DMA Model) 
This model organises Decision-Making-in-Action in successive macrocognitive functions 
numbered 0 to 6 : 0 = Support functions, 1 = Acquisition, 2 = Interpretation, 3 = Affect 
coping, 4 = Planning, 5 = Decision, 6 = Action. 
It highlights the higher frequency of occurence of deliberation-based DMA patterns 
(boldest, black arrows) noted at the detailed PM level, and the secondary role played by 
affect-based DMA patterns (medium bold arrows) also noted at the PM level. It also 
represents the less frequent and predictable phenotypic cognitive links (thin arrows) that 
relate to the role played by support functions (LTM, Attention and STM, Metacognition) 
as noticed in decision networks. Other less frequent, less predictable links are not 
represented on the diagram to simplify the reading of the model. This model does not 
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reflect NDM researchers’ finding of situation recognition as in Klein’s (1998) RPD model. 
Lieutenant A’s data can only suggest that the shortness of decisision making cycles, if not 
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CHAPTER 15. Discussion and conclusions 
The issue of scientificity has already been debated and at this stage we do not feel that 
further discussion would add elements to the pros and cons of the methodological approach 
devised for the study, its weaknesses and also its strengths. This chapter rather discusses 
the topical findings of the study. First, we summarise the steps of the intellectual process of 
the thesis. Secondly, we reflect on the consequences of the seven findings of the analysis. 
Thirdly, we excerpt the key lessons from Lieutenant A’s case that can constitute new 
requirements for CI metacognitive training. We also argue that the conceptual model on 
which CogOps (cognitive operations) were formed, i.e. pairs of {CogAct ; CogObj} is 
rudimentary and should be developed in future research. Our conclusions expose the 
directions of our future research work. 
15.1. General review of the study 
Lieutenant A’s case, as studied here, is one of many similar experiences of attacks (chapter 
1) endured on the line of duty by fire-fighters and, beyond, by other emergency personnel 
(Beignon, 2003 ; Regehr et al., 2005 ; Marmar et al., 2006 ; FBU, 2008 ; Keenan, 2008 ; 
IAFC, 2013). Such events are even largely under-reported (Moore-Merrel et al., 2008) and 
in a number of times perpetrated by or with the use of dangerous dogs. The reports of 
Critical Incidents referenced in our research show that the focus of authorities’ concern is 
on the post-traumatic stage of Critical Incidents (CI) and the Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) syndrom for it affects staff, missions and also soldiers’ families 
(Meredith et al., 2011). These reports also provide sometimes first-person narratives of 
events. These testimonies (as in IAFC's Near-Miss Incident Reports database for instance) 
serve mainly to identify deficiencies in the organisation or competences deployed in the 
field.  
The clinique of trauma (chapter 2) shows that Critical Incidents (CI) such as these attacks 
have the potential to jeopardise missions and staff’s safety in the peritraumatic moment of 
the intervention (Kowalski, 1995 ; Marmar et al., 2006 ; Bertrand, 2007). Chapter 3 
showed that how fire-fighters manage to surmount their exposure to trauma in these 
circumstances remains under-studied from a cognitive perspective (Anaut, 2006 ; van der 
Kolk, 1997 ; Zimmer-Gembeck, 2007) beyond well-known case studies such as the Mann 
Gulch disaster (MacLean, 1993 ; Weick, 1993).  
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Beside Judgement and Decision Making (JDM) research (Shanteau, Hammond, Dawes, 
Lopes, Fischhof, Hogarth, Kahneman, etc.) and more qualitative methods (Maarten 
Shraagen et al., 2008), NDM research (Klein, Orasanu, Fischer, Zsambok, Hutton, Pruitt, 
Flin, Dreyfus, Rasmussen, Endsley, Etc.) has focused (chapter 4) on the cognitive study of 
decision-making in the field of action under stressful circumstances and has elaborated 
cognitive models of decision-making (chapter 4) that serve the engineering of complex 
computer-based environments and systems (aircraft cockpits, command posts, etc.). But 
NDM models have little, if not not at all, taken account of affects into the production of 
decisions. Peritraumatic resilience (PTR) is the capacity, the aptitude of a subject to cope 
with a traumatic incident in the course of action (chapter 3) and was hypothesised (chapter 
4) by us to be an outcome of Decision-Making-in-Action (DMA), the individual cognitive 
process that controls a subject’s performance within the course of a given, delimited, 
situated, embodied and enacted action performed in the field, not in a laboratory. Then, we 
asked whether fire-fighters’ peritraumatic resilience could be trained (chapter 5) and 
summarised the current elements of metacognitive training frameworks aimed at helping 
fire-fighters deal better with Critical Incidents. This led us to conclude that for such 
frameworks to be efficient an a priori knowledge of DMA and PTR was required. 
A wide variety of Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA) and other methods have been created 
and used (chapter 6) by NDM researchers (Ericsson & Simon, 1984 ; Rassmussen, 1985 ; 
Woods, 1993 ; Orasanu, 1997 ; Pascual & Henderson, 1997 ; Stokes, Kemper & Kite, 1997 
; Bisseret et al., 1999 ; Omodei et al., 2002 ; Hoffman, 2005 ; Maarten Shraagen et al., 
2008). But the need to get into closer touch with subjects’ inner cognition, with their first-
person point of view has also been largely advocated (Banbury et al., 2002 ; Omodei et al., 
1997, 2005 ; Maarten Schraagen et al., 2008) in a will to take a radically empirical 
epistemological stance (James, 1904, 1912) rather than rationalist empiricism (Bryman, 
1984 ; Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994 ; Varela & Shear, 1999a ; Vermersch, 2006 ; den Boer, 
2008) inappropriate for the study of singular cases. Hence the choice of a first-person 
methodology for the study of Lieutenant A’s case with its five requirements : 1) to focus 
on an individual’s cognition during a given, delimited, situated, embodied and enacted 
episode of experience, 2) to produce a first-person narrative of such an experience, 3) to be 
able to help the subject to perform recalls of his authentic (= not interpreted, not 
reconstructed, not theorised) episodic memories of the episode of experience, 4) to elicit 
cognitive operations performed by the subject during his experience through a semantic 
analysis process, 5) to be capable of performing both interpretative and an exploratory 
factor analyses out of the data extracted from the first-person narrative.  
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The methodology of the present study, Pheno-Cognitive Analysis (PCA), was created on 
two foundations : psychophenomenology (Vermersch, 2006) for data collection through 
the Elicitation Interview protocol (EI) described in chapters 7 and 9, and 
phenomenography (Marbach, 1993) described in chapter 7 as a basis for data processing 
(chapter 10). The EI allows the researcher to help the subject recall his episodic memories 
of the episode of experience under study. Episodic memories of traumatic episodes of 
experience are said to remain unaffected, vivid and detailed (chapter 2) for a long time 
(van der Kolk, 1997). Ethical precautions have been described and taken during this study 
to avoid affecting the subject during the EI. 
Keeping in mind the criticism addressed to qualitative researchers (Bryman, 1984 ; Varela 
& Shear, 1999 ; Olsen, 2002 ; Cho & Trent, 2006), precautions have been taken to 
guarantee as far as was feasible the scientificity of this research (chapters 11).  
With the reserve that other researchers would inevitably obtain a different narrative using 
the same Elicitation Interview (EI) protocol with the same subject, and also under the 
reserve that the semantic parsing and encoding of the different objects and elements 
describing his cognitive experience might vary, the narrative resulting from Lieutenant A’s 
Elicitation Interview (chapter 12) has yielded an important volume of data (chapter 13, and 
annex volume for details). His episode of experience was interpreted as made of 9 phases 
of experience of the Critical Incident, and 44 Present Moments (Bergson, 1934 ; Gusdorf, 
1951 ; Stern, 2004), i.e. the memorable stretches of experience recalled and narrated by the 
subject during the EI and considered as decision-making cycles. The episode of experience 
and its 44 PMs are the object of this research that was driven by the following question : 
How does a fire-fighter, Lieutenant A, experiencing a Critical Incident in the course of an 
intervention, manage to resume and complete his action immediately after the exposure to 
trauma ? (chapter 3). To answer this question, we described and studied the shape of the 
cognitive processes of DMA and their founding objects, cognitive operations (CogOp) 
conceived (chapter 7 and 10) as indissociable pairs of {cognitive act ; cognitive object}. 
460 Cogops were also elicited (chapter 13) through the semantic analysis of the narrative. 
Decision networks representing the frequency of the chronological succession links 
between CogOps were calculated and helped to discover the different shapes of DMA in 
Lieutenant A’s case (chapter 14) and a set of attributes was defined to analyse those shapes 
and their cognitive context through exploratory factor analyses. Seven findings were 
derived from the analysis : 1) Four DMA patterns were identified, in which affects play an 
important part in a third of all PMs, 2) DMA patterns change from one PM to the next 
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(Inter-Variability) and a model of inter-variability was elaborated, 3) the shape of cognitive 
trajectories varies within each DMA pattern (Intra-Variability) and decision trees of intra-
variability were produced, 4) Recognition, memory and metacognition were found to play 
an unclear part in DMA, 5) CI Experience Phases are resilience-focused turns in the story 
plot, 6) A Critical Incident is an experience of collapse of self-agency, 7) PTR stems both 
from a cognitive struggle for agency and from external support. A macrocognitive model 
of Decision-Making-in-Action (DMA Model) is finally derived from previous analyses. It 
situates the role of affect within the individual decision-making process. 
15.2. Metacognitive and NDM implications of the study’s seven findings 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the seven findings of the analysis : 
• Finding 1 : There are four DMA patterns in which affects play an important part, 
though deliberation-based cognitive trajectories are predominant in two thirds of the 44 
PMs. Affect-based cognitive trajectories intervene in CI Experience Phases presenting 
different levels of stressfulness (nominal, stressful, traumatic) and are not specific to 
the traumatic phase. Lieutenant A’s case shows that cognitive models of decision-
making in action (DMA) (Decision Networks) can integrate affects in their design. The 
macrocognitive model of DMA presented in synthesis of this study does not depict 
team decision-making nor does it describe tactical decision-making. From an NDM 
research perspective, the context of DMA is a given318, delimited319, situated320, 
embodied321 and enacted322 episode of individual action, characterised in Lieutenant A’s 
case by time-pressure in fast-paced circumstances requiring to make by-the-second 
decisions for himself and his mission, clear goals for the action (the intervention) and 
ad hoc sub-goals in its different phases, interactions with others and objects, and the 
subject’s social background and environment defining moral and regulatory guidelines 
and boundaries for the subject’s action. From a cognitive training standpoint, the study 
of Lieutenant A’s case confirms the role of affect in individual decision-making. 
Never, or at best little mentioned in fire-fighters’ regulations, training courses and 
exercises, it is, however, vastly acknowledged by men and officers of all ranks and 
experience in private conversations. Trainees, as well as more experienced fire-fighters 
should be told that affects signal discrepancies, hence risks in the circumstances of 
their action. Beside, they should be taught the four patterns of DMA that represent 
landmarks of the cognitive decision-making process. We hypothesise that it could be 
useful in the toughest situations to “keep a cool head”.  
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• Finding 2 : DMA patterns change from one PM to the next : this phenomenon was 
called Inter-Variability and was analysed to be driven by the stressfulness of the 
circumstances experienced by the subject and the direction of the threat at hand. From 
an NDM standpoint it is consistent with researchers’ finding that people resort on a 
variety of decision-making strategies along the course of a given episode of action. 
These patterns of DMA, and their internal shapes (cognitive trajectories discussed with 
the next finding) represent the way people process situations as indicated in the model 
of the Rules of activation of the four DMA patterns. Of course, Lieutenant A is only 
one case among thousands and these rules cannot pretend to generalisation, like any 
other result from the present research. But we point here to the necessity of performing 
more similar studies to improve our knowledge of these rules and others uncovered 
during our study. Such rules, from a cognitive training viewpoint should be taught to 
trainee fire-fighters. This would be only theoretical material but would also constitute 
landmarks in their retrospective analyses of the many interventions that confront them 
with CIs. Beyond, Inter-Variability tells us that affect intervenes from time to time and 
affect warns the subject of potential risks. However, Lieutenant A’s case shows that the 
subject did not take the opportunity of realising he was subject to anxiety to revisit his 
conduct of the operation. From a metacognitive perspective, Metacognitive regulation 
implies not only the capacity for self-awareness but also the capacity to pose a 
diagnosis of one’s own cognitive processing of circumstances and to readjust that 
process. In Lieutenant A’s case, these last two functions seem not to have been 
performed. 
• Finding 3 : The shape of cognitive trajectories varies within each DMA pattern and, 
beyond, across the entire episode of cognitive experience. This phenomenon was called 
Intra-Variability. It was shown, through an analysis using classification algorithms, that 
the stressfulness of circumstances was a likely factor of the election of certain types of 
CogOps (perception, analysis, judgement, appraisal mainly). However, the transition 
mechanism between CogOps is complex. First we saw that many phenotypic cognitive 
transitions were statistically infrequent in Lieutenant A’s case. Does this hold true with 
any other fireman or person exposed to a CI ? Secondly, we assumed a number (about 
30%) of CogOps. Possibly the subject omitted to narrate them, or he could not recall 
them. Possibly also we could not assume CogOps that would have changed our 
analysis of phenotypic transition mechanisms. Whatever the explanation, if there is 
any, we know that the EI protocol has its limits. In practice, EIs cannot last more than 
an hour. The circumstances in which they are performed are very hard to control. In 
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Lieutenant A’s case, we had to perform it at the fire station. Contextual noises and 
disturbances happened. This may have disturbed the subject and broken some memory 
retrieval threads. Again, new pheno-cognitive studies of similar cases are needed to 
advance the knowledge of the factors and rules {if Geno_DM = X and Factor {a,b, …, 
n} then Pheno_DM = Y} of this phenotypic transition mechanism. 
• Finding 4 : Recognition, memory and metacognition (found only as learning in our 
study) play an unclear part in Lieutenant A’s DMA. Only few CogOps evidenced these 
cognitive “support” functions. The shortness (number of CogOps per PM) of cognitive 
trajectories is an argument in favour of a rapid or early recognition of the situation at 
hand by the subject. Rapid situation recognition can be assimilated to noticing features 
that echoe the subject’s autobiographical knowledge and in Lieutenant A’s case we 
should have found in his narrative some traces of such calls upon his memory. But as 
we did not the question again turns to the power of the EI to guide the subject toward 
the exhaustive recall of his episodic memories. Such is not the case and we must accept 
the incompleteness of the first-person material the EI delivers. On the opposite, this 
militates in favour of a rigorous observance of the guidelines set for this sort of 
interviews, as well as for the data processing that ensues. Similar reasoning can be held 
in relation to long and short term memory processes active at the actual time of the 
subject’s experience. However, they rely upon “under-conscious” processes (Conway, 
1995, 2001, 2005) and thus there is another limit to the pheno-cognitive study of DMA. 
The Elicitation Interview (EI) guidelines do not yet help to cue the corresponding 
probes. Work in progress at the GREX (Vermersch’s Groupe de Recherche sur 
l’EXplicitation – EI Research Group) may in the future yield further ways to help 
subjects perform this sort of recalls. Complementary techniques may be needed. For 
instance, we saw that the re-reading in November 2007 by Lieutenant A of his 
resequenced narrative had triggered a few further episodic memory recalls. Other 
attempts by us in different contexts also tend to suggest that a re-exposure to the initial 
first-person narrative helps further recalls. From a methodological perspective, this is a 
path to explore. From a metacognitive training standpoint, this could help the subject to 
increase his awareness of his own know-what and know-how (Spear-Ellinwood, 2008). 
• Finding 5 : CI Experience Phases are resilience-focused turns in the story plot. The 
apparent proximity of our findings with Higgins’ (1997, 1998) concept of prevention-
focused self-regulation in which “people’s safety/protection/security needs motivate 
them to attempt to bring their actual selves into alignment with their ought selves, 
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[and] negative outcomes to be avoided” (Brockner et al., 2002, pp. 7-8) should be the 
object of later studies. Under this perspective, peritraumatic resilience appears as a 
moral standard, hence one of the three factors of self-regulation. In Lieutenant A’s 
case, there may be a conflict between the prevention-focused and promotion-focused 
self-regulation attitudes. The narrative shows that the subject places at the first rank of 
his priorities his will to play his social role, hence a promotion-focus in self-regulation 
: he wants to stay in place among the policemen and firemen who are standing by the 
dogs. His moral and regulation standards and desire to accomplish his duty are here 
stronger than his need for safety. But his absence of risk awareness and of a subsequent 
decision to rethink the conduct of the operation, for instance to pull back, to recognise 
the grounds to check if security is assured and to prevent undue access to the premises 
(this would have prevented the irruption of the father) lies in his focus on safety for 
himself, under his fear of the dogs. What we understand here is that there is a conflict 
in self-regulation. And this conflict is detrimental to the safety of the operation, of 
people, and of Lieutenant A himself in fine. Self-regulation management, which can be 
seen as a metacognitive skill, therefore stands at the heart of peritraumatic resilience. 
The subject’s rationality does not lie with his capacity to think. It lies with his capacity 
to regulate the focus of his cognition. This point is also a contribution to NDM 
modelling of our cognition in action. This metacognitive regulatory mechanism is part 
of the cognitive process of DMA, and thus was included in the DMA Model 
(macrocognitive functions numbered “0”). However, considering the very small, 
insufficient amount of related data in Lieutenant A’s case, we can only suggest to 
perform more similar case studies and to improve the EI guidelines (New cues ? 
Narrative re-reading ? …) in order to help subjects to recall more memories 
corresponding to this regulatory mechanism (at least to verify the hypothesis of its very 
existence). 
• Finding 6 : A Critical Incident is an experience of collapse of self-agency. Luckily, or 
just as van der Kolk (1997) had suggested, the episodic memories of traumatic 
experiences are the most vivid and detailed. What Lieutenant A’s case shows is 1) that 
he progressively looses his capacity to act upon the course of events (and on his own 
course of action as his margins of safety and manœuvre diminish as the peril increases) 
; 2) that he resorts on a repertory of by-the-second coping modes to keep or regain this 
capacity and the control over his course of action and his fate. From a metacognitive 
training perspective, this is very important. It must be taught to recruits, fire-fighters 
and any person due to work in dangerous settings, that unless they are seriously 
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physically incapacitated they still can find ways to surmount adversity, even under the 
prospect of death. Story-telling is probably an important way to convey this message; 
but alternatively pushing trainees into sharp edge exercises that allow them, risklessly, 
to get in touch with difficulties that require alternative thinking, the instrumentation of 
available artefacts into ad hoc solutions, or the awareness and exploitation of the even 
slightest margins of safety and manœuvre ,could give them a lived feeling of what it is 
like to handle tough circumstances. In NDM terms, this finding also means that there is 
a real interest to invest effort into research about the individual cognitive experience of 
trauma in action. Just like Lieutenant A’s case shows, an episode of experience is made 
of different phases during which the subject experiences nominal, stressful and 
traumatic circumstances. Just like this study has been able to compare the shape and 
factors of the Lieutenant’s cognitive activity and to unveil the components of his by-
the-second struggle for self-agency, multiple studies of similar happenings would allow 
to draw more substantiated comparisons of the same phenomena. In terms of cognitive 
engineering, whether of computerised working environments or of standard operating 
procedures, such elements are very important as they lead to introducing such cognitive 
aids as a self-agency collapse awareness indicator, an on-hand resilience mechanism 
aid (awareness and choice assistant). This is the more justified in the context of very 
fast paced actions. Lieutenant A in PMs # 11 and 12 was able to mobilise resilience 
resources. In other contexts we could not say if subjects could display the same faculty 
without cognitive aids. The present research shows that similar case studies have to be 
performed and their implications in terms of cognitive engineering have to be studied. 
• Finding 7 : PTR (peritraumatic resilience) stems both from a cognitive struggle for 
self-agency and from external social support. The vigilance and support from other 
crew members can help a crew member affected by trauma in action to reconnect with 
his duty. In the present case, someone shouting that a dog has escaped calls on the 
subject’s ethical and regulatory background, the need to search the missing dog in 
order to protect other people against the impending danger. From an NDM standpoint 
this is an important result of this study as it shows that people’s safety on the line of 
duty is dependent not only upon individual cognitive faculties but also on the well 
rehearsed and matured skill to detect crew mates in danger and to make-up a way to 
help them reconnect with the course of action and pull them out of the state of 
wobbleness323 in which they may be. Crews’ safety on the line of duty, in operation, 
can be at stake if the crew altogether fails to provide one another this kind of social 
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support. Hence the tight relationship between individual and collective peritraumatic 
resilience. This is what Weick’s (1993) analysis of the Mann Gulch disaster points out. 
15.3. Five axes for CI metacognitive training and the safety of fire-fighters 
The findings of this study complement those of Driskell & Johnston (1998) and of Keenan 
(2008) about the need to train people for Critical Incidents in order to improve their safety 
on the line of duty, when confronted with attacks for instance. Metacognitive training can 
help to enhance their capacity for peritraumatic resilience.  
Five mechanisms of peritraumatic resilience have been identified : 
1. Lieutenant A’s case teaches us that such a capacity stems first from an ability to better 
picture what is going on in the course of an intervention in the field : the experience of 
CIs is phased (here we identified nine phases) and we characterised each phase as a 
recognisable change in circumstances and in the subject’s cognitive focus, goals and 
coping mechanisms. As far as feasible peritraumatic resilience starts with the 
prevention of potential trouble, provided the subject has this metacognitive capacity to 
analyse the course of events. 
2. We have also concluded to the inability of the subject to question his attitude toward 
the situation and to change the conduct of the operation. We have hypothesised earlier 
that this may have been caused by a conflict between his self-regulation focii. His 
indecision can be noticed, interpreted and acted upon by the subject in order to prevent 
adverse happenings. 
3. We have also shown that the stressfulness of the context was a driver of changes in the 
subject’s decision-making strategies. When affect rules, the study has shown 
reasonable evidence of the subject’s awareness of his emotions (anxiety, fear, not 
mentioning peritraumatic dissociation). At this stage the subject can still prevent 
mishappenings though Lieutenant A did not. 
4. Fourth, we have presented reasonable evidence of the fast-paced cognitive struggle for 
self-agency that materialises in the election of by-the-second coping modes. The study 
also shows that the subject was aware of his shrinking margins of safety and 
manoeuvre. Peritraumatic resilience, in these moments, relied upon adaptive fast-paced 
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manoeuvres aimed at regaining some margin of safety by exploiting available margins 
of manoeuvre. 
5. Fifth, we showed that social interactions have been beneficial to the subject just after 
the exposure to trauma as they helped him to reconnect with his duty and to come out 
of the state of wobbleness he was likely to be in. 
Our findings point therefore to five metacognitive skills that can actively contribute to 
peritraumatic resilience when experiencing Critical Incidents (CI) :  
 
Metacognitive 
Time scale Monitoring Clues Reaction Goal 
Situation shifts management Minute Individual Discrepancy Reorientation Prevention 
Self-regulation conflict management Minute Individual Indecision Reassessment Prevention 
Affect-based decision-making warnings Seconds Individual Emotion Affect control Prevention 
By-the-second cognitive struggle for self-
agency Second Individual Low margins Coping mode Protection 
Attentive crew realignment Seconds Crew level Odd behaviour Support Reconnection 
Table 51 Five CI-focused metacognitive skills 
These five CI-focused metacognitive skills are requirements for a generic framework of 
metacognitive training that we derived from prior work by Driskell & johnston (1998), 
Cannon-Bowers & bell (1997), Fin et al. (2007), Lipshitz (1993), Orasanu & Fischer 
(1997), Klein (1998), Downing et al. (2007), Pruitt et al. (1997) and Flavell (1979).  
Metacognitive training usually pursues : 
• Three goals, from the acquisition of theoretical knowledge to rehearsed practice : 1) to 
develop the trainees’ knowledge of the stressful / potentially traumatic environment of 
work (to date a form of such training occurs de facto at the BSPP as every month the 
dead on the line of duty are honored during morning assemblies in every fire station) ; 
2) to develop their decision-making skills in critical circumstances (today, only a basic 
training is given to recruits and consists in rehearsing the right actions to cope with the 
hazards of the job, like back drafts for instance) ; 3) to build every trainee’s confidence 
in his ability to perform under stress and in surprising critical circumstances (this type 
of training exists to some limited extent at the BSPP in the form of classroom training 
sessions, morning exercises, fire-extinguishing training, and larger civil security 
exercises). 
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• The development of three basic skills under the previous three goals : 1) the capacity to 
perform self-assessments of one’s own cognition in action (i.e. metacognitive 
monitoring and interpretation) ; 2) the capacity to select the right decision-making 
strategy (as seen before, affect-based vs. deliberation-based) ; 3) the capacity to use 
one’s own knowledge and experience to preserve one’s own and people’s safety in 
surprising, novel circumstances (for instance, at Mann Gulch324 as the fire whirl is 
about to burst, Dodge, the head of the crew of smokejumpers burns a small patch of 
grass and creates the escape fire to survive the blast ; Lieutenant A, more basically, 
uses free space around him to escape the dogs and the police bullets ; this corresponds 
also to the “selection of the level of abstraction at which to consider” the problem at 
hand or the rule-based shortcuts, knowledge-based analysis and knowledge-based 
planning processes described by Rasmussen (1985)). 
A generic framework that could allow to annalyse metacognitive training requirements is 
summarised in the following table. Further work is needed however in this domain as in 
practice the process to create learning strategies for “going meta” still has to be explored: 
 
Figure 46 The generic framework for the analysis of metacognitive training requirements 
In the particular context of the preparation for potential CIs of emergency personnel 
working in small teams, like fire-fighters who work in binoms or serve an engine, we 
suggest that two global metacognitive skills be considered: 
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• “Individual Resilience Management” is the metacognitive skill that allows an 
individual confronted with a Critical Incident to manage 1) his awareness of the 
situation and of its shifts, 2) his self-regulation conflicts, 3) affective signals that point 
to discrepancies in himself or in the course of events, 4) his power of agency. These 
elements of knowledge and practice can be supported by metacognitive training 
techniques evoked by Cannon-Bowers & Bell (1997) such as multi-media 
presentations that provide root knowledge of the basics of DMA and PTR and 
cognitive feedback from real-life interventions during which incidents (even non 
critical incidents) have occurred (this should be systematic325).  
• “Collaborative Resilience Management” is the metacognitive skill by which, first, in 
the post-exposure phase of the experience of trauma in action, team mates support one 
another on the basis of a monitoring and response process by which unaffected team 
members assess each others’ condition, seek signs of traumatic exposure in others, 
elaborate pertinents reconnection-with-duty sub-goals, propose them to affected team 
mates, and support the latter while they (try to) act upon this sub-goal. For instance, at 
the end of PM # 12, when Lieutenant A is still shaken by the attack and the shootings, 
he is fortunate that someone reconnects him with his duty by shouting that the second 
dog is missing, posing a risk to surrounding populations, and generating a 
circumstantial search the missing dog sub-goal. Secondly, this skill consists also in 
monitoring the conduct of operations in order to detect discrepancies such as, in 
Lieutenant A’s case, his lack of initiative to restructure the measures taken to secure 
the garden and surroundings of the house. This is why the father could irrupt at an 
inopportune moment. And also, in PM #36, we note the late realisation that shootings 
might have hurt neighbours. This second fold relies on strong cultural norms : telling 
Lieutenant A he had not taken appropriate security measures is a challenge to the 
hierarchical relations between commanding officers and Men. Collective resilience 
Management should be part of training sessions, multi-media presentations, as well as 
cognitive feedback when significant situations or actions have been experienced in the 
field.  
Beside, simulations advocated by Cannon-Bowers & Bell’s (1997) are aiming at exploring, 
improving and assessing one’s capabilities in Individual as well as Collaborative 
Resilience Management, and could be used. These can include classroom tabletop 
exercises, serious games, and when available, the use of proper simulators. Exercises 
placing people in real-life like situations should complement this panoply of techniques, 
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but their content should be carefully defined as dealing with CIs is psychologically 
challenging. 
The challenge we face in future research lies in building a metacognitive learning scheme 
based on the principles presented by Spear-Ellinwood (2008) i.e. to create the set of 
metacognitive learning provocative strategies capable to engage fire-fighters to “go meta”. 
15.4. The need to improve the conceptual model of CogOps 
Finally, methodological conclusions can be drawn from this research. Data processing 
results suggest that the taxonomy of cognitive operations is more elaborate than the simple 
pairs of {CogAct ; CogObj} hypothesised in this study as to characterise CogOps we were 
led in fact to use several further concepts : 
• For cognitive acts :  
• Families of acts : corresponding to the macrocognitive functions presented in the 
macrocognitive model of DMA. 
• Types : CogAct, that act as a fairly manipulable concept for reasoning ; however, 
we saw that DM Steps were better candidates for graphing global decision 
networks and the macrocognitive model of DMA relies upon CogObj families and 
DM Steps for the clarity of its reading. 
• Sub-types : CogActST, that refine the definition of CogActs and were elicited in 
the semantic analysis of speech clauses, but are too detailed for drawing decision 
networks. 
• For cognitive objects :  
• Families of objects : they are the macrocognitive objects taken into consideration in 
DMA (Action regulation objects, objects from the world of experience, affective 
objects, etc.). 
• Types : CogObj, that point to more precise categories of objects taken into account 
in DMA (settings, self, others, situations, margins, etc.). 
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• Sub-types : CogObjST, that detail the definition of CogObjs and were elicited in 
the semantic analysis of speech clauses, but are too detailed for drawing decision 
networks ; CogObjST can be seen as features of the object. 
• The FOCUS attribute of CogOps : CogObjST still remain concepts. For instance : 
the “OTH05- PAIN - Feeling of pain / being hurt / getting wounded ” CogObjST 
details the “OTHERS / ANIMALS” CogObj and we understand that another person 
or an animal feels pain, and that for instance the subject perceives it 
(PERCEIVING CogAct). But still, we cannot say who that person or animal is. 
Whereas, if we associate the FOCUS attribute to the same CogObjST, for instance 
“03 Mother crying / expressing her stress”, we know the subject perceives the 
suffering mother. Marbach’s (1993) phenomenographic notation was too hard to 
use and read. But it identified clearly the fact that cognitive objects are composite. 
PCA research must refine its model of CogObjs to integrate CogObj features describing 
them more completely. This might increase the amount of time spent on semantic parsing. 
The development of ad hoc facilitating automatic text analysis tools is an axis of research. 
Beside, the phenomenographic database was found to be an aid in structuring, criticising 
and refining the descriptive attributes and concepts we manipulated. The following 
diagram presents a possible future, more elaborated, conceptual model for the description 
of CogOps : 
 
Figure 47 The future conceptual model for the description of CogOps 
15.5. Conclusions and future research 
15.5.1. Methodological research 
We have shown, through the idiographic study of Lieutenant A’s case that a pheno-
cognitive analysis of the cognitive process of DMA and of peritraumatic resilience could 
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be performed. This was not obvious in the first place as the Elicitation Interview (EI) had 
been used mainly to elicit subjects’ knowledge of how they learn and resolve issues in the 
domain of classroom education. What was accomplished in this research is bridging a 
traditionally qualitative and interpretative psychophenomenological approach with 
quantitative factor analysis techniques.  
Of course, we have raised along this research report some epistemological reserves, and we 
have highlighted the limitations of our own work. But even with these limits in mind, what 
we found out is that researchers’ claim for a collaboration between qualitative and 
quantitative traditions of research can be satisfied. There are at least three conditions for 
this. The definition of a methodological framework based on well documented and 
articulated concepts, methods and techniques is a fundamental requirement in order to 
satisfy both parties. Olsen (2002) advocates contradictory and diverse researchers’ 
standpoints, i.e. epistemological pluralism, a collaboration between the two types of 
scientists. And, as a lesson from this research, the qualitative side of a study must deliver 
data usable by scientists seeking to perform at least categorical data analyses and factor 
analyses. Semantic analysis was the indispensable bridge between the two traditions. Time 
consuming and still unsupported by ad hoc automatic text analysis tools, this is one of our 
next endeavour and this epistemological bridge is an important aspect of future pheno-
cognitive research work. Another axis is the improvement of the EI protocol as already 
discussed in previous sections. 
In the same line of methodological developments, the second point is that when studying 
the Intra-Variability of the pattern of DMA’s cognitive processes, we have highlighted the 
central importance of the transition mechanism between cognitive operations. This idea is 
not new and it should be paralleled with current work in neurosciences (Varela,1999 ; 
Dehaene et al., 2006 ; Freeman, 2007) on the transition mechanism between the large-scale 
cortical synchronisations that give life to our cognitive operations and sensori-motor 
actions, “transient networks that integrate distributed brain processes into highly ordered 
cognitive functions” (Lutz et al., 2002). Neurophenomenology (Ellis, 1999 ; Varela, 1999 ; 
Lutz et al., 2002 ; Thompson, 2007 ; den Boer, 2008) was conceived to bridge the gap 
between psychophenomenological research and neuroscience through combining first-
person cognitive testimonies and brain imagery of controlled experiments. Already, 
Elicitation Interviews have been used for such purposes (Thompson, 2007). If 
neurosciences underline the complexity of the brain processes that elect a mental 
operation, the “neurophenomenological cooperation” is a source of progress in future 
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cognitive research. The PCA protocol is a candidate instrument to perform Elicitation 
Interviews about real-life episodes of experience in conjunction with brain imagery. The 
study of the correlation between brain images of the mental activity of recollecting 
episodic memories and the cognitive operations semantically derived from the narrative 
would bring further progress in PCA research. Possibly with regards to the assumption of 
unnarrated CogOps and the elaboration of the cognitive taxonomy. 
15.5.2. Topical research 
Our primary topical conclusion and axis of future research has to do with metacognitive 
training and its short term application to improving fire-fighters’ safety on the line of duty. 
We have elicited two global metacognitive skills that contribute to the development of 
peritraumatic resilience in people working in dangerous settings, such as fire-fighters. The 
generic CI-focused metacognitive training framework presented here to emergency 
response organisations, as well as to all organisations concerned with the management of 
emergency situations, even in more mundane areas of civil life, acts as a map to specify 
and organise a metacognitive training plan. This outcome has already practical applications 
opportunities in our daily activities. However, as ne noted before, the challenge is to 
elaborate metacognitive learning schemes that engage fire-fighters, or other people 
involved in dangerous activities, into “going meta” (Spear-Ellinwood, 2008). This requires 
a long-term partnership with an emergency response organisation such as the BSPP. 
In a recent meeting (June 2013), the BSPP’s (Paris Fire brigade) Bureau of Training 
Engineering showed interest for this framework and our findings in two areas : 
• The improvement of fire-fighters’ safety on the line of duty : Post-intervention 
debriefing and lesson learning are a BSPP regulatory prescription. In practice they are 
oriented toward the analysis of events along their timeline, the collective behaviours 
and in case of incidents individual behaviours, the causes of incidents, the domains in 
which progress should be made. The report extracts posted on the IAFC’s web site 
(IAFC, 2013a) show a similar orientation. But, like the SNCF (French Railways 
company) who asked us to inquire into the cognitive underpinnings of an accident in 
2005 (Théron, 2005) when the official report concluded merely to trees blocking the 
view of station officers and a human error, a very traditional conclusion in accident 
reports, the BSPP has an interest in understanding staff behaviour when Critical 
Incidents occur in the field. The primary reason is the institution’s concern for their 
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personnel’s safety in action. This axis of research has not yet been explored but was 
found to be of the highest interest given current legislative obligations placed upon 
employers to guarantee collaborators’ safety, including the BSPP. 
• The recruitment process : People applying for fire-fighting jobs are assessed for their 
capacity to stand the hardships they will inevitably face in their career. If so far the 
recruitment process has been fairly reliable, the current 25 to 30% first-year attrition 
ratio signifies however the need to add new facets to information, evaluation and 
selection methods in use. For instance : the creation of visual material and stories for 
information, and metacognitive games for evaluation and selection. The five CI-
focused metacognitive skills could be part of such tests. This area of research has to be 
explored. 
Secondly, we have seen that Intra-Variability decision trees deliver association rules that 
could feed inference engines, and we assume this approach could help to develop, in video 
games and behavioural simulators, cognitively autonomous computer agents326 that could 
display unpredictable (by the player) and adaptive behaviours founded on sophisticated 
patterns of autonomous deliberative and affective cognitive reactions. In this area, Wang 
(2009) highlights that “Despite the fact that the origin of software agent systems has been 
rooted in autonomous artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology, their 
implementations are still based on conventional imperative computing techniques rather 
than autonomous computational intelligence.”. The link between our work and cognitive 
architectures327 should now be studied. This strand of research could yield new means to 
train people for potential Critical Incidents. It has to be explored. 
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collated figures from Scottish Brigades since April 2003. It reported at the end of 2004 that there were 388 
attacks on fire service personnel – more than one a day – between April 2003 and March 2004.” (p. 3). 
12
 Beignon (2003) reporting an increase in the number of cases of violence underlines the necessity for 
firemen to continue to perform their duties as always : “Il en va de même pour le pompiers qui, en dépit des 
phénomènes d’insécurité éprouvés sur le terrain, doivent continuer à exercer leur mission” (p. 15). 
13
 The 2008 Annual Report of the French Observatoire de la Délinquance 
(http://www.cartocrime.net/Cartocrime2/index.jsf) states that in 2008 899 Firemen were victim of an assault, 
equating to an average national rate of 2 assaults per 10000 interventions. More specifically, the BSPP’s 
average rate was above the national figure at 11.5 per 10000 interventions. 
14
 “really serious incidents are thankfully relatively rare in Scotland, but the cumulative effect of less serious 
incidents also has an impact on firefighters.” (p. 8). 
15
 “’Stress is a major problem in volunteer fire departments and it’s a big reason for attrition’ (Streng, 1985, 
p.24)”. 
16
 Dangerous dogs are a regular problem. In the UK, during the 2013 session of the Commons, the discussion 
of a Dangerous Dogs Bill was started and the House of Commons (2013) report states that dangerous “[…] 
  307 
                                                                                                                                                    
dogs are out of control due to the irresponsible or deliberate actions of a minority of owners. Seven people, 
including five children, have been killed by dogs in homes since 2007 and the cost to the NHS of treating 
severe dog attack injuries is over £3 million annually. Additionally, many animals, including livestock and 
some eight assistance dogs a month, are attacked by dogs.” (p. 3). The Bill is intended to allow law suits 








 The Paris Fire Brigade (BSPP : Brigade des Sapeurs-Pompiers de Paris, France) enrolls more than 8000 
men in 2007. Further information can be found in end notes and on the BSPP’s web site at 
http://www.pompiersparis.fr.  
20
 The French National Day, usually an occasion to pull fireworks 
21
 "Dans son ouvrage, Le ressort invisible. Vivre l'extrême, G. N. Fischer définit ce qu'il entend par vivre 
l'extrême. Il retient principalement trois caractéristiques: la violence et l'intensité de l'événement vécu, son 
caractère soudain et imprévu, et l'impossibilité pour le sujet de négocier cet événement par ses moyens 
habituels.". 
22
 “sudden losses of meaning which have been variously described as fundamental surprises (Reason, 1990) 
or events that are inconceivable (Lanir, 1989), hidden (Westrum, 1982), or incomprehensible (Perrow, 
1984)”. 
23
 My own translation 
24
 CISD is not a psychotherapy but rather helps emotionally healthy people to make sense of their adverse 
experience. 
25
 In 2006, these interview reports were found on the Web but are now impossible to retrieve. These 
testimonies were provided during an internal inquiry performed in October 2001. 
26
 The authors summarise its definition by Freud : “Originally a medical notion, derived from the fields of 
military medicine and surgery, trauma was subsequently integrated into the field of psychiatry, rather earlier 
than the notion of stress. […]  In 1920, he metaphorically defined trauma as the breaching of the ‘protective 
shield’ by an external stimulus, its overwhelming affects pushing the individual into a state of helplessness.”. 
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27
 For Sauzier (1997) “There seems to be a contradiction between trauma, which is seen as exceptional, and 
its consequences, posttraumatic stress symptomatology, which are seen as widespread.” (p. 386), and he adds 
that “the definition of trauma itself is still broad, vague, and changeable. Classically, trauma was seen as an 
extraordinary event that overwhelms the organism’s capacity to survive with physical and/or psychological 
integrity27. DSM-I related war experiences to ‘gross stress reactions’. DSM-III and DSM-IIIR described an 
event ‘outside the range of usual human experience’. DSM-IV has omitted the notion of extraordinariness 
and describes the event by its consequencesonly (loss of or threat to physical integrity or death).” (ibid). 
28
 “As noted at the beginning of this paper, “Experiencing trauma is an essential part of being human” (van 
der Kolk & McFarlane, 1996, p. 3). But what is trauma? Defining “trauma” is a difficult and complex 
undertaking and has been the subject of much discussion and debate. […] In the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders , third editon, revised (DSM-III-R ; American Psychiatric Association, 1987), 
trauma was defined as something “outside the range of usual human experience” that should “evoke 
significant levels of distress in most people” (p. 250). However, this definition was deemed by many as 
unsatisfactory, resulting in critical discussions and suggestions for change (Davidson & Foa, 1991; 
Kilpatrick & Resnick, 1993; March, 1993). The phrase, “outside the range of usual human experience,” 
came under particular scrutiny. “Traumatic events are extraordinary, not because they occur rarely, but 
rather because they overwhelm the ordinary human adaptations to life” (Herman, 1997, p. 33). The 
conceptualization of trauma was changed somewhat in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV ; American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Trauma became defined 
as when a person “experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or 
threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of self or others,” and “the person’s 
response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror” (pp. 427–428). This definition is more closely 
aligned with ideas put forth by a variety of researchers and theorists (e.g., Classen, Koopman, & Spiegel, 
1993; Herman, 1997; Kilpatrick & Resnick, 1993; March, 1993; Spiegel & Cardena, 1991) because it is 
more detailed in operation, more inclusive in experience, and less constrained by the notion of 
uncommonness. Note also that the definition put forth in the DSM-IV includes the individual’s reaction to the 
event. A traumatic event is a highly subjective experience. Two people may experience the same event, but for 
one it may be deemed traumatic while for the other it may not. Thus, such an inclusion in the 
conceptualization of trauma allows the person’s subjective experience to be taken into account and 
potentially allows certain events to be labeled as traumatic even if they are not distressing to most other 
people.” 
29
 in Freud’s Jenseits des Lustprinzips, Beyond the principle of pleasure, 1920 
30
 “a lived experience that brings, within a short lapse of time, such a high rise in psychological excitation 
that its liquidation or elaboration through ordinary and usual means fails, which can but entail long lasting 
disorders in the energetic functioning” 
31
 My own translation 
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32
 Clervoy (2007, pp. 28-29), refering to the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan32, distinguishes (possibly 
stressful) expected events (“automaton”) from traumatic events conceived as unexpected, surprising, events 
(“tuché”). 
33
 A French Army’s chief psychiatrist 
34
 A French Army’s chief psychiatrist also 
35
 “Fright is depicted by subjects in terms of ‘a halt’, ‘a blank’, of an eclipse of the Self – ‘I was not there 
anymore’, of a complete silence, of ‘a loss of words’, of moments of ‘blackout’, a ‘halt of consciousness’ of a 
very short duration with a loss of emotional feelings “. My own translation of : “L'effroi est dit par les sujets 
en termes de « panne », de « blanc », d'éclipse de soi - « je n'étais plus là », de complet silence, de « perte 
des mots », de « moment de black-out », un « arrêt de la pensée » d'une durée très brève avec une absence 
d'émotion” 
36
 “la rencontre brusque d'un détail insoutenable qui fait irruption dans le champ de vision, se surajoutant à 
l'horreur préexistante, détail dont l'horreur dépasse en intensité ce que le sujet avait essayé d'anticiper” 
37
 My own translation of : “ Cette incrustation d'une image de la mort va se faire dans trois types de 
circonstances : 1. C'est la vie du sujet lui-même qui est menacée […] 2. Le réel de la mort est perçu à travers 
la mort de l'autre […] dans des circonstances où l'effet de surprise joue son rôle […] 3. Chez des personnes 
impliquées dans la mort de l'autre, préparées à la mort de l'autre, puisqu'elles en sont les auteurs (bourreau 
par exemple)” 
38
 My own translation 
39
 Kowalski’s (1995) wording shows the ambiguity surrounding the word Stress that may easily get confused 
with Trauma : “Stress may be further categorized as either cumulative stress (eroding, i.e., the daily hassles) 
or traumatic stress (sudden, intense). In emergency management the focus is on the consequences of 
traumatic stress.”. 
40
 Welford A T (1973) Stress and Performance. Ergonomics, 16, 567-580 
41
 “the concept of emotion includes that of stress, and both are subject to appraisal and coping theory. As a 
topic, stress is more limited in scope and depth than the emotions,” 
42
 “The term stress, meaning hardship or adversity, can be found - though without a programmatic focus - at 
least as early as the 14th century (Lumsden 1981). […] Despite […] different usages, however, certain 
essential meanings are always involved. Whatever words are used to describe the stress process, four 
concepts must always be considered: 1. a causal external or internal agent, which Hooke called a load and 
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others call stress or a stressor. In my own analyses, I emphasize the person-environment relationship and 
relational meaning (defined below); 2. an evaluation (by a mind or a physiological system) that 
distinguishes what is threatening or noxious from what is benign; 3. coping processes used by the mind (or 
body) to deal with stressful demands; and 4. a complex pattern of effects on mind and body, often referred to 
as the stress reaction.”. (words put in bold by me) 
43
 “stress consists of three processes. Primary appraisal is the process of perceiving a threat to oneself. 
Secondary appraisal is the process of bringing to mind a potential response to the threat. Coping is the 
process of executing that response. Although these processes are most easily described as a linear sequence, 
Lazarus has emphasized that they do not occur in an unbroken stream. Rather, an outcome of one process 
may reinvoke a preceding process. For instance, realizing that an adequate coping response is readily 
available may cause you to reappraise a threat as less threatening. As another example, if a coping response 
is less effective than expected, you may reappraise the level of threat or reappraise what coping response is 
appropriate. The entire set of processes, then, may cycle repeatedly in a stressful transaction.”. 
44
 “I recently proposed (74, 75) that psychological stress is best regarded as a subset of emotion. In fact, 
anger, anxiety, guilt, shame, sadness, envy, jealousy, and disgust, which arise out of conflict, are commonly 
referred to as the stress emotions. The emotions are a much richer source of information about how people 
are faring in adaptational encounters, and in their lives overall, than the unidimensional concept of stress. 
[…] This is because stress theory usually provides only two analytic categories with which to consider 
psychodynamics, high and low; and even if we take into account the distinctions I have made (29) between 
harm, threat, and challenge, there are still only three categories for analysis of coping psychodynamics. On 
the other hand, there are 15 or so emotions, each with its own script or story line, its own relational theme, 
which provides a far richer potential for understanding people and their situations. We learn different things 
from each emotion about a person's transaction with the environment, the environment itself and—if we 
have information about numerous emotional encounters—about the kind of person we are dealing with. I am, 
in effect, suggesting that emotions always be measured in the context of research on coping and the 
psychological stresses that require it.” 
“each emotion arises from a different plot or story about relationships between a person and the 
environment” : Lazarus (1993b) identifies “15 different emotions, more or less (Lazarus 1991b,c). There are 
roughly 9 so-called negative emotions: anger, fright, anxiety, guilt, shame, sadness, envy, jealousy, and 
disgust, each a product of a different set of troubled conditions of living, and each involving different harms 
or threats. And there are roughly 4 positive emotions: happiness, pride, relief, and love. To this list we 
probably could add three more whose valence is equivocal or mixed: hope, compassion, and gratitude. 
(Below I suggest the "core" relational themes for each of these emotions).”: 
Emotion Core relational theme 
Anger a demeaning offense against me and mine 
Anxiety facing uncertain, existential threat 
Fright an immediate, concrete, and overwhelming physical danger 
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Guilt having transgressed a moral imperative 
Shame failing to live up to an ego-ideaa 
Sadness having experienced an irrevocable loss 
Envy wanting what someone else has 
Jealousy resenting a third party for the loss of, or a threat to, another’s affection or favor 
Disgust taking in or being too close to an indigestible object or (metaphorically speaking) idea 
Happiness making reasonable progress toward the realization of a goal 
Pride enhancement of one’s ego-identity by taking credit for a valued object or achievement, either 
one’s own or that of someone or group with whom one identifies 
Relief a distressing goal-incongruent condition that has changed for the better or gone away 
Hope fearing the worst but wanting better 
Love desiring or participating in affection, usually but not necessarily reciprocated 
Compassion being moved by another’s suffering and wanting to help 
 
45
 Lazarus (1993b) highlights the cognitive nature of the appraisal process and of the subject’s reaction to a 
stressor “psychological stress is dependent on cognitive mediation […] This view is centered on the concept 
of appraisal, which is the process that mediates - I would prefer to say actively negotiates - between, on the 
one hand, the demands, constraints, and resources of the environment and, on the other, the goal hierarchy 
and personal beliefs of the individual.”. 
46
 “the degree of stress reaction depended on evaluative thoughts (appraisal and coping).”. 
47
 “appraisal and coping processes [shape] the stress reaction, and […] these processes, in turn, [are] 
influenced by variables in the environment and within the person.”. 
48
 “Because psychological stress defines an unfavorable person-environment relationship, its essence is 
process and change rather than structure or stasis. […] I shifted from an emphasis on ego defenses to a 
general concept of appraisal as the cognitive mediator of stress reactions. I began to view appraisal as a 
universal process in which people (and other animals) constantly evaluate the significance of what 
happening for their personal well-being. In effect, I considered psychological stress to be a reaction to 
personal harms and threats of various kinds that emerged out of the person-environment relationship.”. 
49
 “I said above, without explanation, that emotions are always a response to relational meaning. The 
relational meaning of an encounter is a person’s sense of the harms and benefits in a particular person-
environment relationship. To speak of harms and benefits is to allude to motivational as well as cognitive 
processes; hence the complex name of the theory, which includes the terms cognitive, motivational, and 
relational.”. 
50
 Selye H (1974) Stress without Distress. Philadelphia: Lippincott 
51
 “Personality variables and those that characterize the environment come together in the appraisal of 
relational meaning. An emotion is aroused not just by an environmental demand, constraint, or resource but 
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by their juxtaposition with a person’s motives and beliefs. The process of appraisal negotiates between and 
integrates these two sets of variables by indicating the significance of what is happening for a person’s well-
being. This is an extension of the cognitive mediational principle in psychological stress theory - namely, that 
what causes the stress reaction is not the environmental "stressor" alone but also its significance as 
appraised by the person who encounters it. […] one key appraisal component is motivational; to have an 
emotion requires an active goal in an encounter; if no goal is at stake there can be no emotion.”. 
52
 “Coping depends on appraisal of whether anything can be done to change the situation. If appraisal says 
something can be done, problem-focused coping predominates; if appraisal says nothing can be done, 
emotion-focused coping predominates. Here we have rediscovered the Alcoholics Anomymous epigram, that 
people should try to change the noxious things that can be changed, accept those that cannot, and have the 
wisdom to know the difference.”. 
53
 “(Lazarus 1966, 1981; Lazarus & Folkman 1984; Lazarus & Launier 1978) emphasized coping as 
process--a person’s ongoing efforts in thought and action to manage specific demands appraised as taxing or 
overwhelming.”. 
54
 “coping is highly contextual, since to be effective it must change over time and across different stressful 
conditions (e.g. Folkman & Lazarus 1985).”. 
55
 Lazarus (1993b) defines a “style” as “stable properties of personality”. Carver et al. (1989) define a 
“coping style” as a dispositional preference : “‘dispositions’ that people bring with them to the stressful 
situations that they encounter. According to this view, people do not approach each coping context anew, but 
rather bring to bear a preferred set of coping strategies that remains relatively fixed across time and 
circumstances.”, and they oppose style and ad hoc process : “Investigating questions pertaining to 
dispositionally preferred coping styles requires that one be able to measure coping dispositions as well as 
situational coping responses. Operationally, this is not difficult (cf. the state-trait strategy used by 
Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). When differentiating coping dispositions from situational coping 
responses, the content of the behavior that is described in the items remains the same; only the frame of 
reference is altered. When assessing a dispositional coping style, the items are framed in terms of what the 
person usually does when under stress. When assessing situational responses, the items are framed in terms 
of what the person did (or is doing currently) in a specific coping episode or during a specific period of 
time”.  Carver et al. (1989) mention “a pair of coping styles. These styles, termed monitoring versus blunting 
(Miller, 1987), are different from the strategies we have been discussing. Monitoring is seeking out 
information about one's situation and its potential impact. Blunting is dealing with an impending stressor by 
attempting to distract oneself from it (Miller, 1987).”. This notion does not play a central role in Lazarus’ 
theoretical approach anyway as, in fact, he denies the idea that appraisal, just like coping, would be governed 
by a given style. On the contrary, he says, followed in this by Carver et al. (1989), that appraisal and coping 
are processes that adjust to circumstances rather than being set, frozen in a given style dependent upon the 
subject'’ personality : “coping is highly contextual, since to be effective it must change over time and across 
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different stressful conditions (e.g. Folkman & Lazarus 1985).” (Lazarus 1993b). Carver et al. (1989) say that 
“the development of a coping style would at best be counterproductive, because it locks the person into one 
mode of responding rather than allowing the person the freedom and flexibility to change responses with 
changing circumstances.” and add that “traditional personality dispositions are not likely to be useful as 
predictors of coping (e.g., Folkman & Lazarus, 1980).”. 
56
 “Although stable coping styles do exist and are important, […] Empirical evaluation idea requires study of 
the same persons over time and across diverse stressful encounters.”. 
57
 “Coping affects subsequent stress reactions in two main ways: First, if a person’s relationship with the 
environment is changed by coping actions the conditions of psychological stress may also be changed for the 
better. My colleagues and I called this problem-focused coping. If we persuade our neighbor to prevent his 
tree from dropping leaves on our grass, we overcome the original basis of whatever harm or threat their 
dropping caused us. Other coping processes, which we called emotion-focused coping, change only the way 
we attend to or interpret what is happening. A threat that we successfully avoid thinking about, even if only 
temporarily, doesn’t bother us.” 
58
 “Coping is complex, and people use most of the basic coping strategies (factors) in every stressful 
encounter. (Are specific coping strategies tied to specific stress contents, or does one strategy follow another 
in a sort of trial-and-error process? The answer is likely both.)”. 
59
 “problem-focused coping tends to predominate when people feel that something constructive can be done, 
whereas emotion-focused coping tends to predominate when people feel that the stressor is something that 
must be endured (Folkman & Lazarus, 1980).”. 
60
 Ways of coping (Carver et al., 1989) are: 
Active coping 
I take additional action to try to get rid of the problem. 
I concentrate my efforts on doing something about it. 
I do what has to be done, one step at a time. 
I take direct action to get around the problem. 
Planning 
I try to come up with a strategy about what to do. 
I make a plan of action. 
I think hard about what steps to take. 
I think about how I might best handle the problem. 
Suppression of competing activities 
I put aside other activities in order to concentrate on this. 
I focus on dealing with this problem, and if necessary let other things slide a little. 
I keep myself from getting distracted by other thoughts or activities. 
I try hard to prevent other things from interfering with my efforts at dealing with this. 
Restraint coping 
I force myself to wait for the right time to do something. 
I hold offdoing anything about it until the situation permits. 
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I make sure not to make matters worse by acting too soon. 
I restrain myself from doing anything too quickly. 
Seeking social support for instrumental reasons 
I ask people who have had similar experiences what they did. 
I try to get advice from someone about what to do. 
I talk to someone to find out more about the situation. 
I talk to someone who could do something concrete about the problem. 
Seeking social support for emotional reasons 
I talk to someone about how I feel. 
I try to get emotional support from friends or relatives. 
I discuss my feelings with someone. 
I get sympathy and understanding from someone. 
Positive reinterpretation & growth 
I look for something good in what is happening. 
I try to see it in a different light, to make it seem more positive. 
I learn something from the experience. 
I learn something from the experience. 
I try to grow as a person as a result of the experience. 
Acceptance 
I learn to live with it. 
I accept that this has happened and that it can’t be changed. 
I get used to the idea that it happened. 
I accept the reality of the fact that it happened. 
I accept the reality of the fact that it happened. 
Turning to religion 
I seek God’s help. 
I put my trust in God. 
I try to find comfort in my religion. 
I pray more than usual. 
Focus on & venting of emotions 
I get upset and let my emotions out. 
I let my feelings out. 
I feel a lot of emotional distress and I find myself expressing those feelings a lot. 
I get upset, and am really aware of it. 
Denial 
I refuse to believe that it has happened. 
I pretend that it hasn’t really happened. 
I act as though it hasn’t even happened. 
I say to myself “this isn’t real.” 
Behavioral disengagement 
I give up the attempt to get what I want. 
I just give up trying to reach my goal. 
I admit to myself that I can’t deal with it, and quit trying. 
I reduce the amount of effort I’m putting into solving the problem. 
Mental disengagement 
I turn to work or other substitute activities to take my mind off things. 
I go to movies or watch TV, to think about it less. 
I daydream about things other than this. 
I sleep more than usual. 
Alcohol-drug disengagement 
I drink alcohol or take drugs, in order to think about it less. 
 
61
 I shall not attempt an analysis of these factors here. Carver et al. (1989) present an extensive discussion of 
the role played by individual differences in the coping process, whether dispositional or situational, in the 
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context of studies involving university students facing various stressful circumstances in their student life. 
Personality traits like optimism vs. pessimism or trait anxiety, controllability of the stressor, self-esteem, 
locus of control, hardiness (commitment, control and challenge), Type A behaviour (competitive 
achievement orientation, sense of time urgency, tendency toward hostility) and social desirability, were the 
variables studied for their potential influence on the choice of coping tactics. But conclusions drawn by 
Carver et al. (1989) remain inconclusive. 
62
 Though “performance decrements would be expected when an individual is frightened [and that] the 
evidence derived from the fear literature supports this view [,] what is little surprising, however, is the 
relative lack of decrement in some of the studies cited even when the subjective and physiological measures 
indicate that the individual is both frightened and highly aroused”, possibly due to a “narrowing of 
attention” (Idzikowski & Baddeley, 1983), which can be seen as a pre-cognitive, pre-conscious coping 
mechanism (Lazarus 1993b). 
63
 “The need for clarity and congruence between organizational macro and micro goals is important in 
achieving organizational ends, and makes a difference in negative and positive stress […] As goal clarity 
increases stress goes down”. 
64
 “In a task involving recall, recognition, or some other form of cognitive performance, [it is] the provision 
of a contextual cue, prime, or prompt that provides information about either the identity or the time of 
appearance of a target stimulus , […] that influences expectancies of targets, as in associative priming [or 
in] expectation-dependent priming or strategic priming”. 
65
 For Clervoy (2007) “Le traumatisme est assimilable à un accident de vie. Ce mot englobe dans sa 
signification la blessure et les dommages liés à la blessure : le terme renvoie à un phénomène d'effraction et 
de rupture. Il n'entre pas dans le registre des événements prévisibles et il est bien au-delà des ressources 
adaptatives d'une personne. Il n'y a pas de graduation repérable du phénomène.”. 
66
 Overconfidence suppresses possibilities of recognising the situation, affects situation awareness and the 
repertoire of routines of the individual for Actions Selection in the decision-making process: “notre système 
de pensée - qui nous laisse croire que nous maîtrisons tout - décuple les effets de surprise et augmente notre 
déroute en situation de catastrophe ” Clervoy (2007). Firemen are formatted to believe that they are prepared 
for the worse as one can understand in the BSP 118 Regulation (BSPP – 2004) : Firemen, by keeping a cool 
head at all times ("conserver son sang-froid et sa sérénité") and by operating in perfect silence under any 
circumstance ("opérer en silence en toute circonstance"), should be able to surmount the difficulties at hand. 
BSP 118 though does not say if traumatic are included here… However, this spirit of overconfidence seems 
fairly common among fire-fighters, Putnam (1995) reveals, stressing the cultural belief that Firemen’s intense 
training will suffice to prevent them from being entrapped in wildfires : “This is a reflection of the prevailing 
attitude among managers that if we give firefighters more training and better predictions for fire behavior, 
fuels, weather, and tactics, entrapments won’t happen.”. 
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67
 “Lorsque survient l'événement traumatique, il n'y a plus aucun effet de routine possible. La personne est 
prise dans un effet persistant de surprise. Elle éprouve le sentiment intense, bref ou prolongé, atroce, d'être 
abandonnée. [...] Ineffable : il n'y a plus de mot pour penser la situation.” Clervoy (2007, p. 42). Also, 
Lebigot (2005) reinforces the last point when he says that in the experience of trauma the subject is 
confronted with the only notion for which no mental representation exists in his mind before the 
confrontation : death, whether his or his kin’s, or even victims’. For him, it is this absence of pre-existing 
cognitive representation that constitutes the essence of the surprise. 
68
 “Le terme de ‘déréliction’ est employé pour désigner le trouble de la pensée de celui qui ne parvient pas à 
suivre l'événement. Il désigne un état aigu d'isolement psychique.” Clervoy (2007) 
69
 My own translation of “La dissociation psychique peut être définie comme la rupture de l’unité psychique” 
70
 “Le terme de dissociation est utilisé pour la première fois en 1845 par Jacques-Joseph Moreau de Tours 
[5], pour décrire les phénomènes psychiques observés chez les consommateurs de haschich. Il sera ensuite 
repris par Pierre Janet pour décrire le mécanisme à l’œuvre dans l’hystérie, cette théorie ayant inspiré celle 
de Bleuler. ”. 
71
 My own translation 
72
 Gershuny & Thayer (1999) say that “dissociation implies some kind of divided or parallel access to 
awareness (Spiegel, 1990) in which two or more mental processes or contents are not associated or integrated 
(Cardena, 1994; Classen et al., 1993), and awareness of one’s emotions or thoughts are diminished and 
avoided (Foa & Hearst-Ikeda, 1996). Dissociation may be regarded as an altered state or fragmentation of 
consciousness (Marmar, Weiss, Metzler, & Delucchi, 1996; Steinberg, 1995) in which experience is 
compartmentalized (van der Kolk, van der Hart, & Marmar, 1996).”. 
73
 “Il n'y a plus que le défilé silencieux et ralenti des images qui se succèdent.”. 
74
 “Sa pensée s'est suspendue sur ‘je meurs’. Le déroulement du temps s'est arrêté.”. 
75
 “(a) identity confusion and alteration (Steinberg, 1995); (b) emotional numbing (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994; Briere & Runtz, 1993; Foa & Hearst-Ikeda, 1996; Litz, 1992) which, as conceptualized, 
is arguably similar to depersonalization and derealization; (c) absorption75 (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986; Ray 
& Faith, 1995; Waller & Ross, 1997; Waller, Putnam, & Carlson, 1996); and (d) disengagement or 
“spacing out” (Briere & Runtz, 1993).” 
76
 Refering to depersonalisation, Crocq (2007a, p9) calls it “a desperate attempt to keep in touch with the 
world at the cost of a fragmentation of consciousness”. 
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77
 My own translation 
78
 In DSM-IV, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD, classified : 309.81) really depicts the symptoms 
incurred by an individual in the aftermath of a traumatic episode. Those symptoms can be verified beyond a 
month after the actual exposure. PTSD is to be distinguished from Acute Stress Disorder (ASD, classified as 
308.3 in DSM-IV) the symptoms of which are to be noticed within the four weeks following exposure to the 
incident. And so, it is only through post-event symptoms that real trauma can be distinguished from acute 
(maladaptive) stress. Both are supposed in DSM-IV to result from an exposure to an extreme stressor, which 
may have threatened the subject’s very life. Whereas research has largely focused on the Post-Traumatic 
phase (Crocq, 2007b, p. 15), scientists have also studied the “clinique” of the peritraumatic (“immediate”) 
reaction to trauma, and among others, Chief Medical Officers of the French Armed forces already quoted :  
Louis Crocq, who created and implemented the “Cellules d’Urgence Médico-Psychologique” concept 
(CUMP, Medico-Psychological Emergency Teams) also a French Army’s Psychiatrist and Professor of 
Pathological Psychology at Paris V University, François Lebigot a French Army’s Psychiatrist and Professor 
of Psychiatry at Paris Val de Grâce military hospital, and Patrick Clervoy a Professor of Psychiatry at the 
military instruction hospital of Toulon. 
79
 For Crocq (2007b), it has both a biophysiological and a psychological component. On the biophysiological 
side, cardiac and respiratory rythms accelerate, the blood sugar rate increases and blood flows to central 
organs from the periphery. On the psychological side, four areas are affected : 
Cognitive area Vigilance increases and becomes more proactive while attention narrows on the dangers 
of the situation suppressing lighter thoughts or day-dreams, situation evaluation and 
reasoning capabilities are enhanced. 
Affective area A disturbing emotional squall may inspire anxiety or a controlled fear, along with 
combativeness and possibly indignation or anger, though social relation to others is 
maintained adequate to the needs of the situation. 
Conative area A pressing need to act, out of an irresistible unpleasant internal urge that can only be 
reduced by doing something, pulls the subject out of indecision and makes him decide 
upon his course of action. 
Behavioural area An ordinary reaction of stress leads the subject into a series of fit for purpose attitudes and 
actions aiming at reducing the threat or at protecting himself ; his gestures are quick 
though not precipitated, and harmonious though less relaxed than usually. 
On a positive side, this stress reaction brings about increased attention, more energy and an impulse toward 
action. On a more negative side, it consumes all the subject’s energy, leaving him in a mix of euphoria and 
complete physical and psychical exhaustion. 
80
 Maladaptive reactions are classified in four families by Crocq (2007b) : 
• Sideration 
Cognitive area Stupefaction, incapacity to perceive, recognise and express feelings 
Loss of sense of identity and location 
Suspension of decision-making faculties, incapacity to select a course of action 
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Affective area Stupor beyond fear 
Neither jolly nor sad mood, but in a kind of secondary, indifferent state 
Conative area Inhibition of volition 
Loss of initiative 
Behavioural area Paralysed, petrified, still in front of danger, owing his survival to comrades who pull 
him away from threats 
Duration From a minute to several hours 
• Agitation 
Cognitive area Too much stress to understand properly what is going on and to elaborate actions 
Affective area Affective mess 
Conative area Desire to act but incapable to form a clear volition 
Behavioural area A wild release of disorderly motion or gesture with gesticulation, shouting, inconsistent 
utterances, … 
Very disturbed relation to others whom the subject knows he is among them but without 
recognising them 
Duration From a few minutes to several hours 
• Panic escape 
Cognitive area Total absence of understanding of what is going on 
Unreasoned flee away from the scene 
Only keeps a fuzzy memory of the course of his actions and of events afterwards 
Affective area Panic 
Conative area Does not know where he is heading to 
Behavioural area Crazy and bewildered running 
Empty look showing total absence of understanding of the situation 
Duration From a few minutes to several hours, until the subject is exhausted 
• Automaton-like behaviour : 
Cognitive area No recollection of their immediate actions 
Affective area Feeling like emerging from a dream 
Conative area Obeys orders 
Behavioural area Does not draw people’s attention on him a priori, seems normal, evacuates with others 
as told, without panicking, possibly helping others out of their own will 
But on refined observation, the subject’s gestures are jerky, repetitive, useless, 
ridiculous, or ill-adapted 
Face expression looks “empty” as if the subject were cut from the tragic reality 
Seems to listen but do not memorise what they are told 
Keeps silent 
Duration From a few minutes to several hours 
 
81
 For Crocq (2007b), pathological reactions can be : 
• Neurotic reactions (based on mild mental disorder, with distressing symptoms, but without loss of 
insight according to Colman (2006, p. 503)) : 
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• Docile behaviour after the exposure 
• Untenable during the exposure with paleness, symptoms of psychological and somatic 
anxiety, requests for reassurance, agitation, capable of jumping into danger without 
thinking 
• ceases as soon as the exposure ceases 
Hysteria : 
• Rare at the peritraumatic stage but may happen 
• Hysterical motion, errand, or immediate conversions such as false blindness, deafness or 
paralysis, aphony and mutism 
Phobia : 
• Rare at the peritraumatic stage but may happen with known phobic subjects 
• Filled with intense anguish at the sight of the phobic threat, they stay paralysed by terror, 
needing a reassuring presence to stand the threat 
• Psychotic reactions (based on mental impairment grossly affecting the capacity to meet ordinary 





• Disorientation in space and time, obsessed, in stupor, incapable of telling his name 
• From ten minutes to several days 
Delirium : 
• Immediate reaction articulated in a brief perplex meditation, acting deliriously until ending 
in a state of confused perplexity 
Maniac : 
• Psychomotor excitation, tics and mimics, volubility with screams and interjections, 
euphoria inconsistent with the gravity of the situation 
• Attracts attention from others usually, but may also engage into tireless participation to 
rescue operations until he is noticed for his agitation and lack of discipline or his 
disrespectful annoying joyous interjections of others 
Melancholy : 
• Rare at the peritraumatic stage but may happen with known phobic subjects 
• Reaction based on a deep depression involving psychomotor inhibition, moral suffering, 
pessimistic exageration of the event’s consequences, self-guilt 
Schyzophrenic : 
• Especially with young subjects 
• Dissociative, autistic or delirious reactions had been brooding for a long time 
 
82
 “De façon plus dramatique, le cas de la femme victime de viol qui a l’impression d’être spectatrice de ce 
qui lui arrive, incapable de crier ou de se débattre, est une illustration du phénomène de dissociation dite « 
péritraumatique ». Elle présente un état de sidération, dans lequel les sensations physiques et les émotions 
sont mises à distance. Dans ce cas extrême, les bouleversements psychologiques et physiologiques suscités 
par l’agression interfèrent avec l’encodage de l’information traumatique. Ainsi, pour Chris Brewin [26], la 
dissociation bloquerait l’encodage des événements par la mémoire verbale (appelée verbal access memory 
«VAM»). Les événements vécus dans un état de dissociation ne seraient donc encodés qu’au niveau sensoriel 
(par sensory access memory «SAM»), ce qui rendrait impossible l’intégration de ces souvenirs à la mémoire 
autobiographique « normale » qui est essentiellement verbale.” Kedia (2009) 
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83
 “Because of this our conceptions of ourselves are grounded in experience and constrained by it. 
Autobiographical memory limits what we can be […] the goals we can hold and delimits what aims the self 
can adopt.” (ibid). 
84
 Conway conceives Episodic Memory “as a system that contains experience-near, highly event specific, 
sensory-perceptual details of recent experiences” (ibid). Per se, episodic memory “cannot on its own be used 
to evaluate more complex goals in working-self goal hierarchies. Instead, the organization of groups of 
episodic memories and abstractions drawn from them, along with attitudes and beliefs of the working self, 
form conceptual autobiographical knowledge.” (Conway 2001, p. 54). 
85
 Conway’s conception of autobiographical memory evolved over time. In Conway (2004), there seems to 
be no traces of his anterior distinction between episodic memory and autobiographical knowledge on the 
short-term vs. long-term distinction he was advocating in Conway (2001).  
86
 “sensory-perceptual episodic memories do not endure in memory unless they become linked to more 
permanent autobiographical memory knowledge structures, where they induce recollective experience in 
autobiographical remembering. By this view access to episodic memories (EMs) rapidly degrades and most 
are lost within 24 h of formation. Only thos EMs integrated at the time or consolidated later, possibly during 
the sleep period following formation, remain accessible and can enter into the subsequent formation of 
autobiographical memories (AMs).” (Conway 2001, p. 54). 
87
 the “most abstract and temporally extended […] knowledge about others, activities, locations, feelings and 
evaluations common to a period as a whole […] a period such as ‘when I was at secondary/high school’ […] 
may also contain a more or less detailed evaluation, e.g. ‘this was a good/bad time for me’ […] mental 
models of the self during a delineated period of time usually defined by a theme or common set of themes, 
e.g. school, work, relationship, etc.”. 
88
 “more experience-near than lifetime periods […] contain information about others, activities, locations, 
feelings and evaluations relating to specific experiences [that] may be of repeated events, […] extended 
events”. 
89
 “such as learning to drive a car, learning to use the library, romantic first relationship, making friends 
with X, etc.”. 
90
 “In the formation of a specific autobiographical memory, autobiographical knowledge becomes linked to 
episodic memories and a stable pattern of activation forms over the indices of autobiographical knowledge 
structures and associated episodic memories (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 2000). When this occurs the 
rememberer has recollective experience – a sense or feeling of the self in the past (Tulving 1985, Wheeler, 
Stuss and Tulving 1997) – attention is directed inwards to the autobiographical memory, and at the same 
time other episodic memories and autobiographical knowledge may also come to mind.” (Conway, 2004). 
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Autobiographical knowledge, Conway says (2004, pp. 562-563), “comes to mind not in the form of memories 
but rather in the form of statements, propositions, declarations, and beliefs about the self, often accompanied 
by generic and / or specific images of details of prior experience”. For the purpose of this study, I assume no 
demarcation between semantic memory and episodic memory, between declarative and non-declarative 
memory, first because my research is not about memory itself, and also because of Tulving’s (2001, p. 276) 
revision of “his own position of 1972” (ibid, p. 277) who affirms that the memory trace of a single event is “a 
‘bundle’ of widely but systematically dispersed features organized hierarchically”, and says that these 
features of the event “are stored separately in different systems: information about the perceptual features of 
the input are stored in the perceptual system, information about conceptual and semantic aspects is stored in 
the semantic system, and information about the involvement of the self in the experiencing of the input is 
stored in the episodic system.” (ibid, p. 276). 
91
 Because “the excessive arousal at the moment of the trauma interferes with the effective memory 
processing of the experience [] the resulting speechless terror [leaves] memory traces that may remain 
unmodified by the passage of time, and by further experience” (Van der Kolk, 1997). And he adds : 
“Personally highly significant events generally are unusually accurate [in memory] , and tend to remain 
stable over time” (p. 247), “While memories of ordinary events disintegrate in clarity over time, some aspects 
of traumatic events appear to get fixed in the mind and to remain unaltered by the passage of time or by the 
intervention of subsequent experience” (p. 248). 
92
 We do not consider maladaptive and pathological reactions in this study as they are relevant to psychiatry 
(Luthar et al., 2000). 
93
 "An example of a Critical Incident for an individual would be the serious injury or death of a colleague in 
the line of duty or an incident where the circumstances, the sights, sounds and smells are so distressing as to 
result in an immediate or delayed reaction.". 
94
 "Individuals who experience Critical Incidents can develop strong emotional reactions that have the 
potential to interfere with their ability to function either at the scene of the incident or later. The severity of 
distress is influenced by length of exposure, perceptions, the cumulative effect of incidents over time, pre-
existing coping strategies, and available social support.". 
95
 “Peritraumatic reactions [are] the reactions during or in the immediate aftermath of trauma exposure […] 
Individual differences in genetic susceptibility, sensitization related to prior trauma exposure, and degree of 
perceived life threat at the time of exposure influence the level of adrenergic activation, a biomarker of 
peritraumatic panic and dissociation. […] Greater panic-like reactions during exposure (e.g., sweating, 
shaking, heart racing, fear of dying, fear of losing emotional control, depersonalization, and derealization) 
are associated with greater adrenergic activation“. 
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96
 Trauma is a “singularity in the mathematical sense, a point that comes to belong in the person’s life but 
that is not in the continuity of her history” which strikes the individual twice, with “a shock and an after 
shock”, he says (p 275). 
97
 "By definition, a traumatizing event is one that is outside the normal range of everyday life events. It is 
experienced by the individual as devastating (Doepel, 1991).". 
98
 "A Critical Incident is one experienced by personnel that produces an emotional reaction with the 
potential for inhibiting a worker’s ability to function either at the scene or at a later time. The individual’s 
coping mechanisms are overwhelmed. An example of a Critical Incident for an individual would be the 
serious injury or death of a colleague in the line of duty or an incident where the circumstances, the sights, 
sounds and smells are so distressing as to result in an immediate or delayed reaction.". 
99
 To have the initiative, in the military sense, refers to a very important ability described by Yakovleff 
(2006) as the faculty to have enough control over the course of events so as to act upon it. It can be lost when 
events taking the subject aback perturb the planned pace of his action, suppress his margins of manœuvre, or 
break the story line of his course of action. Initiative, fundamentally, is at stake under traumatic 
circumstances. 
100
 “Le traumatisme psychique projette la personne dans cette marge, un espace d'attente qui est aussi un 
espace d'impuissance. La personne traumatisée a perdu pour un temps la capacité d'initiative. Elle ne peut 
que vivre passivement le spectacle de sa fin. Sa vie ne lui appartient plus. Elle devient le jouet du destin. Le 
traumatisme prend la main sur elle et seule l'issue dira quel a été son sort.”. 
101
 Bertrand (2007) mentions “the absence of prior ad hoc protecting psychological mechanisms” : “Le 
traumatisme entraîne un double vacillement : le coup et le contrecoup. Sur le moment, la victime est frappée. 
Après, autour d'elle, tout le monde est ébranlé.”. This is very much in phase with DSM-IV acknowledgement 
of the subjective character of this experience, people more acquainted with extreme circumstances being less 
prompt to traumatism. 
102
 Spontaneous testimony by Fireman Cyril, 28 year old. Collected Friday 30th of March 2007 from his blog 
on the Internet at http://loulou95jassume.skyblog.com  
103
 This testimony is part of the data collected for this research : it serves to contrast the Pheno-Cognitive 
Analysis of Lieutenant A’s case. 
104
 A specific action performed by a subject, not all his actions nor a series of actions 
105
 In space and time 
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106
 In a context, both social-cultural and physical 
107
 Lived within our body so that memories of physical moves and sensations are part of the memory of the 
action : “subjective experiences are so deeply embodied in our actions and movements and in the 
physiological shifts” (Stern, 2004, p. 39). 
108
 Effectively performed in the real world, not just seen nor imagined 
109
 Engeström (1999), refering to Leont’ev (1978 ; 1981), defines an action as the realisation of a particular 
goal, within the larger context of an “activity” understood as a social practice oriented at objects that meet 
human needs : “Actions have clear points of beginning and termination and relatively short half-lives [and 
their goals and plans] are formulated and revised concurrently as one acts and […] are commonly 
explicated clearly only retrospectively (Weick, 1995).” (Engeström, 1999, p. 381). 
110
 At http://www.bps.org.uk.  
111
 At http://www.apa.org.  
112
 As of July 25th, 2013. 
113
 “How do people deal with difficult events that change their lives? The death of a loved one, loss of a job, 
serious illness, terrorist attacks and other traumatic events: these are all examples of very challenging life 
experiences. […] Resilience is the process of adapting well in the face of adversity, trauma, tragedy, threats 
or significant sources of stress — such as family and relationship problems, serious health problems or 
workplace and financial stressors. It means "bouncing back" from difficult experiences.” 
114
 As of July 25th, 2013. 
115
 PTSD can be seen as “disturbances in the development of the sense of self and of relationship to others 
[…] commonly manifested […] as pathological object relations and deficits of basic trust, reality testing, 
autonomy, and affect regulation (particularly rage and aggression)” (Matthews & Chu 1997). 
116
 “According to Everall, Altrows and Paulson (2006) models of resilience have predominantly focused on 
one of three operational definitions: (1) a stable personality trait or ability protecting individuals from 
negative effects of risk and adversity; (2) a positive outcome, which is defined by the presence of positive 
mental health (such as positive self concept and self esteem, academic achievement, success at age-
appropriate developmental tasks, etc) or absence of psychopathology, despite the exposure to risk; or (3) a 
dynamic process that is dependent upon interactions between individual and contextual variables, and which 
evolves over time.” Metzl (2007). 
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117
 “According to M. Rutter (1998), an English Child psychiatrist, the mental health sciences have applied 
the concept of resilience progressively in five steps. First, they construe it solely as an individual 
characteristic; what the individual did under stress. Second, “resilience” integrates the individual’s 
interaction with the environment, involving also what happened before, during and after the stress. Third, 
certain specialists deem it a balance of good and bad experiences. Fourth, in a medical analogy, it is seen 
as a type of immunization, where we attain strengthened health by exposure to natural or induced infections. 
Fifth, researchers recognize that psychological challenges and a certain level of stress are useful and even 
necessary for human development; this focus includes emphasis on how to aid children weather adversities 
actively and successfully” (Titus, 2002). 
118
 “Although there is a general agreement as to the outcome of resilient behaviour, controversy exists as to 
the mechanism of resilience. […] Rutter (1987) proposed a process incorporating protective factors. Fine 
(1991) and Flach (1980, 1988) view resilience as a process which one may be able to learn. […] Fine (1991) 
discussed the process of resilience with respect to the demands of physical and neurologic trauma in 
rehabilitation settings. […] Fine (1991), in her work with physically disabled individuals, […] identified a 
two-stage process of resilience. In the acute phase of the process, energy is directed at minimizing the impact 
of the stress and stressor. In the reorganization phase, a new reality is faced and accepted in part or in 
whole (p 499). Although inspiring, Fine’s article is silent on the details of her work. […] The final author to 
be discussed is Flach. Flach (1988), in a self-help text, identified a normal process of disruption and 
reintegration which characterizes the life cycle. Resilience is part of the cycle. Using a developmental 
perspective, Flach presented the idea of ‘bifurcation points… the points in life when major shifts occur’. 
Similar to Rutter’s (1987) key turning points, bifurcation points represent moments of extreme change in the 
life cycle. The process is cyclical, beginning with a bifurcation point stress which disturbs the homeostatic 
processes of the individual. This leads to disruption in normal routines and, ultimately, to chaos. At this point 
resilience is initiated leading to reintegration and a new homeostatic structure at a higher level of 
functionning.”. 
119
 “Resilience refers to a dynamic process encompassing positive adaptation within the context of significant 
adversity. Implicit within this notion are two critical conditions : (1) exposure to significant threat or severe 
adversity; and (2) the achievement of positive adaptation despite major assaults on the developmental 
process” 
120
 “For the purpose of this research the term ‘resilience’ is defined as the ability of an individual to bounce 
back from adversity, persevere through difficult times, and return to a state of internal equilibrium or a state 
of healthy being (Brodkin & Coleman 1996; Henderson 1998).” (Luthar et al., 2000). 
121
 “la résilience renvoie avant tout à l'aptitude du sujet à surmonter le traumatisme. Dans cette optique,  
l'atteinte traumatogène est considérée comme le préalable à l'émergence du processus résilient. On ne 
saurait parler de résilience pour des contextes relevant seulement des stress d'ordre banal de la vie. Pour 
que l'on puisse attester de la résilience d'un sujet qui se développe en dépit des risques, il faut donc qu'il ait 
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été confronté à un traumatisme ou à un contexte traumatogène tel qu'il a provoqué un risque vital pour le 
sujet. Une citation souvent reprise attribuée à Boris Cyrulnik, présente la résilience comme « la capacité à 
réussir, à vivre et à se développer positivement, de manière socialement acceptable, en dépit du stress ou 
d'une adversité qui comporte normalement le risque grave d'une issue négative ». Cependant, dans ses 
travaux ultérieurs, Boris Cyrulnik a précisé que l'on ne pouvait parler de résilience pour un sujet que 
lorsqu'il y avait eu confrontation à la mort, c'est-à-dire que le sujet avait éprouvé une expérience de danger 
extrème relevant d'une atteinte corporelle ou psychique.” (Anaut, 2006) 
122
 “On peut tenter de cerner la résilience à partir de la définition transversale proposée en commun par 
Michel Manciaux, Stefan Vanistendael, Jacques Lecomte et Boris Cyrulnik : « La résilience est la capacité 
d'une personne ou d'un groupe à se développer bien, à continuer à se projeter dans l'avenir en dépit 
d'événements déstabilisants, de conditions de vie difficiles, de traumatismes parfois sévères. » Cette 
définition s'attache surtout à l'aspect dynamique de la résilience, en référence au rebond psychologique qui 
caractériserait le fonctionnement résilient. Dans le processus résilient, il s'agit de souligner la capacité de 
sortir vainqueur d'une épreuve qui aurait pu être traumatique, ce qui peut conférer une force renouvelée (ou 
rebond psychologique).” (Anaut, 2006, p. 86) 
123
 It refers to the fact that in the post-traumatic phase, an individual must find the ways needed to face what a 
traumatic encounter entails for him. First the incident often changes his relationship to the world because 
people around the subject may reproach him to have survived while others did not or because others do not 
accept to recognise his status of a “traumatised person”, possibly resulting in some forms of brutal treatments 
(Clervoy, 2007). This implies that the individual must adapt to this new relationship to others, hence the idea 
of an evolution, possibly a deep change in behaviour and even in personality traits. “Returning to a state of 
internal equilibrium or a state of healthy being” means that the subject recovers some psychological balance 
once events have gone. It is strongly associated with “Preserving identity and a sense of a future”, also a 
post-traumatic developmental perspective. For a Fireman, for instance, it means regaining touch with his 
feeling that he serves the general population, that he has all the abilities to perform the principal duties 
assigned to his profession. A sense of shrinking self-esteem is common among BSPP Firemen when, on 
being wounded in accidents, they are assigned administrative or logistic jobs. Literally, they say they have no 
future at the BSPP as proper Firemen in such circumstances. “Bouncing back” (Edwards, 2005 ; Gerrard et 
al., 2004) is an aptitude needed to improve resilience once the experience of trauma is behind. 
124
 “more researchers have suggested conceptualizing coping as part of a complex adaptive system that 
includes stress, resilience, and competence (Haggerty et al. 1994, Masten 2006). […]  coping operates at 
multiple levels and across several different time scales. As graphically depicted in Figure 1, coping can be 
considered an adaptive process on the scale of developmental time, an episodic process across days and 
months, and an interactive process in real time (Coping Consortium 2001).”. 
125
 “In the past, coping has been treated as belonging within the rubric of decision-making, with its emphasis 
solely on cognitive processes. However, it belongs equally within the realm of motivation and emotion. One 
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could just as easily treat coping as a kind of goal, accomplished by certain strategies in a vertical means-
ends relationship to each other in which there are broader, overriding ends and narrower means of 
accomplishing them. Taking into account the specific emotions, general goals (or ends), and situational 
intentions (or means) to attain goals in stressful encounters would, I believe, facilitate our understanding of 
the basis on which coping strategies are selected and acted on.” Lazarus (1993) 
126
 “At a more micro level, studies will need to consider coping as an interactional process, as it operates at 
the level of interactions with the social and physical context (bottom of Figure 1), and as captured by 
observations or daily diaries. Such research would need to include the multiple components of reactions to 
stress evoked in real time and should specify how they work together in interactions. Studies may use new 
conceptualizations of coping as regulation under stress to build on what is known about temperament and 
stress physiology and to create a place for behavior, emotion, attention, cognition, motivation, and social 
relationships (Derryberry et al. 2003, Gunnar & Cheatham 2003, Holodynski & Friedlmeier 2006).” Skinner 
& Zimmer-Gembeck (2007) 
127
 I prefer the concept of artefact here rather than resource as objects given to us in the course of experience 
are artefacts in Engeström’s sense for instance and can dynamically – creatively – become solutions to 
difficulties or deficiencies, proper resources then, i.e., instruments. When Metzl, in her thesis, refers to 
creativity, her views implicitly refer to theories of creative instrumentation, of instrumental genesis described 
by Béguin et Rabardel, the essence of which is that when a cognitive demand is placed upon me, I search 
within me and around me for solutions ; an artefact emerges for it affords the characteristics, the potential 
functionalities I need to meet the demand ; I devise a scheme that allows me to use it as the solution I need ; 
the artefact then becomes an instrument. Creativity can be viewed as this mental process in the context under 
study. 
128
 “In the flow of skillful coping, we switch activities as a result of the attractions and repulsions we 
experience prereflectively (Rietvield 2004). Such emotional fluctuations act as control parameters that 
induce bifurcations from one Present Moment of consciousness to another. In this way, emotion plays a 
major role in the generation of the flow of consciousness” (pp. 374-375). And also : “Cognitive and 
emotional processes modify each other continuously on a fast time-scale” (p. 371). 
129
 An “idiographic” study in Shaughnessy et al.’s (2006, p. 43) terms is a form of case study. It focuses on a 
unique subject. Nomothetic studies “try to establish broad generalizations and general laws that apply to a 
diverse population” (ibid, p. 42). 
130
 Created in 1986 its first president was James Shanteau, followed by Hammond, Dawes, Lopes, Fischhof, 
Hogarth, Kahneman… 
131
 At http://www.sjdm.org/history.html  
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132
 “Classical theories of choice in organisations emphasise decision making as the making of rational 
choices on the basis of expectations about the consequences of action for prior objectives, and 
organisational forms as instruments for making those choices” (pp. 11-35). 
133
 Part of recent research placed the emphasis on errors and biases, i.e., on the question of why people move 
away from rationality, and of course on how to prevent errors and biases. Literature on human errors is 
abundant and has brought about different taxonomies used either in process or in systems design 
(Rasmussen, 1983 ; Norman, 1988 ; Hollnagel, 1991). And this strand of research has led to many 
prescriptions, e.g. developing training and establishing good practice guides, such as, in Aviation, the Global 
Aviation Information Network’s (GAIN, 2004) report on Common Pilot/Controller Misconceptions. 
134
 Cognitive Task Analysis 
135
 “Psychologists have studied skilled performance and expertise for at least 50 years, beginning with the 
seminal work of Adrian de Groot [1965/1978], who looked at expert memory in chess. During that time, 
expertise has been studied in many domains including chess, physics problem solving, medical diagnosis, cab 
driver route knowledge, typing, fire ground commanders, tank platoon commanders, and many more.”. 
136
 “‘stage’ model for the acquisition of expertise” that describes the expert as “The individual [who] no 
longer relies on analytical principles (rules, etc.) [… as he has] an intuitive grasp of situations [… and is] 
attuned or focused on the relevant aspects of the situation”, providing him with “fluid, flexible, and highly 
proficient performance”. 
137
 “The RPD model was developed on the basis of cognitive task analyses of firefighters (Klein et al. 1989). 
The initial research was designed to better understand how experienced commanders could handle time 
pressure and uncertainty. […] Probe-question based interviews were conducted with more than 30 
firefighters with an average of 23 years of experience, to obtain retrospective data about 156 highly 
challenging incidents.”. 
138
 Regarding Level 1, Klein says “An example of the first level of the RPD model is a firefighter I 
interviewed early in the process. He explained to me that he never made decisions. After trying to press him 
on the issue, I asked him to describe the last fire he was in. He told a story of a fairly conventional fire. He 
described parking the truck, getting out his hoses, and going into the house. I asked him why he went into the 
house instead of simply working from outside, as I would have been tempted to do. He explained that he 
obviously had to go in because if he attacked it from the outside, he would just spread it deeper inside the 
house. He took into account the nature of the fire, the distance of the house from other buildings, and the 
structure of the house. But, even while he was attending to these conditions, he never saw himself as making 
a decision. He never experienced that there was another option. He immediately saw what needed to be done 
and did it.” (Klein, 1997b). 
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139
 “periods of ‘time-constrained decisional pressure’ during which naturalistic, immediate, satisficing type 
decisions were made, co-existing with periods of relative quiet and calm, where ‘time-rich decisional 
opportunities’ prevailed. […] characterised by more classical decisional activity with due consideration to a 
number of possibilities and their likely consequencfes and utility.” (pp. 88-89). 
140
 “Choosing a course of action: decision-making strategies […] In aviation, the calculation of time and risk 
determines the type of decision strategy a pilot is likely to adopt. Where there is little time and high risk, 
pilots use fast intuitive or rule-based decision strategies. With more time, they may opt for a slower, but more 
rigorous, analytical strategy to evaluate alternative courses of action. In the intuitive and rule-based 
methods, only one response option is considered at a time. In analytical decision making, several optional 
courses of action are generated and then compared simultaneously. In the creative option, the situation is 
judged to be totally unfamiliar and requiring a novel response.” 
141
 In Lazarus (1993), we note that “in arguments between spouses”, there may be an “escalation of anger” 
but also that “However, in shared situations of anxiety, husbands and wives more often cope by suppressing 
their anger in the interests of dealing with their joint threat.”, implying that emotion awareness serves to 
regulate that escalation. 
142
 “What could be more logical than the principle that if our goals are thwarted we react with a negative 
emotion, or that if we are making satisfactory progress toward a goal we react with positive emotion? This 
reaction may not always be wise, but there is nothing irrational about it. What is more logical than the 
principle that emotions result from how we evaluate the significance of events to our well-being? It may be 
foolish to want certain things, or to believe certain things, but it is not illogical to emote on the basis of how 
we are faring in attaining these goals.”. 
143
 “Part of the NDM community’s reluctance to embrace affect as a component of expert decision making 
may have to do with the way the construct has been defined and studied by JDM researchers in the past (e.g., 
Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Schwarz, 2000; Weber & Johnson, 2009). Much of the research has examined 
how people’s decisions are influenced by emotions that they bring to the task and that are unconnected to the 
task at hand. […] Considerably fewer studies concern integral affect, the influence of emotions that are 
elicited by features integral to the decision situation itself or by its potential consequences.” (p. 241). 
144
 “Affect has been found to function as “spotlight” or attention guide, as information, as motivator, and as 
common currency (Peters et al., 2006; Weber & Johnson, 2009). Affect as information approaches suggest 
that decision makers use their affective state as information in their judgment process (Peters et al., 2006; 
Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002; Slovic & Peters, 2006).” (p. 242). Also, “affect 
encourages decision makers toward information-processing strategies that preserve 
positive and avoid negative experiences (e.g., Isen et al., 1988; Weber & Johnson, 2009).” 
(p. 243). And affects may constrain information search (ibid, p. 244). 
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145
 The NCO Grid could be used to compare the cognitive operations explicited through a Pheno-Cognitive 
Analysis of decision-making and Peritraumatic Resilience with those identified in NDM studies. 
146
 The ExpGrid could be used to characterise subjects later studied. 
147
 The DMContext Grid could be used to characterise situations in which subjects were involved. 
148
 By deliberative, we understand a rational process seeking to yield a good decision by way of a 
“discussion” between cognitive operations described in the NDM framework. Beside, one must consider 
automatic decision-making as relying on routines. 
149
 Downing et al. (2007) say metacognition is a long-known concept : “Although the term metacognition 
only became part of the lexicon of higher education in the 1970s, when Flavell (1971) introduced the term 
‘metamemory’, the concept is much older than that and, as King (2004) points out, draws on the work of 
more ancient philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Confucius, Solomon, Buddha and Lao Tzu.”. Cox (2005) 
supports this view : “Philosophers and observers of the human condition have been fascinated by the subject 
for a very long time. Around the turn of the 16th century in De Trinitate, Augustine [10] asks “What then can 
be the purport of the injunction, know thyself? I suppose it is that the mind should reflect upon itself”.1 
Mathematicians and philosophers have realized since at least the time of Socrates the problems associated 
with self-referential sentences such as the liar’s paradox represented by the statement “This sentence is 
false.” ([76]; see [183] for a treatment of some of these metalanguage problems.)” (p. 107). 
150
 Bialystok, E. (1992a). Attentional control in children's metalinguistic performance and measures of field 
independence. Developmental Psychology, 28(4), p. 654. Retrieved February 14, 2008, from Academic 
Search Complete database. 
Bialystok, E. (1992b). Selective Attention in Cognitive Processing: The bilingual edge. In R. Harris (Ed.) 
Cognitive Processing in Bilinguals, pp. 501-513. New York, NY:Elsevier. 
Bialystok, E. (2001). Thinking about Language. In Bilingualism in Development: Language, Literacy & 
Cognition. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 121-151. 
151
 Thompson, L. & Thompson, M. (1998). Neurofeedback Combined with Training in Metacognitive 
Strategies: Effectiveness in Students with ADD. Applied Psychophysiology and Biofeedback, 23(4). 
152
 Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge:MA. 
153
 Lin, X., Schwartz, D., ad Hatano, G. (2005). Toward Teachers’ Adaptive Metacognition. Educational 
Psychologist, 40(4), pp. 245–255. 
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154
 Rivers, W.P. (2001). Autonomy at all Costs: An Ethnography of Metacognitive Self-Assessment and Self-
Management Among Experienced Language Learners. The Modern Language Journal, 85(ii), pp. 279-290. 
155
 “Moreover, meta-cognitive processes have often been portrayed as explicit processes that involve 
deliberate reasoning (Mazzoni & Nelson, 1998; Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994). However, evidence has been 
mounting that metacognitive processes may not be entirely explicit. For example, Reder and Schunn (1996) 
argued that there were likely to be implicit processes, for the simple reason of avoiding using up limited 
cognitive resources (such as attention) and interfering with regular processes. Thus, they argued that, while 
meta-cognitive strategies themselves might be explicit, and/or explicitly learned, the selection (and use) of 
meta-cognitive strategies was implicit. We have reasons to believe that meta-cognitive knowledge is neither 
necessarily explicit, nor necessarily implicit (Sun & Mathews, 2003). Meta-cognition is likely a combination 
of implicit and explicit processes, the same as regular cognitive processes”. 
156
 “whilst cognition focuses on solving the problem, metacognition focuses on the process of problem-
solving (Marchant, 2001). In addition to the knowledge people have about how they use their thoughts and 
strategies (Brown, 1987), knowledge about how much they will be able to learn and what kinds of strategies 
they use (Gleitman, 1985; Weinert & Kluwe, 1987), people also possess a set of general heuristics. For 
example, how they plan, set goals and process feedback (Frese et al., 1987). The assumption is that these 
general heuristics can be either conscious or automatic (Brown, 1987; Flavell, 1987) and they may be highly 
generalized or specific.”. 
157
 Their article often makes reference to behaviourism as a landmark. 
158
 “Knowing-how, then, is logically prior to knowing-that, because such propositions refer to practices that 
have been observed either by the self or by others. Neither can the propositions be known as true until they 
have been tested and corrected by observance of performance.” (Tharp & Gallimore, 1985, p. 458) 
159
 “Rules may encourage the subject to learn new tasks, but these tasks must be learned in the contexts o f 
eventual application.” (p. 455), and “learning-how (the actual methods of performance) cannot be achieved 
by announcing propositions, but only by "exercises corrected by criticisms and inspired by examples and 
precepts" (Ryle, 1971, p. 221). Translated into the terms of cognitive behaviorism, learning-how is achieved 
through induced performance, by modeling, by practice, and by differential feedback and contingent 
responses. And, to some unknown degree, by precept.” (p. 459). Tharp & Gallimore (1985) quote Ryle, G. 
(1971). Knowing how and knowing that. In Ryle, G. (Ed.), Collected papers (Vol.2). New York: Barnes & 
Noble. 
160
 “’What is the use of (rules and propositions) if the acknowledgement of them is not a condition of knowing 
how to act but a derivative product... ? The answer is simple. They are useful pedagogically, namely, in 
lessons to those who are still learning how to act. They belong to manuals for novices’ (Ryle, 1971, p. 221).” 
(“Knowing-how, then, is logically prior to knowing-that, because such propositions refer to practices that 
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have been observed either by the self or by others. Neither can the propositions be known as true until they 
have been tested and corrected by observance of performance.” (Tharp & Gallimore, 1985, p. 458). 
161
 “The results of metacognitive training vary enormously from laboratory to laboratory, from skill to skill, 
and from child to child. In a review of the literature, Keogh and Hall (1984) suggest that generalization 
effects seem due to the intensity, length, and nature of tasks of training. Predictability of generalization 
effects remains at a low level, though such effects are not absent (e.g., Kendall & Wilcox, 1980; Feinberg & 
Roberts, 1982; Hall, 1979; Zareski, 1982).” (Tharp & Gallimore, 1985, p. 460), and “ These studies indicate 
that what an individual can do in one setting, he or she cannot or does not do in another (Rogoff, 1982).” 
(Tharp & Gallimore, 1985, p. 461). 
162
 “Brown, Campione, and Murphy (1977) suggest training the ability to stop and think before attempting a 
problem, to ask questions of oneself and others, to determine if one recognized the problem, to check 
solutions against reality by asking not "is it right" but "is it reasonable," to monitor attempts to learn to see if 
they are working or worth the effort. Others have distinguished such components of problem solving as 
analyzing and characterizing the problem at hand, reflecting on what one knows or does not know that may 
be necessary for a solution, devising a plan for attacking the problem, and checking or monitoring one's 
progress (Meichenbaum, 1980; Glenwick & Jason, 1984).” (Tharp & Gallimore, 1985, p. 460). 
163
 Tharp & Gallimore (1985) state that “There is no need for the meta prefix. […] When the same skills are 
to be learned in the context of different domains, that requires separate occasions of learning-how. Much 
"metacognitive" training does include opportunities for practice and feedback in multiple contexts. Any 
potency of such training may well be due to these practice-and-feedback, multiple context opportunities, and 
not at all to so-called "metacognitive" elements.” (pp. 461-462). Considering three basic types of cognitive 
training, respectively “blind training” consisting of “inducing children to perform tasks but are not informed 
as to why, nor are they told that the activity is appropriate to a particular class of situations, materials, 
goals, etc.” (p. 462), “informed training” that includes the pieces of information previously mentioned into 
the induction process, and “self-control training” that “[specifically includes] training of general executive 
skills, such as planning, checking, and monitoring.”, he asks about each category the question “Where then is 
the meta in cognitive training?” (p. 463) and systematically demonstrates that each form of training can be “ 
withdrawn from the meta basket.” (p. 463) : “So long as sound generalization-training programs are 
mounted that include propositional announcements, and then the potency of the intervention is attributed to 
the announced propositions, the case for metacognitive effectiveness remains unproven.” (p. 464). 
164
 Daniels, H. (2001). Vygotsky and Pedagogy. New York:RutledgeFalmer 
165
 Goos, M., Galbraith, P. & Renshaw, P. (2002). Socially Mediated Metacognition: Creating Collaborative 
Zones of Proximal Development in Small Group Problem Solving. Educational Studies in Mathematics, 
49(2), p. 193-223. 
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166
 “Metacognition refers to the ability to reflect upon, understand, and control one’s learning. Previous 
accounts of metacognition have distinguished between two major components, including knowledge about 
cognition and regulation of cognition (Brown, 1987; Flavell, 1987; Jacobs & Paris, 1987). Knowledge about 
cognition includes three subprocesses that facilitate the reflective aspect of metacognition: declarative 
knowledge (i.e., knowledge about self and about strategies), procedural knowledge (i.e., knowledge about 
how to use strategies), and conditional knowledge (i.e., knowledge about when and why to use strategies). 
Regulation of cognition includes a number of subprocesses that facilitate the control aspect of learning. Five 
component skills of regulation have been discussed extensively, including planning, information management 
strategies, comprehension monitoring, debugging strategies, and evaluation (Artzt & Armour-Thomas, 1992; 
Baker, 1989).”. 
167
 Quoting Bialystok, E. (2001). Thinking about Language. In Bilingualism in Development: Language, 
Literacy & Cognition. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 121-151. 
168
 “Recent research indicates that metacognitively aware learners are more strategic and perform better 
than non unaware learners (Garner & Alexander, 1989; Pressley & Ghatala, 1990). One explanation is that 
metacognitive awareness allows individuals to plan, sequence, and monitor their learning in a way that 
directly improves performance.” 
169
 “an intervention to enhance familiarity with the criterion environment and teaches the skills necessary to 
maintain effective task performance under stress conditions [with] three overall goals […] : (a) gaining 
knowledge of and familiarity with the stress environment,(b) training those skills required to maintain 
effective performance under stress, and (c) building performance confidence” (p. 193). 
170
 Because, on the opposite of normative theories of decision-making, naturalistic decision-making “is seen 
as intertwinned with task accomplishment, context-specific, fluid, flexible, and in some respect ‘procedure-
free’ (i.e., lacking prescribed rules […])” (Cannon-Bowers & Bell, 1997). 
171
 “[…] conscious understanding, ability to talk or write about tasks, and generalizability to other tasks are 
also important factors in determining whether a given task is metacognitive and this viewpoint is supported 
by Brown (1987), who agrees that metacognition requires the thinker to use and describe the process of 
mental activity.” 
172
 “According to Driscoll (1994), there are three basic instructional principles on which Piagetian (cognitive) 
theorists generally agree: Principle 1: the learning environment should support the activity of the learner (i.e. 
an active, discovery-oriented environment). Principle 2: the learner’s interactions with peers are an important 
source of cognitive development (i.e. peer teaching and social negotiation). Principle 3: instructional 
strategies that cause learners to become aware of conflicts and inconsistencies in their thinking promote 
cognitive development (i.e. conflict teaching and ‘Socratic dialogue’). […] The emphasis on social 
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interaction as a precondition for the training of reflective skills is today shared by many approaches to 
instruction (Von Wright, 1992).” 
173
 “The mental activities involved in acquiring and processing information”, Oxford Dictionnary of 
Psychology, 2nd Edition, 2006, p. 143 
174
 “Two weeks prior to the experimental session, a preexperimental package was mailed to the subjects to 
allow review of the following scenario materials: (a) overview of the experiment; (b) political/military 
background for the scenarios; (c) intelligence summary; and (d) rules of engagement.”. 
175
 “often referred to as a research method, when in fact it is a data analysis method. The reason is that 
protocol analysis is usually employed in conjunction with a single knowledge elicitation task, the "Think-
Aloud Problem Solving" (TAPS) task” (p. 65). 
176
 “each and every statement in the protocol is coded according to some sort of a priori scheme that reflects 
the goal of the research (i.e., the creation of models of reasoning). Hence, the coding categories include, for 
example, expressions of goals observations, and hypotheses.”. 
177
 “Also, working backwards from a detailed assignment of each and every statement in a protocol, one can 
cluster sequences of statements into functional categories (e.g., a sequence of utterances that all involved a 
forward search or a means-end analysis, etc. (see Hayes, 1989).” 
178
 They might as well be attributed to the low valence (Gusdorf, 1951) of the cognitive experience of those 
moments. 
179
 Hoffman (2005, p. 69) offers a typical example of the logic of Abstraction-Decomposition that shows its 
inapplicability to the present study. This coding scheme is based on “research on nuclear safety conducted by 
engineer Jens Rasmussen at the RIS National Laboratory in Denmark (Rasmussen, Pjtersen, and Schmidt, 
1990).” (p. 67). 
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180
 “(In the Gulf Coast region) high pressure will dominate (in the summer) ; (High pressure) keeps fronts 
north of us (the Gulf Coast region) ; (High pressure) keeps cold polar continental air north of us (the Gulf 
Coast region).” (p. 70). 
181
 Because “there is compelling evidence that many psychological factors negatively impact on decision 
making” (Omodei et al, 2005). HFIP is based on the idea that “The ‘human factors’ approach to 
understanding how people interact psychologically and physiologically with complex task environments is 
particularly useful for understanding human behaviour in safety-critical situations, regardless of whether 
these are essentially manmade (e.g., an aircraft cockpit) or naturally occurring (e.g., a wildland fire) (cf, 
Johansson, Hollnagel & Granlund, 2002).” (ibid). 
182
 Omodei et al. (2005) say that “typical strategies for obtaining retrospective self-reports, such as 
structured interviews and surveys, cause some psychological processes to be much more likely to be recalled 
than others, leading to a distorted understanding of the decision making process” in conjunction with “What 
is least likely to be recalled are those perceptual, affective and motivational states that are essentially pre-
verbal or at least not verbalised during the flow of the decision incident in question. […] Thus, those 
experiences least likely to be recalled are those associated with actual or potential errors precisely because 
such experiences constitute a negative self-assessment and, as such, are subject to self-enhancement / 
protection processes (Omodei, Wearing, & McLennan, 2002).”. 
183
 See Henwood (1994) and Bryman (1984) for a distinction between the terms epistemology, methodology 
and method. 
184
 Equivalent to what Conway (2004) calls “mini-histories” : “learning to drive a car, learning to use the 
library, romantic first relationship, making friends with X, etc.”. 
185
 Deahene et al. (2006) have characterised the notions of conscious and pre-conscious information encoding 
in the brain. In the case of conscious encoding, “Processing receives top-down amplification and expands 
into a global parietofrontal reverberant state”. Pre-conscious encoding “involves local resonant firing loops, 
but top-down attention is focussed on another stimulus or task set”. See also N. F. Dixon’s article on 
“Subliminal perception” in Gregory (2004, pp. 884-887). 
186
 Introspection was defined by James (1890) as “the looking into our own mind and reporting what we there 
discover” (p. 185). 
187
 Though Transcendental Phenomenology does not play a part in this research, it is worth noting its 
methodological principles as they are often refered to in psychophenomenological studies. Studies of the 
phenomenal experience with the method of Transcendental Phenomenology aim at unveiling the “what it is 
like to experience this or that”. For instance, Moustakas (1994, p. 140) reports : “The experience of feeling 
guilty is felt as an intensive and permeating reality. Everything else fades in comparison. […] The world, for 
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the one experiencing guilt feelings, is an alien world – a being in limbo, with unreal and cloudy forms dimly 
perceived”. The phenomenological method is mostly used for purposes outside the scope of the present 
research. For instance, Petitmengin (2008, p. 139) presents a phenomenological report from a patient affected 
by epilepsy constituted mainly of a series of the subject’s general knowledge of what it is like to undergo an 
epileptic crisis. Barclay (1995) interviews A.S., a concentration camp survivor, in an attempt to objectify 
metaphors of the self through a lifetime narrative, spanning from her detention until recent times. The object 
of such research is very different from a study of the cognitive experience of specific events. For McGinn 
(1991, p. 101) their principle is that “subjective experience might be describable in objective (though non 
physical) terms”. The method of Transcendental Phenomenology follows a succession of principles or steps : 
• “Epoche”, i.e.,the suspension, the “bracketing” of the usual researcher’s perspective, the suspension of 
his “natural attitude” (Thompson, 2007, p. 20), which in hard sciences consists in considering 
“objectively” the world, as a physical, absolute, objective given, in favour of an attitude that considers 
that the subject constitutes progressively an “abstraction” of his world of life through his own experience 
: this is the role of phenomena all of which are different perspectives on the world, the variation of 
which is the essence of this abstraction. It requires “the flexible and trainable mental skill of being able 
to suspend both one’s inattentive immersion in experience and to turn one’s attention to the manner in 
which something appears or is given to experience” (Thompson, 2007, p. 19). Epoché is considered to 
be the first step of Reduction.  
• “Reduction”, as redirection (reducere) of the attention toward the inner subjective experience of the 
world, away from the objective outer world (Thompson, 2007, p.18). It is “a ‘leading-back’ (reducere) 
or redirection of thought away from its unreflective and unexamined immersion in the world to the way 
in which it appears to us” (Thompson, 2007, p. 25). For Moustakas (1994, p. 90), phenomenological 
reduction is “the task of describing in textural language just what one sees, not only in terms of the 
external object but also the internal act of consciousness”. 
• The explicitation of intentional “mental operations” and of time in consciousness : in its structural and 
temporal acceptions, it is first the explicitation of the noesis-noema coupling in its dynamic emergence. 
Objects are brought to awareness either by “re-presentational, presentational or protentional acts” 
(Thompson, 2007). Presentation refers to the current perceptive or proprioceptive experience, re-
presentation refers to remembering items of past experience, and protention refers to the imagination or 
anticipation of future phenomena (Thompson, 2007, p. 25 ; Marbach, 1993, p. 10). Presentations, re-
presentations and protentions are not autonomous and distinct in the sense that their affective allure or 
meaning inter-relate them (Thompson, 2007, p. 25, chapter 9 ; Keen, 1975). 
• The explicitation of “Meanings”, the “content” of a “mental act”, “inseparable” of its “object” in 
Moustakas’ (1994, p. 56) terms, that gives a phenomenon its “particular constitution” (ibid). Meaning is 
at the heart of Transcendental Phenomenology as the link between the experienced thing and the thing in 
the real-world, what makes sense of the latter and constitutes its abstraction in the subject’s mind. 
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• The synthesis of the “Essence” of the thing under study, i.e.,the “eidos”, the pure ideal thing, the 
abstraction in the subject’s consciousness (knowledge) of the object that stands in the real-world, gained 
from the variation of its subjective experience (Husserl, 1977, p. 54). It is that which “holds up amid 
variations [of the way we experience the real-world object] of an original [as] the invariant, the 
necessary, universal form, the essential form, without which something of that kind, like this thing as an 
example of its kind, would be altogether inconceivable” (Spinelli, 1989). In Transcendental 
Phenomenology, the search for the eidos of an event or thing is a synthesis of the various 
comprehensions one has had of that event or thing. Through “imaginative variation”, i.e., a confrontation 
of different meanings of the event or thing in question, the researcher aims at finding out what it is like 
for a given set of individuals, i.e., its “invariant” form. Transcendental phenomenological research is 
usually carried out to study situations experienced by communities, or repetitively by an individual over 
a period of time, differently at different moments and in different places (Moustakas, 1994, p. 29). 
Moustakas (1994, pp. 181-182), and its quotation by Creswell (2007, pp. 60-62) although with some 
differences, suggest the following steps to perform a phenomenological study : 
1. Preparing to collect data : research question, literature review, participants selection, interview 
framework 
2. Collecting data : Epoche process, bracketing the question [“as a way of creating an atmosphere and 
rapport for conducting the interview”, says Moustakas (1994, p. 181), which per se is confusing as 
epoché has nothing to do with contracting the interview nor priming the subject], conduct interviews 
(informal, open-ended questions, or topical-guided). The examples provided in Moustakas are not very 
probant: the example provided pp. 117-188 does not relate a specific occurrence of experience but yields 
a generalisation, a theorisation of habitual patterns of behaviour (“I am a very restless sleeper. I’m 
always rolling over and …”. In this example, we must note that such generalisations are already based on 
interpretations made by the interviewee himself : therefore there is no single chance of getting to the 
“what it was like to experience insomnia on such particular day”. To unveil the subjective experience 
and at the same time to reduce the hermeneutical bias of interpretation, we need to reject personal 
theories both from the researcher and from the subject. 
3. Organising, Analysing and Synthesising Data 
4. Summary, Implications, and Outcomes. 
In fact, Moustakas, in Moustakas (1994), does not really provide a set process. Rather, he presents 
alternatives, various methods taken from other authors that he proposes to enhance. Particularly significant is 
chapter 7, Phenomenological Research: Analyses and Examples. The phenomenological analysis (step 3) 
takes a researcher, says Creswell (2007), through “the data […] and highlights ‘significant statements’, 
sentences or quotes that provide an understanding of how the participants experienced the phenomenon”, in 
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a step called “horizonalization” followed by the development of “clusters of meaning”. Moustakas (1994, p. 
122) is more precise, mentioning the following analytic activities : horizonalization [The identification of the 
horizons of experience proceeds from “listing every expression relevant to the experience” (Moustakas, 
1994, p. 120)], delimitation of invariant horizons or meaning units [The method for their identification is not 
very clear and somewhat confusing with regard to Husserl’s notion of horizon : either they are obtained by 
retaining expressions containing a moment of the experience said by Moustakas to be “necessary and 
sufficient” to understand the experience, or by finding out which expression is “possible to abstract and 
label”, or else (Moustakas, 1994, p. 122) by retaining “non repetitive, non overlapping statements”. Horizons 
are social, temporal, physical, intellectual, emotional, intentional, retentional, protentional, etc…], clustering 
invariant constituents into themes, individual textural description, individual structural description. Once 
these steps have been followed by each researcher, a  composite textural-structural description of the 
meanings and essences of the experience is constructed. The phenomenological method examplified by 
Moustakas and Creswell is not focused on cognition in action and specific episodes of experience. It accepts 
elements of retrospective theorisation and generalisation within first-person narratives and is highly 
interpretative due to the subjective way by which it seeks eidetic generalisations in the analysis phase. 
188
 [Husserl (1977, p. 2) also mentions Müller, Weber, Volkmann, Helmholtz, Hering and Fechner but 
akcnowledges the “organising power of Wundt”] 
189
 They are : “doctrinaire arguments about which building blocks of consciousness are really fundamental” 
(Keen, 1975, p. 137) ; the evolution of early Phenomenological Psychology toward Husserl’s Transcendental 
Phenomenology brought it too close to pure philosophy (Spinelli, 1989, p. XI) ; the “limited and dubious 
value” of the views expressed by some phenomenological philosophers like Heidegger who was “notorious 
for the obscurity of his language” (Spinelli, 1989, p. XII). 
190
 From a “splendid impetus from leading German pshysiologists and physicists” (Husserl, 1977, p. 2). 
191
 Dilthey (Husserl, 1977) called for “a scientific analysis, formation of concepts and systematic description, 
carried out on a purely intuitive basis”. 
192
 Husserl (1977) : “not only the descriptive exhibiting of the types of single psychic data, but also the types 
of nexus” for “the single datum is a mere abstraction in the psychic. A feeling, a mood, an emerging thought, 
a hope which makes itself felt, etc – nothing of the sort is ever an isolated lived experience; it is what is in the 
psychic milieu, in its intertwinnings, its motivations, indications, etc.; and these are moments of the nexus, of 
the psychic function, which are lived together inseparably”. 
193
 Husserl (1977) 
194
 {noesis ; noema} in husserlian terms (“noesis” in husserlian language,“the subject’s essential capacity of 
building up his own world” (Thinès, 1977, p. 57), which are  and are “able to constitute (disclose or bring to 
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awareness) its objects” (Thompson, 2007, p. 17) ; a mental object is called “noema” in husserlian language. 
“Noema is that which is experienced, the what of experience, the object-correlate. Noesis is the way in which 
the what is experienced, the experiencing or act of experiencing, the subject-correlate” (Moustakas, 1994, p. 
69).) 
195
 Intentionality is the very nature of consciousness, the “Pact between the Mind and the World” (Rouger, 
1969). 
196
 A fundamental question of Phenomenological Psychology is to understand what makes consecutive 
mental operations cohere into the production of a sensemaking experience rather than occuring in absolute 
disconnection of meaning into a senseless episode of experience. Dilthey advocated the principle of the 
“unity of psychic life as a unity of the lived experience” (Husserl, 1977, p. 6). Husserl (1977, p. 165) views 
the unity of the I as a construct of one’s history, and the constructed I, the Self, overlooks and controls new 
cognitions in an aspiration to self-preservation, “to remain true to itself insofar as it is no longer inclined to 
abandon its convictions”. Continuity is the idea of a self-regulation, of “circular causality” (Thompson, 
2007, pp. 61-62) in which the “global” controls the “local” while the “local” influences the “global”, through 
three forms of “emotional self-organisation” (Lewis, 2000) : Emotional-Interpretations that occur in the 
instant (seconds to minutes) and are driven by occupational intentions and goals ; Moods, that develop over 
hours to days, and are governed by intentional orientations, goal preoccupations, inhibited or unsuccessful 
action ; Personality, which develops over months and years and is controlled by the sense of Self 
progressively constructed by the convictions of the I. Continuity is also the idea that cognition-in-action is 
controlled, maybe only to some extent, by mental stories. They are of three types (Conway, 1995) : 1) the 
life-story to which Conway (1995) refers as lifetime autobiographical knowledge, 2) occupational stories 
likely to last for years, lived in several “sociohistorical systems” i.e., “social networks or institutions” 
(Bujarski et al., 1999, pp. 222-224) and between “sub worlds of life” (Schutz, 1987), and 3) the 
circumstantial story at hand to which Conway (1995) refers to as event-specific. Mental stories are landmarks 
one uses when in need of sensemaking, to select local representations and cohere them into a global 
representation (Pennington & Hastié, 1986, 1988, 1992) or to “preserve plausibility and coherence, 
something that is reasonable and memorable, that embodies past experience and expectations [… and] holds 
disparate elements together long enough to energize and guide action, plausibly enough to allow people to 
make retrospective sense of whatever happens” (Weick, 1995, pp. 60-61). Theron (2005) studies how mental 
stories compete with one another to focus and distract subjects’ attention, leading to a minor train accident. 
Consciousness is a rolling process of mental operations with a fundamental quality : its continuity. The 
consistency of consciousness stems from a global process : its “historiality” (we cognise through stories), and 
from a local process : “emotional self-organisation” (our cognition is influenced by affects of different 
scales) governed by circular causality, the reciprocal influence on the flow of consciousness of global and 
circumstantial goals. The creation of sense, or its modification, takes place when something triggers it. 
Acting in the world, we face situations and react to them. Cognition takes place within the time spanning 
from the instant we encounter a new situation – a change in the world, in our body or in our mind – and the 
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instant the sensori-motor faculties of our body are activated to deliver a reaction with an impact on the 
surrounding world. 
197
 Which differs from chronos, the always-passing-away threefold {past, present, future} structure. 
198
 My own translation 
199
 My own translation 
200
 My own translation 
201
 My own translation 
202
 My own translation 
203
 My own translation 
204
 My own translation 
205
 My own translation 
206
 There are two reasons to this choice. 1st-Person narratives often start with a “once upon a time I was …” 
clause : the individual is being-in-the-world, he is faced with circumstances or he is doing something, or he 
just stays there. Also, from a practical perspective, if we started from a cognitive happening, which one 
should we choose ? 
207
 In this sense, the trigger of the PM is the stimulus of the first decision cycle of this PM. 
208
 Expliciter is the GREX’s quarterly review. GREX is the Groupe de Recherche sur l’EXplicitation started 
by Pierre Vermersch in 1988. Conceived as a work-in-progress media to enter into a dialogue with other 
researchers and professionals interested in the explicitation of the subjective experience, Expliciter can be 
accessed at www.grex2.com.  
209
 My own translation 
210
 Here, we can note the proximity of goals with Rassmussen (1985). 
211
 My own translation 
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212
 In this sense, the EI is a contribution to metacognitive learning. 
213
 In this sense, the EI is a metacognitive training process. 
214
 My own translation : “D'une certaine manière, nous l'avons vu cet été avec le thème de recherche du 
"Sentiment intellectuel", il ne suffit pas d'avoir une méthode de production et de recueil de verbalisation pour 
cerner un objet de recherche. Il ne suffit pas de savoir mener un entretien, fut-il d'explicitation, ni de savoir 
opérer une description, pour parvenir à produire des données intéressantes qui font avancer l'intelligibilité 
du monde intérieur. Pour atteindre un tel objectif, il faut disposer d'un modèle hypothétique de ce que l'on 
veut étudier, qui permet de générer de nouvelles questions. Il faut pouvoir orienter son regard dans la bonne 
direction pour apercevoir des propriétés qui sont là devant nous, mais qui ne se révèlent que si on a l'idée de 
les questionner. (Ce que je dis là n'est pas mystérieux, je l'ai développé dans mon intervention au GREX sur 
"Pourquoi est-il si difficile de décrire son propre vécu". Si vous allez dans un jardin, vous ne verrez, et ne 
pourrez décrire qu'à la hauteur de vos compétences de botanistes ou de jardinier. Et cela n'est pas passif, 
cela suppose regarder certaines plantes en "changeant la direction de son regard", certains détails 
n'apparaissent que si l'on sait, par exemple, aller se mettre sous les feuilles parce que c'est là où on peut voir 
s'il y a des parasites.)”. (Vermersch, 1999) 
215
 It allows “to generate new questions” and to “turn our eyes into the right direction to spot properties that 
stand there before us, but that came into the spotlight only if the researcher questions them [like when] you 
visit a garden one won’t see and describe it only to the extent one owns a competence in botanics or 
gardening. And this is no passive attitude but supposes to look at plants from ‘a new angle’, certain details 
appearing only if one knows, for instance, to look at leaves from beneath as it is only from that perspective 
that one can spot parasites for instance.”. 
216
 Literally “Informations satellites de l’action” 
217
 Literally, untranslated from Vermersch 
218
 Phenomenography also designates a method used in Education Science (Webb, 1997) “to find and 
systematize forms of thought in terms of which people interpret aspects of reality […] a research method for 
mapping the qualitatively different ways in which people experience, conceptualize, perceive, and understand 
various aspects of, and phenomena in, the world around them”. He claims phenomenography has “a 
‘qualitative’ rather than a ‘quantitative’ orientation” and seeks “an empathetic understanding of what is 
involved” in the cognitive processes of learning and that it is “exceptionally rigorous” as “it sets out to 
identify concepts which describe important differences in the way students learn and study.”. In this sense, it 
seems to be very close to Vermersch’s psycho-phenomenology. But in a critical stance Webb (1997) also 
argues that due to this “tension between the ‘empathetic understanding’ [and the] reference to ‘rigour’ and 
‘scientific research’”, phenomenography seems “to have more to do with the quest for positivist 
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generalisation than the development of hermeneutical understanding”. Searle (1985) also suggested a formal 
description of the cognitive experience. 
219
 Let’s recall that the “static” husserlian phenomenological view refers to the “correlational structure of 
intentionality”, as described by Thompson (2007, pp 24-25), the “invariant structure of intentional act / 
intentional object […] known as ‘noema’ (the object in its givenness) and the ‘noesis’ (the mental act that 
intends and discloses the object in a certain manner)”. The “dynamic” phenomenological view refers rather 
to the “emergence” (Thompson, op. cit., p 29) of phenomena in the subject’s cosciousness, of his mental acts, 
whether out of “passive genesis” understood as “being involuntarily influenced and affected by something”, 
or out of “active genesis” which equates to “subjects [playing] an active and deliberate productive role in the 
constitution of objects [the products of which] are tools, artworks, scientific theories, experimental 
interventions, logical judgments, mathematical propositions, and so on.”. The word “constitution does not 
mean fabrication or creation […] ‘To constitute,’ in the technical phenomenological sense, means to bring to 
awareness, to present, or to disclose.” (Thompson, op. cit., p 15). 
220
 Brain studies give support to this hypothesis. The mechanism that sparks new mental operations, the 
“descending attentional amplification” mechanism, according to Naccache (2006, p. 274), works as follows. 
At the “1/10 Brain Time-Scale”, i.e., between 10 and 100 millisecond (Varlea, cited by Thompson, 2007, p. 
331), in the region of a thousand unconscious mental representations are presented by local networks to the 
central network. If the central network is actively engaged in a global mental operation [which occurs in the 1 
Time-Scale, i.e.,between 250 millisecond and several seconds] at that moment then these inputs will be 
rejected, but if it is in a phase of transition [One of Varlea’s experiments reported by Thompson (2007, p. 
335) suggests that a transition phase might last around 250 milliseconds and be in Varela’s (1999) “1” Brain 
Time-Scale.], a “discussion” is started between the central network and the local networks, those discussions 
being in the 1/10 Time-Scale (Naccache, 2006, p. 276). Then, they – or some of them – traverse “in a flash” 
(Naccache, 2006, p. 277) the central network, which is massively interconnected. Suddenly, one of these 
flashes will gain the central network’s attention, for either it has some kind of familiarity and echo in 
consciousness, or it has an “emotional value” that signals a danger or is related to episodes of our past 
experience that have left their mark in our autobiographical memory, or else because they fulfill an 
expectation of our consciousness. If a “critical threshold” is reached, then that particular discussion whose 
flash was noticed becomes the object of an increased exchange between the central and the ad hoc local 
network, and other discussions fade away, the elected disucssion is “amplified” from within the central 
network and sparks throughout the whole Global Workspace and the new, corresponding, mental operation, 
equivalent to Varela’s large-scale dynamic neural assembly (Varela, 1999 ; Thompson, 2006, pp. 329-338), 
is performed at the “1 Time-Scale”, i.e., from 250 millisecond to several seconds in Tompson (2007, p. 333), 
“some tenths of a second” for Naccache (2006, p. 278). Note that the “10 scale” is the time-scale of 
“descriptive-narrative assessments involving memory” (Thompson 2007, p. 331). The conscious mental 
representation, i.e., cognitive operation, synthesises the unconscious mental representations provided by 
distinct neuronal populations (Naccache, 2006, p. 280). This mechanism, free of any “central monitor” in the 
characteristic self-organising, autopoietic manner of dynamic systems (Naccache, 2006, p. 281 ; Thompson, 
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2007, pp. 37-65), serves three complementary and distinct purposes : the amplification of local unconscious 
mental representations, and the election of one of them at a time in the central neural network ; the circulation 
of representations from one local processor to another so as to give birth to new mental representations ; the 
learning and progressive routinisation of skills. 
221
 We can hypothesise that in the opposite case, fire-fighters are injured, or even killed, events for which 
specific reports and statistics can be found. 
222
 To simplify the writing of the data processing and data analysis parts of this report, by cognitive operation 
we mean both a “cognitive operation” (perception, thoughts, emotions, etc…) and an “action” or a “state” 
(doing something, being or standing somewhere, speaking, moving, …). Both are pairs of {act ; object}. A 
CogOp is a pair of {CogAct ; CogObj}. An action is a pair of {Act = doing ; Object =  something}. 
223
 DMA = Decision-Making-in-Action, the cognitive process of a decision-making cycle. 
224
 Emotional tone, noise, location, peripheral actors, physical environments, … 
225
 In practice, this revealed to ve very difficult at the BSPP : Firemen were available only during service 
hours at the station ; we were allocated rooms sometimes not so secluded : a gymnastic hall, a dining room, 
… And fire stations are very noisy : fire alarms resonated very often, I would say roughly ten times in an 
hour. Sometimesn EI’s were interrupted as the subject being on duty (this is why he was at the station) had to 
go for an intervention and I had to wait for quite a time then until he returns and restart the interview. That 
was fairly uneasy but feasible. 
226
 In Vermersch’s EI training session of September 2007, this point was very important. 
227
 I insisted clearly, at the contractual stage of the interview that should the subject feel uncomfortable he 
could terminate the interview at his convenience and that his decision would not be challenged. Also, I 
watched carefully for signs of overwhelming emotions while the interview was in progress. I notice, with 
men, a form of agitation in the narration characterised by hesitations, repetitions, interruptions of the speach 
flow, and with women humid eyes and redish throats. When I noticed those signs, I suspended my 
questionning, gave the subject as much time as he needed to get over, suspend the narration or possibly close 
the interview, and precautionously asked if they were all right. 
228
 Some subjects are totally incapable of speaking in the first person and this must lead to discarding their 
interviews. At the same time, some use the impersonal form “one”, i.e.,“on” in French. In this case, 
interviews must not be discarded straight away as the question is : what does “one” stand for ? It might be a 
collective “we” (meaning that the subject cannot express his personal experience but only collective 
interpretations, for whatever reason that can be discussed after the interview), or a narrative style reflecting 
the subject’s narrative position at recollection time (as a spectator of what he or she experienced rather than a 
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re-presentification of that past experience). Alternatively, it could be a manner of embedding one’s whole 
experience into a single utterance to say how common this particular item was, meaning : “I perceived or 
thought that at the time, but now, at recollection time, in fact when I do so I know that in such a case it is 
always like this”. This would be the sign of a most unwanted retrospective re-interpretation of the original 
experience. In an email he sent me on January 6th, 2010, Pierre Vermersch told me that the use of “one” 
might also be connected to a cultural habit specific to the subject’s community provided that beside the 
phenomenological quality of his narrative could be established. 
229
 The researcher must clearly state that he is not there to judge the person or the narrative, that there are no 
good nor bad elements in the narration and in fact that everything narrated is of interest as it can reveal 
meaningful to the research. 
230
 The GREX’s quarterly publication 
231
 In annex 2, our Information Form, validated in its English version by the Ethical Committee of the 
University, is reproduced. 
232
 Vermersch says “position de parole incarnée” : literally “embodied speech position” (p57) 
233
 Re-presentification is the state of mind by which the subject’s attention is pulled away from the present 
experience of the Elicitation Interview, including his present attitude (Robinson, 1995), and focused entirely 
on re-experiencing now a given episode of past experience. Once the subject has accepted this principle of 
the Elicitation Interview at the contractual stage, for him it becomes easier to focus on “re-living the 
situation, to find it again, to get in touch with it” says Vermersch (2006, p. 57), who adds that “under this 
narrative stance, the past situation is more present on the subject’s mind than the present interlocutary 
situation […,] the subject focuses his attention more on what he recalls from within than on his relationship 
to the interviewer […] and can stay in that state of evocation of the past situation to describe it for himself 
and to inform himself while informing the interviewer too” (ibid). 
234
 Two alternative narrative stances to avoid in an Explicitation Interview are Generalisation (the subject 
only narrates elements of his a posteriori theorisation of similar events or of his whole life experience ; that 
translates into formulations like “usually when this happens you do not do this but… ; In general one does 
this ; In such circumstances one thinks of his team mates ; …”.) ; and Reconstruction (the subject delivers a 
narrative that reinterprets his experience in the light of the values of his social milieu. That stance is often 
expressed by reports of personal conduct, sometimes heroic). 
235
 Presence to one’s body as it was experienced at the actual time of the event 
236
 Presence to one’s world-of-activity as it was experienced at the actual time of the event 
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237
 My own wording : Vermersch says “questionnement descriptif” : “descriptive questionning”, literally 
(2006, p. 86). Subjective refers to the fact that during the EI the researcher subjectively appreciates the way 
the subject responds to probes and the way the narration goes. Subjective cueing is subjective because it is an 
adjustment to these perceptions of the researcher. 
238
 Vermersch distinguishes Pre-conscious : Elements of autobiographical knowledge that once were fully 
conscious but which are not at the present moment from Pre-reflexive : Elements of autobiographical 
knowledge never conscious, never verbalised, the unnoticed consciousness of the experience of a course of 
action, that remains to bring to consciousness by way of a reflection process. Vermersch (2006, p. 210) says 
that “cognition is mostly pre-reflexive, without any necessity for reflective consciousness to be permanently 
at play”. Pre-reflexive cognitions are most common in the flow of consciousness. For instance, when one 
walks, say in a forest, one may be thinking of his current research and his attention is merely attracted to 
other aspects of one’s experience of the walk. But, while attending so strongly to intellectual matters, one 
perceives many elements : smells from the pine-trees, the light between tree branches, a change in the 
brightness of the light, the shape of the ground, turning left, etc… These elements, though recorded into 
autobiographical memory, are not made conscious, i.e., are not reflected upon at the time of the experience. 
Reflection is the process by which pre-reflexive knowledge is brought from the concrete level of mere doing 
to the semantic level of a representation. That representation, says Vermersch (2006, pp. 80-81), makes sense 
for the subject in the light of his internal interpretative framework, it is an interiorisation, “creation of a new 
psychological reality” (ibid, p. 81). it is “a conceptual elaboration” (ibid, p. 85). 
239
 “Everyone has the capability to recall [even] one’s own pre-reflexive autobiographical knowledge” says 
Vermersch (2006, p. 82). 
240
 In bold characters, the researcher’s utterances. My own translation. More examples can be found at 
www.grex2.com.  
241
 My own translation 
242
 My own translation 
243
 Wrong, inadequate, untrue 
244
 My own translation. Here, I actually chose not to quote Vermersch exactly to term the probe in a more 
colloquial English 
245
 When saying right or left here, this means to the subject’s right or left, i.e.,to the researcher’s left or right 
conversely. Should the subject’s eyes redirect to up right, it usually means that he is elaborating the image 
whereas up left means he evokes the image. When eyes move to the subject’s right, he elaborates the auditive 
memory, whereas to his left means he evokes it. 
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246
 For instance, imagine yourself facing two aggressive dogs showing signs that they are intending to attack 
you. They show their teeth, they are growling, their posture is one of threat or fear. You are in no position to 
escape. You look for a way of showing them that you are not afraid of them with a hope to dissuade them to 
give up. You feel that you are becoming just like them, an animal with ad hoc bodily capabilities. You have 
clawsed paws. You feel they are articulated and you could bend your back, and in case they would charge 
that you would also charge and with your paws knock them down like a lion would do to a bull, right on their 
head or on their back, just like in that documentary you saw on television the other day. And suddenly your 
attention is drawn to a kinesthetic feeling : your fingers have tightened around your hand, your feel your hand 
is ready to knock them. That kinesthetic change was not conscious, inspired by that flow of intense thoughts. 
247
 My own translation 
248
 My own translation 
249
 By refocusing the subject’s attention on these moments. 
250
 Video-recording can be useful a posteriori to elicit non verbal indicators and to reflect on the evocation 
process and on the conduct of the interview. But, out of experience, I would say that in the course of the 
interview it is unnecessary as the researcher is totally absorbed by subjective cueing. A hidden observer, 
discretely radio-linked to the interviewer, would be more useful : he could look for key moments in the story 
narrated by the subject and attract the attention of the interviewer to suggest focusing or elucidating probes. 
251
 Stanghellini (2004) describes the epistemological and heuristic characteristics of psychiatric interview 
techniques. Their fundamental purpose, which neatly differentiates them from the Elicitation Interview, is to 
assess the reality of psychopathologies of patients referred to a psychiatrist in reference to codified 
characteristic signs and symptoms. An alternative, but less mainstream approach to the psychiatric interview, 
Stanghellini (2004) says, is a free-format and insight-oriented report aiming at creating a special instance of 
interpersonal rapport between therapist and patient. Such reports can be found in the Schizophrenia Bulletin 
at http://schizophreniabulletin.oxfordjournals.org.. 
Another technique is the Cognitive Interview described by Memon et al. (1997) and elaborated by Fisher & 
Geiselman (1992) as “a procedure designed for use in police interviews involving witnesses” to augment the 
accuracy and richness in details of their testimonies. Drawing “upon experimental research on memory [it] is 
presented as a package of techniques that can be used to facilitate memory search and retrieval”. Its steps 
include : 
• Context reinstatement, i.e. the “mental reinstatement of the physical and personal contexts that existed at 
the time”, which “involves (a) emotional elements ("How were you feeling at the time?"), which may 
work via state-dependent effects (Eich, 1980), (b) perceptual features ("Put yourself back at the scene of 
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the crime and picture the room; how did it smell, what could you hear?") and (c) sequencing elements 
("What were you doing at the time?").”. 
• Report everything, in which witnesses receive “instructions to search for details extensively (which can 
lead to the recall of additional relevant information (Geiselman & Fisher, 1988)”. 
• Reverse order recall, which is probed by a question like “Tell me about the very last thing you remember 
in the magic show and then what happened before that, and before that, so you're working your way 
back to the first thing you remember”. That question is “placed towards the end of the interview so that 
any extra information it elicited could be identified.”. More generally, witnesses are asked “to recount 
events in a variety of orders (Loftus & Fathi, 1985)”. 
• Varied perspective recall : witnesses are asked “to recount events […] from a variety of perspectives 
(e.g., the perspective of the victim, suspect, another witness)”. 
In their study, with children aged 8 and 9, of the efficiency of the Cognitive Interview, Memon et al. (1997), 
“divided [the interview ] into the following phases: 
• Rapport. Boggs and Eyeberg (1990) pointed out that the essential first phase of the interview is to 
establish rapport between child and interviewer. […] An important part of the rapport building was the 
transfer of control from interviewer to interviewee (which included active listening, not interrupting and 
effective use of pauses). As part of this transfer of control the interviewer makes it clear that he or she 
does not have the information about the event but rather it is the child who holds the information. 
• (ii) Free recall phase. […] interviewers were asked to request a free narrative account from the witness 
and this was used as a strategy for obtaining information in the subsequent questioning phase. [and] in 
addition they were given training in encouraging witnesses to reinstate the context mentally […] before 
they began. The CI interviewers also employed the `report everything' instruction at this stage. 
• (iii) Prompt Phase. At the end of the free recall phase, […] interviewers paused briefly and used one 
prompt: "Please tell me more" before commencing the questioning phase. 
• (iv) Questioning Phase. […] interviewers were asked to use the information reported by the witness in 
their free recall phase as a guide for follow-up questions [and] were instructed in the use of appropriate 
types of questions. They were asked to begin with open questions and then follow these with closed 
questions. In general interviewers were asked to use the free report to find out who was present at the 
event and what they did. Where a person was mentioned, interviewers were asked to elicit details about 
clothing. They were specifically instructed to avoid leading, misleading, and forced-choice questions. 
The CI interviewers received additional training in the activation and probing of images relating to 
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various parts of the event. (For example, the children were told to "picture the magician's face, and then 
describe it.").”. 
The aim of the Cognitive Interview is to yield a recall of events as perceived by a witness. It focuses on the 
what happened in the world then and there. 
252
 In which case, the same speech clause is “analytically duplicated” and numbered as many times as its 
semantic analysis yields CogOps. 
253
 It may happen that Specch Clauses do not clearly allow to identify the opening CogOp of a Present 
moment or the closing Action of the same Present moment. When the cognigraph is drawn these gaps, if not 
yet detected, appear clearly and this provides the researcher with an opportunity to reflect on his prior 
semantic analysis of the narrative. This is when some CogOps may be assumed. 
254
 A step (speech unit) is a move, a change of perspective within the story, identified by the researcher . 
Steps are articulated between them by “turns”, i.e.,some form of salient event, change in the nature, 
perspective, focus, mode, or control of the story in progress. 
255
 Victim Rescue Vehicle : this is an absolutely free translation, without any reference to an existing type in 
Britain’s emergency services 
256
 Without entering into a discussion on differences between needs, drives, and other urges to act. 
257
 Defined as “an inner condition of imbalance (for example, thirst) that provokes an organism to take some 
remedial action” (Arnold, 1960) 
258
 The subject never narrates his experience chronologically, and Subjective Cueing, by asking him to return 
to and further detail already evoked Present Moments, generates a natural fragmentation of the narration. 
Speech Clauses relating to one same Present Moment, or even to one same Cognitive Operation, may be 
found in several answers throughout the transcript of an EI. Sequence tags indicate, for a given speech clause, 
before which other one it should come chronologically. 
259
 “A process in which the researcher writes down ideas about the evolving theory […]” : used in grounded-
theory research, this technique, I believe, is very well suited for my own research as it is a way to explicit the 
grounds of my epistemological choices and my own stance, and their variations as my study progressed. 
260
 “Les travaux de Theureau sur le cours d'action, qui sont à la source de notre propre réflexion sur le cours 
d'événements, reposent sur la notion centrale de "signe tétradique" (objet, interprétant acquis, 
representamen, unité de cours d'action), elle-même fondée sur la théorie du signe triadique de Peirce (objet, 
interprétant, representamen). Theureau considère le cours d'action comme "un enchaînement de signes 
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tétradiques", "directement alternative à ce que postule la psychologie cognitiviste pour les conduites 
cognitives" et qui, "par la notion d'objet, place la relation de l'acteur avec le contexte, les circonstances 
particulières, à la base du cours d'action, de sa dynamique locale". Le concept de representamen "insiste sur 
le rôle de l'activité perceptive dans le cours d'action ici et maintenant", tandis que le concept d'interprétant 
acquis renvoie à l'idée de typicalité de Rosch faisant "le lien entre cours d'action ici et maintenant et cours 
d'action passé". La notion d'unité de cours d'action renvoie à l'idée d'un sentiment d'unité de signification 
pour l'acteur de ses divers actes. D'un point de vue épistémologique, l'approche de Theureau, assez 
complexe, un peu confuse au premier abord, repose sur le principe de l'observatoire du cours d'action où 
l'analyse "en signes" des verbalisations des acteurs permet de mettre à jour l'enchaînement de signes 
tétradiques. Elle prétend à une représentation formelle du cours d'action au moyen de "graphes d'analyse en 
structures significatives" et par la "représentation graphique des différentes sortes de signes". Elle propose 
une taxonomie des éléments du signe tétradique. Elle repose, enfin, sur le "primat de l'intrinsèque", c'est-à-
dire sur la recherche du point de vue intérieur des acteurs au travail sur le cours de leur action au moyen de 
l'analyse "en signes"260 des verbalisations (au regard des prescriptions "nominales" des processus260), et de 
la pratique de la confrontation et de l'autoconfrontation.” (Théron, 2005). 
261
 Triadic means excluding the unity of the course of action, the underlying story that gives sense to triadic 
transformations of input objects. 
262
 This is how phenomenology came to be a possible way forward in Lieutenant A’s case study. 
263
 Attempts were made to model mental activities by Lamareille (2009) based on data class models used in 
UML 2.0, 2004 version. For a more current version of UML, refer to Version 2.4.1 at 
http://www.omg.org/spec/UML/2.4.1/Infrastructure/PDF. 
264
 Course of Events, Course of Action 
265
 Cross-coding, i.e., the performance of this semantic elicitation of CogOps should be performed by several 
researchers. 
266
 By convention, from now on by cognitive operation we mean both a “cognitive operation” (perception, 
thoughts, emotions, etc…) and an “action” or a “state” (doing something, being or standing somewhere, 
speaking, moving, …). 
267
 Sub-type (ST) 
268
 This process also helps to verify the taxonomy of CogActs and CogObjs by : making sure that each sub-
type of act or object is independent from the others, and by making sure that each sub-type is assigned into 
the correct more abstract type. 
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269
 Refer to ANNEX 12 or 13 
270
 Refer to the following sub-section for more details on these levels of analysis of DMA patterns. 
271
 In the integrated RPD Model. Refer to the chapter on NDM for more details. 
272
 It was experimentally engineered, in many steps of progressive refinement through which the data 
processing method emerged and became more and more formal. If the data model guarantees a certain 





 Asymmetric lambda is interpreted as the probable improvement in predicting the column variable Y given 
knowledge of the row variable X. Asymmetric lambda has the range 0 < λ < 1. 
275
 The present thesis is not based upon Wittgenstein’s approach of the inner experience. 
276
 My own translation 
277
 My own translation 
278
 “subjects recalled memory details clustered around the detail they subsequently judged the most 
distinctive” (p. 70). 
279
 There are a number of variants of these research protocols. It is not my intention to discuss them as they 
are out of my scope. 
280
 In the case of Firemen : milieu would be more appropriate 
281
 Herman, J. L.  (1992). Trauma and Recovery. New-York: Basic Books, quoted by Matthews & Chu 
(1997) 
282
 The therapist in (Matthews & Chu, 1997) 
283
 EM stands for “Etat-Major” : Headquarters ; G stands for “Groupement” : Group ; then EMG1 stands for 
“Headquarters of the First Fire Group” 
284
 Literally “9th Rescue Company” : a Fire Station. 
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285
 History and organisation of the Brigade des Sapeurs-Pompiers de Paris : 
The Paris Fire Brigade (BSPP : Brigade des Sapeurs-Pompiers de Paris, France) enrolls more than 8000 men 
these days, amounting to about 3% of all French Fire Forces, and was created as a military unit on September 
18th 1811 by Emperor Napoleon the First (then called "Bataillon des Sapeurs-Pompiers de Paris" with a total 
of four companies and 571 men) after the Austrian Embassy in Paris was devastated by a major fire on July 
1st 1810, leaving over a hundred diplomats and their wives dead. Inheriting from a century old tradition of 
courage and technical improvements, they were made a military unit after it was revealed that the 
Commanding Officer of the "Garde-Pompe de Paris", the name of the batalion before the fire and since the 
1720's, was away in the country when the Austrian embassy fire started and had therefore been unable to 
command his men. The 19th Century saw the structuring of the BSPP as well as attempts to develop 
techniques (Gallet, 2006 ; Rolland, 2005) - like clothing and breathing hardware along with different types of 
ladders - that would allow men to approach fire closer and more safely, to operate for longer periods of time 
or in hostile atmospheres, and to rescue victims more efficiently. Regulations were passed that defined more 
and more precisely the Brigade's organisation. 
The BSPP’s territory 
The BSPP's territory includes Paris and the "Départements" immediately surrounding it. It is today placed 
under the combined authority of the Préfet de Police de Paris (Paris Police Prefect), the Gouverneur Militaire 
de Paris (Paris Military Governor) and the Maire de Paris (Paris Mayor). The Paris' Police Prefect who is in 
charge of the Capital's Civil Security commands the Brigade. The Paris Military Governor would coordinate 
the engagement of military forces with Civil Security forces should a major catastrophe affect the area. As 
such, the BSPP being a military unit would fall under his command. The Mayor of Paris supports the BSPP 
financially, just as other local communities in its area of competence. But Paris sheltering so many political, 
official and diplomatic sites, not mentioning its vast population of about two and a half million people, the 
Maire de Paris has a stronger connection with the BSPP than any other local community. In total, the area 
under the protection of the BSPP represents more than six million people, two million workers on transit 
everyday, twenty-five million tourists every year. It operates 2 300 kilometres of gas piping, 250 kilometres 
of Métro rail lines, 3 airports (Roissy, Orly and Le Bourget) and three quarters of all the high-rise buildings 
of France, 365000 companies, 17 oil depots, the largest food market in Europe and, altogether, 25% of the 
national GNP. That territory also includes the strategic sites of the Presidency, the two Chambers of the 
Parliement and Senate, along with Central Ministerial administrations, 130 embassies, 5 "Préfectures" and 
144 town Halls. Monuments, 105 museum and numerous sites open to the Public plus several thousands 
kilometres of technical galleries define an area of intervention ranging from 35 metres below ground surface 
to 310 metres above at the top of the Eiffel Tower. 
The BSPP’s command chain and structure 
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Headed by a Three star General and his Etat-Major, the BSPP is divided into three Fire Groups 
(Groupements Incendie), a Logistics Group (Groupement des Services), a Training Group (Groupement 
Formation) and three Detachments (Détachements) based on the strategic sites of Kuru (French Guyana, 
where space launches take place), Lacq (a major Oil & Gas site in the South-West of France) and Biscarosse 
(a military site in Southern France). Each Fire Group is divided into Fire Companies (Compagnies 
d'Incendie, 24 in total), themselves divided into Fire Stations (Centres de Secours, literally "Rescue Centres", 
more commonly call Fire Stations). G1, in particular, has responsibility for a territory including the North of 
Paris and the Department of Seine-Saint-Denis on the North / North-East border of the city. This is the most 
turbulent and dangerous portion of the BSPP territory, where the number of criminal assaults has increased 
by up to 24.8% per year (See http://www.cartocrime.net) between 2003 and 2007, not mentioning danger 
stemming from main and suburban railway lines, tunnels, motorways (A1, A3), industries, depots, decrepited 
housing, etc... Seine-Saint-Denis is the area where urban riots started in 2005 after a police chase ended-up in 
two teenagers hiding inside an electric transformer where they died electrocuted. Riots then spread through 
the whole country for nearly a month. Val de Marne in the East / South-East (Under command of G2) is also 
a popular area punctuated with industrial sites, main and suburban railway lines, tunnels and motorways 
(A6). And Hauts-de-Seine in the West / South-West (G3’s responsibility) is the poshest area incorporating 
business areas like "La Défense" just West of the Capital and next to Neuilly and Saint-Cloud, two of the 
richest local communities in France. This department has also its motorways (A13, A14), long tunnels, 
railway lines, etc. 
Regulation and discipline 
BSPP's interventions are framed by strict operational and security regulations (BSP 118: Regulation of the 
organisation and operation of the firefighting and rescue service, “Réglement sur l’organisation et le 
fonctionnement du service d’incendie et de secours”, of June 2004). Some more specific regulations such as 
the BSP 370 of March 1995 regarding interventions on railway premises provide more detailed ad hoc 
instructions. Global intervention plans detail the concepts, rules of engagements and means to dispatch to the 
field in case major incidents happen. The Plan Rouge (Red Plan, 1978, revised in 1989) describes the 
concept of operations in case of an incident involving massive casualties. The Plan Rouge Alpha (Alpha Red 
Plan, 2005) addresses multi-terrorist attacks, the Plan Jaune (Yellow Plan) addresses CBRN attacks, the Plan 
Troubles Urbains (Urban Unrest Plan) organises the BSPP's response in case of riots similar to the 2005 
ones, ... Beside, National Reference Guides (GNR) detail instructions to follow when facing specific 
situations such as the 2003 GNR on Backdraft and Flash-Over. 
Discipline is at the heart of BSPP’s activities. No one can ignore it as the code of discipline is of mandatory 
knowledge (BSP 118 – Part 2 (Intervention general duties and roles ; Devoirs généraux et rôles en 
intervention) – Title 1 – Chapter 2 : Discipline). Discipline285 is founded on a perfect knowledge and 
seasoned practice of the job to be performed (ibid). Situations are reckoned to be harsh (hasty departures 
from the Station, heat, smoke, aggressive - chemical for instance – atmospheres, …). And this is precisely 
because there are many dangers to expect that regulation BSP 118 excludes any "hesitation" and 
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"improvisation” which could result from a lack of discipline, preparation and knowledge (ibid)285. Discipline 
also challenges both the physical and cognitive abilities of Men engaged in fire-fighting who must “protect 
themselves, keep a cool mind, operate in silence, keep constantly in touch with a colleague, report 
immediately” (ibid)285. Firemen accept the terms of that discipline, even at the expense of their own 
involvement in the active fire-fighting service, for instance if they can't pass their annual physical test of 
aptitude or have been wounded. A BSPP’s common saying is that Firemen’s image of Self, their sense of 
identity is that “A Fireman fights fire”. 
Education and training 
Education plays a crucial part in BSPP Men’s life as beside discipline, they have to learn the technicalities of 
the job. When just enrolled Men start their curriculum with a four months period during which their physical 
and mental resistance are challenged and the basics of their future job are taught to them. Then, further 
periods of instruction are mandatory throughout their professional involvement up to the highest ranks of 
sub-officership, as well as daily exercises and tests at the Fire Station aimed at reinforcing and checking their 
current ability to perform their tasks. Officers come mostly from High Military Schools and many of them 
also graduate from Universities. They are trained to command operations and men. Two of their most 
important training courses are consecutively the "Officier PC" (Command Car Officer) and the 
"Commandant des Opérations de Secours" (Rescue Operations Commander), which they are to undertake 
with success in order to manage field operations, the first one preparing Officers to be deputies to Rescue 
Operations Commanders. These training sessions include further apprenticeship of Tactical Reasoning 
Methods and of the "Marche Générale des Opérations" (MGO = General Conduct of Operations) which 
provide the guidelines necessary to sequence any intervention within their remit. Exercises aimed at 
familiarising men with plans, situations and technical means are frequently organised, based now on a 
Directive of February 2007. Full scale exercises are run every year under the conduct of the Bureau 
Formation Instruction (BFI, the Training & Instruction Bureau). On one hand, these are mainly an occasion 
to put to the test the ability of the Rescue Operation Commander in charge, a way for him to repeat 
procedures he has learned. On the other hand, they are an occasion for every one to understand the part they 
would take should an incident of the type under test occur. Every one learns from exercises, even young 
Firemen still in their period of instruction as they are called in to play a part in every exercise. Exercises are 
systematically concluded with a collective debriefing - not in the psychological sense here - during which the 
Officer in charge of organising and observing the exercise gives all main actors an opportunity to express the 
lessons they learned. This includes "Agencies" external to the BSPP but who would normally take part in real 
operations and who are invited to play it during the exercise (SAMU for instance, the Medical Emergency 
Service). "RETEX" (literally “Return on Experience”, Lesson Learning) is the link between performed 
interventions and the establishment of new regulations and training courses. It is regulated by a "Note" of 
February 2005 that stipulates its aims and principles. If the "individual experience" of men involved is at the 
heart of preoccupations mentioned in the text, in practice, RETEX is rather formal, takes an "expert stance" 
and analyses fire propagation and the way it was prevented or handled, the way the line of command 
functioned and the involvement of the medical component of the BSPP interventions. 
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Rituals, death and good fires 
The life of the Fire Station is paced by different ritual activities. At 8AM, in all Stations, men gather in the 
courtyard and that's the beginning of their day. They are reminded operational instructions and prospective 
events, while their colleagues on duty during the past twenty-four hours finish their shift. 8AM is then also 
the time duty shifts start and finish and they last for a period of twenty-four hours up to seventy-two hours. 
BSPP’s motto, "Sauver ou Périr" (Rescue or Perish), is a pillar of its doctrine. Victim rescue is at the 
forefront of its priorities and its culture has been shaped by a myth of heroism formed in 1868 (Rolland, 
2005), when "Sapeur" Thibault armed only with a ladder and his courage rescued several people screaming 
through their windows while fire was raging behind them, the story says. The Brigade's motto, according to 
Didier Rolland, the historian and an experienced Major (Major is the highest rank amongst Sub-Officers. It is 
accessed through a concours open to Adjudants-Chefs) of the Brigade in his fifties, means "I will go to the 
end of my physical possibilities in order to rescue a victim, and it means giving my life up to succeed, I will 
sacrifice my body to that end". For him, the BSPP’s culture is one of duty to rescue victims, of cohesive 
vigilant team, of "going beyond one's own corporality", of uncompromising mandatory excellence, of effort 
and training, of discipline and organisation, and of ritual reinforcements of that culture. Once a month, a 
special gathering of all available men is organised : that's the "Appel des Morts", the roll call of the dead. The 
names of Firemen killed on duty are called, one after the other, and someone is assigned the task of replying 
"present" for them. Dead Firemen are therefore always present in the Brigade's daily routine. People talk of 
them as if they were virtually there, they set a daily example for every one, like a landmark in good fire-
fighting practice or like an active reminder of the dangers and risks of their activities. Death is said by Men to 
be a deeply thought of issue, a tragic possibility, a living enemy who fills Men’s thoughts as they are moving 
to fight a fire and triggers their sense of responsibility and discipline. The level of the demands placed on the 
Men is said to be high but they are excited at the prospect of going for a "bon feu", a "good fire" as they say, 
one that is hard to understand, contain and extinguish, which you have to fight like “a living creature” in 
their own words. Typically, when you meet any Fireman and ask "How are you ?", invariably they will 
answer "Very well, thank you, we had some good fires...". A "good fire" is THE challenge, the ultimate 
fascination and reason why they do this job, Firemen's attitude being quasi-promethean, like an irresistible 
invitation to take control of Fire itself. 
Duty shifts 
Duty shifts range from 24 to 72 hours, 72 hours shifts being extremely wearing. They start and finish at 
8AM. Every day, all engines are assigned a team on duty shift, in particular on VSAV vehicles (Véhicule de 
Secours Aux Victimes), an emergency vehicle only equipped for light paramedics interventions and run by 
four Men, and on PS vehicles (Premiers Secours Evacuation) engine, a multipurpose emergency vehicle 
equipped both for light paramedics and fire-fighting emergency interventions. It embarks five Men with sets 
of hoses, a water capacity of 600 Litres, and a light deployable ladder on its roof. The VSAV is the most 
solicited vehicle. The CS9 Station has two of them, respectively VSAV1 (the first to go if available) and 
VSAV2. VSAV1 operates an average number of interventions of 20 to 25 per 24 hours. Being on a shift 
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means 24 hour availability to go down to business. Whether you are in the middle of your lunch, or slipping 
fast at the Station, or else, when the alarm rings for you, you have merely a minute to get up on your feet, to 
get fully dressed, collect instructions from the switchboard and to get into the car. On average, a rescue 
mission, all inclusive, takes between 40 and 60 minutes. At the G1's Headquarters, I was also allowed to 
follow Officers on duty should a fire or any other kind of emergency operation take place that he would have 
to command. This is how I could experience the friction with Police forces285 that is common in the field as 
fire fighters and policemen have different concepts of operation and different modes of command, with 
minimal coordination between them. 
The General Conduct of Operations 
One of the most noticeable folds of the COS course (which I took in September – October 2007) has to do 
with the MGO ("Marche Générale des Opérations"), the General Conduct of Operations that specifies the 
successive stages of any intervention on a fire. Reconnaissance consists to explore all places exposed to the 
fire in order to be able to proceed immediately to the search for and rescue of possible victims and to find out 
the nature, localisation and extent of the fire, the appropriate mode of extinction, the most suitable points of 
attack and its potential for propagation, therefore the limits the fire should not overpass. It also serves to take 
immediate actions to contain the fire, to help the evacuation of hot gases and to prevent accidents and 
mistakes. Rescue consists to substract people from danger, whether it is real or they only fear they might be 
exposed. Setting-up (hose lines) consists in deploying and securing hoses dispensing water or mousse as 
appropriate to the situation. Ventilation consists in forcing air circulation in order to push hot gases and 
fumes out of the premises so as to secure and facilitate the progression of Firemen and to ease the extinction 
of the fire. Attack consists to attack the fire with appropriate extinguishing means, water, mousse or 
otherwise, that have been established before. It aims at reducing flames until they are pulled out and to stop 
the propagation of the fire. Protection aims at limiting the damage that can be caused by fire, water, heat and 
smoke. Cleaning and stripping facilitate the complete extinction of the fire and consist to remove contents 
and containers debris that may restart the fire or keep it active for a longer period of time. Surveillance 
consists to watch the premises after the fire has been pulled out in order to prevent or to stop immediately 
any resurgence. The MGO’s process is extended, de facto, to all other, non fire extinguishing, interventions. 
MGO is the result of the BSPP’s experience and is said to be very useful to prevent accidents and to ease-up 
fire-fighting operations.Among the BSPP senior Reservists, stands Lieutenant-Colonel René Dosne, a man 
whose particular talent is that along forty years of service he has devised a technique of drawing fire 
propagation and he has an amazing knowledge of the phenomenon. Based on an analysis of vertical and 
horizontal volumes, he helps Rescue Operation Commanders to articulate very quickly a fire-fighting 
strategy. All examples of his drawings also show the pedagogic interest of René Dosne's numerous accounts 
of fires he worked on. He has edited them in many BSPP's magazine "Allo 18" articles and has detailed them 
during many training sessions. The lessons from his work impregnate the BSPP's strategy of action on an 
everyday basis. All Men know about him and his technique has helped to reduce the risk of accidents. His 
research has been one of the foundations of the development of "Ventilation”. 
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How BSPP Firemen operate and make on-scene decisions 
In field settings, Firemen both plan their intervention and make instant decisions to process situations at 
hand. In fire-fighting settings, situations at hand are constantly evolving, sometimes quickly and roughly, 
always uncertain and dangerous. They require expertise, physical strength, psychological balance and moral 
commitments that may extend as far as dying to rescue victims (“Sauver ou Périr” is BSPP’s motto). 
Sometimes, especially when there are risks of an explosion or of fire propagation, time-pressure and care rule 
Firemen’s actions, which, according to regulation, must always be targetted, thought-of, neatly executed, and 
swift. Moves taken have always the potential to bring men across unexpected hidden sources of danger like 
still-active electric wire. Goals are well set from the early stages of an intervention : “La guerre se gagne 
dans les vingt premières minutes” (“War is won in the first twenty minutes”), Firemen say. Following the 
prescriptions of the General Conduct of Operations, reconnaissance is performed in the earliest moments of 
action, tactical decisions are made early and specific tasks are assigned to specific teams of two (Binoms : for 
instance, the “Chef d’Attaque”, Chief of Attack, extinguishes, attacks, the fire using the hose while his 
“Servant” helps him first by lifting and moving the hose as needed – hoses in pressure are very rigid, heavy 
and very physical to handle –, secondly by looking after him and watching surrounding premises for danger, 
thirdly by being there to extract the Chef d’Attaque should he be injured. Of course there are binoms who do 
not penetrate the premises to attack the fire from inside. Some are operating ladders, for instance, but the 
same principles apply. They work as an inseparable team of two, one looking after the other, helping and 
warning him of dangers, and being there to rescue him if needed. It can be said that Firemen know what they 
have to do in the field. They are never pursuing unclear or undefined goals. But they face impending risk. In 
victim-rescue settings, things are significantly different. Teams on a VSAV are under the command of a Chef 
d’Agrès (Engine Chief). When arriving at the scene of the rescue, they generally discover a victim, and must 
evaluate her condition in the first moments of their arrival at the scene. Each man, duly qualified, knows 
what he has to do and does it. Few words are exchanged between team members. When the victim’s 
condition is uncertain, the Chief phones the Medical Co-ordination to get further instructions or advice, and 
orders or instructions so given are executed. Goals are virtually always cristal clear. Well learned and 
exercised diagnosis and action routines are the essence of the job at hand. Uncertainty arises when there are 
people around Firemen Squads, members of the public who are curious, sometimes aggressive, often difficult 
to control. In such a case, Firemen may call for the assistance of the Police, which they do not necessarily 
get, or not quickly enough. Which sometimes they get but they wish they would not have, as when the Police 
are with them on Council Estates social tensions are such that the presence of Police Officers may trigger 
violence in which Firemen are caught. Many of these interventions take place within people’s private habitat. 
There, domestic violence, alcoholism, mental health problems are quite common and a source of further 
dangers and uncertainty. 
286
 Resequenced speech clause numbers : “8-5-ZZZZZ-ZZZZZ ” means that the number is the original 
speech clause number while “8-10-356-1” is the new resequenced number “8-10” followed by its original 
counterpart “356-1”. This is a processing convention within the Phenomenographic database. 
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287
 Long-Term Memory / Episodic Memory / Autobiographical Memory 
288
 Self here must not be misinterpreted : it designates the acting-self, self as actor performing actions 
(CogObjST) 
289
 Our immersion in the field gave helped the semantic analysis of utterances sometimes difficult to 
decypher. 
290
 Let us remember here that CogActs belong either in a cognitive class or in an action class. What speech 
clauses elicit first is usually a cognitive act as in “I see that woman lying on a sofa”. This is generally due to 
the presence of an action verb. 
291
 CogActST / CogAct sub-type 
292
 Cognigraphs are produced on the basis of all CogOps, both CERTAIN and ASSUMED. 
293
 The first three types of objects in this list share nearly the same sub-types. For instance, “SLF02- 
STANCE - Lying down / Sitting” is a CogObjST associated with the “SELF” CogObj : it allows the 
researcher to encode the “what is perceived of himself by the subject” (if “PERCEIVING” is the associated 
CogAct, possibly through a “PER16- Propriocepting (have a proprioception = body position/configuration 
awareness)” CogActST). 
294
 The CogOp, PM and EP data sets are supplied separately, as a complement to the present thesis report. 
The EP data set supplies data describing each CI Experience Phase (EP). 
The PM data set supplies data describing each Present Moment (PM). 
The CogOp data set supplies data describing cognitive operations (CogOp). Note that Decision-Making Steps 
(DM Step) are substituted to CogOp. Note that the CogOp data set is created to analyse the phenotypic links 
between successive CogOps ( DM Steps). 
295
 Driving is said for the most frequent trajectory, alternative for the second most frequent one if any.  
296
 PM # 00 was not considered in this analysis as it is only a starting point, the action from which the story 
departs. 
297
 χ2= Σ(o-e)2/e, the chi-square of a variable (Y) and an attribute (X) , is the sum of the squared 
difference between observed (o) and expected (e) values of Y (or deviation, d), divided by the expected 
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values of Y, in all possible categories of X. Given the values of χ2 and df (degree of freedom), the p-value 
determines a probability of independence (if p > 0.05) between the variable and the attribute. Beyond p > 
0.10 results are not significant. If the calculated p value is p < 0.05, the hypothesis of independence is 
rejected, meaning that some factor other than chance is operating for the deviation to be so great ( 
DEPENDENCE). For example, a p-value of 0.01 means that there is only a 1% chance that this deviation is 
due to chance alone. Therefore, other factors must be involved. 
298
 Cramer’s (1946) v varies from 0 (no association) to 1 (association) and measures the inter-correlation of 
two discrete nominal or ordinal attributes. It is a symmetrical measure that does not consider which attribute 
is X or Y. it does not take account of the order of rows and columns in the data set. Its limit is that as chi-
squared values tend to increase along with the number of rows and columns, the more likely Cramer’s v tends 
toward 1, then not providing evidence of a dependence between attributes. 
299
 Using the Genie 2.0 free software developed by the Decision Systems Laboratory at Pittsburgh University : 
http://dsl.sis.pitt.edu/ 
300
 This analysis was performed with the help of the TANAGRA software, version 1.4.41, developed by Eric 
Rakotomalala of Lyon 2 University (rakotoma@univ-lyon2.fr). Decision Tree learning algorithms split a data 
set into nodes and leaves to produce a classification of data into a hierarchical thesaurus, thus partitioning the 
data set into different homogenous “regions” in which data belong. Splitting is based upon a recursive search 
for the best categorising attributes and a minimal error. The Random Forest algorithm uses a particular 
classification technique called bootstrapping that consists in creating reference learning sets on a random 
basis. Learners are used to grow classification trees. Nodes are split into leaves according to refined learning 
subsets called predictors. The construction of the tree stops when the error rate stops decreasing. If Random 
Forest is supposed to lower the error rate over classic decision tree algorithms, it must be noted that in the 
present case there was no significant difference in the error rates between the C4.5 and Random Forest 
calculations for a given data set. 
301
 C4.5 did not detail the EMOTION in [s6_neutral] condition. 
302
 This clause means : DMAPATTERN = DB_NA occurs in 100 % of 3 PMs for which THREAT = 
[s4_SOPmistake] 
303
 In lieutenant A’s case 
304
 Up to 8 steps were thus identified in any cognitive trajectory 
305
 A slightly different vocabulary was used originally here. Correspondences with CogAct Families such as 
described in the taxonomy are: Interpretation = Understanding, Planning = elaborating (a plan of action), 
LTM = solliciting LTM. These data are not included in the PM data set. 
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306
 Trait – Attitude – Mood – Emotion cognitive software architecture for creating affect-realistic robots. 
307
 Given two classifications of a population, X and Y, with X and Y neither continuous nor ordinal and the 
X classification of the population preceeding the Y classification either chronologically, causally or 
otherwise, in guessing the largest marginal proportion of Y (Pym) given the largest proportion of X (Px), i.e. 
the most likely value of Y given the most frequent value of X, Goodman & Kruskal’s (1954) λ measures the 
association of Y with X in terms of the relative decrease in probability of error in guessing Yi as between Xi 
unknown and Xi known : “To put this another way, λy gives the proportion of errors that can be eliminated 
by taking account of the knowledge of the X classification of individuals” (Goodman & Kruskal, 1954, p. 
741). 
308
 The following DM Step production rules were found with the C4.5 algorithm : 
Cleaned Rules 
· Geno_DM in [DM60- Action] 
· Pheno_Attention in [Arousing]  
· Pheno_Temp in [Present] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (90,91 % of 22 examples)  
· Pheno_Temp in [Past] then Pheno_DM = DM01- Attention & STM (60,00 % of 5 examples)  
· Pheno_Attention in [Diffusing]  
· Pheno_Agency in [Safety] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 4 examples)  
· Pheno_Agency in [Control] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Agency in [Manœuvre]  
· Pheno_Focus in [05 Dogs - Threats] then Pheno_DM = DM01- Attention & STM (100,00 % 
of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [01 Priority to find missing dog - Duty & Intervention] then Pheno_DM = 
DM42- Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) (100,00 % of 2 examples)  
· Pheno_Attention in [Focalising]  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 Police Crew - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % 
of 2 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Shootings & Attack - Traumatic experience] then Pheno_DM = DM01- 
Attention & STM (100,00 % of 3 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Explanation / Analysis of the events - Explanations]  
· Geno_Focus in [07 Explanation / Analysis of the events - Explanations] then Pheno_DM = 
DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 2 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Gun charger - Explanations] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 
2 examples)  
· Pheno_Attention in [Saturating] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples) 
· Geno_DM in [DM10- Acquisition]  
· Pheno_Temp in [Present]  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 BSPP Staff (any) - Rescue Force]  
· Pheno_Agency in [Safety] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 5 examples)  
· Pheno_Agency in [Manœuvre] then Pheno_DM = DM21- Analysis (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [03 Victims - Victims]  
· Geno_Focus in [04 BSPP Staff (any) - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [03 Baby - Peripheral actors] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (100,00 
% of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [01 Duty & Intervention - Duty & Intervention]  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [01- Save/Optimise efforts/resources/time] then Pheno_DM = DM10- 
Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [02- Fulfil duty/Complete the job at hand] then Pheno_DM = DM27- 
Judgement (100,00 % of 2 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [01 Characteristics of case / intervention - Duty & Intervention] then Pheno_DM = 
DM27- Judgement (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
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· Pheno_Focus in [01 Decisions & Orders - Duty & Intervention] then Pheno_DM = DM27- 
Judgement (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [01 Regulation & Ethics - Rules]  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [02- Fulfil duty/Complete the job at hand] then Pheno_DM = DM27- 
Judgement (100,00 % of 2 examples)  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [11- Maintain moral standards] then Pheno_DM = DM03- LTM 
(100,00 % of 1 examples) 
· Pheno_Focus in [04 Animal Squad – Rescue Force]  
· Pheno_Attention in [Arousing] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 4 
examples)  
· Pheno_Attention in [Diffusing]  
· Pheno_Valence in [Satisfactory]  
· Geno_Focus in [04 BSPP Staff (any) - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = 
DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [04 Animal Squad - Rescue Force]  
· Pheno_EMOTION in [s6_emotionlessness] then Pheno_DM = 
DM50- Selection (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_EMOTION in [s4_Mild_AnxietyEtc] then Pheno_DM = 
DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Valence in [Burdensome] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (50,00 % 
of 2 examples)  
· Pheno_Valence in [Unpleasant] then Pheno_DM = DM21- Analysis (100,00 % of 
1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 BSPP PSR - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 
1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [06 People present Outside - Stressors]  
· Geno_Focus in [06 People present Outside - Stressors] then Pheno_DM = DM21- Analysis 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [03 Victims' destination – Victims] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 Police Crew - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (84,62 % of 
13 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [02 Seriousness of the case - Safety] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (100,00 
% of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [06 Parking space in the garden - Settings (World of the intervention)]  
· Geno_Focus in [06 Parking space in the garden - Settings (World of the intervention)] then 
Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (100,00 % of 2 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [06 Main gate - Settings (World of the intervention)] then Pheno_DM = 
DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [06 Main gate - Settings (World of the intervention)] then Pheno_DM = DM10- 
Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [06 Fence - Settings (World of the intervention)] then Pheno_DM = DM10- 
Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [06 Garden - Settings (World of the attack)] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition 
(100,00 % of 3 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 Medics - Rescue Force]  
· Pheno_Valence in [Satisfactory] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (80,00 % of 5 
examples)  
· Pheno_Valence in [Unpleasant] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [03 Victims' yelling / crying - Stressors] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [03 Lounge in shambles - Stressors] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 
% of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [03 Sofa - Settings (World of the victims)] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [03 Daughter - Victims] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (75,00 % of 4 
examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [03 Daughter yelling / begging for anaesthesia - Victims] then Pheno_DM = DM10- 
Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [03 Mother - Victims] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (60,00 % of 5 
examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [03 Daughter's pain – Stressors] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (100,00 % of 
1 examples)  
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· Pheno_Focus in [07 Lived Experience – Traumatic experience] then Pheno_DM = DM50- Selection 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [03 Daughter's hair / head - Stressors] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (50,00 
% of 2 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [03 Daughter's condition - Victims] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (100,00 % 
of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [05 Dogs - Threats]  
· Geno_Ctrl in [With RSK] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Ctrl in [Reliance]  
· Pheno_Attention in [Arousing]  
· Pheno_Valence in [Satisfactory] then Pheno_DM = DM21- Analysis 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Valence in [Unpleasant] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Attention in [Diffusing] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % 
of 2 examples)  
· Pheno_Attention in [Saturating] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % 
of 2 examples) 
· Geno_Ctrl in [Powerlessness] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (50,00 % of 2 
examples)  
· Geno_Ctrl in [Vigilance] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 5 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [01 Priority to find missing dog - Duty & Intervention] then Pheno_DM = DM42- 
Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [06 Trees & Groves - Settings (World of the search)] then Pheno_DM = DM10- 
Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [02 Danger & Risks - Safety] then Pheno_DM = DM21- Analysis (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [05 Father – Threats] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (91,67 % of 12 
examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Shootings - Traumatic experience] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition 
(100,00 % of 2 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 14th July Fireworks - Stereotypes] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (100,00 
% of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Shootings & Attack - Traumatic experience] then Pheno_DM = DM42- 
Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Lt A's own motion - Traumatic experience] then Pheno_DM = DM33- Coping 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Police shooting at dogs - Traumatic experience] then Pheno_DM = DM27- 
Judgement (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [06 A car parked in the garden - Settings (World of the intervention)] then 
Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [06 Shade in adjacent parcel - Settings (World of the search)] then Pheno_DM = 
DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Failing to find the missing dog - Stressors]  
· Geno_Focus in [04 Animal Squad - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition 
(100,00 % of 2 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [07 Failing to find the missing dog - Stressors] then Pheno_DM = DM27- 
Judgement (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Succeeding to find the missing dog - Safety] then Pheno_DM = DM27- 
Judgement (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 Veterinary - Rescue Force]  
· Geno_Focus in [04 Animal Squad - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [04 Veterinary - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM42- Stimulation 
(Motivation / Intention) (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Explanation / Analysis of the events - Explanations]  
· Geno_Focus in [07 Explanation / Analysis of the events - Explanations] then Pheno_DM = 
DM27- Judgement (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [07 Gun charger - Explanations] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Gun charger - Explanations] then Pheno_DM = DM03- LTM (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 Forensics team - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 
% of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 Forensics' envelops - Rescue Force]  
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· Geno_Focus in [04 Forensics team - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [04 Forensics' envelops - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM27- 
Judgement (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 Forensics' equipment - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 Forensics methods - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [02 Search for casualties in neighbouring villas - Safety]  
· Geno_Focus in [04 BSPP Staff (any) - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [02 Search for casualties in neighbouring villas - Safety] then Pheno_DM = 
DM27- Judgement (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 SAMU ambulance - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition 
(100,00 % of 3 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 SAMU ambulance initiative - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM27- 
Judgement (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Temp in [Past]  
· Pheno_Focus in [01 Characteristics of case / intervention - Duty & Intervention] then Pheno_DM = 
DM27- Judgement (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [01 Regulation & Ethics - Rules] then Pheno_DM = DM03- LTM (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [03 Hair on table - Stressors] then Pheno_DM = DM01- Attention & STM (100,00 % 
of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [05 Dogs - Threats] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (100,00 % of 4 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Shootings & Attack - Traumatic experience] then Pheno_DM = DM01- 
Attention & STM (75,00 % of 4 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Police shooting at dogs - Traumatic experience] then Pheno_DM = DM01- 
Attention & STM (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Explanation / Analysis of the events - Explanations]  
· Geno_Focus in [04 BSPP Staff (any) - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [07 Explanation / Analysis of the events - Explanations] then Pheno_DM = 
DM21- Analysis (100,00 % of 2 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [07 Gun charger - Explanations] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 SAMU ambulance - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM01- Attention & STM 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Temp in [Future]  
· Geno_Focus in [04 Police Crew - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM21- Analysis (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [05 Dogs - Threats] then Pheno_DM = DM21- Analysis (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [04 Forensics' equipment - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement 
(100,00 % of 2 examples)  
· Geno_DM in [DM27- Judgement]  
· Pheno_Temp in [Present]  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 BSPP Staff (any) - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM44- Orientation (Action 
Design) (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [01 Duty & Intervention - Duty & Intervention]  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [02- Fulfil duty/Complete the job at hand] then Pheno_DM = DM50- 
Selection (100,00 % of 2 examples)  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [03- Protect others / Secure] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [01 Characteristics of case / intervention - Duty & Intervention] then Pheno_DM = 
DM21- Analysis (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [01 Decisions & Orders - Duty & Intervention]  
· Geno_Focus in [01 Duty & Intervention - Duty & Intervention] then Pheno_DM = DM42- 
Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [01 Decisions & Orders - Duty & Intervention] then Pheno_DM = DM31- 
Appraisal (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 Animal Squad - Rescue Force]  
· Pheno_Valence in [Satisfactory] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Valence in [Unpleasant] then Pheno_DM = DM50- Selection (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
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· Pheno_Focus in [04 BSPP PSR - Rescue Force]  
· Geno_Focus in [01 Decisions & Orders - Duty & Intervention] then Pheno_DM = DM50- 
Selection (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [06 People present Outside - Stressors] then Pheno_DM = DM10- 
Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [06 People present Outside - Stressors] then Pheno_DM = DM42- Stimulation 
(Motivation / Intention) (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 Police Crew - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM33- Coping (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [06 Parking space in the garden - Settings (World of the intervention)]  
· Geno_Focus in [02 Seriousness of the case - Safety] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [06 Parking space in the garden - Settings (World of the intervention)] then 
Pheno_DM = DM50- Selection (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [06 Main gate - Settings (World of the intervention)] then Pheno_DM = DM10- 
Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 Medics - Rescue Force]  
· Pheno_Attention in [Arousing] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Attention in [Diffusing] then Pheno_DM = DM50- Selection (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Attention in [Lowering] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [03 Daughter - Victims] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [03 Daughter yelling / begging for anaesthesia - Victims] then Pheno_DM = DM10- 
Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Lived Experience - Traumatic experience] then Pheno_DM = DM31- Appraisal 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [03 Daughter's wounds - Stressors] then Pheno_DM = DM01- Attention & STM 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [03 Daughter's condition - Victims]  
· Geno_Focus in [01 Regulation & Ethics - Rules] then Pheno_DM = DM42- Stimulation 
(Motivation / Intention) (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [03 Daughter's condition - Victims] then Pheno_DM = DM31- Appraisal 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [03 Baby - Peripheral actors] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [05 Dogs - Threats]  
· Pheno_Valence in [Satisfactory] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Valence in [Unpleasant] then Pheno_DM = DM31- Appraisal (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Valence in [Harmful] then Pheno_DM = DM50- Selection (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [01 Reporting message - Duty & Intervention] then Pheno_DM = DM50- Selection 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [02 Danger & Risks - Safety] then Pheno_DM = DM31- Appraisal (100,00 % of 5 
examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Shootings & Attack - Traumatic experience]  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [03- Protect others / Secure] then Pheno_DM = DM02- 
Metacognition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [04- Protect oneself] then Pheno_DM = DM31- Appraisal (100,00 % 
of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [06- Get relief / De-stress / Vent emotions] then Pheno_DM = DM31- 
Appraisal (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [10- Be sociable] then Pheno_DM = DM50- Selection (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Police shooting at dogs - Traumatic experience] then Pheno_DM = DM21- 
Analysis (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Failing to find the missing dog - Stressors] then Pheno_DM = DM31- Appraisal 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Succeeding to find the missing dog - Safety] then Pheno_DM = DM50- Selection 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 The truth about the events - Explanations] then Pheno_DM = DM31- Appraisal 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
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· Pheno_Focus in [07 Like a machine gun - Stereotypes] then Pheno_DM = DM50- Selection (100,00 
% of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Explanation / Analysis of the events - Explanations] then Pheno_DM = DM31- 
Appraisal (80,00 % of 5 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Gun charger - Explanations] then Pheno_DM = DM31- Appraisal (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 Forensics' envelops - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM42- Stimulation 
(Motivation / Intention) (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 Forensics' equipment - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM50- Selection 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 Forensics difficult job - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM31- Appraisal 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [01 Intervention's proper end - Duty & Intervention] then Pheno_DM = DM42- 
Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [03 Victims' destination - Victims] then Pheno_DM = DM42- Stimulation 
(Motivation / Intention) (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [02 Search for casualties in neighbouring villas - Safety] then Pheno_DM = DM50- 
Selection (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [06 TV Crew - Stressors] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Righteousness of the shooting - Explanations] then Pheno_DM = DM02- 
Metacognition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Temp in [Past] then Pheno_DM = DM03- LTM (100,00 % of 3 examples)  
· Pheno_Temp in [Future] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (66,67 % of 3 examples) 
· Geno_DM in [DM21- Analysis]  
· Pheno_Temp in [Present]  
· Pheno_Mean_EMOTION in [s4_LittleNegative]  
· Pheno_Focus in [03 Victims - Victims] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 
1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [01 Duty & Intervention - Duty & Intervention] then Pheno_DM = DM48- 
Checking (consistency / applicability / efficiency / outcome) (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Mean_EMOTION in [s3_FairNegative]  
· Pheno_Attention in [Diffusing] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (66,67 % of 3 
examples)  
· Pheno_Attention in [Focalising] then Pheno_DM = DM31- Appraisal (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Mean_EMOTION in [s2_MildNegative]  
· Pheno_Valence in [Unpleasant] then Pheno_DM = DM21- Analysis (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Valence in [Distressing]  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [03- Protect others / Secure] then Pheno_DM = DM27- 
Judgement (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [06- Get relief / De-stress / Vent emotions]  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 BSPP Staff (any) - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = 
DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Shootings & Attack - Traumatic experience] then 
Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [08- Understanding / Interpreting] then Pheno_DM = 
DM27- Judgement (100,00 % of 2 examples)  
· Pheno_Valence in [Critical or Fatal] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Mean_EMOTION in [s1_SignificantNegative] then Pheno_DM = DM02- Metacognition 
(66,67 % of 3 examples) 
· Pheno_Temp in [Past]  
· Pheno_Valence in [Satisfactory] then Pheno_DM = DM03- LTM (100,00 % of 2 examples)  
· Pheno_Valence in [Unpleasant] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (50,00 % of 2 examples)  
· Pheno_Valence in [Distressing] then Pheno_DM = DM21- Analysis (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Temp in [Future]  
· Pheno_Valence in [Burdensome] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Valence in [Distressing] then Pheno_DM = DM21- Analysis (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Valence in [Harmful] then Pheno_DM = DM22- Anticipation (SA) (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_DM in [DM03- LTM]  
· Pheno_Mean_EMOTION in [s4_LittleNegative]  
· Pheno_Focus in [03 Victims - Victims] then Pheno_DM = DM50- Selection (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
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· Pheno_Focus in [01 Duty & Intervention - Duty & Intervention]  
· Geno_Focus in [01 Duty & Intervention - Duty & Intervention] then Pheno_DM = DM22- 
Anticipation (SA) (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [01 Regulation & Ethics - Rules] then Pheno_DM = DM21- Analysis 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Mean_EMOTION in [s3_FairNegative]  
· Pheno_Focus in [01 Duty & Intervention - Duty & Intervention] then Pheno_DM = DM27- 
Judgement (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 LtA's Car - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Mean_EMOTION in [s2_MildNegative]  
· Pheno_Agency in [Safety]  
· Pheno_Attention in [Arousing] then Pheno_DM = DM42- Stimulation (Motivation / 
Intention) (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Attention in [Diffusing]  
· Pheno_Temp in [Present] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (80,00 % of 5 
examples)  
· Pheno_Temp in [Past] then Pheno_DM = DM03- LTM (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Attention in [Focalising] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Agency in [Manœuvre] then Pheno_DM = DM42- Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_DM in [DM22- Anticipation (SA)]  
· Pheno_Focus in [01 Decisions & Orders - Duty & Intervention] then Pheno_DM = DM44- Orientation (Action 
Design) (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Police shooting at dogs - Traumatic experience] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_DM in [DM44- Orientation (Action Design)] then Pheno_DM = DM50- Selection (75,00 % of 4 examples)  
· Geno_DM in [DM48- Checking (consistency / applicability / efficiency / outcome)]  
· Pheno_Focus in [01 Duty & Intervention - Duty & Intervention] then Pheno_DM = DM50- Selection (100,00 
% of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [01 Regulation & Ethics - Rules]  
· Pheno_Temp in [Present] then Pheno_DM = DM48- Checking (consistency / applicability / 
efficiency / outcome) (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Temp in [Future] then Pheno_DM = DM44- Orientation (Action Design) (100,00 % of 1 
examples) 
· Geno_DM in [DM50- Selection] then Pheno_DM = DM60- Action (100,00 % of 29 examples)  
· Geno_DM in [DM31- Appraisal] then Pheno_DM = DM32- Affection / Shock (100,00 % of 21 examples)  
· Geno_DM in [DM32- Affection / Shock]  
· Pheno_Mean_EMOTION in [s4_LittleNegative] then Pheno_DM = DM01- Attention & STM (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Mean_EMOTION in [s3_FairNegative] then Pheno_DM = DM33- Coping (100,00 % of 4 examples)  
· Pheno_Mean_EMOTION in [s2_MildNegative]  
· Geno_Ctrl in [With RSK] then Pheno_DM = DM33- Coping (100,00 % of 10 examples)  
· Geno_Ctrl in [Powerlessness]  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Shootings - Traumatic experience] then Pheno_DM = DM32- Affection 
/ Shock (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Lt A's perimeter & proximate people - Traumatic experience] then 
Pheno_DM = DM33- Coping (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Ctrl in [Vigilance] then Pheno_DM = DM33- Coping (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Mean_EMOTION in [s1_SignificantNegative] then Pheno_DM = DM33- Coping (100,00 % of 4 
examples) 
· Geno_DM in [DM01- Attention & STM]  
· Pheno_Temp in [Present]  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [02- Fulfil duty/Complete the job at hand] then Pheno_DM = DM10- 
Acquisition (100,00 % of 4 examples)  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [03- Protect others / Secure] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % 
of 2 examples)  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [04- Protect oneself]  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 Police Crew - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [05 Dogs - Threats] then Pheno_DM = DM21- Analysis (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [06- Get relief / De-stress / Vent emotions] then Pheno_DM = DM27- 
Judgement (66,67 % of 3 examples)  
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· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [08- Understanding / Interpreting] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [10- Be sociable] then Pheno_DM = DM50- Selection (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [11- Maintain moral standards]  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 BSPP Staff (any) - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM10- 
Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [01 Decisions & Orders - Duty & Intervention] then Pheno_DM = DM27- 
Judgement (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Temp in [Past]  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [02- Fulfil duty/Complete the job at hand] then Pheno_DM = DM27- 
Judgement (100,00 % of 2 examples)  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [03- Protect others / Secure] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (100,00 % 
of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [06- Get relief / De-stress / Vent emotions] then Pheno_DM = DM21- Analysis 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [08- Understanding / Interpreting] then Pheno_DM = DM21- Analysis (100,00 
% of 2 examples)  
· Pheno_SUBGOAL in [10- Be sociable] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Geno_DM in [DM33- Coping]  
· Geno_Ctrl in [With RSK]  
· Pheno_Mean_EMOTION in [s3_FairNegative] then Pheno_DM = DM27- Judgement (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Mean_EMOTION in [s2_MildNegative]  
· Pheno_Attention in [Arousing]  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 BSPP Staff (any) - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM60- 
Action (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 Forensics team - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM10- 
Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Attention in [Diffusing] then Pheno_DM = DM60- Action (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Attention in [Focalising] then Pheno_DM = DM60- Action (100,00 % of 7 
examples)  
· Pheno_Mean_EMOTION in [s1_SignificantNegative] then Pheno_DM = DM60- Action (100,00 % 
of 4 examples) 
· Geno_Ctrl in [Reliance] then Pheno_DM = DM60- Action (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Ctrl in [Distraction] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Ctrl in [Struggling] then Pheno_DM = DM60- Action (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Ctrl in [Powerlessness] then Pheno_DM = DM33- Coping (100,00 % of 3 examples)  
· Geno_Ctrl in [Vigilance]  
· Geno_Focus in [05 Dogs - Threats]  
· Pheno_EMOTION in [s2_fear] then Pheno_DM = DM33- Coping (100,00 % of 1 examples) 
· Pheno_EMOTION in [s1_trauma] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [07 Bullets in motion - Traumatic experience] then Pheno_DM = DM33- Coping 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Ctrl in [Margins seeking]  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 Police Crew - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM01- Attention & STM 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Lt A's own sensation of pain - Traumatic experience] then Pheno_DM = DM10- 
Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [07 Bullets in motion - Traumatic experience] then Pheno_DM = DM33- Coping 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Ctrl in [Thinking right] then Pheno_DM = DM60- Action (100,00 % of 1 examples) 
· Geno_DM in [DM42- Stimulation (Motivation / Intention)]  
· Geno_Ctrl in [With RSK]  
· Pheno_Temp in [Present]  
· Geno_Focus in [04 BSPP Staff (any) - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM50- Selection 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [06 People present Outside - Stressors] then Pheno_DM = DM44- 
Orientation (Action Design) (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [03 Daughter's condition - Victims] then Pheno_DM = DM50- Selection 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [01 Priority to find missing dog - Duty & Intervention] then Pheno_DM = 
DM10- Acquisition (66,67 % of 3 examples)  
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· Geno_Focus in [07 Shootings & Attack - Traumatic experience] then Pheno_DM = DM50- 
Selection (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [04 Veterinary - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM50- Selection (100,00 
% of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [04 Forensics' envelops - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM50- Selection 
(100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [01 Intervention's proper end - Duty & Intervention] then Pheno_DM = 
DM42- Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [03 Victims' destination - Victims]  
· Pheno_Focus in [04 Medics - Rescue Force] then Pheno_DM = DM10- 
Acquisition (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [01 Intervention's proper end - Duty & Intervention] then 
Pheno_DM = DM50- Selection (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Geno_Focus in [02 Search for casualties in neighbouring villas - Safety] then Pheno_DM = 
DM01- Attention & STM (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Temp in [Past] then Pheno_DM = DM01- Attention & STM (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Temp in [Future] then Pheno_DM = DM42- Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) (100,00 % 
of 1 examples) 
· Geno_Ctrl in [Reliance]  
· Pheno_Focus in [01 Priority to find missing dog - Duty & Intervention] then Pheno_DM = DM42- 
Stimulation (Motivation / Intention) (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Focus in [02 Danger & Risks - Safety] then Pheno_DM = DM21- Analysis (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Geno_DM in [DM02- Metacognition]  
· Pheno_Agency in [Safety] then Pheno_DM = DM31- Appraisal (100,00 % of 1 examples)  
· Pheno_Agency in [Manœuvre]  
· Pheno_Mean_EMOTION in [s2_MildNegative] then Pheno_DM = DM03- LTM (100,00 % of 1 
examples)  
· Pheno_Mean_EMOTION in [s1_SignificantNegative] then Pheno_DM = DM10- Acquisition (100,00 
% of 2 examples) 
 
309
 MOS : Margin of Safety (distance to danger) ; MOM : Margin of Manoeuvre (space, time, right, social 
support, …) 
310
 “Self-regulation is the process in which people seek to bring themselves (their behaviors and self-
conceptions) into alignment with relevant goals and standards. […] Higgins (1997, 1998) proposed that 
people are guided by two distinct self-regulatory systems, one with a promotion focus and the other with a 
prevention focus. Three factors differentiate a promotion focus from a prevention focus: the needs that 
people seek to satisfy, the standards with which people try to bring themselves into alignment, and the 
outcomes which are salient to them. […] safety/protection/security needs are at work when people are 
prevention focused. […] Other standards refer to people’s duties, obligations, and responsibilities (e.g., the 
regulatory standards imposed upon organizations by a governmental agency); these are known as ought 
selves. […] when they are prevention focused they are trying to bring themselves into alignment with their 
ought selves. […] Human behavior is motivated by people’s desires to (a) attain positive outcomes which 
make them better off and (b) avoid negative outcomes which make them worse off. […] The avoidance of 
negative outcomes is emphasized by people who are prevention focused. The more that prevention focused 
persons bring themselves into alignment with their ought selves, the more they experience the pleasure of a 
non-loss. If they fail to do so, they experience the pain of a loss. […] When prevention-focused people’s 
safety/protection/security needs motivate them to attempt to bring their actual selves into alignment with 
their ought selves, negative outcomes to be avoided are emphasized.” (Brockner et al., 2002, pp. 7-8) 
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311
 “Self-regulation is the process in which people seek to bring themselves (their behaviors and self-
conceptions) into alignment with relevant goals and standards.” (Brockner et al., 2002, p. 7). 
312
 In total, PM #11 and 12 last a few seconds only : as a measure of their shortness, add the fastness of dogs 
jumping and running to the time needed for policemen to fire 15 bullets with an automatic gun. Five seconds 
?… 
313
 Weber, M. (1920 / 1965). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, translated by T. Parsons, with 
a foreward by R. H. Tawney. London: Unwin University Books. 
314
 PMs’ and CogOps’ timescales are different. We must remember here that a CogOp is supposed to last 
between 250 ms and several seconds, and that a Present Moment can last between some seconds and several 
minutes, CI Experience Phases lasting from some seconds to some tens of minutes as seen earlier. In the 
CogOp data set, the value of each PM’s attributes is assigned to each CogOp forming this PM. Hence a flat 
line for the SA attribute for every PM. 
315
 PM # 36 is not analysed ; it corresponds to the moment Lieutenant A suddenly realises bullets might have 
wounded neighbours. 
316
 This clause means : Ctrl = [With RSK] occurs in 99,66 % of 294 CogOps for which Agency = [Safety] 
317
 In fact, the subject’s powerlessness lies with the total surprise that adverse events represent. He cannot 
prevent nor stop them. But in terms of his power of agency he is not powerless as Lieutenant A’s data show. 
318
 A specific action performed by a subject, not all his actions nor a series of actions 
319
 In space and time 
320
 In a context, both social-cultural and physical 
321
 Lived within our body so that memories of physical moves and sensations are part of the memory of the 
action : “subjective experiences are so deeply embodied in our actions and movements and in the 
physiological shifts” (Stern, 2004, p. 39). 
322
 Effectively performed in the real world, not just seen nor imagined 
323
 In Lieutenant A’s case we cannot characterise his “state of shock” at the end of PM #12. This is only an 
hypothesis that at the end of the few seconds of the trauma exposure the subject might have been 
destabilised, in a state of wobbleness. 
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324
 MacLean (1993), Weick (1993) 
325
 The meeting of June 18th, 2013 with the BSPP’s Bureau of Training Engineering (BIF) has concluded to 
the need to develop a new fold in the RETEX (Lesson learning) procedure taking place after the hot 
debriefing of major rescue operations. 
326
 For Franklin & Patterson (2006), an autonomous agent is a “system situated within and a part of an 
environment that senses that environment and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its own agenda and so as to 
effect what it senses in the future (Franklin & Graesser, 1996).”. Wang’s (2009) definition of an autonomous 
software agent is “an intelligent software system that autonomously carries out robotistic and interactive 
applications based on goal-driven cognitive mechanisms and that possesses high-level autonomous ability 
and behaviors beyond conventional imperative computing technologies”, and systems of autonomous agents 




EVENT CONSTANT Routine Autonomic VARIABLE Algorithmic Autonomous 
 
327
 Such as IDA (Franklin, 2003) 
